ML20141M393
| ML20141M393 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 08/29/1990 |
| From: | Hayes B NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI) |
| To: | Jun Lee Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20141J614 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-91-351 NUDOCS 9208130118 | |
| Download: ML20141M393 (1) | |
Text
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1 August 29, 1990 MEMORANDUM FOR: Jean Lee, Allegation Coordinator Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 4 l
FROM: Ben B. Hayes, Director ic Office of Investigations \); ,
SUBJECT:
LETTER FROM STEPHEN B, COMLEY REGARDING SEABR00 STATION NUCLEAR PLANT -
. This ' letter is forwarded to you for appropriate action.
Attachment:
As Stated
. Distribution:
Seabrook Reading
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of the United States 7. 7 Stop Chernobyl Here
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Hr.-Ben Hayes LOffice of-Investigations- #
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U.t S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissi on -
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Dear.- Mr. Hayes',
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$N Enclosed-for your reviewjplease find-a copy of our h
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1etter of--June;14,o1990 to Mr. David Wi11iams of-the Office JofLinspector General', Nuclear _ Regulatory Commission along '
with-a copy:of a chronology-prepared by Ernest Hadley, attorney-for We The People. This chronol ogy doc aents-- t he Equality assuranceLproblemsLpertaining-to-welding encountered.
- during- the construction phase of Sea brook Station in Seabr'ook,--New Hampshire lthroughout the-decade of 1980.
- As stated in-the-chronology, backup documentation is '
iavailableLupon? request; please do_.not hesitate to contact us regarding this matter.
4
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tep en B. Comley xecutive Director .[
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-Enclosures 2
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. Main Office: Box 277s Rowley Mt. 01969,(508) 948 7959 ^""P+'*' * "8 ""daa l ' $0 Court St.. Plymouth,' M A 02361, (508) > 746 9300
- National Press Bldg.,14 & F. Sis. N.W... Washington D.C. 20045,(202) 628-6611-
~
- Offices 5 A 6, 3 Pleasant St., Concord,' NH 03391,(603) 228-9484
~
iBaybefry Village. Route 9. Kennebunk.' ME 04043,(207) 967-5111 I ~ m-ff5fb6//h .. .. ._
Me The People, Inc.
of the United States Stop Chernob.sl Here June 14, 1990 Mr. David Williams Office of the Inspector General Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wachington DC--20555
Dear Mr. Williams,
During our meeting March 8, 1990 with Mr. Leo Norton ar.d Mr. Robert Watkins of your staff, we agreed that we would prepare and provide your office with a chrono 1. y of quality assurance problems pertaining to the welding at Seabrook Station. Enclosed you will find that report which has been prepared by Ernest Hadley, attorney for We The People, Inc.
It shows'that the 20% rejection rate for welds found by Mr.
Joseph'Wampler during his 1983 Level III inspections was part of an on-going problem with welds and related materials.
These problema date from 1980 to the present and include high weld rejection cates, f alsified r!uality assurance documents, inspection lapses, unqualified welders and inspectors and the use of counterfeit substandard parts in the construction of this plant.
The observations of-an independent nuclear plant expert noted at the end ol' this chronology find an-" apparent lack of objectivity" of NRC inspectors at'Seabrook Station.
We believe that both the history of weld safety problems and the NRC's teeatment of them varrant a serious investigation.
We'suggest that cuch an investigation should also include gathering information from the Employees Legal Project (their contact person would be Hr. Ronny Cuching, telephone 603-926-6718),-a.non-profit research organization which has confidentially interviewed.many former Seabrook Station workers over the last 4 years.
Alain Office: Pos 277, Rowley, N1A 01969,(508) 948 7959 ^""" " #~
50 Court St., Plymouth, N1A 02361,(508) 746 9300 National Press Bldg.,14 & E Sts., N.W... Washington D.C. 20045,(202) 628Will Offices 5 A 6, 3 Pleasant St., Concord, NH 03301,(603) 228 9484 Batbern ViMace. Rome 4. Nennsbank, ME GnJ1 (20h Wl f f b, $ /
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page 2.
Since the NRC has chosen to license Seabrook, which is now at 50% capacity, without thorouchly investigation these refety concerns. Hopefully by working together we will be able to stop 1 Chernobyl instead of reacting to one. The Russian people and our own people at Three Mile Island will testify that once you have experienced a nuclear disaster, hindsight administration is not acceptable.
