ML20149H624

Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Min Contained Borated Water Vol Requirements of Boric Acid Storage Sys to Reflect Adjustment to Zero Percent Level of Boric Acid Tanks

ML20149H624
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	02/05/1988
From:	DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20149H613	List: ML20149H612 ML20149H624
References
NUDOCS 8802220027
Download: ML20149H624 (8)

Text

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REACTIVITY C0kTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCE - SHUT 00WN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be 3.1.2.5 OPERA 8LE:

A Boric Acid Storage System and at least one associated Heat Tracing a.

System with:

6l12 l

A minimum contained borated water volume of 5190'ga11ons, 1) 2)

Between 7000 and 7700 ppe of boron, and A minimum solution temperature of 65'F.

3)

The refueling water storage tank with:

g-b.

A e.inimum contained borated water volume of 26,000 gallons, 1)

A A minimum boron concentrat+on of 2000 ppe, and 2)

A minimum solution temperature of 70*F.

3)

APPLICABILITY:

H0 DES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no borated water sourca OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURNEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The aoove required borated water source shall be deeonstrated OPERA 8LE:

4.1.2.5 At least once per 7 days by:

a.

1)

Verifying the boron concentration of the water,

2)

• Verifying the contained borated water volume, and Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution temperature when 3) it is the source of borated water, At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWST temperature when it is the source of borated water and the outside air temperature is b.

less than 70*F.

9802220027 es020s PDR ADOCA 05000319 P

pcp 3/4 1-11 suss.,-,~< u..

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4, 3 McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 m e, a s * ~..

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING LIMITING CON 0! TION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.6 As a minimum, the following borated water source (s) shall be OPERABLE as required by Specification 3.1.2.2:

A Boric Acid Storage System and at least one associated Heat Tracing a.

System with:

10, wi%

1)

A minimum contained borated water volume of.1&rW17 gallons, l

2)

Setween 7000 and 7700 ppe of boron, and 3)

A minimum solution temperature of 65'F. '

b.

The refueling water storage tank with:

t 1)

A contained borated water volume of at least 372.100 gallonsj, 2)

Between 2000 ar.d 2100 ppe-of beron,

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3)

A minimum solution temperature of 70'F, and 4)

A maximum solution temperature of 100'F i

APPLICABILITY:

H0 DES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

(

RTR:

With it.e Coric Acid Storage System iroperable and being used as one e.

of the above rtquired borated water sources, restore the storage system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1% delta k/k at 200'F; restore the Soric Acid Storage System to OPERA 8LE status within the next 7 days.or be-in COLD 5HUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

)

b.

With the refueling water 6torage tank inoperable, restore the tank i

to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STAN08Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTOOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

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j McGUIRE UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 1-12 g y g.,

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.6 Each borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by:

r 1) verifying the boron concentration in the water, l

2)

Verifying the contained borated water volume of the water j

source, and 3)

Verifying the Boric Acid Storage System solution temperature I

when it is the source of borated water, i

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWST temperature when tne outside air temperature is either less than 70*F or greater than l

100*F.

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4 McGUIRE = UNITS 1 and 2

'3/4 1-13 1

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/v 0 Cit /w v(s A / A *Wr REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 1

BASES MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (Continued)

The Surveillance Requirements for measurement of the MTC at the beginning and near the end of the fuel cycle are adequate to confirm that the MTC remains within its limits since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boren concentration associated with fuel burnup.

3/4.1.1.4 MINIMUMTEMPERATURIFORCRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant Systes average temperature less than 551'F.

This limitation is required to ensure:

(1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within it analyzed temparature range, (2) the trip instrumentation is within its normal operating range, (3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and (4) the reactor vessel in sbove its NDT temperature.

(*

minimus RT 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS The Boron Injection System ensures that negativa reactivity cuntrol is available during each mode of facility operation.

The components required to I

perform this function include:

(1) borated water sources (2) charging pumps, (3) separate flow paths (4) boric acid transfer pumps, (5) associated Heat Tracing Systems, and (6) an emergency power supply fres OPERABLE diesel generators.

With the RCS average temcerature above 200*F, a minimum of two boron injection flow paths are required to ensure single functional capability in The the event an assumed failure renders one of the flow paths inoperable.

coration capability of wither flow path is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1.3% delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200'F.

The maximum expected boration capability requirement occurs at EOL from full power equilibrius xenon conditions and requires 16,321 gallons of 7000 ppe borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 75,000 gallons of 2000 pps borated water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST).

With the,RCS temperature below 200'F, one Baron Injection System is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single Boron InjectionSystembecomesinoperable.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be CPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except j

the required CPERABLE pu p to be inoperable below 300'F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a 4

single PORV.

McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 B 3/4 1 2 Amendment No. 42 (Unit 1) leendment No. 23 (Unit 2)

,.DY C

, O.'" 7 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASFS BORAT10N SYSTEMS (Continued)

The boron capability required below 200*F is sulficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1% delta k/k af ter xenon decay and cooldown from 200*F to 140*F. This condition requires either 2000 gallons of 7000-ppe borated water fros' the-tocic acid storage tanks or 10,000 gallons of 2000-ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available ber.ause of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and borun concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 10.5 for the sslution recirculated within containment after a LOCA.

