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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20212J6311999-10-0101 October 1999 SER Accepting Request for Relief from ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section Xi,Requirements for Certain Inservice Insp at Plant,Unit 1 ML20212F4761999-09-23023 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 246 & 237 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20212F0831999-09-23023 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief from Certain Weld Insp at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) for Second 10-year ISI Interval ML20196J8521999-06-28028 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Proposed Alternative to Use Iqis for Radiography Examinations as Provided for in ASME Section III,1992 Edition with 1993 Addenda,Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20239A0631998-08-27027 August 1998 SER Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20236Y2091998-08-0707 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Relief Requests RP-03,RP-05, RP-07,RV-05 & RV-06 & Denying RV-07 & RV-08 ML20217K4471998-04-27027 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Requests for Relief 1-ISI-2 (Part 1),2-ISI-2 (Part 2),1-ISI-5,2-ISI-5,1-ISI-6,1-ISI-7, 2-ISI-7,ISPT-02,ISPT-04,ISPT-06,ISPT-07,ISPT-8,ISPT-01 & ISPT-05 ML20138D2581997-04-28028 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Licensee Proposed Alternative to Use 1989 Edition of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI for Performance of Containment Repair & Replacement Activities Until 970909 ML20057F8441993-10-14014 October 1993 SER Granting Relief Giving Due Consideration to Burden Upon Licensee That Could Result If Requirements Imposed on Facility ML20057D5321993-09-28028 September 1993 SER Granting Licensee 921117 Relief Requests ISPT-2 & ISPT-3 Re Inservice Pressure Test Program ML20057D6351993-09-28028 September 1993 SER Granting Relief as Requested for Both ISPT-2 & ISPT-3 Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) & 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(i) ML20128K0221993-02-11011 February 1993 SE Accepting Util Justification for Break Exclusion of Main Steam Lines in Valve Vaults Provisionally Until End of Refueling Outages ML20128E9161993-01-0606 January 1993 SE Approving Request for Relief from ASME Requirements Re First 10-yr Interval ISI Plan ML20247K3321989-09-14014 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Accepting ATWS Mitigation Sys,Pending Tech Spec Issue Resolution ML20245E6951989-08-0303 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Inclusion of Alternate Repair Method to Detect microbiologically-induced Corrosion in Previously Granted Request for Relief from ASME Section XI Code Repair Requirements ML20247G8661989-07-21021 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Re Silicone Rubber Insulated Cables. Anaconda & Rockbestos Cables at Plant Environmentally Qualified for Intended Function at Plant & Use Acceptable for 40 Yrs ML20247B4891989-07-19019 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 890330 Request to Eliminate Dynamic Effects of Postulated Primary Loop Pipe Ruptures from Design Basis of Plant,Using leak-before- Break Technology as Permitted by Revised GDC 4 ML20246N0321989-07-11011 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 1.2, Post-Trip Review,Data & Info Capability ML20244D1771989-06-0909 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Re Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 2.1.1 & 2.1.2 NUREG-0612, Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Request to Delete Three Commitments in Response to NUREG-0612 Re Heavy Load Control on 5-ton Electric Monorail Hoist W/Integral Trolley & 4-ton Monorail Chain Hoist W/Geared Trolley1989-05-26026 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Request to Delete Three Commitments in Response to NUREG-0612 Re Heavy Load Control on 5-ton Electric Monorail Hoist W/Integral Trolley & 4-ton Monorail Chain Hoist W/Geared Trolley ML20245A1301989-04-14014 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Re Shutdown Margin.Procedural,Hardware & Training Enhancements Implemented & Committed to by Util Will Provide Reasonable Assurance That Adequate Shutdown Margin Will Be Maintained at Plant ML20244D8821989-03-14014 March 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Procedural,Hardware & Training Enhancements Implemented & Committed to by Util to Provide Reasonable Assurance That Adequate Shutdown Margin Will Be Maintained at Plants ML20195J0891988-11-28028 November 1988 Safety Evaluation Accepting Program for Plant in Response to Items 4.2.1 & 4.2.2 of Generic Ltr 83-28 Re Reactor Trip Sys Reliability ML20205T1621988-11-0707 November 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Improvement Plan for Emergency Diesel Generators Transient Voltage Response ML20206G4531988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept Co 15101, Floor Drains ML20206G3961988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Util Investigation of Employee Concerns as Described in Element Rept 308.03 ML20206G5341988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept OP 30114, Malfunction of Doors