ML20148D166

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Summary of Telcon W/W Lorenz Re Data on Alleged Overexposure to Radiation to H Saadeek,As Transmitted in Anonymous Ltr to J Hendrie
ML20148D166
Person / Time
Site: West Valley Demonstration Project
Issue date: 09/25/1972
From: Bidinger G
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:
Shared Package
ML20148D021 List:
References
NUDOCS 8009150110
Download: ML20148D166 (1)


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Tr.IT,00:1 FRCII U. LOTI:!Z, RO:I, RE ANO:CIICOS LETIER TO J. If. ICICIE, L'

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ABOUT h?S - L'EST VAL 1rl 4

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on 9-25-72. Loren: reportcd the following for the dead can with the i '

alleged overexponure, lung removal, atomach cancer and death centioned in the letter:

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llaafcz Sandech F

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050-12-1213 Address:

RD #1, Ucst Valloy, Ucw York 14171 N

Dato of Eirth:

7-23-00 li Date of Death:

1972 Aac:

71 Late of li?S Employment:

10-12-66 to 1-19-72 IP.:olo Eody Equure:

8.95 rc:a

,s Chin E::posure:

11.7r E:<trenitics:

11.7r

/ Lung Count in 4-57:

13n C1 cesium 137 (< 57.12LD)

Y Other Luns Counts annually:

No pticitivo luag depositions i

Urine nad Fecal Ecsults:

Nono Significant Ponding Law Suit:

IFS is not avaro of any suit t

,, The inforention was roccived by Eppaccin during an inspection on 9/19-22/72 Durina ins 7cetion on 9/25-29/72, Eppstein vill obtain

,,' nu.crical results for urine and fecal ca.apics.

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C. H. Didinger lhtcrials and Fuel Pacilitics Eranch s

Directorate of nceulatory Operationa ec:

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U. S. AT0!!IC ENERGY C010!ISSION

' DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS.

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REGION I j ' ;

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.RO Inspection Report No.:- 50-201/72-03 L%chet No.:

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Licensec:

Nuclear Fuel Se vices. Incorporated.

License'No.: CSF-1 s

P.O. Box 12,4 Priority:

1 L.

Category:

A-(1)-

t Location:

West Vallev. New York 14171-

, Type of Licensee: Fuels - Reprocessing Type of Inspection: Special - unannounced Dates of Inspection: Seotember 19-23 & 26-29, 1972 Dates of Previous Inspection: September 6. 1972 Principal Inspector:

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Eugene Eps<ein, Radistion Specialist Date None Accompanying Inspectors: _

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Date Other Accompanying Personnel: None

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R. $1 /5mith, Acting Senior, Facilities Radio-

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Reviewed By:

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logical Protection Section

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_SU}D!ARY OF FINDINGS

. Enforcement Action w

A.

Violations

'1.

. Solid radioactive waste not pacf.'ed to prevent dispersion.

(Report Details, Paragraph'15) i 2._ ' All batches of liquid effluent not analyzed for activity.

f (Report Details, Paragraph'13) t-3.

Violation of Procedures (Report Details, Paragraph 15) i B.

Safety Items l

None

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Licensee Action on Previously Ident'ified Enforcement Items

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A.

Item No. 4, Enclosure 1, of licensee letter dated April 7, 1972 to i

Directorate of Regulatory Oper,ations.

(Report Details, Paragraph 2)

B.

Item No. 5, Enclosure 1 of licensee letter dated April 7, 1972 to (7

Directorate of Regulatory Operations (Report Details, Paragraph 3)

C Item No. 6, Enclosure 1, of licensee letter dated April 7, 1072 to Directorate of Regulatory Operations (Report Details, ?aragraph 4) i D.

Item No. 1, Enclosure 3, licensee letter dated April 21, 1972 l

to Directorate of Regulatory Operations (Report Details, Paragraph i

5) i E.

Item No. 2, Enclosure 3, licensee letter dated April 21, 1972 to Directorate of Regulatory Operations (Report Details, Paragraph 6)

F.

Item No. 3, Enclosure 3, licensee letter dated April 21, 1972 to Directorate of Regulatory Operations.

(Report Details, Paragraph p

7)

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G.

Item No. 4, Enclosure 3, licensee letter dated April 21, 1972 to l

y Directorate of Regulatory Operations.

(Report Details, Paragraph

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Item No.

5, Enclosure 3, licensee letter dated April 21, 1972 to g-Dir e c to'ra t t. of Regulatory Operation.

(Report Details, Paragraph

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Item No. 6, Enclosure.3, licensee letter dated April-21, 1972,to

~ Directorate of Regulatory Operations.

(Report Details, Paragraph 10)

-o Design Changes

.3 None Unusual Occurrences' A. ' Licensee letter dated June 21, 1972 to Directorate of Regulatory Operations reporting a liquid cffluent release.

(Report Details, Paragraph 11)-

B.

Licensee telephone call on June 16, 1972 to Directorace of Regula-tory Operations, Region I, reporting a malfunction of a stack mon-itor.-

(Report Details, Paragraph 12)

C.

Licensee telephone call en June 16, 1972 to Directorate of Regu-latory Operations, Region I, reporting a release of liquid ef-fluent to ground surface run-off.

(Report Details, Paragraph 13)

D.

Licensee telephone call on July 12, 1972 to Directorate of Regula-4' tory Operations, Region I, reporting contamination transferred to one employee's residence.

(Report Details, Paragraph 14) l 1

E.

Licensee letter dated July 26, 1972 to Directorate of Regulatory i

Operations reporting an overexposure.

(Report Details, Paragraph l

15)

F.

Anonymous letter dated September 3, 1972 to the AEC Directorate of Licensing.

(Report Details, Paragraph 16)

G.