Sincerely, O' Jh +
S$ephen B. Comley Executive Directo cc: Rep. Peter Kostmayer, Chairman of the House Energy Comm.
on Oversight and Investigation House Interior and Insular Affairs Chairman Morris Udall Mr. Ben Hayes, Director of the NRC's Office of Investigation Sen. Edward Kennedy Sen. John Kerry -
Congressman Edward Markey Congressman Nicholas Mavroules
\\ e i lie l'eople, i.ic, of the United Sta:es Stop cherr:obyl Here SEABRo0K STATION CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS The following chronology, compiled by We The People, Inc., documents the history of major problems encountered during the construction phase of Seabrook Station in Seabrook, New Hampshire throughout the decade of 1980. Backup documentation is available upon request.
1.160
- Letter from PSNH Site Manager to UE&C Resident Construction Hanager:
"The quality of pipe welding. .is cause f or serious concern. The rejection rate for radiographed safety class velds performed by Pullman-Higgins vas 38% as of 6/10/80. The rejection rate for weld repairs was 50%...From 5/1/80 to 6/10/80 the rejection rate for both new welds and repairs was'60%...The above examples show an unacceptable situation wherein the quality of weldin's is poor and.seems to be worsening." 1 1%Bl
- Some welds in the main steam feed restraints were never QC inspected; two Pullman-Higgins welds (4001 and 4002) performed in 1981 were st crackedandunrepairedwhentheworkwascompleted(2301-89-004).pil -
- program.
YAEC Site Audit: " Deficiencies identified... weaknesses in the QA Weld monitoring was. . .a repetitive deficiency. . ." 3 1931
- YAEC Site Audit: " Twenty-deficiencies were identified; two primary areas of concern [are] material identification and weld monitoring. . .
P-H management less than effective in taking corrective action. . . .
"4
- A Stop Work Order was issued by_P-H in part because of 1 / 1989 Employees Legal Project (ELP) Report, Exhibit G,-Testimony for the State of Vermont Department of Public Service,12/86, VII, Pullman-Higgins Problems, Exhibits, at p. 1. Employees Legal Project, Box 633, Hampton, New Hampshire - 03842 -
2 / 1989 ELP Report, Appendix H: Statements of Concerned Individuals, 301-89-004.
3 / 1989 ELP Report, Exhibit G, at p. 2.
4 / .IA, at p. 3.
Main Office: Box 277. Rowley, htA 01969,(508) 948 7959 ^ * '" "' "' " " '""' "
$0 Court St.. Plimouth, h1A 02361 (508) 746 9300 National Pren Bldg.,14 & T. Sis., N.W., Washington D.C. 20045,(202) 62 0 6611 Offi<es 5 & 6, 3 Pleasant St.. Concord, NH 03301,(6031 228 94 4 Hnhem \.mer R m o ke-chont vi put(2nh w.w t,
5 unquailfied welding procedures. .
- - A concerned individual told the NRF in 1934 that in 1982 he has seen Dravo Co. piping with f aulty shop welds in turbine building 1, in the radioactive pipe tunnel and in reactor coolant pipe in the main steam feed area. P-H QC told him Dravo welds were not their concern. Dravo Co. was reported by the NRC in 1988 tohavesuppgiedcounterfeit, possibly defective, piping to Seabrook Station.
1983
- YAEC Audit "The lack of timely response to open items, the new items revealed during this audit ... indicate a need for P-H ... to display proper sense of urgency relative to identified program deficiencies." p
- Counterfeit unistrut bolts installed throughout the plant in 1982 and 1983 were partially replaced in late 1983 because the bolts were of the wrong material and were not strong-enough. However, the only bolts replaced were those which were easily accessible. The reporting individual was a member of the team changing the bolts. There is apparently no record of which bolts were replaced and which wgre not.
The bolts hold ~up electrical raceways, cables, conduits, etc
- Twenty people in a 30 person cadwelding . crew were fired f or f alsif ying test cadweld splices. The cheating violated several QA requirements.
-The NRC did not issue a violation to the utility, or require the utility to investigate the cause of the problem. 9
- xAn NRC report " identifies the lack of requisite QA coverage on certain saf ety-related systems." 10 JAMES PADOVANO
-- James Padovano, a Pullman-Higgins quality control inspector, conducted between 2,399 and 2,408 non-destructive examination at 5 / JJ. at p. 5.