ML20206G4621988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept 204.8(B), Communication & Interface Control ML20206G5291988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept OP 301112, Sys 31 Not Operated Properly ML20206G5241988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept OP 30111, Valve Closure ML20206G5191988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept OP 30105, Questionable Design & Const Practices ML20206G5091988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept 23706, Gassing of Current Transformers ML20206G5021988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept 23504, Exposed HV Cable Routed W/O Raceway - Personnel Hazard ML20206G4571988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept Co 15105-SQN, Flex Hose Connections ML20206G4971988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept 23501, 480 Volt Power Receptacles Unsafe ML20206G4861988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept EN 232.9(B), Freezing of Condensate Lines ML20206G4591988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept 204.7(B), Vendor Documents Legibility & Dissemination Sys ML20206G4801988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Element Rept EN 232.2, Carbon Steel Vs Stainless Steel Drain Pipes ML20206G4721988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept 22912, Panel- to-Equipment Distances ML20206G4661988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept EN 229.6(B), Lack of Valves in Sampling & Water Quality Sys ML20206G5431988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept OP 30301, Difficulty in Obtaining Obsolete Equipment ML20206G6111988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept OP 31105, Alara ML20206G6161988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept OP 31106, Health Physics Facilities,Clothing & Protective Equipment ML20206G6211988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept OP 31204-SQN, Mgt & Personnel Issues ML20206G6321988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept OP 31208-SQN, Security at Plant Entrances ML20206G6371988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept OP 31201-SQN, Adequacy of Public Safety Svc (Pss) Officer Uniforms in Nuclear Plant Environ ML20206G4351988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept Co 11101-SQN, Contact Between Dissimilar Metals ML20206G4381988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept Co 11202-SQN, Craft-Designed Hangers as Related to Const ML20206G4081988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept Co 10307-SQN, Uncoated Welds as Related to Const ML20206G3661988-11-0404 November 1988 SER Supporting Employee Concern Element Rept EN 21002, Inadequate Environ Qualification of Electrical & Instrumentation Control 1999-09-23
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20212J6311999-10-0101 October 1999 SER Accepting Request for Relief from ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section Xi,Requirements for Certain Inservice Insp at Plant,Unit 1 ML20217G3721999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20212F0831999-09-23023 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief from Certain Weld Insp at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) for Second 10-year ISI Interval ML20212F4761999-09-23023 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 246 & 237 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20212C4761999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20210L4361999-08-0202 August 1999 Cycle 9 12-Month SG Insp Rept ML20216E3781999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20210L4451999-07-31031 July 1999 Unit-2 Cycle 10 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20210G6631999-07-28028 July 1999 Cycle 9 90-Day ISI Summary Rept ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML20209H3831999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20211F9031999-06-30030 June 1999 Cycle 9 Refueling Outage ML20196J8521999-06-28028 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Proposed Alternative to Use Iqis for Radiography Examinations as Provided for in ASME Section III,1992 Edition with 1993 Addenda,Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20195K2951999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20206Q8951999-05-0505 May 1999 Rev 0 to L36 990415 802, COLR for Sequoyah Unit 2 Cycle 10 ML20206R5031999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for April 1999 for Sequoyah Units 1 & 2.With ML20205P9811999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20204C3111999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20205B6631999-02-28028 February 1999 Underground Storage Tank (Ust) Permanent Closure Rept, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Security Backup DG Ust Sys ML20203H7381999-02-18018 February 1999 Safety Evaluation of Topical Rept BAW-2328, Blended U Lead Test Assembly Design Rept. Rept Acceptable Subj to Listed Conditions ML20211A2021999-01-31031 January 1999 Non-proprietary TR WCAP-15129, Depth-Based SG Tube Repair Criteria for Axial PWSCC Dented TSP Intersections ML20198S7301998-12-31031 December 1998 Cycle 10 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20199G3641998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20197J5621998-12-0303 