ML20147E385
| ML20147E385 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/03/1988 |
| From: | Grimsley D NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| To: | Stewart M PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| FOIA-88-114 NUDOCS 8803070050 | |
| Download: ML20147E385 (2) | |
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PART1.k 4ECORDS RELEA@ OR NOT LOCATED (See checked 60ses) i No egency records subst to the request have been located.
No add. tonal egency records subsect to the request have been located Agency records hbrect to the request that are centdied in Appendiu _ are already evadatse for pubhc inspecton and copyeg in the NRC Pwc Document Room.
'1717 H Street N W., Washington. DC .
Agency records subst to the request that are dentified m Appenden - are being made asadable for pubhc espectee and cwying in the NRC Pubhc Document Room 1717 H Street. N W., Washington. OC, in a folder under this FOLA number and requester name The nonpropnetary servon of the proposaitsi that you agreed to accept n a telephone conversation wwth a member of my star t ta no* made avalable for public orspecten fnd coymg at the NRC Publ c Document Room.1717 H Street N W . Washington. DC e a folder under tNs FOIA number and reo ester name.
Enclosed is informaton on how you may obtam access to and the charges for copyeg records placed m tre NRC Pubhc Document Room,1717 H Street N W., Washegton. DC.
Agency records si.bgt to the request are enclosed Any apphcable charge for copes of the socords prowded and payment procedu es r are noted an the comrnents sectea Cocords su' sect to the request have been referred to another Federal agencybest for reve* and d<ect resporse to vou.
In y4w of NRC's response to the request, no further acton es bemg taken on apceal letter dated PART fl A-INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC OISCLOSURE Certam informaten in the requested records a beg withheld from pubre disclosure pursuant to the FOI A esemptons descnbed in and for the reasons stated in Part 11. sec-teone B. C. and D. Any released portons of the documents for whch orvy part of the record a beeg *4hheid are beeg enade avadable for pubhc inspecten and copyeg n the NRC Pubic Document Room.1717 H Street N W., Washangton OC, e a fonder under tNs FoiA number and requester name.
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APPENDIX 1 IN kM)
RECORDS MAINTAINED AMONG POR FILES dVM8ER DATE DESCRIPTION Transcripts Minutes
/*. Diablo Canyon Subcomittee Meeting. 06/26/76 ACR5T-0338 ACR5-1348 g, 195th ACRS Full Comittee Meetir.g. 07/08/76 ACRST-0342 ACRS-1353 l
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. DOCKrr NOS: 50-275 AND 50-323 APPLICAin: PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPNU (PGSE) -
DIABID cal #0N NUCLIAR POWER trIATION, U!EIS 1 AND 2 6 FACILITf:
SUMMARY
OF ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MErrmG IIELD ON FEBP
.. An ACRS Subecmittee Meeting regarxiing the 18-19, Diablo Canyon Nu 1975.
Station was held in San Luis Obispo, Ca'ifornia on Febmarf A complete i 'Ihe agerda for the meeting is attached as Enclosure No.1.
1 list of attendees is given in Enclosure Ib. 2.
i Inheductory Statenent by Acolicant_
The reeting opencd with an intmductory staterent by the appli Constniction included a status report on construction and fuel load.
has reached appimimately 90% and 50% completion o Shipment of fuel to the site respectively.
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1975, and Unit 2 in late surer of 1976.for Unit 1 is schedul Outstanding Items in Safety Review I
'Ihe staff then sur.Trarized the status of the outstanding item I Diablo Canyon safety review.in 31, 1975.
Section 22 of Supplement !b.1 Supplement was issued on Januar/ i l of the
{ of these iters are our evaluation cf the earthquake potent a lbsgri Fault, effects of tsummis caused by near-shore'Ihegenerators, seismic gmli#ication of electrical equipnent, ECCS and A'IWS. i status of each ite:n was mviewed in detail, with the staff l tioninficat ng where inforrution fmn the applicant was outstanding and when mso u of each item was likely.
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Sandra A. Silver
' int, a statement was read into the acord by Sandra A. Silver nt of San Inis Obispo County and an intervenor in the Diablo ,-
a proceedings.
Ms. Silver ccamnted on seveml issues involved
.no Diablo Canyon safety review, and expressed strong objections to
.e location of the plant in San Luis Obisp County. Dr. Okrent dicated that her ccmmnts muld be passed on to the R111 ACPS Corsnittee. ,
t Geology an'd Seisnology 7
'Ihe applicant then began his presentatien on Geology and Seisnology.
'Ihis presentation consisted of four sepa ute talks by PGSE consultants:
(1)
Dr. RichaM Jahns, principal geologist since the beginning of the project, discussed the geological background and the j .
development of the geology repet for te site. He enphasized the general regionalization of the site and its location in California _ geology.
(2)
Mr. Douglas Hamilton, geology consultant, dealt specifically with the offshore seismic interpretation prograrrs.
(3)
Dr. Stewart Smith, the seisnologist of record, discussed existing seismic data and a deternination of the postulated earthquakes i that should be considered in the design of the plant.
(4)
- Dr. John Blume, structuml engineering consultant in the area
- of earthquake engineering, discussed the meth:xis used for
, ; development of seismic input on events into vibratory ground notion.
Dr. Jahns concentrated on two' areas in his pmsentation: (1) a brief
! sumary of the early geologic investigations at the site, with emphasis on the problem of potential surface faulting; aM (2) a surrmary of regional tectonic chameteristics of Southern California that are
' pertinent to appraisals of the site. 'Ihe exploration of the site as far as artificial ex,cosures ware concerned was aired at a detailed app uisal of the sub-horizontal contact between the wave cut bedrock surface and the overlying narine terrace deposits.
l can be dated, it would then be possible to de ronstate that if faultsSince these were fourd in the cedock, and these faults did rot disturb the over]ying
- dated material, then an age cailing could be impos.ed on the latest PC000314A.
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(. MAR. I 8 1975 novement of these faults. As a result of the extensive trenching ard excavation ptrgmm which was conducted, it was concluded that potential surface faulting need not be considered in the plant design. With regard to the regional situation, Jahns emphasized that the different major faults riust be evaluated in the context of their own physical characteristics, continuity, segment length, etc., and also with
, regard to their positions and behavior throughout different parts of geologic time. He indicated that the San Andmas Fault was clearly .
the domimnt feature involved, but also discussed the importance of the Sun Nacimiento fault zone. He concluded by stating that for i
the faults in this mgional setting, it would seem significant in
, -; considering the respective roles and' orders of significance to consider them nest specifically in the conte >:t of the past five million years since that is basically what is involved in appraising their present
- and potential future activity.
i
! Doug Hamilton began his presentation by d , cussing sorte of the work that has been done in surveying the offshc e geology. He irdicated
- l that them are tm elements of this survey ag: (1) seismic reflection profiling; and (2) gravity survey and rapp' ng progmm. There have been four different surveys applicable to i e regien offshom from the Diablo Canyon site:
(1) USGS Bartlett cruise in 1972 urder the direction of Ely Silver; (2) USGS Kelez survey in 1973 urder the dimetion of Ibily Wagner; (3) PGSE sponsored wrk in 1973-1974 by the fim of Bolt, Beranek
. and Newman of Houston; .
