ML20149E082
| ML20149E082 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1987 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8801130215 | |
| Download: ML20149E082 (4) | |
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f DUKE POWER GOMPANY P.O. HOX 33180 CitARLO'FrE, N.o. 28242 IIAL B. TUCKER retzenozz ma ree.mm (704) 373 4531 p
NtT4EAS PRODUCTSON
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December 31, 1987 l
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Cor. trol Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 l
Subject:
Catawba Nuclear' Station l
Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414 IE Report 50-413/87-30 l
RII: PKV/i4SL l
Dear Sir:
Please find attached a reply to the Notice of Violation for 413/87-30-01 which l
was transmitted by letter from Dr. J. Nelson Grace on December 1, 1987.
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Very truly yours, i
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Hal B. Tucker LTB/1184/abn Attachmont xc:
Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator j
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissicn Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 l
Atlanta, Georgia 30323 l
Mr. P. K. Van Doorn NRC Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station 9901130215 871 1
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DUKE pCWER COMPANY REPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION VIOLATION No. 413/87-30-01 Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 requires at least three independent steam generator auxiliary feedwater pumps and associated flow paths to be operable.
With one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, restore the required auxiliary feedwater pump to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in hot shutdown within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
Technical Specifications 6.8.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A to Regulation Guide 1.33, Revision 2.
Catawba Nuclear Station Directive 3.1.15, Activities Affecting Station Operations or Operating Instructions, requires that permission be obtained from the Shift Supervisor or other Supervisor with operational control prior to removing from eervice an instrument or component that may affect unit operation.
Contrary to the above, pressure switch 1 CAPS 5131 was removed from service at some point between July 18, 1986 and July 6, 1987, by shutting its isolation valve without obtaining permission from the Shif t Supervisor or other Supervisor with operational control.
This caused the flow path from Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B to the 1C Steam Generator to be inoperable as it would have isolated under cartain conditions and the licensee did not maintain the unit in an Operational Mode in which Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 did not apply.
This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I) applicable to Unit 1 only.
RESPONSE
l (1) Admission or Donial of Violation l
Duke Power Company admits the violation.
l (2) Reason for Violation if Admitted Our investigation could not determine a reason for the closure of ICAPS 5131 isolation valve between July 17, 1986 end July 6, 1987 No completed work request or calibration records could be located to determine the root cause of this violation. The investigation and monitoring of instrument valve position problems continues.
(3) Corrective Actions Taken and Results Achieved (1) Detailed corrective actions taken/results achieved for programmatic issues concerning our surveillance / calibration program for safety related instruments can be found in our response to Violation 413/87-30-02, 414/87-30-02.
(b)
Inst rument 1 CAPS 5131 was checked and valved back into service under Work Request 5749PRF on July 7, 1987. No cause for the mispositioned valve could be determined.
(c) Existing system procedures to check instrumentation valves were reviewed and revised as necessary. Then these procedures were started on Unit 2 on September 17, 1987 and completed on September 30, 1987.
Unit 1 systems were started prior to the refueling outage with CA and NS completed on September 30, 1987 (CA and NS were selected based on historical records, to include ICAPSS131). All Unit 1 systems were completed on December 13, 1987 during the refueling outage. On both units the systems involved were:
CA (Auxiliary Feedwater)
FW (Refueling Water)
KC (Component Cooling)
NC (Reactor Coolant)
NI (Safety Injection)
NS (Containment Spray)
NV (Chemical & Volume Control)
NW (Containment Penetration Valve Injection Water)
RN (Nuclear Service Water)
SM (Main Steam)
The audit result was:
One valve for non-safety instrument 2KCFT5810 was found closed.
It was returned to service.
No cause could be determined.
(d) IAE personnel were given training on proper restoration of instrumentation including valve positioning.
Included in this training was detection of loose Dragon Valve handles (Note:
This was the cause of the problem on 1NSPT5040 isolation valve handle as previously reported in LER 413/87-18, Rev. 1).
All containment pressure isolation valve handles were inspected (3 of ~ 30 were loose). All handles found loose were tightened.
The training was completed on September 24, 1987. Performance personnel were given training on Dragon Valve operation, valve position, verification and detection of loose Dragon Valve Handles. This training was completed November 4, 1987. Training on Dragon Valve operation, and the verificatier. and detection of loose valve handles will be incorporated into the basic and continuing training program for IAE and Performance personnel by January 31, 1988.
(e) Incidents involving mispositioned valves have been discussed with IAE personnel. Disciplinary action has been administered in the one case in which IAE personnel error was the cause.
(f) A review of our Planning and Scheduling activities has yielded the following information:
When a safety-related component has been identified as requiring a periodic surveillance, the Planning Section is responsible for tracking and scheduling these work items.
Their track record is very good in this area once an item has been worked in the first time. The computer program calculates the next due date and flags management personnel when the surveillance is due.
3 (4) Corrective Actions to be Taken to avoid Further Violations (a) The IAE Engineer will go over with all IAE crews the incidents involving mispositioning of. instrument valves.
In performing the CA Instrument Valve Checklist on Unit One Restart, one root valve for safety-related instrument ICAFT5110 should have been found open, but was not as a result of personnel error in performing the valve checklist procedure. The reason for the valve closure has not been determined as yet.
The investigation on this incident is administerod for tbc personnel error which was discovered.
(b) Performance procedures for aligning instrument penetrations will be revised to include a note to notify supervision if the the as-found valve position of instrument isolation valves is closed.
This has already been completed for Unit 1 and will be completed for Unit 2 prior to next performance of this procedure.
(c)
In the tracking and scheduling of surveillances (see (f) above) for those items that have not yet been completed the first time, the computer does not have a date from which to calculate the next date for scheduling. To resolve this problem, the Planning Section will provide a monthly listing of these surveillances to Maintenance Management.
This list will be reviewed by Planning, IAE and MM to determine why these items have not been performed and to either 1) focus management attention on getting them done or 2) provide technical justification as to why they should not be performed at the current time.
This list will be available February 1,1988.
(5) Date of Full Compliance Duke Power Company will be in full compliance April 1, 1988.
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