December 1998 Unit 1 Cycle 9 90-Day ISI Summary Rept ML20197K1161998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20195F8061998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20154H6091998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20154H6251998-09-17017 September 1998 Rev 0 to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Cycle 10 Colr ML20153B0881998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20239A0631998-08-27027 August 1998 SER Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20236Y2091998-08-0707 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Relief Requests RP-03,RP-05, RP-07,RV-05 & RV-06 & Denying RV-07 & RV-08 ML20237B5221998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Snp ML20237A4411998-07-31031 July 1998 Blended Uranium Lead Test Assembly Design Rept ML20236P6441998-07-10010 July 1998 LER 98-S01-00:on 980610,failure of Safeguard Sys Occurred for Which Compensatory Measures Were Not Satisfied within Required Time Period.Caused by Inadequate Security Procedure.Licensee Revised Procedure MI-134 ML20236R0051998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant ML20249A8981998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20247L5141998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant ML20217K4471998-04-27027 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Requests for Relief 1-ISI-2 (Part 1),2-ISI-2 (Part 2),1-ISI-5,2-ISI-5,1-ISI-6,1-ISI-7, 2-ISI-7,ISPT-02,ISPT-04,ISPT-06,ISPT-07,ISPT-8,ISPT-01 & ISPT-05 ML20217E2221998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant ML20248L2611998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20199J2571998-01-31031 January 1998 Cycle 9 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20202J7911998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1997 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20199J2441998-01-29029 January 1998 Snp Unit 2 Cycle Refueling Outage Oct 1997 ML20199F8531998-01-13013 January 1998 ASME Section XI Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Snp Unit 2 Refueling Outage Cycle 8 ML20199A2931997-12-31031 December 1997 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1997 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20198M1481997-12-31031 December 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1997 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20197J1011997-11-30030 November 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1997 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20199C2951997-11-13013 November 1997 LER 97-S01-00:on 971017,vandalism of Electrical Cables Was Observed.Caused by Vandalism.Repaired Damaged Cables, Interviewed Personnel Having Potential for Being in Area at Time Damage Occurred & Walkdowns ML20199C7201997-10-31031 October 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1997 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant L-97-215, SG Secondary Side Loose Object Safety Evaluation1997-10-23023 October 1997 SG Secondary Side Loose Object Safety Evaluation 1999-09-30
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 68 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. OPR-77 AND AMENOMENT NO. 60 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. OPR-79 l 1
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY !
l SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 l 1
DCCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 I l
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated Jaruary 11, 1988, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) requested a change to the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications l l
(TS). The change would revise the TS surveillance requirement 4.7.7.e.3 for l both units. The licensee has stated by telephone that, although the testing j has shown that the required control room pressure can be maintained by an j intake airflow of less than 200 cfm the required intake airflow is so close to !
the existing TS maximum allowed value as to allow for little degradation of the '
control room during plant operation. The licensee stated that an intake of up to 1000 cfm will still keep exposures to control room operators to a fraction 1 of the General Design Criteria (GDC) 19 limits of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.
The proposed change revises surveillance requirement 4.7.7.e.3 (Units 1 and 2) ;
to allow up to 1000 cubic feet per minute (cfm) intake of fresh air to the !
control room during emergency ventilation system (CREVS). The TS requirement now allows only up to 200 cfm.
2.0 DISCUSSION i During an accident, the control room is pressurized to prevent unfiltered air fren seeping into the control room. The current fil*.ered makeup flow into the control room is 200 cfm with 3800 cfm recirculation flow. During the current i outage at Sequoyah, TVA has performed a significant amount of testing on the j CREVS. These tests revealed that the control room needs approximately 190 cfm j to maintain the minimum of 1/8 inch water guage required by TS a.7.7.e.3 for I both units. The proposed change revises surveillance requirement 4.7.7.e.3 I (Units 1 and 2) to allow up to 1000 cubic feet / minute intake of filtered fresh air during operation of the CREVS.