Licensee letter of September 12, 1972 to Directorate of Regulatory Operations, reporting external overexposure of nine contractor employees.

(Report Details, Paragraph 17)

Other Sihnificant Findings 3

I L1 A.

Current Findings f

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The NFS plant is in shutdown condition.

No fuel has been repro-j cessed since January 1972 and no irradiated fuel has been repro-ic i

cessed since November 1971.

Approximately 80 employees have been l

laid off.

Licensee representatives stated that they use contract

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employees, for a minimum of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> work.

These employees are ob-x_

i tained from local labor contractors and are used, according to re-L..

cords of these contractors and statements of licensee repre-i sentatives, to perform decontaminati:n cnd replace hot cell l

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equipment. These employees work until a whole body exposure of 2 rem / calendar quarter has been received.. Contractor records indica-ted a total of-516 such employees were used in 1972.

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Status of Previously Reoorted Unresolved Items Q

5 None j

Management Interview-k-

A management interview was held September 29, 1972 with the following individuals:

J. P. Duckworth, Plant Manager B. E. Knight, ibnager, Operations W. A Oldham, Manager, Construction T. Ki Wenstrand, Manager, Health and Saf ety The follo' wing subj ects were discussed:

A.

The carrent AEC policy of providing the licensee with a copy of the inspection: report to define proprietary information prior to release of the report to the Public Document ' Room.

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B.

The proper packaging of radioactive waste and contaminated material particularly pointing out that failure to properly package such waste had caused a reportable incident.

(Report Details, paragraph 15)

C.

The release of liquid effluent to ground water prior to analysis particularly pointing out that employees had failed to follow sea-ted procedures.

(Report Details, Paragraph 13)

D.

The failure to perform smear surveys of contaminated =aterial prior to transfer.

(Report Details, Paragraph 15)

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted T. K. Wenstrand, Manager Health and, Safety D. Coughig, Production Supervisoc y

R. T. Smolkowski,' Supervisor, Contract. Administration and Secre-l t

tary of.the Safety Committee J. P. Maier, Health Physics Technician M. Jump, Technical Services Manager P.' Burns, Product Operator L

R. May, Chemical Operator E. J. Halas, Blaw Knox, welder J. D. Jablinski, Blaw Knox, welder

,J. C. VanAusdale, Blaw Knox, welder D. C. Crockett, Blaw Knox, welder J. F. Skrzpek, Blaw Knox, welder M. J. Noble, Blaw Knox, welder J. B. Holt, Blav Knox, welder E. S. Rothschild, M.D.

'H. Benz, Vice President, Benz Labor. Agency G. W. Mcdonald, Plant Assistant Engineer J. E.; Birchler, Supervisor, Plant Assistance Current Status of Previously Identified Enforcement Items 2.

Licensee representatives stated that they had identified 'the source of surface run-off water as being the wake from the Condensate and Cooling Tower.

Licensee represer.tatives stated that this cooling water gathers activity via small leaks in operational equipment.

Licensee representatives stated that corrective action was achieved by re-routing the Condensate and Cooling Water to an interceptor holding pond which feeds into the Low Level Liquid % ;te Treatment Facility.

Surf ace stream activity which prior to the corrective action was as high as 1.85 X 10-5 uci/cc beta was louered to 7.8 X 10-9 uC1/cc beta.

3.

Licensee representatives stated that the Diesel Motor drive to e

provide emergency power for the Head End Ventilation System was never installed.

They stated that the propane gas motor, which

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was first evaluated in 1967 and submitted to DML and approved, was y

installed., Licensee personnel stated that a Diesel Motor requires U

several minutes to ccme to full power whereas a Propane Gas notor

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immediately gives full power.

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The inspector inquired if other changes were evaluated to reflect whether a safety question existed.

The following project reports were reviewed:

31 A

3-c c a.1 Installation'of a' passport into the Process Mechanical Cell b..-Addition of a tank to the Fuel Receiving ~and Storage Pool.

w The? inspector noted that in both of these additions a full safety

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evaluation was made as indicated by examination of the Safety

'h Committee Minutes.

4.

The inspector by examination of Safety Committee Minutes and'ob -

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servation, noted that the diesel engine' driving the electric j

generator was scrapped and the originally approved propane gas

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motor electric generator.was installed instead.

The minutes.

J 1-of the Safety Committee indicated no unreviewed safety matters.-

5.

Licensee repreaentatives reported that radiation levels within:

-the plant and adjacent areas were due to the present acid recov -

ery system. - The inspector noted that a new acid' recovery system housed within a separate concrete shielded building was under con-struction. Licensee representatives stated, that the plant was in a shutdown condition and had been for the past six months.

They-reported that the present work program activity consists of new construction, decontamination and replacement of faulty equipment.

Records of surveys, which were reviewed, revealed that the opera-tion of the Head End Ventilation System caused a reduction in l[

contamination, air concentrations and radiation levels within the Operations Building and adjacent areas.

The inspector made a con-firming survey throughout the Operations Building and adjacent areas.

Radiation levels inside the building were noted not to exceed 1.0 mR/hr and were less than 0.2 mR/hr in any outside area within the fence restriction.

The inspector also examined film badge and TLD reports from De-cember 1971 to September'1, 1972 and noted that the average whole body exposure for permanent plant employees was 2.4 rem during the first six months of 1971.

Records also indicated that addi-tional contract help was obtained frca local labor agencies.

Per-sonnel monitoring records indicated that the average exposure for these per-sons was 1.73 rem.

Th2 average whole body exposuce for the first six months 1972 has decreased from that noted during a T

similar period in 1971.

1 1

6.

Licensee representatives stated that they have replaced the chest counter with a shielded whole body counter.

He stated that all plant personnel are now routinely counted by the whole body counter

<N once yearly and ac any other time there is reason to believe an uptake has' occurred.