15 / 1989 ELp Report, Appendix H, 112-84-012; Appendix E, Exhibit B; " Counterfeit and Substandard Haterials in US Nuclear Power Plants, Parts:I and II,-and Seabrook Station Involvement," We The People, 1988.
7;/ 1989 ELP Report, Exhibit G at p. 13.
8 / 1989 ELP Report, Exhibit G, 149-89-002.
9 / 1989 ELP Report, Appendix H, 195-89-001.
10 / USNRC Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance,
_ August, 1983.
Seabrook Station between Jul y 1982'and Harch 1983.
-- He was indicted by a Federal grand jury in June 1985 for filing inspection reports on welds in the piping system for which he had perf ormed no inspections. He entered a plea agreement with the US attorney, pled guilty to two counts of falsifying documents (each count carries a maximum sentence of five years, with a possible fine not to exceed $250,000), and was sentenced to six months incarceration and three years probation.12
-- The NRC allowed Pullman-Higgins to hire and supervise a company which performed the reinspections of Padovano's work- apparently 1,000 of the welds'were never actually reinspected.Ib
-- An NRC investigator told We The People during an interview at the Department of Justice that the NRC has inspected less than 10% of Padovano's work. The NRC was told that during the Padovano investigation, records had been burned.14
-- Padovano told a member of We The People that he felt he was encouraged to falsify weld reports and that others were doing the same.
-- According to a concerned individual who wa. QC weld inspector in 1983, Padovano had worked at three nuclear plants previously; at two he had falsified weld inspections, using the same x-ray on many welds. A Seabrook Station employee who had worked with Padr,vano at a plant in Oswego had caught Padovano falsifying inspections there. Oswego management did not tell the NRC and gave Padovano a good recommendation to Seabrook. P-H did not check Padovano's background. One of his fellow inspectors at Seabrook checked on Padovano's LP exams, found bad welds and informed the NRC. The company gave Padovano a good reconmendation and he went back to work at another nuclear power plant. 15 11 / PSNH Letters to NRC Region I, 6/3/83, 7/5/83, 8/4/83, 8/16/83, 9/9/83, 10/12/83, 12/2/83, 12/21/83.
12 / United States of Amer.ica v t James Pado.y_ano, Docket No. 85-000016-Ol-L (D. NH, Sept. 30, 1985).
13 /- See Note 10.
14 / During interview of Stephen-B. Comley at Department of Justice, Washington DC on 1/15/87.
15 / 1989 ELP Report, Appendix H, 108-86-007.
-- The NRC concluded that Padovano's was an isolated case of document falsification. However a weld inspector on the job at the same time as Padovano said that he thought Padovano was only 1 of 100 people who had falsified weld inspections. He said Padovano was a scapegoat. Another weld inspector provided documentation of a weld inspection f alsification, and a f urther instance of a f orged signature was reported by the NRC itself (NCA 7433 which, by chance, the NRC discovered during a spot review.16 ),
-- Updates to the NRC'from the utility regarding the status of reinspections of Padovano's weld falsifications reveal inconsistencies. For example, the categori es into which welds were placed varied throughout the utility's reports. It is never clear in the PSNH reports to the NRC how many safety-related welds fell into each category, therefore it is unknown how many un-reinspected welds labelled " inaccessible" and " accept-as-is" were safety related welds.17
-- The NRC report said "about one third" of the 2399 Padovano welds were safety related, but a Dept. of Justice press release stated that "More than half of these welds were classified as saf ety related, i.e., they were on critical systens within the plant."18 JOAEEH HAMPLER'
-- Joseph D. Wampler was hired by Pullman Higgins in August, 1983.
He was the company's only Site Level III inspector at the time. He oversaw non-destructive examination inspections performed by P-H, and inspected weld x-ray packages dating back to 1981, though most were from early 1983. He-found a rejection rate of-20% and considered 5% to be high. The company gave him less than a month to inspect 970 packages of backlogged weld x-rays; there were_ numerous paperwork errors, lack of fusion and porosity rejects, and illegible film.
-- Wampler was _ terminated- by P-H on January 3,1984.