3.0 EVALUATION Recent special testinc performed on CREVS identified several deficiencies and previously unidentified system interactions. One system interaction that was identified directly impacts the control room pressurization surveillarce. This interaction existed between the normal control building pressurization fans and CREVS. The ficw diagram for these systems is SON Final Safety Analysis Report l (FSAR) Figure 9.4.1-2. The logic diagram is FSAR Figure 9.4.1-3.
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The system design called for the normal control building pressurization far flow to be decreased from 8200 cfm to a'pproximately 3000 cfm if a centrol room isolation (CRI) was initiated. The CRI also isolates flow control valves (FCVs) 31A-105A and 31A-106A. This isolation directed the normal pressuriza-tion flow to the. suction of the electrical board room air handling units.
These units in turn supplied outside air to the two lower floors (elevations
[E.1] 669.0 and 685.0) of the control building.
A de#iciency in this system that was discovered during the special testing was that the normal pressurization flow was not adequately reduced during a CRI.
The failure of a nonsafety related controller for the fan blade pitch caused the inadequate flow reduction. The controller logic is shown on FSAR Figure 9.4.1-3. Because it was nonsafety related, the controller was not routinely calibrated or tested. The resulting high flow from the normal pressurization fans, ard thus from the electrical board room air handling units, resulted in an abnorrial pressurization of the lower two elevations of the control building.
Normal leakage around doors and wall peretrations allowed air to pass through the stairwells and into the cable spreading room (EL. 706.0). This provided the potential for a pressurization of the cable spreading room and the stairwells that lead to the control room elevatien. The pressurization of the cable spreading room and the stairwells would have masked the potential for outleal ge from the habitability zone and, if severe enough, would have resulted in unfiltered inleakage into the habitability zone. The potential radiological consequences for unfiltered inleakage are currently being assessed by the licensee.
As an interin measure, power has been removed from the rormal pressurization fans, elimirating the potential for pressurization of the cable spreading room.
The licensee is developing a permarent design fix because the controller involved has a peor performance history in this and other applications.
A system interaction that directly impacts the ability to satisfy SR 4.7.7.e.3 was also identified. This interaction involves the discharge duct of the spreading room supply fan. On a CRI signal, the spreading supply fan stops and flew control cperators (FCOs) 31A-17 and 31A-102 isolate. As can be seen on FSAR figure 9.4.1-2, the recirculation suction duct for the control building energency air cleanup fans ties into the spreading room supply fan duct. In this configuration, operation of CREVS induced a substantial differertial pressure ceross FCOs 31A-17 and 31A-102. This caused a backflow of air frem the spreading room, through the blade-type isolation dampers, through the idle spreading room supply fan, and into CREVS. This backflow would serve as additional makeup flow to CREVS, and until the recent testing, was not identified or quantified. This additional makeup flow is passed through the CREVS filter banks before reaching the control room.
To minimize the likelihood of drawing nakeup air from the cable spreading recm, the CREVS recirculation duct has been disconnected from spreading room supply far duct, and now draws air frem an independent point in the E1.732 rechanical equipment room.
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o The main control room has sufficient out leakage such that when CREVS is operated with 200 cfm intake of fresh air, it may not maintain control room pressure at a positive 1/8 inch water gauge, or the rest of EL.732 slightly positive, as described in FSAR section 9.4.1. If the control room habitability zone is not maintained at a sufficiently positive pressure, the potential exists for unfiltered contaminated air to leak into the contro1 rorn habitability z.one during an accident.
The licensee performed a calculation, numbered Division of Nuclear Engineering (DNE) Calculation SQNAPS3-082, to determine the effect or operator dose of increasirg the ratio of fresh air to recirculated air processed by CREVS, The total calculated operator dose in the control rron is composed of three parts.