(4) PGSE sponsored wrk in 1974 by the fim of Aquatronics, Inc.,
t ; of Houston.
i Hamilton used detailed traps and track charts to indicate the areas of
. coverage by each of these surveys; he stated that the interpretation of the offshore profiling inwlved integmtion of data from all four of these surveys. These data sere discussed in considerable detail; the discussion also included a detailed interpretation of the Hosgri Fault. He described the Hosgri Fault as continuing as either ore or a group of tm or thme breaks, and tmced the fault from near Point Sal rorthward to the vicinity of Cape San Hirtin where the breaks die out. The plant site is about two and a half miles to the inner braaks of the Hosgri Fault at its rearvst point of approach. Hamilton
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then tumed his attention to the compilation of the gravity survey data.
The map gave gmvity aromaly values for the offshore ama ranging fmm Point Conception up the coastline to a point amund Cape San thrtin.
He emphasized the importance of this nap, in that it gives definite indications of major stmetural fr.atures that have been mapped independently by other means, e.g., the Santa bacia Bank and Hosgri Faults. Hamilton concluded his discussion by su:marizing the major features of the area, ircluding the large offshore Santa l' aria Basin, '
the lesser or folded basins, including San Luis Obispa syncline, the Pisco syncline, the area of the Santa Maria Valley and the onshore Santa Maria Basin which lies generally south of the Santa l' aria
.-; Val'ey dowTi to where the transverse ranges come up south of Lompoc.
'n.3 stmetumi disturbance of these includes very large faults which
. ave very pmnounced gmvity expression. These include the Santa Dacia Bank and San Sir. eon Faults, the Faults of Rinconada aM the Sur flacimiento system, ar.d to the south, the faults of the transverse ranges system including the Santa Ynaz and a system of faults which has o specific nace that branches off from the Santa Ynez and then
- heads up towaM Point Sal. Lesser faults am also sFam in this
! gravity expression, including the Hosgri Fault which does have local gravity expression, but clearly rot expression which is co.rMle either to the Santa Lucia Bank or San Simeon Faults and to other l faults mapped onshom which include the Edna, the Pisno, ard related faults in the grourd east of the San Luis Range area.
Several questions were asked regarding Hamilton's presentation. Dr.
Page asked whether there uas fir.n eviden e that the Hosgri and San
. Simeon Faults am not connected? Hamilton discussed the data in
! the agion of the proposed connection; he felt that the evidence I is good that they are not all one continuous system, although he j qualified the statenent by saying that both faults have to be considemd l part of the system of faults on the eastem bourdary of the Santa
- l' aria Basin. Dr. Trifu
- uc asked what Hamilton's speculations would be regarding the general sense of notion, the amplitude of otion, and the effects of these notions on the najor faults that wem discussed? Hamilton responded in light of the Hosgri Fault, and
. indicated that the Hosgri might be considend capable of a few feet of novenent, although he did rot sW whether that novenent would be vertical or lateral.
Dr. Stepp of the tiRC staff then cwmented on the inforration presented.
He indicated that the staff had mviewed the raterial presented, and that additioral information on the subject had been requested fmm the applicant. This mquest included questions on the relationship l .
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.. P.AR.I 8 1975 of the Hosgri and San Simeon Faults, a nore detailed documentation of the structural relationship of these faults in their assumed
' area of approach, ~and a discussion of the. structural relationship of the Hosgri Fault to the transverse ranges faults. The staff also asked for a discussion of the nagnitude of earthquakes that one might expect on faults within the San Andreas Fault System that have different orders of structural significance. Finally, additional documentation was requested mgarding the location of the 1927 .
earthquake that occurmd off Point Conception. Stepp indicated that i
the staff hoped to cortglete its review of this naterial in May of this year.. F. McKeown of USGS concurred with the staff's coments, and emphasized that the relationship of the southern end of the Hosgri Fault to the transverse ranges could be extwely impor tant in locating the 1927 event.
Dr. Okrent then asked how nmh of the offshore inforration that is reported now was available in sufficient scope in 1957 to prompt soncone to look for the structures rm being reported and discussed?
Dr. Jahns irdicated that the potential existence of the Hosgri Fault was suspected in 1967, but that no detailed offshore sub-bottom data wem available. The applicant emphasized that the geolog,ical studies perforned prior to the construction remit review were quite extensive, and that them was no question in their mind t'at a very conplete state of the art investigation of the site had been performed.
i i Dr. Smith began his presentation by discussing the earthquakes which
! had been postulated as design basis events for the plant; he emphasized i the levels of conservatism that had been employed at the construction i pemit stage, e.g., the assu~ption of an earthquake unassociated with
- a fault occurring directly beneath the plant. Smith indicated that
' the discovery of offshore faults in acent years was not mally a surprise, and that events subsequent to the initial analysis at the CP stage have borne out the wisdom of the very conservative approach that was taken in considering that earthquakes of the size postulated could occur as close to the plant site as was assumed. He further stated that, based on Hamilton's interpatation of possible notion on the Hosgri Fault, the ground notion produced by an event of this size, at a distance of three to five miles at closest approach would certainly fall within the envelope of the kinds of grourd notion that have been proposed for the site. With regard to earthquakes on the offsicre faults that have been analyzed, Smith indicated that these events have contained a large component of vertical slip. He then discussed specifically the 1927 earthquake that was centered e
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off Point Conception; analysis of the data iMicates that the aftershock agion had to be substantially closer to the shom than the min shock location given by Byerly in 1930. However, Smith stated that he cannot e.
clearly associate this event with one of the pmsently mpped faults, although it is his opinion that the rest likely association is with the transverse mnge structums.
After several questions from the ACRS consultants aganiing location .
and depth of the 1927 event, ard postulated earthqtakes on the Hosgri Fault, Dr. Blume began his presentation by myiewing the four specific fault-earthquake situations which were postulated for the design of the plant' He erphasized that, at the CP stage, very few methods were available for converting mgnitude and distance into site accelemtion, and that sire or peak acceleration was only one consideration that was e
used in the design. Other eqtally important considerations wem the l damping factors asstred for various structums and systems, the dumtion of the shaking, the probability of peak acceleration, given a certain earthqtake, and the probability of the spectml msponse diagram, given that peak acceleration. Blume discussed in detail the methods tnat 5
wem used for estimting site acceleration; he indicated that the principal one employed was the Site Acceleration Pagnitude (SAFD or Blune Pethod. After a detailed discussion of the SAM method as applied to the four earthquake situations rentioned above, Blume stated that i he is pleased with the fact that the netheds used nearly 8-10 years j ago at the CP stage compare extremely well with those in use tcday, i
e.g. , those proposed by Snauble S Seed, Clotd S Coress, ard Donovan.
Blune then discussed the mcent analysis that was perfonned based on I
components of the Parkfield-5,1966 and Castaic,1971 carthquakes, each realized to a peak grottnd acceleration of 0.5g, rather than
, the 0.4g that was used in the origital design. He also mentioned l
I the Koyna transverse earthquake in India as being close to the situation at the Diablo Canyon site; an acceleration of 0.49g was observed from
,' this event.