The licensee representatives also stated that f

there has been'no case, within the plant itself, in 1972 where there 1-was excessive exposure to concentrations of radionuclides in air.

I.

There was one case reported in 1972 where one person was exposed to concentrations of radionuelides in air at the waste burial site.

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l Nasal swabs are taken, according to records, after each zone entry-and the. swabs are counted'in a' pulse height analyzer as well as a beta

. counter.

If activity'is detected, urine analysis and whole body s

counting is performed.

If alpha activity is detected, above a

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.value~ofL3 dpm/ day in urinalysis, f ecal sampling is performed. -

2 Records of these. analyses were examin'ed and no ' overexposure f

l was revealed, exc.ept'as stated above.

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Permanent Employees u

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Licensee representatives stated that;all permanent employees have.

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received formal classroom training including use of films and training guides. The curriculum was noted to include the subjects listed in the licensee reply.

Formal written examinations were~

given.and the examinations and_ grades obtained were observed in formal records. -The examination covered types of radiation.sur-veys, instrumentation,'what readings mean, actions to be taken when instrument readings are obtained, exposure. limits, workin, time

' limits, special work permit' procedures, protective clothing, and emergency procedures.

Questioning by the inspector, of three par-manent employees revealed that.they had received the training and had taken written examinations immediately following the lectures.

They also stated that they. periodically see training films and re-g;.

ceive lecturcs-from the Health Physics Staff.

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Contractor Employees 1

Oac Health Physics technician was noted to be permanently assigned to contractor employees. The inspector spoke to one contractor employee, who stated that he had been at the NFS. site for six years.

He stated that he had received training in radiation safety when first employed and periodic refresher training since then.

Tuo other contractor employees working at the NFS site for one and two years stated that they too had received training.

Each one questioned, knew the exposure they could receive in any days work, reporting requirements, as well as emergency action and evacuation procedures, m

Temporary Employees f

9 The inspector verified by a visit to one labor agency that 516 such j

employees from this agency were used at NFS in 1972, to date The r

labor contractor reported that these people do not receive formal i

training.. Licensee representatives verified this and stated that.

O they work only under the direct surveillance of a health and safety

'i technic'ian.

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The licensee representative stated that these persons are instructed J

c in the use of protective clothing ar.d cashs and also receive instruc-tion in the use of self reading dosime:cr pencils and ucar tuo such i

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. pencils, a low range 0-200 mR, and a high range, 0-lR.

Licensee' j

- representatives stated that these temporary employees are used i

for exposure 11n any calendar quarter up to 2R, to the whole body.

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- All employees whether temporary, contractor or permanent were noted f ;'

to. nave signed Forms AEC-4 with all sacries completed.

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8.

Environmental Sampling The program for sampling air and water was described by the licen-see representatives as follows:

L, Section 3'of the licensee's Health and Safety Procedures Manual dated S/3/72 specifies the location and frequency for sampling of:

air and water; background radiation measurements, deer, fallout, fish, food crops, milk, silt from Buttermilk and Cat-taraugus Creeks, and water from all sources of release were noted specified.

The inspector noted that the procedures specified the data sheets to be used and the method to record and calculate results.

These data sheets were examined and in no case were AEC or Technical l

Specification limits exceeded.

b Solid Waste Control Solid Waste Management Control was noted to be covered co$pletely in Sections 8 and 10 of the licensee's Health and Safety Procedures Manual.

The Manual specifies the handling, packaging surveillance monitoring and control of both high level and low level solid waste.

Adequacy ofinternalQuality Control Svstems to assure reliability

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.of Analytical procedures and specifications for checkirg and cali-bration of analytical instrumentation Section 10.2.2.1 - 10.111 Health Saf ety Procedures describes stack monitors,what readings mean, set points and calibration of stack monitors to determine particulate and gaseous release.

The inspec-tor noted that the operation of these ::onitors are checkec' daily p

L and that the results of checks are entered in a log meintained by l

the shift supervisors.

Section 10.3.1 - 10.4 describes liquid check procedures and ana-l

'ytical procedures to check the presesce of fission products in j

liquid.

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k Sections 8.1 - 8.5 of the Health and Safety Procedures describes methods for taking all in-plant samples, logs for results, instruments g

Q used, calibration and analytical precedures to determine concentrations l

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I of? in-plant air concentrations.

These procedures arf dated 4/10/72.

Training'for' Transients and Visitors I'

i Transient workert and visitors: accord,ing to; documentation are

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never une; orted. Licensee' personnel stated that these" persons'

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. receive instruction according to,need. Visitors were noted.to j

receive at the guard gate, s' dosimeter pen and required escort,,

j according to observations made by the inspector.

They also pass.

A through hand and foot monitoring stations,.one located at,the W

plant main entrance and one located at the guard reception shack.

L They' receive from the escort, instructions commensurate with the hazards in the area to be visited.

l Recording'of date:

exposures, personnel monitoring, notifications, bioassay, whole body counting and comparison of exposure determination methods 1

l The licensee's Health and Safety Procedures prescribes precisely how the information obtained is to be recorded.

. Environmental Samples of water were noted by the inspector to have been split between NFS, and two of f-site contractors.

The retults 9

were available and examined by the inspector and showed that a u t

three split sample results were within 20%.

Film b'adge and TLli systems were also compared and found to be within close agreement.

9.

The licensee condueced a complete emergency evacuation drill on 4/22/72 which was filmed..The inspector reviewed the film and noted the following:

Upon sounding the alarm, the plant was evac-usted. Attendance of evacuee's was noted to be checked at the guard shack beyond the gate.

Attendance revealed, one person miss-ing, (a simulated casualty).

