ML20148B851
| ML20148B851 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/23/1979 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148B855 | List: |
| References | |
| SECY-79-058, SECY-79-58, NUDOCS 8001240253 | |
| Download: ML20148B851 (5) | |
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1 January 23, 1979 SECY-79-58 i COMMISSIONER ACTION For: The Cccrcissioners Frctn: William J. Dircks, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
/"4 Thru: Executive Director for Operations. v-
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Subiect: DECIARED CRIGIN OF NCCI?lR MATERIALS Purcose: To.cbtain a Cctnissica decision regarding a pcssible chance in NRC reculations to recuire licensees to report origin swapping of nuclear raterials.
Catecerv: This paper concerns a rinor policy issue.
Issue: Should the SRC be kept currently informed of the nuclear transactions involving licensees in which there is an origin swapping of nuclear raterials?
Decision Cn teria: (1) Are de proliferation implicatiens of origin swapping of nuclear raterials of sufficient Cctrissien concern to justify levying a routine reporting requirement en licensees?
(2) Would inferratien frca licensees alcne, and not frcm ECE license-exempt coa. tractors provide the infor-raticn deemed necessarv bv the Cecm,ssicn. to assure that U.S. proliferaticn.cen'tro'ls en exported nuclear raterials are not being circu:riented?
Alternatives: (1) Publish propcsed rule changes in very near future without further study to require licensees to report origin swapping of nuclear raterials.
I
Contact:
R. G. Page, WSS/SG 42-74036 e
8 0 01 2 4 0 d 5.3
(2) Conduct a study of origin swapping transactions during the past year and those planned for the near future including an inforral survey (by phone or visit) of lice,nsees and centacts with the Department of Energy and their centractors, and an assessment of the prolifer-ation irplications of such transactions. The need for, and likelihood of achieving internationally agreed supplier controls on sapping would also be assessed.
(3) Decide new not to require licensees to report origin swapp:.ng.
Discussion: Backzround Based upon verbal inforation received by R!SS, it is cccrrn practice for ccganies to " swap" nuclear raterials originating in different countries. Swapping is an arrangement whereby nuclear raterials that originated in one country are exchanged for nuclear raterials held by another organication that originated in a different country without a physical transfer of raterial. This inferration came to light during our efforts to deterine the location of nuclear raterials of foreign origin currently within the United States so as to establish baseline country-origin acccunts to implerent the country of origin tracking systen initiated by :iRC cn. January 1,1979.
Info: atica conceming this ratter was rc uested by Ccmissioner Bradford and.orovided to him in a cencran 7. dated Neveser 9, 1978 (Enclosu're 1). After reviewing and considering this information, Cecrissioner 3radford has requested us to examine the possibility of requiring NRC licensees to repcrt each " swap" 'in which they participate (Enclosure 2).
Analvsis of Alternatives Fo11cwing is a listing of arguments pro and con for each alternative.
Alternative 1 Publish propcsed rule changes in very near future withcut further study to, require licensees to report origin sapping or nuclear raterials .
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Pro o Would. permit NRC to evaluate each seping transaction involvingNRClicenseesonacurrentbasisandenable NRC to initiate timely action if a reported transaction indicates a potential for circumventien of U.S.
proliferatica centrols on exported nuclear materials, o Ihis alternative provides the quickest means to determine whether and to what extent origin swapping cccurs and might be used in the future to circumvent U.S. e:gort controls.
Ccn o Ue have not as yet identified a type of origin swapping transaction that could result in a possible circumvention of U.S. export controls.
o Since such a reporting requirencat wculd affect caly NRC licensee transactions, it would be of limited value as a centrol ceasure.
o The. principal argument for imposing the reperting requirement would be to assess if a potential ,orablem exists and such an assessment should properly ce made before the rec,uire.ent is impcsed, o Khile it does not appear that reporting such informatica vould be costiv and difficult for licensees, ve do not really kncu th'e extent to shich origin swappin- has occurred in the past and therefore do not real!y Icew what the cost impact might be en licensees.
Alternative 2 Conduct a study or origin swapping transacticns during the past year and those planned for the near future, including an in:orral survey (by phone or visit) of licensees and contacts with the Department of Ener2v and their centrac-tors, and an assess =ent of the proliTeratien i, plications of such transactions. The need for, and likeliheed of achieving internationally agreed supplier controls en swapping uculd also be assessed.
Pro o Would . develop inforration necessary to deternine if such a reporting requirement is needed and permit NRC assessment of the possible impacts on licensee operations.
o Would allcw appropriate time for discussions concerning those sapping transactions involving DCE license-exempt contracters or sm pping arrangements ,oetween toreign parties involving U.S. origin raterial.
Ccn o Could delay the date for taking acticn reprding l future swarping transactions that could lead to a possible ciretz:venticn of U.S. export centrols. j l
o Licensees rav not raintain cccolete inforratien of this type an'd response ray be incomplete.
Alternative 3 Decide new not to require licensees to report origin swapping. !
l Pro o ~
We have not as . vet identified a
- a tvce of oririn s1 of U.S. export ccatrols.
Cen i i
o Without a careful e::arination of past and future origin swapping transacticas (accccolished by Alternative 2),
we could be prematurelv deciding not to take acticn regarding origin swacptng transactions that could undermine U.S. .proli'faration centrols on e:gorted nuclear raterials.
If the Coranissien decides in tavor or Alternative 1, it shculd censider encouragerent of ECE to i::olenent a similar requirement applicable to DCE license-exedt operatiens.
Large quantitles of ncrral UFs enter the U.S. each year consigned directly to DCE, and these do not involve a dccestic licensee. Unless origin suspping transactions
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l involving all U.S.-supplied nuclear raterials are currently scrutinized, the requirment applied only to licensees ray not be_ justifiable.
Reccmendation: The Cecrcission: )
(1) Acorove Alternative 2.that staff collect and ccnduct o oripn swapping of U.S.
a scucy ofnuclear exported data involvin$s rateria which cecurred during calendar l year 1978 and swapping planned in near future.
(2) Direct the staff to carry cut this study within a perica of three months.
Coordination: Tne Office of International Progrars concurs. The Office of the Executive Legal Director has no legal objections.
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& J Willia:n J. Dircks, Director Office of Muclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Enclosures:
- 1. Memo to Ccen:. Bradford 5n R.G.Page dtd 11/9/78
- 2. Memo .to W.J.Dircks in Ccent.
Bradford dtd 1/5/79 Commissioners' comtrents should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by close of business Monday, February 5,1979.
Commissien Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Ccmmissioners NLT January 30, 1979, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary. If the paper is of. such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments l may be expected. I DISTRIBUTION l Cc-.irsienors .
'CP mission Staff affices 3cc. Dir. for Cncrs.
'ACRS !
Secretariat j i
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