ML20147H712
| ML20147H712 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 03/02/1988 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20147H710 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-55352, TAC-59932, NUDOCS 8803090048 | |
| Download: ML20147H712 (2) | |
Text
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 108 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3 TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY AND THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-346
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated March 27, 1987, Toledo Edison Company proposed changes to the Appendix A Technical Specifications (TS's) pertaining to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) instrumentation. The proposed changes were in response to Generic Letter 85-10 (GL 85-10), dated May 23, 1985.
GL 85-10 reconnended Action (s) to be taken when one of the control rod drive trip diverse-trip features is inoper-able, or when one of the Silicon Controlled Rectifier (SCR) relay channels is inoperable. The letter also recommended Surveillance Requirements for the SCR relay channels and control rod drive trip breakers. The surveillances would include channel functional tests for the SCR relay channels and the control rod drive trip breakers, and independent verification of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments of the breakers.
2.0 BACKGROUND
AND EVALVATION Toledo Edison Company has proposed the following changes:
A.
The addition of an Action to TS section 3/4.3.1 Table 3.3-1, appli-cable to Functional Unit 12, Control Rod Drive Trip Breakers, which would require the return to operable status of an inoperable Reactor Trip Breaker diver:e trip device within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or othemise trip the breaker within the next hour. The provisions of TS section 3.0.4 would not be applicable.
B.
The addition of Functional Unit 15 (SCR relays) to TS section 3/4.3.1, Table 3.3-1, which would specify the number of SCR relay channels required to be operable, mode applicability, and Action required. The Action required in the event of the inoperable status of one or both SCR channels would be to restore each channel to operable status during the next cold shutdown which lasts for more than 74 hours8.564815e-4 days <br />0.0206 hours <br />1.223545e-4 weeks <br />2.8157e-5 months <br />. The pro-visions of TS section 3.0,4 would not be applicable.
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C.
The addition of a notation to TS section 3/4.3.1 Table 4.3-1, that the operable status of Functional Unit 12 undervoltage and shunt trip devices shall be verified independently through startup and monthly channel functional tests.
D.
A requirement for a channel functional test at least every 18 months for Functional Unit 15 would be added to TS section 3/4.3.1, Table 4.3-1.
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j The staff has compared the proposed changes to the recomendations in GL 85-10
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and finds that they are consistent with the generic letter.
Further, the staff has found that the proposed changes will improve reliability of the RPS, and, i
therefore, improve safety. The indication that TS section 3.0.4 is not applicable for changes A and B above is acceptable because the Limiting Condition for Opera-tion and associated Action applies to all modes.
3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
This amendment involves changes to a requirement with respect to the installation
'7 or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to a surveillance requirement. We have determined that the anendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no signi-
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ficant ch6nge in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulutive occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding i
that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement nor environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
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4.0 CONCLUSION
I The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will l
not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities l
i will be conducted in corp 11ance with the Comission's regulations, and the 1
issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and i
security or to the health and safety of the public.
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Principal Contributor:
A. Toalston 1
Dated:
March 2, 1988
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