A rescue force properly suited and.

equipped with survey instrumentation entered the plant and located the person, removed him via stretcher into a vehicle and transported him to Chaffee Memorial Hospital in Springville.

The simulated casualty uas wrapped in plastic to prevent spread of contamination.

Twelve doctors and the nursing staff were in attendance and were

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s briefed and instructed as to how to handle and treat a radiation H

casualty.

All biological sera was collected and tagged.

All no-h tifications to NY State, AEC, Police, and Fire authorities uere made.

[Q Chapter 9; of the' Saf ety Procedures Manual entitled Emergency Pro-p:

cedu.es was approved by the Safety Cc mittee on 4/3/72 and the

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Plant Manager on l/6/72.

Section B also contained procedures for L'

personnel at Chaffee Memorial Hospital.

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3 The plan:was noted to contain procedures for monitoring surveying and decontamination. _A responsible person has been designated to notify outside agencies.

The plan places duty upon the' Technical Services. !:anager or in his absence a. person designated by the Plant s

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L Manager.. The plan contains-criteria for notification of outside agencies.

The inspector noted all alarms were sounded and tested each Friday f

precisely at 11:00 a.m. with loud speaker announcements of a test.

f Records indicate evacuation drills have been held.at least four 1

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' times yearly.

i 10..

Head End Ventilation System (HEVS)

Records examined included minutes of the Safety Committee. Thesa-records indicated a training program in filter removal was given i

to 16 people on 10/19.- 21/70.

The system was transferred by the vendor to the licensee on 10/25/70 according,to records.- The com-mittee' minutes indicated that on 10/2/70 all TOP's (Temporary Op-erating Procedures), were approved for operation of the Head End Ventilation System.

These were later changed to SOP's Mos. 15-20 and -21.

4 Operating logs of the Chemical Cell indicate that all operators

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worked with the vendor in going over all parts of the ventilation system.

A licensee representative stated that a formal training program was given only 3 days before the system was scheduled to go into operation but insisted that this was a better method since the training received was fresh in the mens mind.

According to a written report dated 10/25/70, the HEVS was accepted without meeting design criteria as to air flow.

The report listed some 50 system checks, the identity of the person responsible for each check, and the date the checks were completed. All checks were complete by 10/24/70 at 2300 hours0.0266 days <br />0.639 hours <br />0.0038 weeks <br />8.7515e-4 months <br />.

The data obtained showed that of 15 locations checked for air flow, 11,of the locations did not meet design specifications.

Locations 11 and 12, the north and.

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south glove aisle in the filter change room designed for 100 CFM had

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an airflow of 7 CFM.

g Licensee representatives stated that the deficiencies were corrected 6

i by installing larger bearings and increased fan speeds.

Airflow h

v study reports thich were reviewed, show that the design goal, nega-tive pressure with respect to operaging cells, was obtained.

On ir l

11/6/70, a work report to the safety committee stated that in the i

glove port aisles of the filter chan3e room, the gloves were re-moved to' obtain higher air flow and pressure differential.

The report showed the radiation icvels were below that required for Zone III entries.

The Safety Committee minutes also show the re-4 4.-

quirement, that the gloves be replaced prior to any filter changes and that those persons performing this operation wear air supplied j

masks.

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.I Licensee representatives stated that.the spray system was not; tested prior'to turnover.

Tha representatives stated that the duct spray system was initially available but locked out.of x

- t.he 'line at the time off turnover with all vater ' supply valves

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closed. The spray: system was. checked out at a later date and

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found to' meet' design specificationsf*

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1 Licensee representatives. stated that the general DOP test pro-

'l cedure available at the time for testing filters required no 9

special procedure to test-the.f11ters'in the HEV system.

Records Lof, tests showed that they were performed'on 10/21/70 showing

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99.98% efficiency for,the filters.

Another DOP test was performed on 5/7/71 showing 99.98% ef ficiency.

The < licensee's' procedures

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for DOP testing of filters are contained in Chapter 10.2.4 of the

~ Health and Safety Procedures Manual dated 3/19/69.

Licensee rep-resentatives stated that these procedures were followed.

Licensee representatives stated that original drawings of the HEV system were approved on 6/16/67.

Revision 1 was approved 10/30/

67.

Revision 2 was approved 11/17/67 "As built" drawings "ere approved 6/22/70 and final drawings were assembled and submitted to the Plant Manager on 12/2/70.

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LowLevelWastbTreatmentFacility (LL"T)

Training records maintained by Operations showed that all, operators i

had-received training in the operation of the LLWT on 4/20 and(

21/71, approximately one month prior to turning over the facility to the-licensee. Temporary operating procedures - TOP-02 and'04 were approved by the safety committee on 5/21/71, according-to the Safety Committee minutes.

The entire system was checked out with non-radioactive water on 4/15,17 and 20/71 prior to operations.

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All checks were completed by 5/10/71.

DOP tests of Filters were performed on 5/7/71 and found to be 99.98% efficient.

Licensee personnel stated that the LL'R facility did not meat de-sign expectation of lowering Sr-90 concentrations to the e'xtent anticipated.

However, research is being continued with different ion exchange media which appears to have promise.

The LL'n does, however, reduce other fission product concentrations in Cattar-augus Creek by a factor of 100.

The records,also show that Sr-90 concentrations exist in the order of 3 X 10-o uCi/ml water after l

operation of the system. This is still below~10 CFR 20 Ap-4 pendix 3, Table II levels of 3 X 10-/ uCi/ml.

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W The inspector noted that the licensee has modified the LLWT sys-g tem to increase its efficiency and operation by institution of f

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r steady inflow rates and ph adjustment.

Full sets of plans were noted to have been available prior to operation of the system.

e 11.

Unusual Occurrences A review of the licensee's " Health P$ysics Log" revealed that jet

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  1. 4C-7 was accidently left open on May 25, 1972, causing an esti-4 mated release of 2.02 mei beta activity.