This pH band minimizes d e avoiution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

The OPERABILITY of one Boron Injection System during REPJELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that:

(1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses are limited. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insartion limits.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requi ements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original design criteria are met. Misalignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors and a restriction in THERMAL POWEL These restrictiens provide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation.

In addition, those safety e nlyses affected by a misaligned rod are reevaluated to confirm that the results remain valid during future operation.

The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the safety analyses. Measuren.ent with T greater than or equal to 5?'F and with all reactor coolant pumpt operatin6* Ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a Reactor trip at operating conditions.

Control rod positions and OPERABILITY of the rod position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are adequite for assuring that the applicable LCO's are satisfied.

McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 8 3/4 1-3

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ATTACKMENT 2 Justification and Safety Analysis i

The current McGuire snits 1 and 2 technical specifications for BORATED WATER SMUTDOWN (TS 3.1.2.5) and BORATED WATER SOURCES OPERATING (TS SOURCE 3.1.2.6) specify minimum contained borated water volumes of $100 and 19,500 l

gallons, re sp e c t iv e ly, for the Boric Acid Storage system.

These values are based on boration capability requirements to provide a shutdown margin from expected operating conditions of 1.3% delta k/k af ter xeuen decay and cooldovn to 200 degrees-F (16,321 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water), and a shutdown J

margin of 1% delta k/k af ter xenon decay and cooldown f rom 200 degrees-F to 140 degrees-F (2000 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water), to ensure that nega-I tive reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation.

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These current technical specifications reflect a minimum usable level (zero i

percent level) in the Unit 1 and 2 Boric Acid Tanks (Ref. Attachment 2A) as l

being to the outlet pipe centerline (the outlet pipe is nominally 4 inches in diameter with a centerline located 6 inches above the bottom of the tank; i

6 inches of unusable tank level corresponds to approximately 3100 gallons on 1

unusable volume. therefore 3100 + 2000 - 5100 gallons and 3100 + 16,321 = 19, 421 (conservatively rounded up to 19,500] gallons).

)

Due to re-evaluation of the piping associated with the Boric Acid Tanks and Boric Acid Transfer Pumps (during unrelated modification work it was recently discovered that the piping has a highpoint higher than the tap on the tank),

it has been determined that the minimum usable level for the Boric Acid Tanks i

is the top of the outlet pipe, not the center line.

Cons equent ly, the new 1

zero percent level point of the tank is 8 inches above the bottom of the tank (to top of outlet piping), corresponding to an unusable volume of approxi-mately 4132 gallons.

This necessitates a change in T.S.'s 3.1.2.5 and 3.1.2.6, which are based on the old zero percent level point (centerline of outlet pipe). Accordingly. T.S.'s 3.1.2.5 and 3.1.2.6 are revised to reflect minimum tank levels of (413242000=)6132 gallons and (4132+16,321=)20.453 gal-l 1 ens, re sp ec t ively, in order to satisfy the base beration capability require-l ments. So other changes to these T.S.'s (or to their bases) are required, t

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i ATTACHMENT 3 Analysis of Significant Hazards Consideration

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As required by 10CFR 50.91, this analysis is provided concerning whether the l

4 proposed amendments involve significant hazards considerations, as defined by 10CFR 50.92.

Standards for determination that a proposed amendment involves l

no significant hazards considerations are if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would nott

1) involve a significant l

increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evalu-ated: Cr 2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from j

any accident previously evaluated; or 3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

l The proposed amendments revise the minimum contained borated water voluee l

requirements of the Boric Acid Storage System to reflect an adjusteent to the

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zero percent level of the Boric Acid Tanks.

The proposed amendments would not involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident previously

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j evaluated Lecause the borated water sources are designed to mitigate the conse-quences of accidents and can have no effect or, causal mechanisms.

The amend-ments would not involve a significant increase in the consequences of an acci-

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dent prevfously evaluated since the new requirements are more restrictive than j

the current requirements (and thus would likely decrease the consequences of l

J an accident).

Inerefore the first standard is met.

2 i

j The proposed amendments would not create the possibility of a new or dif ferent i

i kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the borated l

vater sources are designed to mitigate the consequences of accidents and can i

have no effect on causal techanis:s.

Therefore the second standard is met.

The poposed amendments would not involve a significant reduction in a margin l

of safety since the new requirements are more restrictive than the current j

requirements (and thus would likely increase the margin of safety). Therefore the third and final standard is cet.

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i The commission has p<ovided examples of amendments likely to involve no signi-

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ficant hazards consideration (48 FR 14870).

One exa:ple of this type is (ii).

j "a change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or control not presently included in the technical specifications:

for exa=ple, a more j

1; stringent surveillance requirement".

Since the new minimum contained borated j

water volume requirements are more restrictive than the current requirements, j

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the above eited exacple can be applied to the amend =ents.

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Based on the preceding analyses. Duke Power Co:pany concludes that the pro-

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posed a=endeents do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

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