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~ Dr. Trifunac asked a question agarding the SAM method as described in Dr. Blume's paper in the 1965 World Confemnce Proceedings. Trifume indicated that the use of this methcd by Bltre appears to msult in accelemtions which underestinate all pmsent available data by a factor of 0.5 to 0.8 on the logarithmic scale. After a lengthy discussion, Blume agreed to get together with Trifunac in an attempt to resolve this appamnt discrepancy.
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MAR. I 81975 Dr. Kapur of the NFC staff enghasized the pcrt played by damping values in the detemination of msponse spectra. He i.,dicated that the damping
.. values used by the applicant were very conservatis . . and that the staff
. considers the response spectra calculated by the applicant to be quite l conservative. <
Dr. Okmnt then asked the USGS to elabomte on their staterent that a design acceleration value of 0.5g is not adequate? James Devine of
- USGS indicated that this statement was meant to leave the issue open because he' did mt feel that all questions had been answered at this point. Devine stated that r icent work by Dr. Smith concerning the location of the 1927 event, along with some unpublished work by the USGS, indicate that there. is still profitable infomation avdlable
. concerning that earthquake which could alter the obligation to put it on the Hosgri. He also enphasized the Lgrtance of the ranking of faults with regani to the msolution of this question. Okrent then asked what appraach the USGS wculd take regarding the nature of
- the Hosgri structum if the 1927 event had never occurred? Frank itKecwn of USGS responded that there is to definitive evidence to tie the Hasgri and San Sireon Faults together, but that the possibility cannot be ruled out entirely. He indicated that it is very difficult
, to assign a given size earthquake to the fault because you am not deal! .g with a single continuous break; it consists of nany, many bmaks . Dr. Trifunac asked whether the applicant's four proposed l design basis earthquakes could be corsidemd reasomble if the 1927 l event wem eliminated? Devine replied that he felt that all four
! were reasonable at the tire of the CP, and that he still feels that l
they are reasonable with a proviso on earthquake D (the event umssociated with a fault), that being that the Hosgri be exanined rore carefully after the applicant responds to the staff's recent reque.st for additional infomation. He irdicated that this infonnation will help to better estinate the maxinum carthquake that cculd occur on the
- Hosgri Fault which in effect rx
- w controls the undesigmted earthquake
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Dr. Okmnt asked the staff whether the acceptable seismic design l
criteria for Diablo Canyon 1 and 2 would be the sare for additioml units, if such were proposed? Dr. Stepp indicated that the staff's seismic design criteria have constantly been upgraded as our under-standing of the problers of earthquakes and earthquake spectra preparties change. He stated that we would always consider the probable raximm l earthquake for the site in our evaluation, regardless of whether the plant was partially built or not. Dr. Shao emphasized that the PC000314 F
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MAR.I 8 1975 staff will consider all steps in going frun the g value to response spectra and damping values, incitding the methods used, and then a decision would be made regarding the adequacy of the seismic design.
After nore discussion, Shao indicated that if the g value holds at 0.5, and the applicant has employed the criteria ard methods which
, have been stated, then the plant is probably adequately designed for seismic loads. Dr. Okrent then asked what probability per year of .
safely shutting down the reactor in the event of an earthquake, that the staff is seeking for Diablo Canyon? Dr. Denton replied that the staff does. not use a probability approach in selecting safe shutdown 4 earthquakes'(SSE). He stated that the Coninission's criteria, as set forth in Appendix A to Part 100, provide a francork to work in to arrive at an SSE; we then have to couple that with the design approach and the design of structures and congnents in order to arrive at an evaltation of adequacy of the seismic design.
Dr. Thonpson pointed out that, after all the discussion that had
, transpired, the question of whether the Hosgri Fault would be expected to exhibit predomirant strike or dip slip had not really been answered. Holly Wagner of USGS comented in detail on the findings of his survey, but did rot reach any fina conclusiors reganiing the preference for strike or dip slip.
i Seismic Desien 1
i Mr. Wilak of FGE began the session on seismic design with a presentation on the design criteria for the major components, and hcw Dr. Blume's criteria have been implemnted. Wollak stated that the seismic analysis of Seismic Category I stnictures, systems, ard components is based on the input free field grourd notions and the resulting response spectra for the operating basis and safe shutdown earthquakes. Four dynamic nethods of seismic aralysis were used:
, (1) Time history nodal superposition; (2) Response spectrum nodal superposition; (3) Response spectzw. single degree of freedom; and (4) Method for rigid equiprent end piping.
After discussing design precedures in detail, Wollak cormented on some recent wrk which was done to compare the safe shutdcun earthquake response of typical Category I sinien:res, systers, and cocconents to that which muld be induced using nodified input Ivsponse spectra and
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MAR. I 81975 the damping values given in Regulatory Guide 1.61. These modified input response spectra wem derived from acceleration time histories
. for ccaponents of the Parkfield-5,1966 and Castaic,1971 earthquakes, each nomalized to 0.5g. The spectral content of these records is considered representative of the vibratory ground notion expected at a site with foundation sterial similar to Diablo Canyon, and generated from a nearby source. A ccmparison of these modified spectra with
. the spectra and damping used in the SSE design confims the seismic '
design adequacy of typical Category I structures, systems, and ccaponents.
. Wollak concluded his presentation by stating that the seismic design
' , *. basis for mjor plant structures and components includes significant
, conservatism in the fom of design spectra (unusually rich in high frequencies), ve:y low assumed damping values, and an acceptance s criteria based on overall elastic behavior under seismic loadings.
Dr. Okrent asked whether a calculation had been done using 0.5g peak acceleration and the response spectra and damping values of Regulatory
- Guide 1.60? Wollak replied that they had not done this. The staff
- then cccmented on the applicability of the response spectra in 1.60, i'
and also on the reasoning behind the selection of the Parkfield and Castaic earthquakes as ccmparisons for the Diablo Canyon site.
Dr. Okrent emphasized the importance of ) cowing, with sace degme of assurance, that all safety related structures
- will be able to survive an earthquake of given, syste s, and components acceleration, e.g.,
O.5g. Mr. Lindblad stated that once seismic design criteria were chosen for the plant, all structures, syste.ts and emponents were designed to meet these criteria. He indicated that he feels that j there is conservatism in the overall design.
l After additional discussion en loading factors and the different seismic design situations where the OBE and SSE centrol the design,
', Dr. T. C. Esselmn of Westinghouse presented the seismic design criteria that were used for the primary loop ce@ents and piping.
He reviewed the rathods used for each ccaponent and for piping, and irdicated the margins that resulted from the analysis. Dr.
Okrent asked whether the staff reviewed the seismic modeling of various cceponents in the primary icop. Dr. Kaour replied that Westinghouse has documented many codes involving this nodeling, and that the staff has reviewed these codes in scoe detail. The possibility of failure of the turbine building (a non-seismic Category I structure), and the effect of such a failure on Category PC000314h
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. MAR. I 819.'5 I systems was discussed. The staff stated that al'1 such systems in the turbine building had been adequately protected against such a failure.
With regard to this item, Dt. Bush asked about the supports on the valves, that in the event of loss of pcwer during an earthquake, what is the reliability mgarding closure of the valves? Westinghouse agn ed to provide information in msponse to this question at sane later date.
ACRS Questions Regarding Geology-Seismology and Seismic Design .