The log revealed that 1

prior to the incident a decontaminating solution had been run through this particular jet.

The log revealed that the operator 3

on the morning of May 26, 1972 noticed that the liquid level on L

Tank # 4D-S was increasing and that solution was leaking out of the ratio-relay on the 4C-7 pressure pot.

The operator closed the valve and notified the Health and Safety Division and his shift supervisor.

The log indicated that the Upper Extraction Aisle had a puddle of water on the floor due to a total leakage of 1 1/2 - 2 gallons acid-water mixture and that this area was isolated and surveyed.

Surveys were performed with an Eberline PAC-4 and showed readings of 7000 cpm alpha on the liquid and the surrounding floor area 50,000 cpm alpha.

Air concentrations of room air samplers in con-tinuous operation were noted to be 8.4 X 10-13 uCi/m1, alpha and k,,

3.0 X 10-12 uci/ml, beta.

After several decontamination efforts, the contamination was re-duced to 45 dpm alpha /100 cm2 on 5/30/72.

The activity in the puddle was identified as Pu-239.

Bioascay records, uhich were reviewed, tndicated that those involved in operations and in the decontamination effort were counted by a whole body counter on 6/9/71 and no alpha activity was found.

The cause of the inci-dent was determined by l'icensee representatives as due to a con-trol room operator telling a workman to close the 4-C-7 jet.

The workman stated that he did not hear the operator and left the jet open.

Corrective action, according to licensee representatives, was the issuance of an SOP requiring that all velving operations be performed b'y the control room operator.

The SOP, which was re-viewed by the inspector, also specified that this duty cannot be ql delegated.

12.

Records of the Heath Physics log vere examined and revealed O

that on June 15, 1972 oper ors in the Upper Extraction Aisle (UXA) had been preparing a 2ngancte solution to be used in decontamination.

The recora indicated that during the solution Mcparation, some solution splashed onto the valls of the UXA

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aisle and the' operators cleaned and re.ovet' the permanganate with g,.

copious amounts of water.

Some of the water splashed onto the l

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electronics portion of the continuous stack monitor, shorting.out.

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' the system, which caused full scale 'aadings.

An air sampler fil-ter paper. mounted at the 80 foot 1. vel of the stack was immediately

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pulled and counted. Activity re' eased was determined to have alpha l

.concentra{gonsof1.15X10-22 sci /mlandbetaconcentrationswere q

1.5 X 10-uC1/ml.

These er.centrations are 2.7% of' the allowable 3

-release rate and correspond to 2.06 X 10-5 uC1/see alpha and 2.68 j

X 10-3 uC1/sec, beta, and nere.within technical specification limits.

j

.i 13.- Licensee representatives stated that they change the anthrac'ite fil-d ter media of their low level waste treatment f acility. (LL*.lT) at per-4-

iodic intervals. The procedure requires flushing the filter media.

from the LLWT into two-1000 gallon burial tanks.

The anthracite filter media settles to the bottom and the supernatent liquid is to be siphoned off into a drain which leads to Storage Lagoon #2 in accordance with SOP-15-1, Plant Liquid Releases.

A review of the." Health Physics Log", revealed that at 23:30 hours on 6/15/70, an operator, apparently decided that the siphoning ac-tion from the underground tank to the-drain was proceeding too slowly.

He inserted a second siphon pump but the nozzle end of the duct could not fit into the drain so the supernatent liquid, pulled from the underground tank by the second siphon, was allowed II..

to flow along the ground surface.

At 03:00 hours on 6/16/72, the water was noted to be running onto the ground.

The water remaining in the hose line was sampled on the morning of 6/16/72 by the Health Physics Group and beta activity of 8.9 X 10-4 uCi/mi was noted. An estimated 600 gallons had been re-leased to the ground surface.

A total of 2.02 mei mixed beta ac-tivity was released.

Licensee representatives stated that the soil, where activity was noted to exist because of the release, was removed, packed in waste drums, and buried in the ASDA burial site.

The ground had measured radioactivity levels of 50 mR/hr at the surface.

Licensee representatives stated that the liquid si-phoned off the charcoal contained activity due to being in ccatact with contaminated equipment.

l 7~

14.

The incident report revealed that the subject involved was a la-borer working at the waste burial site.

The subject, by self i

monitoring at 16:45 hours on July 7, 1972, discovered contamina-tion on his person and immediately notified his supervisor.

L1-2 censee representatives stated that a Health Physics technician immediately reported to the site, and using an Eberline GM cnd window probe, reported 3000 cpm on the subjects jacket, 6000 cpa, 7

~,

1 l

on his' shirt and'on his forehead 1000 - 2000 cpm.

n..

On the evening lof July 7,1972 a visit was made to the subjects l

home at Scranton, N.Y., by a technician from the Health Physics 1

t l

1 1

1 bC.LOSOETr.

(%OF'2O i

y r

u s

--13

=

J I

I l

/,.

l Group,,and a survey with a'GM revealed contamination existing on a pillowcase, washcloth, sheet and jacket in'the order of 250 -

.3000 cpm. A towel had activity of 25,000 cym.

.t 3

Urinalysis ' samples provided by the subject on 7/7/72 revealed in j

two samplings, 11 and 14 dpm/24' hours void'of fission products, A

Cs-134, -137.

A chest count performed July 10, 1972 revealed the j' l presence of 32 nei Cs-137.- With this quantity representing. 12.5% of what was inhaled, then-256 nci gould have been inhgled.: Using 4

'l' X 10-8 uC1/ml the limit expressed in Appendix B, Table I,10

.CFR 20'and an. inhalation of-5 X 10-7 ml/40 hr week, 500 nei could q) have been inhaled to equal an exposure to 40 itPC hrs.

