05000277/LER-1981-013, Forwards LER 81-013/01T-0.Provides Narrative Description of 810203 Occurrence Re Failure of Valves to Meet Seismic Qualification Requirements

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Forwards LER 81-013/01T-0.Provides Narrative Description of 810203 Occurrence Re Failure of Valves to Meet Seismic Qualification Requirements
ML20148T180
Person / Time
Site: Peach Bottom 
Issue date: 02/18/1981
From: Cooney M
PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To: Grier B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20148T183 List:
References
NUDOCS 8102250035
Download: ML20148T180 (3)


LER-1981-013, Forwards LER 81-013/01T-0.Provides Narrative Description of 810203 Occurrence Re Failure of Valves to Meet Seismic Qualification Requirements
Event date:
Report date:
2771981013R00 - NRC Website

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5.2 hMILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY c

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PHILADELPHIA. PA.19101 (2151841 4000 E

O February 18, 1981 Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director Of fice of Inspection and En fo rcem en t Region I US Huclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King o.f Prussia, PA 19406

SUBJECT:

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT MARRATTVE DESCRIPTTOM

Dear Mr. Grier:

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The following occurrence uns reported to Mr. Cowgill, Region l

I, Office of Inspection and Enforcement on February 3, 1981.

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Reference:

Docket No. 50-277 50-278 l

. 2-81-13/1T-0 Report No.:

Report Date:

February 18, 1981 l

Occurrence Date:

February 3, 1980 Facility:

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station

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RD #1, Del tn, PA 17314 Tochnien1 Specification H o f e r e ry;<;,:,

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Technical Specification 6.9.P.n(9 ) requires prompt P

reporting o f "Per for nance of nt. rut turen, nys t e:n n, or componenta that require remedial action or correct,ive measures to prevent operation in a manner less conservntive than assumed in the accident analysis in the safet,y annlysis report or Technien)

Specification that require remedini nction or corrective measures to prevent the existence or development of an unsafe condition."

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8102250035 S

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rn Description of the Event:

1 Analysis of primary ventilation isolation valves identi fied v alves that did not, mot 1, seismic quali rient,l on 4

requirements.

On Unit 2, two primary containment, ventilat,lon penetrations were involved.

In one case only one of the two valves was affected, and in the other case both valves were nfrected.

On Unit 3, three primary con t a i nme n t penet, rations were I

involved.

In one enne only one v alve was involved, and in t.h e other two cases hot,h valves were affected.

Prohnble Consequences of the Denurrenen:

l A review of the seismic qualifications of primary containment ventilation isolation valves revealed that three valves on Unit 2 and five valves on Unit 3 might not wi ths tand the accelerations experienced during a design basis carthquake (DBE).

A DRE could result in tho valve oporator support bracket exceeding material yield stress levels.

The possible deformation from the DBE could result in a force being applied to the valve shaft tending to open the va]ve.

Cause of the Evart:

The valve operator mounting bracket was not designed to meet seismic requirements.

Corrective Actions

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was invo]ved, the redundant vnivon were admi ni st, rat i vel y bl oc ked For those penetrations where only one isolation valve i

closed and the nfrected valves declared inoperable.

For the penetration with both isolation valves affected, the inhoard j

valve was clamped in the cl o n e<l pos i t. i on and temporaril y mod i ficd to make them seismically qualified.

As stated in the prompt notification update, dated Fobruary 6, 1981, a concern was identified that the temporar y modi fiention miP,ht havo a f fected the ability o f the valves to meet, leak rate criteria.

The penetrations with modified valves were unsatisfactorily lenk tested.

The discs were repositioned and satisfactorily leak tested on February 5, 1981.

Primar y contai nment integrity was maintained during this period because the redundant isolation valves were closed and sealed.

1 The tem po r nr y mod i f i en t. i on will remain in pl ace untti materini is availabic to replace the affected operator support D**D A

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bracketn.

When the now support. henckeln are nynllnhin, thay will be installed and the valve opernt.orn will L, e returned to their normal configur.ition.

Very truly yours.

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Sup.rintendent Ge cration Division - Muclear Attachment cc:

Director, NRC - Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement j

Mr. Norman M.

Haller, NRC - Office of Management &

Program Analysis i

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