The first part is the dose from activity surrounding the control roen habitability zone. This dose is independent of the 9esh air flow in CREVS.
Additionally, it contributes only to the whole body dose. The dose from the surrounding activity is 0.07 ren The second contributing factor to control room operator dose is the result of traveling to and from the crntrol room during the accident period (30 days).
This dose is also independent of the fresh air makeup in CREVS. This dose contributes 0.06 ren whole body dese 0.1 rem beta dose, and 1.0 rer inhalation (thyroid) dose.
The third contributiro factor to the control room operator dose is from the activity irside the control room habitability zore. The activity inside the control room is due to the contaminated fresh air that is processed by CREVS for pressurization of the control room and a definec amount of unfiltered inleakage.
The licensee's calculatier shows that the whole body dose to the cperator increases from 1.1 rem to 1.5 rem as the fresh air finw rate increases fren 200 cfm to 1000 c'n. This is to be expectoc, since more contaninated air is being processed by CREVS, and ultinately delivered into the control roon. The whole body dose is principally due to the noble gas activity, which is rot affected by filtration or absorption. The beta dose, whis is also principally due to the noble gas activity, increases from 10.3 ren to 15.2 rem. The beta dose is essentially the skin dose, and would affect only uncovered parts of the operator's body. Finally, the inhalation dose decreases from 13.5 rem to 10.4 rem as the makeup flow increases. TVA exclaired that this is because of the ralative dose contributions of the filtered and unfiltered air entering the control room. From measurerents it has been determir.ed that a pressurized duct carrying unfiltered air to CREVS equipment will leak at a rate of 51 cfn. This is unfiltered leakage into the control room habitability zore. The fresh air rakeup flow used to pressurize the control room balances the outleakage from the control room; therefore, the creater the makeup #10w rate, the shorter the residence tire of the activity in the control room, and the sraller the buildup of activity. Because the ratio of filtered air to unfiltered inleakage increases as the takeup flow increases, there will bo less total activity in the habitability zone, resulting in icwer inhalation doses.
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4-The NRC staff reviewed TVA's calculations and does not completely agree with the method as described in FSAR Section 15.5.3. Ecuation 2 should have contained an additional tern to account for loss of one or more filtered radionuclide concentration by recirculation through the filter (-RcK,3N/V).
Although inclusion of this term reduces the overall dose calculated,"it shows an opposite trend than that calculated by the licensee. That is, the staff determirled that increasing the intake flow ircreases the dose inside the cortrol room including that from inhalation. The staff was able to ve*ify TVA's calculations for inhalation doses from I-131 using the con-centration model as described in FSAR Section 15.5.3 and agrees that operator j doses will be below the GOC Criterion 19 exposure limits for makeup ficws up to an including 1000 cfm.
The proposed change to the TS is also requested because the measured intake flowrate to the control room to meet the required positive 1/8 inch water guage pressure (about 190 cfm) is very close to the maximum allowed flow rate in the TS (i.e., 200 cfm). The licensee has stated that this does rot allow for degradation of the control rcom during the lifetime of the plant. The tightness of the control room is determined by the amount of air needed to be drawn into the control room to maintain the required positive 1/8 inch pressure. The staff acrees that this tightness could degrade with time and the TS should allow for this degradation. Based on the proposed 1000 cfn intake resulting in only a fraction of the GDC exposure limits to the control room operators, the proposed 1000 cfm is acceptable to the staff.
Based on the above, the staff concludes that the procosed charge to the TS l fs acceptable. l l
d.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION These amendments involve a change to a reouirerent with respect to the installation or use of a facility comperent located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that these amendments involve no signi#icant increase in the amounts. and no signficant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released effsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Comission has previously issued a proposed 'inding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has beer no public coment on such finding. Accordingly, these arendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement nor environ-rental assessment need he prepared in connection with the issuance of thase amendments.
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5.0 CONCLUSION
We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by. operation ir the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Ocmmission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will r.ot be inimical to the coumon defense end security nor to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor: R. Wescott Deted: February 17, 1988 i
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