ML20149L077
| ML20149L077 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 02/15/1988 |
| From: | DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20149L063 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8802240103 | |
| Download: ML20149L077 (5) | |
Text
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0 Proposed Technical Specification Changes 8802240103 880215 PDR ADOCK 05000413 P
_ PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 3)
Verifying that each non-automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position;
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Verifyingthateachautomaticvalveinthehlowpathisinthe[o
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4) fully open position whenever the Auxiliary Feedwater System is placed in ;.te; ti; ;;ntr:1 ;r t;n ;tev;.,
sfonJh re.Jinus 5)
Verifying that the isolation valves in the auxiliary feedwater pump suction lines are open and that power is removed from the valve operatnrs on Valves CA-2, CA-7A, CA-98, and CA-11A and that the respective circuit breakers are padlocked.
b.
At least once per 18-months during shutdown by:
1)
Verify 1cg that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its corract position upon receipt of an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation test signal, 2)
Verifying that each motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump starts as designed automatically upon receipt of an Auxiliary
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Feedwater Actuation test signal, 3)
Verifying that the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump steam supply valves open upon receipt of an Auxiliary Feedwater Actua-41on' test signal,** and f
4)
Verifying that the valve in the suction line of each auxiliary 0
feedwater pump from the Nuclear Service Water System automatically 4
actuates to its full open position within less than or equal to 15 seconds
- on a Loss-of-Suction test signal.
4.7.1.2.2 An auxiliary feedwater flow path to each steam generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE following each COLD SHUTDOWN of greater than 30 days prior to entering MODE 2 by verifying normal flow to each steam generator.
- Includes 5 second time delay.
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- This surveillance need not be performed on Unit 2 until prior to entering HOT STANDBY following the Unit 2 first refueling.
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AmendmentNo.g((Unit 1) Amen CATAWBA - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-$
4 Discussion And Justification Of No Significant Hazards Considerations i
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e m a. w w DISCUSSION AND JUSTIFICATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS This amendment would clarify the intent of Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.2.la.4).
This surveillance requires the verification that automatic valves in the Auxiliary Feedwater (CA) System flow paths are in the fully open position whenever the CA System is placed in automatic control or when the plant is above 10% power.
In particular, the proposed changes would specify that tnis surveillance is applicable to the automatic valves on the discharge side of the purps.
Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.2. la.5) is applicable to the valves on the suction side of the pumps. Also, the Standard Technical Specification wording "... is placed in automatic control or when above 10% RATED THERMAL p0WER..." would be replaced by Catawba specific wording "... is not operating and placed in standby readiness...".
This change will alleviate the snbiguity that it is unacceptable to run the CA pumps with throttled flow control valves for steam generator makeup or for lowering the feed line temperature in the event of check valve back leakage after the CA System has been aligned for standby readiness.
Normally the CA System is operated up to 15% p wer at which time a swapover to Main Feedwater is made.
The CA System disc.3arge valves may need to be in a throttled position during this time to support swapover.
Additionally, during operation above 15% power, feedline check valve back leakage has occurred.
In order to ecol those check valves to avoid damage, the CA System is needed to be run with the discharge valves in the throttled position.
There is no effect on safety by the operation of the CA System with throttled flow control valves for the purposes stated above.
Any ESF actuation signal which generates a CA System auto-start signal will override the manual controls and will actuate the CA System.
The CA discharge valves will still be required to be in the fully open position whenever the CA System is not operating and placed in standby readiness.
10 CFR 50.92 states that a proposed amendment involves no significant hazards considerations if operation in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
(1) In'fulve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3)
Involve a significant reduction in a maroi.n of safety.
The proposed amendment does not involve an increase in the probability or consequences of any previously evaluated accident.
The probability or consequences of an accident are not affected since these changes are meant to clarify the existing requirements. The CA System will continue to be required to y
be operable to mitigate the consequences of all applicable accidents and/or transients. These changes will not affect the operability of this system.
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m DISCUSSION AND JUSTIF7. CATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS (Continued)
The proposed changes will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident ' rom any accident previously evaluated. This proposal will not result in any change to the design of the plant and will not allow the plant to be operated in a different configuration than is currently allowed. All required safety functions will still be available if called upon.
The proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. These changes will not degrade the operability of the CA System or any other system in the plant.
For the above reasons, it is concluded that this proposed license amendment does not involve significant hazards considerations.
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