-- Wampler filed a Dept. of Labor suit stating he was terminated in retaliation for exposing-safety problene. In a March 1984 agreement with the utility, Hampler withdrew his complaint and agreed not to report safety violations in exchange for a money payment. 19 16 / 1989 ELP Report, ' Appendix B; NRC Combined Report 50-443/84-12 and 84-06, pp. 60-61.
17 / 1989.ELP Report, Appendix B at p. 5.
18 / NRC Inspection Report- 50-443/85-25 at p. 6; Press Releas of Sept.
20,.1985, Department of Justice, District of New Hampshire.
19-/ U.S. Department of Labor, In the matter of Joseph D. Wampler vs.
Pullman-Higgins Co., Case No. 84-ERA-13 (March 30, 1984).
4 1 984
- 'A welder used a graphite pencil in a weld in the equipment vault to hide.the welds porosity; a QC inspector accepted the weld. 20
- An INPO evaluation stated control of pipe installation and welding .
processes-need improvement. Improvement is needed in training craftsmen and QC inspectors. 21
- Awomaninthedocumentsectionof1g-Hdestroyedmanydocumentsthe week before UE&C took over.for P-H 7
- UE&CLchanged procedures on Feb. 20, 1984, to lower weldin inspection criteria. Thisreportingindividualwasaweldinspector.2g-
- The company began using cheaper piping as money got tight. 24
- Faulty welds were performed in the pipe tunnel; 100 sispect welds were
.not inspected. A QC inspector was ordered not to inspect welds. 25
- Ebasco-Schedule Review: "A. backlog of P-H documentation packages to support 18 safety related BIPS has accumulated.
A backlog of 1, 68 P-H radiographic film packages was recently discovered by YAEC QA." p6 P-H-records Management Program: The review-showed documents with dates and-signatures missing, NRC numbers transposed, ISO revision missing, conflicting data entries on related inspections. . ." gur..bers 7
- Non-conformance report NCR-73-011687 R/A identifies falsified QC signatures.on a weld process sheet. It appears Pullman Higgins was using
-welders to QC their own. welds prior to this 8/85 NCR. 28 20 /-1989 21 /T1989 ELP Report, Appendix G at pp. 15, 20, 22-/-ELP' Report, Appendix H, 111-86-003.
23 / )d., 110-87-002.
24 / Ld., 112-84-003.
25-/-Id., 112-84-006, 007. -
26 / 1989 ELP Report, Exhibit GLat p. 16, 27:/ Id.
28 / Id.,-090-86-002.
9
- An NP.C report stated "the site was experiencing difficulty in the
' ultrasonic examination of 6-inch diameter stainless steel welds. Also, the valve sides of the 6-inch piping welds were not being examined. It was not clear to the inspector a to what type of examination the licensee plans for these welds. 39 g;
- UE&C again lowered weld inspection criteria. 30 1986
- A non-conformance report was changed to make the problem appear to be with Unit 2. 31
- An individual witnessed a welder welding stainless steel althouoh he
- was not qualified to do so; the welder then etched another welder's initial into the completed weld. A QC inspector signed off on rejected welds without inspection, based on who the welder was. 32
- Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company provided Authorited Nuclear Inspector (ANI) inspection services to Seabrook Station. In May, 1985, unable to' provide:a qualified inspector, Lumbermens hired an inspection trainee, .and sent Seabrook Station a letter of instruction stating this individual could perform only limited inspections under the supervision of a. qualified ANI. In March this individual failed every section of the test to qualify as an ANI. In April 1986 this individual was f ound in possession of marijuana while driving a company car and was fired.
- An investigator for Lumbermens found that the qualified ANI had preformed independent inspections of pipe welds, in violation of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code and~of the letter of instruction.from Lumbermens to Seabrook Station. Lumbermens investigator recommended a full. investigation, but Lumbermens dropped the matter because an-investigation would have interfered with Seabrook station's process _of compiling data certification-reports. The ANI inspector's
- work is suspect and-there appears to-have been a deliberate coverup of the f act these inspections were perf ormed by an unqualified inspector. 33 The attitude in most NRC documentation available is one of unwillingness to believe anything could be wrong at Seabrook.
- An individual wrote an NCR. on a violation of weld inspection
. procedures; the NCR was canceled by his QA supervisor. This was one of 20 or 30 violations of weld procedures-this person encountered. 3'
-29 / USNRC Inspection Report 50-443/85-25 at p. 8.
