ML20148B860
| ML20148B860 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/09/1978 |
| From: | Page R NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Bradford P NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148B855 | List: |
| References | |
| SECY-79-058, SECY-79-58, NUDOCS 8001240256 | |
| Download: ML20148B860 (2) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:_ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ i 4 1 _. J- e
. , , . .,. _..l November 9, 1978 7 ;
.-4 MEMORANDUM FOR: Coc:missioner Bradford I
THRU: '. Ex(svee wam A cirosecutive Director for Operations FROM: R. G. Page, Special Assistant to the Director for Licensing - Division of Safeguards, W.SS
SUBJECT:
DECLA?ID ORIGIN OF F0PIIGN-0WNED MATERIALS 1 This is in response to your ce=:randum of October 12, 1978, concerning the subject tatter. ' Based upon verbal infor:ation that we have received, it is com.on practice for companies to " swap" cuclear raterials originating in different countries. We have no docu=ents to support this, but companies nave informed us orally that " swapping" periodically occurs. We have no infor atica to support, the example case centioned in your mecorandum. ne are oid that swapping is done principally e.s a cost savir.gs business practice to avoid unnecessary sn. 4.pments of nucisar caterials. .- c r example, a cc pany in country A cay receive nuclear caterial tna: Oricina ed in ecuntr.v 3 that is owed b.v a comany
. e in coun:ry C. Countr.v B ray have r'ecuimd as a condition of supply tha coun:ry C use the ca erial for peaceful purposes in :na: country. In a separa .e cencur en: '
transaction coun:ry C ray have agreed to supply country A wi n an ecuiva-len; acoun Of nuclear saterial na; c:es no: have attacned to it coun:ry Origin controis. Ratner than ship tne country B origin na:erial in country A to coun ry C and separately ship :ne nondesignated country crigin caterial in countr/ C to country A, -te shipper and receiver agree
;o swap catarials :: cc: ply with country origin comitr.ents wi hout an actual physical transfer of caterials. The substitu:fon of nuclear raterials in :nis canner is an accepted internati:nal practice we are sn .
e Set:0 ping of caterials in :nis manner, or core pre?erly ne swapping of ce:lared crigin, coes not appear c r-ml; in any ne: recuction in the
. aman: of .a erial :: which controis i::csed by the originally cesignate:
su;;;ier wcuic apply. I,ose controis scule simply be tr:nsferre: from ! cne batch of caterial to another, soce:imes in a differer.: country. Con:act: I 1 I I i i i
, g o 0124 0 18b ;
".. :nile :ne net ar. ant of material to which these controis are applied retains constant, Oneir effectiveness could be undent.ined through this kind of swapping. For exa= pig, if the United States has a e reprocessing veto en caterial supplied to country A which that country
- h. now wishes to reprocess, he could escape the effec: of the control by
- 2. a swapping arrangement which transfers the US label to a similar lj amount of material in country 3, not intended for reprocessing at
- na notant. By effecting such swaps whenever US c0ntrols would come into effect, their whole purpose could be defeated. It is not clear whether er to what extent tnis is occurring in practice, but
'l .i it is a least a theoretical possibility.
The information concerning the swapping of nuclear materials cane to our attention during our efforts to determine the present loca: ion of all nuclear materiais of foreign origin currently within the United _a S ta tes. That information is needed to establish baseline country-crigin accounts to implement tne country origin tracking system that NP.C and
, 00E will initiate en January 1,1979. SECY.78-f90, , ca_: ed Sep; amber 8,
., 1978 cascribes the i=plementation plans._ ____ _.____
The date centioned to initiate the country origin tracking recuiremen s
. has been delayed from October 1,1978 to January 1,1979 to allow ccapanies more time to prepare to implemen the new requirements. - Tne new tracking requirscents will permit fungibility of nuclear cateriais whereby receipts of nuclear material =ay bo com:ined with existing inventory quantities. Later shipments may actually contain mixed origin nuclear materials, but would be recorded as matorial originating in one particular country. There is no recuirement tha; atocs ce precisely accounted for by country origin. There is a restric-tion, however, tha: the Octai of all withdranais from a particular origin a::oun: cannot exceed the corresponding inputs to tha 20: cunt. Origin swacoing can be detected witn the new tracking procedures unles: swapping c::urs oe:reen two ?revi0usly established country accounts and these nave sufficiently large balances to cover coun:ry crigin swapping.
I: would be our inten tc monitor country crigin accounts of licensees
, to assure :na: withdrawals do not exceed inputs for designatec :Ountries.
In answer to your las: question, IAEA reporting recuiraments identif f snipoing and receiving coun: ries, bu: c: not acdress :ne cuestion of country crigin of nuclear material:.
; 4~ ui s r ,t -.s.
-a.'-
R. G. page, 5:e:ial Assistar.: to the Direc::r f:- Licensi.-{
. Division cf Safeguarts cc: Chai.c,an hendrie m......,...:. . ... . . .y
.CO.=- ..i... ._;..i o n e...*.".
.l ' K.a..n...n,.e dy Comissionerj Ansarne
, l _ . . . .
S 4 Y*}}