ML20148B041

Forwards Insp Repts 50-321/87-31 & 50-366/87-31 on 871130-1211.Potential Enforcement Findings (Pefs) Noted. Chance That Deficiencies Not Presently Representative Recognized.List of Pefs Under Consideration Encl

ML20148B041
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	03/16/1988
From:	Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Head G GEORGIA POWER CO.
Shared Package
ML20148B044	List: ML20148B041 ML20148B186
References
NUDOCS 8803210330
Download: ML20148B041 (4)

See also: IR 05000321/1987031

Text

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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k..... MAR 1 o 1988

Docket Nos. 50-321, 50-366

Georgia Power Company

ATTN: George S. He'ad

Senior Vice President

P. 0. Box 4545

Atlanta, GA 30302

Gentlemen:

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SUBJECT: QUALITYVERIFICAil0NFUhCTIONINSPECTIONATE.I. HATCH

NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-321/87-31 AND 50-366/87-31

. Enclosed is the report of the special, announced NRC team inspection con-

ducted at Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Power Plant from November 30 through

December 11; 1987, of activities authorized by NRC License Nos. DPR-57 and

NPF-5. The inspection team consisted of K. Hooks, J. Heller, K. Jury,

G. Pick, W. Scott, and M. Shannon of the NRC. The inspection team's findings

were discussed with J. T. Beckham, H. C. Nix, and other members of your staff

at the conclusion of the inspection.

The inspection was the fifth in a series of NRC Headquarters-directed Quality

VerificationFunctionInspections(QVFIs)performedundertheguidanceof

Temporary Instruction (T.I) 2515/78. The inspection focused on the effective-

ness of your quality verification organizatiora in identifying, resolving,

and preventing safety-significant technical deficiencies. The inspection

also evaluated the effectiveness of your management in ensuring that identi-

fied quality deficiencies were responded to promptly and con,pletely.

Our review indicates that the Hatch quality verification organization's

performance has been generally effective in the operations and plant modifi-

cations areas. The staff involved in these areas are experienced individuals

who are capable of conducting in-depth technical verifications. The audits,

surveillances, and observations conducted in these areas are perfortnance-

oriented and have resulted in the identification of significant issues that

impact plant reliability and safety. Additionally, management appears to be

effective in ensuring that deficiencies are addressed promptly and completely.

Although the Hatch quality verification organizations were found to be

generally effective, the NRC inspection team identified six Observations

and three Potential Enforcement Findings (PEFs); these are described in the

Inspection Report. The PEFs are associated with Design Change Request (DCR)85-007, and relate to failure to identify a Technical Specification viola-

tion associated with reactor water clean-up (RWCU) system primary containment

isolation valves, inadequate post-maintenance / modification testing of the

RWCU system, and failure to properly identify the bases for the detemination

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that a change did not involve an unreviewed safety question. The details of

these PEFs are given in Enclosure 1; these apparent violations of regulatory

requirements will be further evaluated by NRC 9egion 11 management for

possible enforcement action. Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/87-31 and

50-366/87-31 is in Enclosure 2. The NRC recognizes that DCR 85-007 was

initiated in January 1985, and the deficiencies identified are not necessarily

representative of the present organization at Hatch Nuclear Plant.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosures

will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. No reply to this letter is

required at this time. _ ,

Should you have any questions regarding this inspectiun, please contact us or

the NRC Region II Office.

-

Se erely, 1

. I

, '

g

even . r , 're or

Division of Reactor P ects I/II

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

,

Enclosures: ,

1. Potential Enforcement Findings

2. Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/87-31

and 50-366/87-31

cc w/encls:

J. T. Beckham, Vice President, Plant Hatch

H. C. Nix, Manager, Plant Hatch

l

0. M. Fraser, Manager, Site Quality Assurance

L. T. Gucwa, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing

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ENCLOSURE 1

P0TENTIAL ENFORCEMENT FINDINGS

As a result of the NRC Quality Verification Function Inspection at Hatch

Nuclear Plant from November 30 through December 11, 1987, the following items

listed below are being referred to Region II as Potential Enforcement Findings.

Section references given refer to the detailed descriptions in the Inspection

Report.

1. Criterion XI of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B requires, in part, that the

licensee identify and perform all testing required to demonstrate that

systems will perform satisfactorily in service. ANSI 18.7, Section

5.2.7 states that a suitable level of confidence in structures, systems,

-

or components on which maintenance or modifications have been performed

should be obtained by appropriate inspection and performance testing,

a. Contrary to these requirements, the NRC inspectors found that the

post-mainttnance testing of the reactor water clean-up (RWCU) system

performed after the corrective action of Licensee Event Report

(LER)84-029 did not verify that both RWCU isolation valves would

close as required on a high differential flow signal (Section 3.4).

b. Also contrary to these requirements, the NRC inspectors found that

the post-modiffcation testing performed under Maintenance Work

Order (MWO) 9-85-401 did not test the installation of the 45-second

time delay relay (Section 3.4). ,

2. 10 CFR 50.59(b)(1) requires that a licensee initiate a written safety

evaluation that provides adequate bases for the determination that a

change to the facility does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

Contrary to this requirement, the safety evaluation for Design Change

Request 85-007, Revision 1, did not adequately detail the bases for the

determination that the change was not an unreviewed safety question

(Section3.4).

3. The Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specifications--Sections 3.6.3, "Primary

Containment Isolation Valves," and 3.3.2, "Isolation Actuation

Instrumentation"--require that the reactor water clean-up (RWCU)

isolation valves be operable with an instrument response time of less

than or equal to 13 seconds and a subsequent valve closure time of less

than or equal to 30 seconds.

Contrary to this requirement, the RWCU isolation valve response time

exceeded 13 seconds because the licensee installed a 45-second delay

timer in the instrument loop (Section 3.4).

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Georgia Power Company -3-

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