30 /-See note 22.
31 / 1989 ELp Report, Appendix H, 119-86-001.
32 /..Id., 077-86-12, 13, 16.
33 / We The People Letter to U. S. Department of Justice, 1/11/88.
34 / 1989 ELP Report, Appendir H, 84-86-001.
l
- An individual who worked for Gen'eral Electric was concerned with vender practices. The source inspector fcr GE passed products on 1Aspection before they had ever been poured. X-rays for completed welds were incorreet; all parts of the welds could not be seen. Upper tie pistes which pick up the rods were tested with a sample program: 5 x-rays for a batch of 100. If the x-rays revealed cracks in the tie ple.tos, GE would centinue x-raying the pla tes until they had 5 good x-rays x-rays to prove the batch was good, GE would ship them outo ypingthe5
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- An individual saw a Mass. Gas official falsify certifications for materials supplied tc UE&C. 36 1987
- TheANIsi9nedoffillegibledocumentationandsignedoffonworkwhgeh sas never looked at. This concerned inuividual was a weld inspector.
- There tre indications that . anaerobic bacteria is causing corrosion (H7C or equipment.
microbiologically induced corros# nn) in piping and other MIC is a recently-discovered saf ety hazard at nuclear power plants,-and current' treatment methods don't work. The corrosion can be a
-particular
-pipe. 38 problem when the bacteria sets in improperly welded areas of
_ COUNTERFEIT HATERIALS AT S.EABRO.0K btATJON 13AA
- During an NRC-ordered inspection in August 1988, PSNH discovered 369
'" suspect" piping fixtures built into Seabrook Station, but said those fixtures met safety. requirements. However a chemical analysis by an-independent laboratory in October.1988-revealed some-flanges in the service water system were defective. The NRC had told utilities to test bolts because counterfeit bolts have been installed in the plants. They can shear off ocr melt under normal stress. However, PSNH was-only required to test ten safety and ten non-safety bolts found in the warehouse. This was two years after plant canstruction was completed; no bolts in the actual plant itself were testec.
- The NRC announced that tens of thousands of counterf eit, possibly L
defective, materials ~had been built into half of US nuclear power plants.
The agency called off all.further investigations after an industry-sponsored computer study convinced-the NRC to lower safety standards I-35 / Id., 100-06-001, 002, 003, 004.
36 / _I.d., 111-86-007, 37-/ Id.,-110-87-005.
38 / 1989 ELP Report , Appendices A & F.
L i-
9 rather than require nuclear'utilitiec to find and replace materials which did not meet the safety requirements. Counterfeit materials inclade
. circuit breakers, valves, piping materials, pumps and fasteners.
Companies which supplied materials to seabrook Station f all into two categories: -those whose labels were illegally af fixed to used or below-grade parts; and those known to have manufactured or distributed cheaper, weaker or less accurate materials falsely labelled as meeting safety requirements. Those companies include General Electric, Westinghouse, Underwriters Laboratories, Dravo Piping Co., Pullman Power Co., Planned Maintenance Systems, West Jersey Manuf acturing Co., and Piping Supplies, Inc. 39 1989
- During a public hearing held September 6, 1989 to discuss the NRC Region I inspection team report, Seabrook operators were sited as reacting in an unacceptable way to equipment failure that btought about an abrupt halt to low power testing June 22, 1989. Beyond the criticism of_Seabrook staff reaction to proper shut down procedures, Mr.
Eselgroth, Mr.:Dudley and Mr. Martin of the NRC, gave little indication that either their agency or the licensee regarded falsification of a maintenance inspection sign-off on an unrepaired valve as-a serious matter,-even though the valve in question, No. 3011, led to the actual
- emergency shut down. There is no evidence at present to show that the person who falsified this report was ever reprimanded. 40
- Quality Technology Company, an independent company of nuclear plant experts, examined Seabrook Station documentation and information from plant workers. QTC found that NRC reports dealing with various safety
- concerns show an "apperent lack of objectivity" by NRC in these mattets.
The attitude in most NRC documentation available is one of unwillingness to believe anything could be wrong at Seabrook. 41 39 / " Counterfeit and Substandard Matetials in US Nuclear Power Plants, parts I-and II,-and Seabrook Station Involvement," We The People, 1988.
