ML20148B041
| ML20148B041 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 03/16/1988 |
| From: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Head G GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148B044 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8803210330 | |
| Download: ML20148B041 (4) | |
See also: IR 05000321/1987031
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MAR 1 o 1988
Docket Nos. 50-321, 50-366
Georgia Power Company
ATTN: George S. He'ad
Senior Vice President
P. 0. Box 4545
Atlanta, GA 30302
Gentlemen:
SUBJECT: QUALITYVERIFICAil0NFUhCTIONINSPECTIONATE.I. HATCH
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NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-321/87-31 AND 50-366/87-31
. Enclosed is the report of the special, announced NRC team inspection con-
ducted at Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Power Plant from November 30 through
December 11; 1987, of activities authorized by NRC License Nos. DPR-57 and
NPF-5. The inspection team consisted of K. Hooks, J. Heller, K. Jury,
G. Pick, W. Scott, and M. Shannon of the NRC. The inspection team's findings
were discussed with J. T. Beckham, H. C. Nix, and other members of your staff
at the conclusion of the inspection.
The inspection was the fifth in a series of NRC Headquarters-directed Quality
VerificationFunctionInspections(QVFIs)performedundertheguidanceof
Temporary Instruction (T.I) 2515/78. The inspection focused on the effective-
ness of your quality verification organizatiora in identifying, resolving,
and preventing safety-significant technical deficiencies. The inspection
also evaluated the effectiveness of your management in ensuring that identi-
fied quality deficiencies were responded to promptly and con,pletely.
Our review indicates that the Hatch quality verification organization's
performance has been generally effective in the operations and plant modifi-
cations areas. The staff involved in these areas are experienced individuals
who are capable of conducting in-depth technical verifications. The audits,
surveillances, and observations conducted in these areas are perfortnance-
oriented and have resulted in the identification of significant issues that
impact plant reliability and safety. Additionally, management appears to be
effective in ensuring that deficiencies are addressed promptly and completely.
Although the Hatch quality verification organizations were found to be
generally effective, the NRC inspection team identified six Observations
and three Potential Enforcement Findings (PEFs); these are described in the
Inspection Report. The PEFs are associated with Design Change Request (DCR)85-007, and relate to failure to identify a Technical Specification viola-
tion associated with reactor water clean-up (RWCU) system primary containment
isolation valves, inadequate post-maintenance / modification testing of the
RWCU system, and failure to properly identify the bases for the detemination
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that a change did not involve an unreviewed safety question. The details of
these PEFs are given in Enclosure 1; these apparent violations of regulatory
requirements will be further evaluated by NRC 9egion 11 management for
possible enforcement action.
Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/87-31 and
50-366/87-31 is in Enclosure 2.
The NRC recognizes that DCR 85-007 was
initiated in January 1985, and the deficiencies identified are not necessarily
representative of the present organization at Hatch Nuclear Plant.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosures
will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. No reply to this letter is
required at this time.
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Should you have any questions regarding this inspectiun, please contact us or
the NRC Region II Office.
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Se
erely,
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Division of Reactor P
ects I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
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1.
Potential Enforcement Findings
2.
Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/87-31
and 50-366/87-31
cc w/encls:
J. T. Beckham, Vice President, Plant Hatch
H. C. Nix, Manager, Plant Hatch
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0. M. Fraser, Manager, Site Quality Assurance
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L. T. Gucwa, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing
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ENCLOSURE 1
P0TENTIAL ENFORCEMENT FINDINGS
As a result of the NRC Quality Verification Function Inspection at Hatch
Nuclear Plant from November 30 through December 11, 1987, the following items
listed below are being referred to Region II as Potential Enforcement Findings.
Section references given refer to the detailed descriptions in the Inspection
Report.
1.
Criterion XI of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B requires, in part, that the
licensee identify and perform all testing required to demonstrate that
systems will perform satisfactorily in service. ANSI 18.7, Section
5.2.7 states that a suitable level of confidence in structures, systems,
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or components on which maintenance or modifications have been performed
should be obtained by appropriate inspection and performance testing,
a.
Contrary to these requirements, the NRC inspectors found that the
post-mainttnance testing of the reactor water clean-up (RWCU) system
performed after the corrective action of Licensee Event Report
(LER)84-029 did not verify that both RWCU isolation valves would
close as required on a high differential flow signal (Section 3.4).
b.
Also contrary to these requirements, the NRC inspectors found that
the post-modiffcation testing performed under Maintenance Work
Order (MWO) 9-85-401 did not test the installation of the 45-second
time delay relay (Section 3.4).
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2.
10 CFR 50.59(b)(1) requires that a licensee initiate a written safety
evaluation that provides adequate bases for the determination that a
change to the facility does not involve an unreviewed safety question.
Contrary to this requirement, the safety evaluation for Design Change
Request 85-007, Revision 1, did not adequately detail the bases for the
determination that the change was not an unreviewed safety question
(Section3.4).
3.
The Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specifications--Sections 3.6.3, "Primary
Containment Isolation Valves," and 3.3.2, "Isolation Actuation
Instrumentation"--require that the reactor water clean-up (RWCU)
isolation valves be operable with an instrument response time of less
than or equal to 13 seconds and a subsequent valve closure time of less
than or equal to 30 seconds.
Contrary to this requirement, the RWCU isolation valve response time
exceeded 13 seconds because the licensee installed a 45-second delay
timer in the instrument loop (Section 3.4).
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