A nacal smear taken on 7/7/72 showed an activity of 5800 dpm, equiv <-

'alent to'2.64 uci.

Tnvestigation by licensee personnel revealed-the contamination occurred on July 6, 1972, when the laborer was j

oiling the lift crane in the wacte burial area.

Licensee personnel l

stated that procedures have been set.forth whereby head covers would be worn in addition to other protective clothing-(

)

15.

Licensee representatives stated that on 6/26/72 at 13:00 hours, j

cement blocks, which had been use d in the of f gas aisle (OCA),,,

were removed for burial.

Examinttion of the Health Phys 4.cs log i

indicated that the cement blocks were urapped in plactic and e,.

. brought to the roof of the COA where they were transferred from the roof to a " Red Stake Truck".

A health physics technician measured the dose ratas and noted radiation levels of 5k/hr from the cement blocks.

He stated and the records indicated that no contamination surveys were made.

Licensee representatives stated

['

that no person noted or repaired the torn plastic wrappings.

Li-censee. representatives stated that the cement blocks were grossly contaminated and had been used to shield an acid rccovery line in

.the OCA.

They stated that the removal of the cement blocks was part of the current program to reduce radiation icvels and con-tamination in production areas.

The person became exposed, for a periom of approxima tely 5 minutes,

j while unloading; manually, the c'ement blocks from the Red Stake Truck.

On 6/23/72 S'R No. 5034 which authorized the removal of

.).

the cement bricks, showed dose rate measurements of 15, 40 and 250 R/hr at'the surface of the blocks.

During the 5 ninutes unloading a

time a self-reading dosimeter showed a reading of 100 mR.

The person exposed followed the'p*oper procedure by passing through 7

~

a monitoring station at 16:30 and the monitor alarmed.

The person i

L notified his supervisor, who in turn notified the Health and g

l Safety Croup, which immediately respo;.ded to the scene.

A Health

!L Physics Technician immediately obtained a nasal swab which showed activity of,180 dpm alpha and 170,C;0 dpm beta equal to 77 nei

beta activity.

The nasal swab was cnalyted chemically and j

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G.te_tetoes E.

64. ce 2c 3

m in :

)

D w

j, g

['

g, I

J showed Ru-116 - 19.6.nci, Sr-90,- 0.24 nei, Pu-02.109 nci,' Zr-Ni-544 nci, Ratio. studies were:

ZrNi,-95. 544 = 27.7

^

Rul06 19.6 j

4 s.

J t

9 ' ',

5000 h

ZrNi-95 ~544 =,2305

'ZrNi-95 544

=

j 1

Sr-90

.236_

Pu-239

.109 a The perion(was decontaminated and also.had nasal flushes < performed.

]pj l

.('-

)j

'He was immediately who*e body counted and the results of this count

, and succeeding-whole body counts are shown -in the licensee 's let-

L, ter;of July 26, 1972.

The licensee' calculated that the subject was

.f a

expo' sed to ' 71 MPC hours of combined concentrations of Pn-239, Ru-ll6 and ZrNi-95 or 1.77 X 40 hr MPC as sr.ated"An Appendix E Table I 10 CFR'20..

1

/

A review of the'11censee's calculations revealed'that the licensee used a total volume of. 2150 ml for 15 raspirations per minute. This.

resulted in a higher-amount of millimeters of air breathed per 40

~

hour work week, than listed in Radiological Health Handbook, Janu-ary 1970 edition., USHEW, page 216 of 9500 liters /8 hour work day.

Using the' licensees method with 7.74 X 10n7 ml air /40 hour work week instead of 5 X 10-7 ml air /40 hour work week, an exposure of 75;5 MPC hours or 1.89 X MPC was obtained..The licensee in:his cal-<

g culations obtained 71 MPC hour or 1,78 X MPC, a slight difference.

9 See Exhibit "A" for, calculations.

The inspector noted thot.the

. subject received written totice of his exposure from examination of -

records of personnel monitoring.

The licensee sta.ced that the surveys of the blocks prior to trans-fer consisted only of direct radiation measurements.

The records indicated that.no survey was made to determine cont' amination levels.

Licensee representatives. stated that the cement blocks were being

~

sent f~or solid waste burial and were not packaged to prevent contamination of handlers.

The laborer, involved, was stated to be a handler.

Proper packaging, according to the licensee rep-resentatives would include plastic covering over the cement blocks themselves plua a plywood container.

The licensee representatives stated that no plywood' container uns provided for the cement block burial.

7

[b 16.

Licensee representatives identified the employee who died this i

-C spring as a laundry worker, age 72.

Personnel records indicated that he worked at NFS as a laundryman between 10/12/66 and 1/19/

= 7 2.. Records of personnel monitoring indicate that the deceased's total whole body exposure in 5.25 years of uork was 8.950 rem.

J' Forms AEC-4 and -5 were examined and showed no quarterly exposure I

in ucess of 1.2 rem. The records also indicate an extremity and L

skin exposure, for 5.25 years, of 11.7 rad.

j

  • p

.s.

t L The 'subj ect ' underwent routine urine analysis and whole body count -

ing during"his c=ployment.

Urine analysis record results were as L

follows:

i..

.e M:

'FAssion Products 4

Volume Date of Sample net. dpm/ml.

Pu-239 dpm/1 j

?

~3/17/67.

922 ml.

.14 1.06.(removed fib 10[12/67 900 ml.-

108

.3 for 50 days

'1/2/68 930 ml.

.03

.3

-from work) d' i' 3/13/68 800

.03

.3 L-3/19/68 1000

.03'

.0.732

'6/20/70 1000

.03 None-detected 10/17/70

. fecal sample

.03/gm.