40 /. September 6, 1989 Public Hearing at University of New Hampshire to Discuss-the Results of NRC Region I on Seabrook Unit I at Durham, New Hampshire pp. 107-117 41 / 1989 ELP report: Quality Technology Company's Investigation, NRC
- Lackzof Professionalism
t f
~
- The: NRC did not do eVerything possible, in a professional manner, to investigate' concerns . 42 QTC has discovered a continuing failure by the NRC to address qual-ity problems as such. 43 4
- * "NRC actions in the_ area of documer.t falsification do not appear to-address ~the full spectrum of the OA breakdown that occurred. These
" isolated incidents" aus the NRC calls them make up a programmatic problem. The NRC'cannot or will not see problems at Seabrook Station as other-than " isolated incidents...".44 42'/ Id., at p. 19.
43 / Id., at p. 40.
1 '
44 / .Id., at'p. 41.
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InsideNRC ,
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IN3fDE NJLC- hee is, lP9e . An emelus!ve report on Lbe U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Couunineion NO SIGNIFICANT EVENTS EARNS PGE TOP RATTNG FOR OPERATIONS NRC aw arded Portled General Eleetn: Co. (PGE) a top Category I ruing in thc wea of plet operadons in $c agency's laust SALP redew of performance at Trojan. Region V Administruor John Martin said the absence of py sign 16 cant operadonal events during the 15 month review penod wu a primary reason for the high rating.
De utility, however, wu given a low Category 3 ruing in the area of maintenance / surveillance.
Martin said the $ ALP board " considered the planning. scheduling, and oversight of ma-intenece/ surveillance work activities to be weak, and the quality of useelated proce/ .1 ed work in.
ewetJons to P in need ofirnprovement." Some imp:ovement w as nod u the end et _. priod, but, Merdn said,"this cea clearly wananu close future scrutiny by PGE management."
< According to Nucleonics Week, Trojan, a 1,178.MW, Westinghouse PWR, had a gross capacity fac-tor in 1959 of 56.61%.T'hrough April 1990, the unit's capacity factor wu 61.83%.
In the area of radological controls, the 5 ALP report noted that 1o'.11 collective dose hu beca increu. 7q-
. Ing since 19fa, wim the 1959 total at 420 person rem. De report said that the development of a "healdy ALARA progtarn was hindered by plantwide probleres with inef6cient outage coordinadon, U in:ensistent job scope evaluation, and ine Lfective planning."
The report noted that PGE has taken steps to " enhance its Trojan management learn and to imple- gg h
ment broad scope irnprovements through the nuclear division impmvement plan."The report said, however,6st many of 6e changes have yet to occur and 5:vsral key management positions wers gW vacant, being temp 3y $11ed,or were in transition u the S ALP period ended, and therefore, the Q resulu of PGE's esorts are only recen'Jy beginning to be observed. }O u.
Qd2 L i NRC INVESTIGATION PROBES ALLEG ATIONS OF FAULTY SEABROOK WELDING M A two mons NRC investigation airned at resolving quesdons about tbc integrity of certain Scabrook pipe welds and relned quality assurance manen is coming to a close, with a report expecte $
ted by the end of tbc month. -
Lee Spestard, the NRC senior manager leMing the investigation. deellred to discuss details of the_ qgu 'T gb)M report. Spesutd said the group wu e.hanered "to do an after- :;-
sedog and nondcatructive cumir. den a:tivides u Seatrock.
Sc. fact in NRC launched the independent team investigation about one tr.onth after the commission aneerlaed W' full. power operation of the controversial plant GNRC.12 March. 51 Desoite the commjulon's vom okaving full power opera: ion. NRC and con;rcuional sta5 cts and cor.sultants have been oorint over yee.rs of inspection reports, rMiographs, and o$cr reccrds to determine if welds for safety related d QM piping at Seabrook meet regulatory requirements and if a paper trall, supporting tl:u conclus!on. exists.
- Og
- Questions about the integrity of the welds--or at least the integrity of the quality assurance p'ogram' (for the welds--.came to light six years ago during a Deputment of Labor griesance bearing k
@j former Seabrook conerset worker. nc worker, Joacph Wampler, we employed by Pullman Higgins Co.,
gP
- piping contra
- tor for Seabrook from August yu ur> cooperative and caused ^<* u work.