. Following.a short executive session, the meeting reconvened, and the following questions were raised by several of the ACRS members and
. '.' consultants:
j Dr. Trifunac (1) In light of previous discussions with John Bltrne, justify the apparent discrepancies in the relationships used.
.(2) Referencing question 1, w.at would be the calculated peak
- acceleration using other currently available methods?
(3) What wuld be the effect on the response of the plant of a small negnitude earthquake which produces ve2y high peak accelerations?
i (4) When this peak acceleration has been derived, muld it te possible i to calculate confidence levels on this value?
I l (5) What is the maxim.rn historic, as well as predicted, nodified Marr.ali intensity at the site due to any earthquake any place, and what would be the peak acceleration resultire frun it?
Dr. 'Ihcroson s
! (1) He inquired about copies of USGS Open File Report 74-272. Mr.
Devine of USGS agreed to provide several copies of this report.
. Dr. White 1
(1) Provide additional evidence to defronstrate that the Castaic and
. Parkfield earthquakes (normalized to 0.5g) really have lesser effects on the Diablo Canyon stnictures than the original design carthquake.
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r Dr. Okmnt (1) What kind of errors can arise in the seismic design analysis? ,
, (2) What am the sources of error in going frtsn the ear thquake itself via a one-dimensional seismic nodel to the finite element model?
(3) Assuming that some peak g value is adopted by the staff as adequate, justify that the calculations based on the Castaic and Parkfield- ,
. spectra provide the necessary assurance. 7 N (4) How cho's e the staff decide what constitutes an adequate audit of i the seismic design analysis? (Reference the Appendix to Draft WASH-1400 which includes a partial design check). -
s Dr. Okrent asked the applicant and staff to be prepared to discuss these questions at the next Diablo Canyon Subeccmittee Meeting. ('Ihe last question is for the staff only).
Seismic Design (continued)
Mr. Dorrycott of Westinghouse then presented the design criteria and 4 qualification requirements fcr safety related instru entation. He I listed the instrunent control electrical equirrt.ent that had been qualified
- in testing programs; this equi;rcent was tested in full-scale testing I programs and qualified to design acceleration levels. Dr. Okrent asked if an earthquake with a larger higher frequancy ccr:gonent than the one analyzed would appreciably affect the perforrance of the instrunentation?
After some discussion regarding the effects of damping, etc., Okrent i asked the applicant and Westinghouse to look into this matter. Dr. Kapur conrnented that equipnent at higher elevations in the plant does not ,
experience the very high frequency component, and so the problem is not
',! so severe. Mr. Ebersole pursued the discussion with regard to possible :
contact chatter in switches, etc. Dorrycott resporded that Westinghouse is pursuing a failure mods and effects analysis with regard to the resolution of this problem. 'Ihe staff indicated that they hoped to have the issue of seismic qualification resolved prior to ccrnpletion of the Diablo Canyon review by ACRS. With regard to qualification, Dr. Bush brought up the possible interactive effects of sais. tic ano enviremental qualification; he asked if any work had been done in this area? After scme discussion, it was agreed that this problem had not really been addressed.
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+ letters for both Units 1 and 2. Mr. Lindblad indicated that a number of pmgrams have been instituted in response to this concern:
. (1) Equipnent qualification dy.aamic tests, as discussed by Mr. .
Dorrycott.
(2) Dynnic tests of expansion anchors (tests sponsored by PGSE
.1 at the University of California).
(3) Component tests conducted at Indian Point 2 and San Onofre on
', cceponents similar to those which will be used at Diablo Canyon.
I With regard to item 3, Dr. Lin of Westingbuse discussed the
- applicability of these es.ponent tests to Diablo Canycn. He first discussed in detail the seismic qualification of instrunentation, in response to earlier questions. He then indicated that vibration testing of the zwactor coolant loop and stea:n generater had been performed a*. Indian Point 2. He indicated that data were available
. frun San Onofre, both frrm shake tests and from effects of the
- San Fenuado earthquake. Lin also discussed s.
- me full-scale testing en a Westinghouse reactor in Japan.
(4) Testing of models of pipe and pressure vessels for seismic damping i characteristics (tests sponsored by PGSE at UCLA).
t l (5) Installation of plant seismic instzmentation to record the g smil earthquakes that my occur during the ccrting years of operation.
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Dr. Okrent asked whether PGSE had any plans for full-scale shiking of the Diablo Canyon Plant? Mr. Liadblad replied that they did not, and that they felt that the conservative damping as==ai in the design pnwided sufficient mrgin such that full-scale shaking to reproduce the natural period of vibration was rot really necessary. The staff added
- Jut unless one could sinulate accelerations close to the SSE, e.g. , 0.4 to 0.Sg, the benefits of such testing would be small. 'Ihe point was also made
. that artificial testing to such large accelerations would be extzvmely difficult.
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MAR. I 81975 e
Seismic Scram The last agenda item of the day involved a discussion of seismic scram.
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Mr. Lindblad indicated that PGSE had mviewed the recent Liventore report on this subject; he stated that the m port leaves many questions open, and that at the present time, PGSE believes that an autcmatic trip of
- - the mactor at the onset of an earthquake does not necessarily impmve the safety situation. Dr. Okrent asked whether the applicant had prepared some kird of list detailing the good and bad featums of a seisnic scram?
Mr. Lindblad stated that they had done this at various times, and that on the bad side, such a scram introduces a non-standard condition for the
%. reactor, a transient involved in shutdown, loss of one of t le sources of peur, and an additio:ul need to monitor a changing ope: ation in the plant on top of the stmss of the earthquake itself. Dr. Okrent then asked whether PGSE had evaluated the plant to see what level earthquake would lead to trip, whether you wanted it or rot? Lindblad said they had not, but that he would esti. rate something of the order of a 0.lg
.- acceleration value. 'Ihis could be a reactor trip, turbine wip, or i perhaps some other cceponent, and would not ne:essarily initiate an autorratic reactcr shutdown. He added that he did not feel that it m s good practice to shut the plant down for any earthquake, only for ticse which are potentially da: raging to the plant; he did not think that PGSE siculd tolerate spurious trips of the reacter for c all earthquakes.
Okrent asked about the possible merits of an early scram for an earthquake which is going to cause a loss of ecolant accident (LOCA). Dr. M pur stated that the most important mason for havin'; a seismic scram is that if the earthquake is acccmpanied by a LOCA, tk.e ped. clad temperature could be significantly reduced. He then censidered various postulated earthquakes. For earthquakes of the ordar of the OBE, e.g. , slightly greater than or equal to the OBE, the operater is mquired to shut dcun the plant. For earthquakes nuch gmater th3n the OBE, sorre damage will be incurred, but within the SSE, the plant is still designed i to be safely shut dcwn. For earthquakes in this range, there are other nonitoring systems which will trip the plant. k pur also cited the problems of spurious sigrels and unmnted transients in concluding that he did not feel that a seisnic scram was desirable at this time.
1tr. Etersole raised the question of d-c power supplies with mgard to breaker closure or trip in the event of an eartrquake where one his
. genemtor trip. Then, what am the seismic qualifications of the switchgear and power supplies? Mr. Hermra of PGSE indicated that the tatteries for the switchyards hsve earthquke bracing and are designed to withstard accelerations of at least 0.2g.