None detecte'd 3/19/71 1000

.03 0.07 Whole Body Counting Record Results

.4/67 13 nei Cs-137 4/68.

background 4/69 background 4/70 background a

An interview was held with the medical doctor who treated the rub-ject.

He stated that the subject underwent lung removal at the

'Chaffee Memorial Hosp. cal in the Spring of 1972 and died shortly thereafter due to spread of a malignancy to other portions of the body.

The physician involved stated that the subject smoked to excess and was of advanced age.

His opinion voiced to the inspec-tor, was that the malignancy noted, was in no way related to the occupation he had at NFS.

Licensee representatives, interviewed, all stated that no suit at law was pending from any interested party.

Records of stack releases were examined from 4/1/70 to 9/1/72 and no excessive releases were noted.

A11 releases appeared to meet Tech-nical Specification limits and 10 CFR 20 limits.

Inspections dur-ing 1972 have been unannounced and no advanced notification was TT given to the licensee.

Smear data was reviewed and some 500 smears are counted weekly.

There was some contamination noted with high p

levels in operating areas but there was also a constant cleaning b'

effort.

Work order records indiccted a constant replacement of contaminated objects and consequent reduction of ambient radiation icvels.

.s.

17.

The lic'ensee's investigation report, was reviewed and reveiled that k_

at 0800 hours0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br /> on August 9, 1972 one contractor employee noticed what was later determined to be a 24 Ci Ir-192 source capsule and its pigtail, 9 inches long, hanb ng on a pipe inside an Acid Re-i

-covery Cell under constmtetion.

It Ecd been determined that a

3.

1 s

b radiographycompany.licensedby'theStateo[NewYorkhadper-formed radiographyJinside the Acid Recovery cell after 1600 hour0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br />s-on August 8, 1972.

The. worker (Employee No. 1) finding.the source

],

examined it;briefly, one or two seconds, holding the source be-i tween the thumb'and forefinger of one hand and the hook end of the sour e cabic between the' thumb and forefinger of the other hand.

?

A" p

Employee No. 1 above handed the' source to Employee No. 2 who in-y spected the obj ect in the san + manner ~ at length.

His statement

{' i was that it was 2 or 3 minute, but reenactment limited the'. hand-ling time to 15 seconds.

Employee No. 2 stated ~that he placed.the object.in his tool box and a short while later he took the object

'from his. tool box to.show it'to employee No. 3.

He 1tated that i

Employee No. 3 handled'it'in the same manner from 5 to-10 seconds and that Employee No. 3 replaced the object in the tool box.

Fn-ployee No. 2 stated that at about 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br /> on August 9. 1972 he saw the raciographer approaching the gateLand asked emnioyee No.

3 to give him the obj ect.

Employee No. 2 then carried the source to the gate approximately 25 feet away and held a conversation with the. radiographer.

He stated th'e radiographer denied that the object was his, but finally took the~ coject and walked with it in his hand to his truch.

Licensee representatives stated that the radiographer reported the loss of two dosimeters; the'une provided by his company and tha' one provided by NFS.

Licensee representatives also did not know what had happened-to the film badge vorn by the radiographer.

On September.20, 1972 the inspector questioned contractor em-ployees about the training NFS provided them.

Employee No.'2

. stated to the inspector, upon learning the inspector's iden ity, "Look.what that thing did to me."

The inspector'noted what ap-peared to be two healed blisters one on the edge of the fo're-finger above

e first joint and one on the thumb in the same position.

The blistered-area on each finger was noted to be ap-2 proximately 0.2 cm,

Employee No. 2 st.ated that the blisters appeared 8 days af ter Aug-(

(:

ust 9, 1972 and that he brought the blisters to the attention of a 1

physician wh,o gave him the opinion that they might be duc'to his i

work as a welder.

's l-Q The physician involved was interviewed by the inspector on September

.p, L

20, 1972.

He stated that no one had previously spoken to him rela -

ting to the actual circumstances of the exposure.

Me again entled

~

employee No'. 2 to the. infirmary and ekamined his fingers.

After I

the employee left, the physickn exprescad the opinion that the l

blisters could reprerent a possible radiation syndrere, and that l

further expert evaluation was needed.

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- - 17. - '

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'ALlicensee. representative. stated' chat-he had:made an evaluation of:

I 'the hand,' exposure using / the gamma. constant for ! iridium-192 lis ted.

~on pagall31.ofLthe 1970 edition of the' Radiological Health Handbook

? ',.

~-

, and. arrived at a dose rate fo. 24 Ci of' Ir-192: of 20R/sec.at. con-'

tact., He s tated that. he realized it, hat this' exposure rate was';1ow' h

4

~

but.

that he'had no other' sources of infor=ation to refer to.

~

The

?

' inspector referred him,to the Handbook:-of Health Physics OSP-70, 1

' April.1963,..page E 3 which shows;a dose rate'per curie for Ir-192

- j at :1 ma distance of 5000 R/hr.- The inspector calculated, using

~

the
same factor'used-by the'~ licensee representative, a. dose rate-

'd a

of 160. rad /sec'to.the area'of the finger' involved.

See Exhibit "B" for calculations.

Employee No. 2 could ha~ve received a. cal-s culated:exposur'e to a limited portion of his finger during 30 seconds-handling time of 4800 rad..

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2 18 m

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. CALCULATIONS i

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1..

From Vo'1.12,' LHealth PhysicsLJournal.'1966, " Task Group on. Lung

Dynamic s"..

7f

.hg

. 15 respirations a minute x ' 2150 =1/ respiration

.rj

-x 60' min /hr.x -40 hr/ week

  • 7.74 x ~ 10 : ral. air breathed 7

by'u workman during 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br />.

Ib 1

eMaximum' amount.of each radionuclide raced which could be ~ inhaled -

L during 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br />..