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( r HAR.181975 Dr. Okrent asked whether one can engineer a seismic scram system with a high degme of mliability, e.g. , a reliability such that one has a pmbability of spurious scram no larger than one in a 100 or one in a 1000 per year? Considerable discussion ensued on this item, with the
- general conclusion being reached that such reliability could probably be achieved if the thmshold level were set far enough above the
. accelemtion for the OBE.
After additional discussion of this item, the meeting adjoumed for
. the day. -
.". Systerrs Interactions
'Ihe meeting for the second ca7 began with the subject of systers inter-actions. The mference for this discussion was an ACRS letter from Dr.
Stratton to Mr. Muntzing (dated tbvember 8,1974) titled, "Systems
! Analysis of Engineered Safety Systers". In this letter, the Ccmittee
! indicated that attention to the evaluation of safety systems and associated equipment frta a multi-disciplinary point of view to identify potentially undesirable interactions between systems is beconing increasingly desirable and important. 'Ihe letter then contains several examples to illustrate this theme.
.l After some general comments by Mr. Lindblad reganiing the nature of the letter and its applicability to Diablo Canyon, Mr. Ebersole posed a series of questions and situations regarding the applicability of this i letter to the Diablo Canyon Plant. Ebersole had visited the plant the previous day. These questions and situations are sunmarized below:
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(1) In the event of fire in the turbine building, it appears that there could be ventilation problems in the 4 kV vital switchgear roons
'- l and also in the diesel generator compartrents. For the switchgear i reces, there is comen atnospheric coupling between these roces, i and it appears then that there would be comunication between these
. roces in the event of a fire in one of them. In the case of the diesel generator compartments, if the generator end of the diesel is isolated, i.e. , the roll-down doors are closed, one would have
- a situation where the generater could meieve very little cooling,
- causing a temperature rise in that par t of the room and a possible j overload condition and resultant a-c power outage.
(2) The plant has many pairs of rotating shafts of various sorts serving
, different functions. 'Ihese are typical redundant configurations of services which are on line at all times (not engineering safety feature designs). tbw, ' suppose one postulates the failure of one PC000314N\
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MAR.I 8 1975 of a pair (say train A) which serves some specific function. Has' the applicant examined the consequences if the altemate service, say train B, does not respond properly as a function of time?
Examples migh. be service functions which control ventilating systems, water supplies, etc. In other words, the intenst here is the thesis of non-response of backup trains of active services, and a
- consideration of the time delay involved that might be an atnennal delay rather than norinal. An extension of this might be, if the .
backup service does not respond, what time is available to repair the service or else pursue an alternate course of action?
'- (3) The Rasnusse, Report discussed the total loss of all a-c power, and included s me probabilities on the length of time before power might be restorea. With regard to this situation, has the applicant considered this loss of power in light of the stoppage of rotating l shafts and a possible te.T.perature excursion in the contairinent to i values of the order of 400-500*F? Mr. Lindblac indicated that they had reviewed tnis general type of situation, and that the containment would not exceed its design temperature. He further added that with loss of a-c power, the containment heat input is reduced by about 85% because of the loss of the normal heat loads from the reactor-and the reactor coolant pumps.
I (4) In the case of small IDCA conditions (larger than the charging pump capacity), one has depmssurization of the primuy system.
For this situation, can the applicant describe the heat transport l paths to the ultimate heat sink? Possible paths are the residual heat removal system (but there is probably not sufficient flow here), the ccaponent ecoling water system (which passes through the
- containment fan coolers) coupled with the auximry saltwater j system, or natural convection in the steam generators. As a function of break size, what fractions of the heat are carried along these various transport paths to the ultimate heat sink? .
An additional question raised was, what will be the ambient temperature surrounding the auxiliary feedwater planps, as a function of time, in the absence of cooling and ventilation in these pump
- rooms?
(5) For the auxiliary saltwater system, one of the auxiliaries is a
- cormon pair of sump pumps in the intake structure to pnp out leakage, if necessary. 'Ihese pumps would be suirnerged unde" a high wave condition. khat are the critenia for the design of these sump pumps? In addition, the piping for the salt eter pumps is supported by connection to a non-seismic structure,
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namely the condenser discharge conduits. 'Ihe' idea of a seismic piping system anchored to a non-seismic structure appears to deserve some clarification. 'Ihe coupling of the auxiliary saltwater
-. piping to the earthen fill and the building foundation was also discussed.
(6) Again with respect to the strnp pumps for the auxiliary saltwater system, it was untioned that these pumps would be flooded under
. very high waves. Under this condition, would the integrated intake' of water into the louvres be such that the sump pmps would not be i required in the short-term following this flooding?
.A (7) 'Ihe cable link that supplies power to these sump pumps is an example of cabling which is intemittently subjected to fresh-and salt-water flooding. What qualification of this cable has been perforned to ensum its function under the conditions of alternate drying and sutnergence in either fresh-cr salt-water?
- I (8) With regard to the hot shutdcwn panel is there a possibility that 3
I in providing this auxiliary function, you re. ally have not recreated a new scene for comon vulnerability of damge? In other words, is there really independence from the control recrn with regard to j this panel being a center of active functions?
! Each of the items raised by Mr. Ebersole was discussed in considemble i detail. Dr. Okrent asked both the applicant and staff to be prepared to e discuc:, and resolve any outstanding questions on these items at the next
, Subcomittee Meeting.
I Dr. Bush then raised the following two questions:
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.. (1) His the applicant considered the problem of phosphate build-up with
.1 regard to closure of valves on the turbines? This question is related to the response of ron-seismic valves urxler severe seismic
,, , shaking. Are there any reif abi.lity statistics regartling closure
' ' of such valves under seismic loadings (when generator load has been
, dropped)? Mr. Lindblad indicated that the Earthquake Engineering i
Researr.h Irstitute cbes collect information of this sort. With regard to contacting the alove-centioned Earthquake Institute,
- Bush suggested that data frun Alaska also be obtained, e.g. , data frun the 1964 Alaskan earthquake.
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MAR. I a 1975 (2) If you assume a failure of one of the inlet lines to the steam generator so that you have the full impact of the jet forces, as well as the jet forces fmm the exhaust frun the steam generator, and then impose a seismic loading as well, does this
. situation fall within the design envelope?
. (3) Dr. Okrent asked that the staff reexamine in detail the modeling of the prinary coolant pump under a seismic loading, to be ,
- assured that this nodeling has teen done properly.
(4) Mr. .Noffman asked what accelerations might be experienced in the control room for the design SSE acceleration of 0.4g?
Mr. Lindblad estimated between 1.6 and 2.0g, but indicated that they would look further into this item. Yoffnun stated N that this could be an additional argument for having a seismic i scram.
! As a concluding renark to the general subject of Systems Interactions, T. Hirons indicated that the staff has had some preliminar,/ discussions with ACRS as to how seme of these situations should be htMled. It ic
. planned that nany of them can be incorporated into various sections of the Standard Review Plan. A special ACRS Subcocmittee, with Dr.
Nsh as chairran, has been set up to begin reviewing some of these items with the staff.