From Appendix B, Table I, 10.CFR 20.

Zr-Ni-95

  • 3 x;10-8 ' uci x ' 7. 74 x.10-7 al '- 0. 46 uCi cr : 2130 nei.

i Ru-10'6 =. 6 x 10-9 'uci 'x 7. 74 x >10-7 al - 0.46 uCi or 460 nei..

Sr-90 =15 x 10-9 x 7.74 x 10-7 21 = 0.39 uC1 or 390 nei.

Pu-239'a '2 x' YO-7 ml = 15.5 x 10-5 uci or 0.'155 nei.

~

The licensee used the ' amount' ih. the nose plus. the activity.noted in a whole body.~ count.taken'3. hours post incident as the total uptake.

Zr-Ni.Ru-106 Sr +

Pu-239 611 + 544 nei-22 + 19.6-nei 0.5 nei

.10 +.109-1155 nci'-

+

'41.6

+ 0;5 nei

+

0.209 2130 460 390 0.155 1.89 x 40

=

0.54

+

.09 0

1.35 = 75 5 MFC hrs.

p d1 B.

i i

EX111 BIT. "is" k

=

, =i -

s

~

-.....r

?k,

' W,. :

; ; 9 '., ',

f 19 -;

y

e

'I fCalcula tions. of. Dose 'Rcte -. f roia.'a.l24 C1 Ir-192 sotirce at ' contact.

,i

i. w
1. >From page 131; Radiological Health Handbook, tFe gamna constant '='

. t

, 4.8 for Ir-192.

' ^

. A

4. 8 ~= ' R -- cm2 '.

(

hr-mci-mei = 24 x 103L area of blister = 0.2 em2

'4.8 x 24'x'1'03 =.R/hr' 0.2.

f!

t 57.6 x 104, Rad /hr

'i

=

57 x1104 Rad /hr

+36 x 10' sec/hr.

..f.

r.

160 Rad /sec

=

r ei d',

L

=

0,.

li-5.0b s.

i

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t ts '..

-n

' l 1

I EX11IBIT' '.'S"

- 3 i

l

-bMG060RG M

D

.., _.. -...........;..:...~.-;...

"..'j..

n.-1. A "n'/s7a",*e E ~ J

. a sec d Eo5

  • ls'o7Ed o5'

.[. ~

a

/t f.' ;g ac cm j

j 970 ERO AD STR EET

.j ;13'.

E 1

N CW A R.. NEW JEDE E Y. 0 71 ;2 5

., e s

S k,p f n,,a,.

p-JAN' 51973 ith,'Ac. ting Senior,' Facilities Radiological Protection Section, f

R.Directorate of Regulatory Operations, RO:I

. r f5:

l

. INSPECTOR'S 'r; VALUATION

' NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES, INCORPORATED

}

' VEST VALLEY, NEW YOPX LICENSE OSF-1 revealed A fo113w-up inspection conducted from September.19. to -29,1972 l

items do not constitute a hazard.

three'violationn.

Thes:

Activities presently consist The facility is in, shut-down condition.

of a construction of improved facilities, repair of used or damaged No hazard'is believed to exist equipment, decontamination and cleanup.

.{

because of these activities.

l' forth in an anonymous letter An inquiry was made into allegations setThe details of this complaint.are covered in

'y dated September 3, 1972.

The person alluded to in the com-paragraph 16 of the report details. plaint was. identified as Haafez (9) con-An inquiry was also made into overexposures incurred by nine The details of these exposures are covered in para-tractor employees.

graph.17 of report details.

This matter was referred to the State of New York by P. Stohr, RO:1, by telephone on 9/21/72 for their further evaluation and consideration of this incident.

The license is properly categorized as A-(1) and will be reinspected on a priority 1 basis.

.\\

/(w-E. Epstein Radiatian Specialist.

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x[N.x;;P U tilTC D T,T /.'I t3

.fJ ATOMIC ENERGY'COMMISSIOIC J.f -

_ {T/.

, m n cero'n Av c or ve cV LA*f 0 H Y OPcR ATION S n

oa pm, )..

ne:mou, ;

,k C#

,E 970 llRO AD STRCC T l

(/

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NEW ARK, NEW JCHSCY 07102, d

JAlt :51973 L,;;f 1

.G. W. Roy, Chief, Materf E.2 s &f Fuel Facilities Branch,

~

T Directorate of' Regulatory-Operations, RO:HQ 1

1 1

'R0 INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-201/72 *

~ NUCLEAR. FUEL SERVICES, INCORPORATED:

i

{

1rTEST VALLEY,1 NEW YORK

-s The sugject inspection? report is forwarded for' your infornation.

1-1 The identity.of'the person alluded to in the anonymous, letter (Re-

. port. Details,-Paragraph 16) was Haafez Saadek, SS-050-12-1213, BD.

- July 23, 1900..

q The information obtained regarding the' overexposure of nine construc.

l tion ermloyees (Report Details, Paragraph 17).. was provide.d to the i

State of New York on September j.

. low-up.of the' incident.- '

21, 1972 for:their evaluation and.fol-

~

A regional' documentation < letter f.s being forwarded to the' licensee regarding the inspection results.-

i f

Q c)

q.

Paul R. Nelson, Chief f

Radiological 6. Environmental i

Fr6tection Branch--

Enclosure:

Subj ect Inspection Report

^

. c:. R0' Chief, Materials & Fuel Facilities Branch j-RO:HQ (4) i jj L:D/D for Fuels'&^ Materials i

,e

'DR Central Files t

f. '

PDR, Rpt only l w.1Dn

%+~..,

I.,

NSIC<, Rpt only-

[

State of New Ycrk, Rpt only.

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J 80091 5,// 7 E.tactosoze M u

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