Electric Power Systems _
I i Mr. Herrera of PGSE opened this subject with a presentation en the
- offsite powr system for Diablo Canycn. He stated that the inter-I connected PGLE 230 and 500 kV electric transmission systems will
- serve as a two-system source of offsite power for the Diablo Canyon
. Units. The two generating units will be connected to the transmission system by means of' two 230 kV and three 500 kV lines enanating frem their respective switchyards. These yards are physically separated and independent of each other. Each of the 230 and 500 kV lines
. supplying the Diablo Canyon switchyards have primary and backup protective relaying systems and automstic closing features. This will ensure fast and proper clearing of all electrical faults, and will permit autccatic restoration of power frun the system if all conditions are proper. Stability studies which have been conducted on the system indicate that the loss of any sirgle generator in the systen, including that for either Diablo Canyon Unit, while operating at full load, will rot adversely affect the stability of the renainder of the transmission grid. Ib concluded by stating that the design of the offsite poiar system meets the intent of General Design Criteria 17 and 18, IEEE Standard 308-1971, and Regulatory Guide 1.32.
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MAR. I 81975 Several questions wen raised regarxiing the pasentation on offsite power. Dr. Okrent asked if figures were available on system reliability that would provide a basis for judging the probability per year of losing all offsite power to the Diablo Canyon site? Mr. Herrera indicated that specific figures were not available. Mr. Ebersole asked if PGSE was taking any steps to upgrade the lead rejection logic to prevent cascade as the nuclear units come on to the system? Mr. Herrera indicated that they were. Dr. Bush asked if, under a seismic loading,
. can you bootstrap yourself to the turbine fnm a startup condition. -
as contmsted to a load rejection continuing operation? Mr. Lindblad responded that they. could.
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Mr. Nielsen of PGSE then mde a presentation on the onsite power system for Diablo Canyon.
- his syste n consists of the output fum the s min generator and an auxiliary power system composed of 12,000, 14160, and other icw voltage systems. All auxiliary system luses can be fed frun either the main generating unit or from the standby-startup offsite scurce. The emergency w er system can also be supplied by the diesel generators. The engineered safety features and other emergency services are fed from three 4160 volt buses, each supplied by a diesel genemtor as well as by the nomal offsite and main unit sources. ESF loads have been grouped to meet single failure criteria. Two diesel genemtors are sufficient to carry the emergency loads that are
- required for safe opemtion under nortral and accident corditions. One diesel generator is ccaron to both Units and is automatically transferred
! to the Unit which requires actuation of safety features. The onsite d-c power system consists of a 125 volt system. The systen is divided into 3 groups, and each battery has its own battery chargers and j switchgear. The batteries have the capscity to supply their loads i for the time duration required, even without allowance for the diesels i innediately relieving scoe of the load.
Dr. Okrent asked what happens if, in a seismic event, both reacters indicate that there is a 1DCA? Nielsen indicated tMt whichever Unit receives its accident signal first will obtain the load frun the swing diesel. After additional discussion, Okrent asked if anytme has looked at the aliability cf this situation, and does one have the necessary reliability? He further stated that he felt that the staff shuuld lock in detail at the design of everything that one needs to function in order to get onsite power (both a-c and d-c), given an earthquake large enough to have a reasonable chance of losire, offsite power. Finally, Okrent asked if the staff had considered the possibility of sequential effects due to earthquakes, s.g. , offsite power going off ard on. Nielsen indicated, for the example cited, that once the diesels PC000314g
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MAR.I 8 1975 ccme up to full speed (10 to 12 seconds), the offsite power source muld be locked out. Mr. Ebersole raised some additional questions regarding the change-over fmm offsite power to the diesels, e.g. ,
, valve actuation. Nielsen responded to these questions for PGSE.
Finally, Ebersole raised the concern that the day tanks for all five diesels are supplied through a two-tank, tw-pipe, tw-electrical pump fuel oil system, and that the state of the entire fuel oil
. system depends on getting power to these tw small pumps which
- nust cycle on and off frequently. Mr. Lindblad responded that the systen. m6ets the single failure criterion, and that he feels that
,.- , it is adequately designed to perform its intended function.
lockout of Pcuer to Fbtor-Ocerated EST Valves s
A letter on this subject fmm Dr. Kerr of ACRS to Mr. Muntzing (dated January 14, 1975) had been distributed earlier in the meeting to the applicant and staff. The letter raised s:.e questions regarding the pmposed lockout of pcwer to the atove-<nentioned valves. T. Hirons of the staff indicated that the position stated in the Diablo Canyon Safety Evaluation Report was unchanged at this tire. Mr. Lindblad
, stated that PGSE's position is that they prefer to raintain operability
- of the valves frtm the contml mcm.
Mr. Gormly of PGSE then began his presentation on this subject. He used a piping diagren to indicate the nine valves which the staff had flagged with regard to lockout of power. The nost important of these are the single valves fmm the refueling water stcrage tank to the
, safety injection and RHR pumps. Several questions were asked during
, the presentation regardirg the size of the valves, valve operators, annunciation of valve position in the control rtxe, etc. Gormly detailed the information that would be available to the operator to indicate that one of these valves vas closed, and the steps that the operator could take to open them. He indicated that they had made no ecmpmhensive evaluation of the probability of spurious closure of one of these valves.
Several of the questions in the ACRS letter on this subject were then discussed in light of the Diablo Canyon design. These included an evaluation of the probability of a spurious signal, time interval required for reactivation of valve operator cfter loss of pxer, question of whether sigml lights are lost when the circuit breaker is opened, reliability of valve indicators, etc. The discussion concluded with Mr. Lindblad stating that the applicant would like additiomi tine to consider sccc of the questions in the letter.
'Ihe staff also indicated that they would respond later to these questions.
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Gomly responded that they had taken this pmblem into account in designing the plant. With regaM to hydrogen evolution out of the battery rooms, Mr. Nielsen stated that they had studied
- this problem in detail (partly at the request of the staff), and that.the analysis showed that it would take 28 days to accumulate enough hydrogen to approach the mininum explosive limit, assumiry!;
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cceplete loss of ventilation.
(2) With regad to inservice inspection (baseline), Dr. Ibsh stated that the Units apparently meet the criteria set forth in ASME Section 11-1971; in this regard, he asked how this compares with the 1974 code? Mr. Lindblad mplied that the areas of non-
. compliance with Section 11 of the 1974 Code are very limited in nature. 'Ihis question will be discussed in gmater detail at a future meeting.
(3) Dr. Okrent asked if in the routing of electrical systems, are
. seismic Category I and non-seismic Category I lines ever placed in the same cable tray or penetration? Mr. Nielsen mplied that they are rot. Okrent then asked if there are possible nodes of 4 overheating for the ron-seismic lines which could lead to a loss i of penetration integrity? After some discussion, Okant asked the applicant and staff to be pmpared to discuss this item at the next meting.
i
, h ency Plan
- Mr. Shiffer of PGSE discussed the emergency plan for the Diablo Canyon Units. He indicated that in the develogrent of the plan, primry considecation was given to the December 1970 AH: guide for the preparation of emergency plans for production and utilis:atico facilities. The plan
- includes provisions for primry and alternate emergency control centers, notification of offsite state and fedeml agencies with responsibilities during an energency, onsite first aid and decontamination facilities, and emergency radiological monitoring equipmnt. Shiffer indicated that the p*an describes a spectnrn of accidents and the specific action levels to be taken for protective measures. In the event of an energency, the San Inis Obispo County Sheriff's Department is responsible for coordimtion of any initial pffsite protective measures which my be required.
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MAR. I 8 1975 Dr. Okmnt asked if PGSE had developed within their own procedurts, the specific information, the inst 2umentation, and the evaluation of these readings such that the operator or some other responsible person could detemine the nature of the events, given scme postulated accident? In the question he included the range of situations discussed in Draft WASH-1400. Shiffer replied that their procedures did include specific offsite nonitoring techniques, and procedures for interpretation of ,
' nonit*> ring results, e.g. , dose conversion tables. Considerable discussion ensued on this item, with Okrent emphasizing that early mzming time '
of accident details was an important consideration in Draft WASH-1400.
Shiffer indicated that they have looked at high temperature radiation.
nonitors inside centainment, and also the possi'ility of a detector outside contaiment looking at either the extnor concrete surface or at the liner at the contairnent equiprnent hatch. However, he questioned
- the validity of the interpretation of data wttich might be obtained from such instrunents. T. Hirons indicated that the staff is still -
reviewing this question, both in a generic sense and specifically,
- for the Diablo Canyon Units; a d"aft Regulatory hide on post-accident instrumentation is currently being formulated. OkIrnt asked both the applicant and staff to be pmpared to discuss this item at the next meet:tng.
. Miscellaneous Qaestions (continued) ,
' (4) Mr. Ebersole comented on the setting of valves in the RHR system, i.e., the setting of valves to cope with the problem of pipe bmak l with regard to the paths which the water could follow. The question i
on this pertained to the fairly si.~ple instruction on an TSAR j drawing regarding adjustment and locking of a specific valve; Eberr. ole '
felt that perhaps this instzuction should be expanded because of w
the neber of possible fault situations. Mr. Lindblad replied that indeed nore detailed instructions are available for the operators.
(5) Ebersole asked about the interraediate ccrmen C train in the ccuponent cooling water system. If a major leak occurs in this i C train, hcw do you prevent the operator from simply drying up
. the system by pumping the alternate water inventories in the A and B trains into the sa.n fault? Mr. Gomly discussed the nonitors which would alam such a fault, and indicated that the C header would to isolated before any substantial loss in backup water supply had occurred.
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, (6) Dr. Okrent asked whether the water hanmer pmblems experienced at Indian Point 2 could be expected to occur at Diablo Canyon? Mr.
, Lindblad indicated that both Westinghouse and MSE are currently reviewing the installed Diablo Canyon system to see how it compans with the Indian Point situation. Okrent further asked whether Diablo Canyon would be subject to the associated effect of containment liner heating that accccpanied the feedwater line rupture at Indian Point? Lindblad stated that he did rot think so, and that .
Diablo Canyon has a different feedwater design in that welds are removed from the inmediate area of the liner plate.
(?) Okrent postulated a U)CA situation downstream of the steam generator when a tuo-phase mixture coming out of the vessel might lead to
., dynamic forces, particularly in the steam generator. He asked whether Westinghouse had & ne any further e.m ination of this question? Dr. Peawek indicated that Westinghouse had ccepleted
. an analysis of the prirary to secondary system interface in the steam generator; the analysis considered the dynamic loads resulting frun seismic forces, blowdown, and various load cmbinations. One conclusion of the analysis was that slug flow uould not te predicted by the bicukr.m pmcess. Peacock stated that this ucrk was documented in a WAo report which was submitted to the staff over a year ago. Okrent asked the j staff to check on the review status of this report and cament
! at the next neeting.
(8) Okmnt asked if the staff had reviewed the kinds of insulation used at Diablo Canyon, and examined the potential effects of
. insulation in the sump in the event of a ILCA? Hirons indicated
. that the staff had requested and received this information
. fran PGSE, and that we were still reviewing it for acceptability.
Okmnt asked for additional discussion on this at the next meeting.
(9) Okrent asked if it was planned to run the Diablo Canyon contairment in the purge node while the reactor is at power? LiMhlwi replied that the purge valves would nomally be closed. He further added
- that the purge valves have the capability of closing durirq; a U)CA.
(10) Okrent asked whether the question of unacceptable forces on the check valve seats in the secondary system had been examined?
Mr. Lindblad responded that this question had been analyzed by their consultant (Nuclear Services Corporation), and that the valve integrity was found to be satisfactory; he also stated that PC000314R
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( ( KAR. I 81975 the staff had aviewed the analysis and found it to be acceptable.
Mr. Ebersole pursued the discussion with regan$ to one of the check valves experiencing steam flow a versal; he asked whether the discs will survive the tremendous impact upon closum. Mr. Allison
. of the staff stated that the discs would be defomed but not bmken. In relation to this pmblem, Ebersole suggested that a
, pipe break in the vicinity of these valves could indeed effect the valve in the opposite line and possibly usult in the blowdown of two steam generators. Lindblad stated that their analysis
- had shown that the second valve could withstand the failure of the first line. Peacock emphasized that pmtective functions have
. be m incorporated in the design to assum that only one steam reaem tor blows down.
Conclusions
. Another Diablo Canyon Subcomittee Meeting will be scheduled once the evaluat:'on of Geology and Seis:rlogy has been ecmpleted. The staff plans to complete this evaltation secatime in May of this year. ,
lL:H, . Ns I 'Ihocas J. Himns o
! Light Water Reactors i* Pmject Branch 1-3 Division of Reactor Licensing Enclosums:
- 1. Proposed Agenda
- 2. Attendance List
cc w/ encl:
Mr. John C. tbrrissey Philip A. Crane, Jr., Esq.
Andmw J. Skaff, Esq. ~
Mr. Fmderick Eissler Ms. Elizabeth E. Apfelberg.
Ms. Sandra A. Silver Mr. John Forster Mr. la nie Valentine Mr. William P. Cornwell Mr. W. J. Lindblad Mr. J. W. Dorrycott I
a
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DCIDSURE 10.1
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- i .' PROPOSED AGENDA,
.. DIABLO CANYON UNITS 16 2 SUBCO'C41TTEE HEETING FEBRUARY 16-19, 1975.- SAN LUIS OBISPO, CALIFORNIA PRINCIPAL SPOKESMEN: . W. J. Lindblad - PC&E, Project Manager Tom Hirons - Project Manager, Reg. Staff TUESDAY. FEBRUARY 18, 1975 .
(30 min.). I. Executive Session - CLOSED -(8:30 a.m. - 9:00 a.m.)
. .(5 min . ) II. Introductory Statement (PG&E) '
A. Brief Description of Site Location / Layout
. B. Construction Status - Units 1 & 2
'C. Fuel . load / Opera tion Schedule
~
(15 min.) III. Project Review Supenary and Status Report
, (DL)
A. Update on Sept., ?
1974 SER Unresolved / Outstanding Items *
( B. Resolut ion / Status 'of ACRS CP Letter Items
. . (2 hrs.) IV. Site Characteristics L_ ; A. ceology/Scismology '
- 1. Detailed Status of DL Review -
(DL/USGS)
- 2. Applicant Presentations (PG&E) a) Basic Geologic / Seismic Data
. b) Vibratory Ground Motion c) Surface Faulting
, d) Offshore Scismic Interpretation Program e) Determination of SSE and Seismic Design "g" Value for Site Tsunami Analysis (Model/ Analysis / Review Status) (PC&E/DL)
(30 min.) B.
(15 min.) C. Tornado Design / Criteria
. 1. Applicant Presentation (PG&E)
- 2. Conformance to Current Criteria (DL)
- 3. Systems for Safe Shutdoun Weakly Protected (PC&E/DL)
(15 min.) D. Other Site Characteristics
- 1. Mc,teorology, Hydrology, Demography, etc. (PG&E)
, (1 hr.) V. Scismic Design (PC6E/DL)
- A. Design Criteria for Containment / Major Components B. Significant Changes in Design Since CP Stage C. Design Criteria / Qualification Requirements for Safety-Related Instr.
D. Stress Levels at 0.4g/0.5g/Highet.- "g" values
- l. Safety-Related Systems Most Vulnerable to Scismic Events E. Possible Effect os* Non-Seismic Class I System Failure on Safety .
(15 min.) VI. Experimental Confirmation of Scismic Design Aspects (15 6)
, (30 min.) VII. Scismic Scram (PG&E/DL)
A. Exis ting Designs /Available Methods .
B. Experience & Reliability Considerations .
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1 ' ' .y .$* : Prep; sed Agenda'- Diaolo 1/28/75
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. SUBCatMITIEE CAUCUS - CLOSED SESSION
.... (15 ~ min.) VIII. ' Systems Interactions
-(PG&E/DL) -
(reference letter, dated 11/8/74. WRS to Muntzing)
Adjourn meeting at
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7:00 p,,,
WEDNESDAh - FEBRUARY 19,1975
( 30 min.) 1.
, Executive Session - Closed (8:00 a.m. 8:30 am)
- s
' (30 min.) II. . Reactor A. Brief Description of Major Features / Comparison (PG&E)
- with Exis ting Designs B. ECCS/LOCA - Appendix K Evaluations.
- j '
i
- 1. - Unit 1/ Unit
- 2 Results - Comparison with Existing Designs
- 2. Limiting Ff calculated for Unit 1/ Unit 2
- 3. Status /Scht dule for Completion
, , , C.
Power Distribution Control Method - Ex-core /APDMS/
COAC D. (PGE/DL/W)
Significant changes in Design from CP Stage .
E. Status of 17xl? Verification / Review (15 min.) III. ElectricPowe$ Systems (OneLineDiagram) (PG&E)
A. Offsite Power
, B. Onsite Power
! C. Emergency Power j D. Reliability Considerations - Diesel Qualifications (15 min.) IV. Emergency Plan (PG&E)
(15 min.) V. Industrial Security - Closed (FC&E)
(?? ) VI. Resolution / Status of Generic Items (PG&E) t A. List it ;
B. List ?? .
- C. List ??
(20 min.) VII. Plant Items (PG&E/DL)
A. Brief Description of Plant / Layout C. Major Design Changes Since CP Stages C. Lessons Learned from Operati.4 Experience /Related Design Changes VIII. Lockout of Power-Operated ESF Valves (PG&E/DL)
Adjourn !!coting at 2:00 p.m.
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. DCWSURE NO. 2 ATrDOANCE LIST DIABW CANYON ACRS SUBCOFMITTEE MEErDG
-. ACRS Dr. D. Okrent Dr. S. Bush 1-CONM be. B. Page* (Stanfoni University)
3 Dr. G. Thcmpson* (Stanford University)
_i*
Dr. M. Trifum ch (California Tech.)
Dr. M. White (University of Massachusetts)
Mr. X. Steinbruggen (University of California)
Mr. J. Ebersole** (on leave of abserce frem TVA)
Mr. E. Koffmn (los Angelt.s Water & Power Department - Retired)
Dr. S. Siegel (Atomics International - Retired)
ACRS STA1T
! J. Conran PACIFIC GAS NO ELECIRIC COMPAIN (PGEE)
L W. J. LiJdblad J. B. Hoch l R. V. Bettinger W. X. Brunot
'q t H. J. Gannly
' E. P. Wollak
- i.
V. J. Ghio D. Nielsen R. A. Young R. R. Pray
- t. J. C. Carroll J. R. Herrera
.~ P. A. Crane
- D. Sullivan R. Ramsay J. Shiffer R. Patterson i
TC000314Y
.~. . , _ - - . . . - - . . .
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PGSE C0t1SULTNTFS Dr. R. Jahns* (Stanford University)
Dr. S. -W. Smith * (University of Washington)
Mr. D. H. Hamilton * (Earth Sciences Associates)
D. J. A. Blume* (John A. Blume & Associates, Engineers)
R. Gallagher* (John A. Blume & Associates, Engineers)
D. Jhaveri* (John A. Blume S Associates.
Engineers)
Dr. L. S. Hwang* (Tetra Tech, Irceryxated) j WESTI!GPdJSE Dr. D. W. Peacock i* Dr. T. C. Esselman Dr. Chi-Wen Lin
- Mr. J. W. Dorrycott Mr. A. J. Abels NRC - STAFF T. J. Hirons D. P. Allison O. D. Parr I R. C. DeYoung*
J. C. Stepp*
R. B. McMullen*
R. B. Ibfrann*
W. P. Gamill*
H. R. Denton*
L. G. Hultran*
- M. L. Fliegel*
1 K. K. Kapur*
' ' L. Shao*
J. R. Tourtellotte*
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USGS J. Devine*
F. McKeown* '
H. Wagner
- R. Yerkes*
GDERAL RJBLIC 2
Attendance by the general public-
- ranged between 10 and 30 people, depending on the particular subject being discussed.
l .
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+
i
- Denotes attendance on first day only.
] ** Denotes attendance on second day only.
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Distributicn:/ R. Tedesco j/ *}
Docket Fil v NRC POR V. Stello local PDR. R. Maccary NRR Reading (M.- Groff) H. Denton R. DmYoung V. Benareya V. ) bore C. Img' D. Skoviolt J. Kastner D. Niler G. Iainas R. Denise D. Poss X. Goller T. Ippolito G. Iaar J. Ynight W. Atler S. Pawlicki J. Stolz L. Shao R. Clerk B. Grimes T. Spies W. C e ill D. Vassallo R. M11ard K. )tiel P. Fine O. Parr T. Novak A. Schencer M. Spangler R. Sclemel EP Project !% nager - W. Poss D. 7.iemam Attomey, EID #
P. Cbilins- IE (3)
R. Purple V. Wilson G. Knighton ACRS (14)
G. Dicker Project Mam6er - T. J. Firons B. J. Youngblood IRR 1-3 Paarhng W. H. Pagan, Jr. IFR 1-3 ' File R. Vollmer D. P. Allison W. Ibusten J. C. Stepp S. Vary;a R. B. McMullen R. W. Klecker R. B. Ebfmann F. Schroeder L. G. Hulman K. K. Kapur M. L. Fliegel J. R. Tourtellotte FOTer % ~ 391