In his brief tenure at seabrook,Wampler was aasigned to catmine hundreds of backlogged weld I 198 radozraphs. Of those he reviewed, Wampler rejected about 20%, either because the ra6egraph could 6t
[ ' not be stad because it had not bees shot properly or had faded or becsase the tsdlograph showed a weld MM -
- \ that did not meet code.Wample sleged that one of the reasons he wu 6_ red wu because he re}ected too _
.[_many of the weld radiographs.Not until tattler this year dJd NRC male _a c
' Wampler's allegations, whleh were surfaced by anti Seabrook activist Stephen Comley, led to the now-(1. (.headened inquiry. M At first, NRC sanfor omeials said the 20% reject rate cited by Wampler was ** sot unpual"la the industry. The agency staffers, citing "some confusion over the exact nature of Mr. Wampler's
. function" at Pullman 4Tiggins, have since pulled back from that statement, but are holding to the posi-
)
)
,tsv Q .*-r 70% re;ert r.te. by it.self,is of vcts limed relesan:t iri asscssiQ osertJI plant safety.
NE ~ s :on$cente in N mttpuy of t'.t w tids and the weling ;n.gTn appears to be bue4 lugely on i*o !Nngr a "100% : heck of the radiegraphs"conda:te4 by Yekc4 Atomi: Elettne Co. and a recent NRC revie* cf 100 weld rabortiphs.
Respending to questiens from Sen. Edwud Kennedy (D.Mus.), S*RC uid the compey, "d:cmed it D pruden: to do an independent 100% review" of Pu!!me Higgins raicpaph *erk. In the beginning, the 10M review wu "a ongoir.;, informal proccJs," NRC uid, but in 194 Yank:e formalired the teview by adepung a written procedure "which contained provisions to review all ufety r: lated vendor and site generated rdopphs."
nere appears howevtr to be some distgreement beracen the licensee and NRC over w hether the 1984 mien prendge in ft:t con: rolled the 10M weld radletraph review.
i New Mr.mpshire Yankee sykesman Roc Sher told inside N.R.C. that procedures for the 100%
review "had rJways been the same." Contrary to NRC's understanding, the 19H wriuen procedurt ap.
plied to nother Yankee review prograra-sot the 100% review.
According to Sher,in 194, Yankee adopted a program whenby they duplicated a variety of non.
destru:tive exarninadons that had already been conducted. Those included rad:rgraphy, liquid ponertnt, and magnede peticle exarninadens, done on a number of rsadomly selected welds. nat effort aimed to check the adequa:y of Yankee con:ractors'nondemucdve exam!naden operadons, but did t'ot constitute a 100% r: view.
Re inform:.!ity of the process early on, and the concomitut !a:k c!renres on the effort. troubles
. congresten:] cnd:s who atrae that relying on such e infonnal, scand;y dxamented review indicstes noncomphance with NRC's quality usure:c criteria.Dese critics eknow! edge that there is no
\ evidence of rreelhc defective welds, but they argue there is qxsdonabic 14 sis for NRC ceni6cujon that The wel6ng wu done in accordW'RefGit3adons.
Spokesman Sher noted that the Yankee 100% restew wu not a regulatory requirement. Ruher, it wu a step beyond whu NRC regdadons called for r.nd thenfore, not Wholden to NRC documenta.
tien reqdrements. *'It's not a requirement. bat its ce type of cocservadvs appron:h we'vc always takes at Seabreck " Sher sali Aaked to further explore the apparent contradictioo in Yankee and NRC understandIzz of the role the 1984 s ritten procedures p!syed in the 100% review, Sher said it wodd be "inapproprtate" to respond to additional inquiries that " pars!!c1" the NRC lavesdgaden. "Given this isyart of the h _Jegulatory review, the apptcpriate for em for us to answer these (quesdtns)is NRC," Sher said.
Sher added that the comptny beheves it has "demonstrued to NRC thu ca welds and weld records meet NRC and code re4tdrements." He said he wu aware Inside N.R.C. wu taIking to Seabrook's
- critic s and contended that the Seabrock's "dedicmed opponents idll probably never be utisted with
- what we do at Seabrook." But he added, "we want to usure the general p.blic" thu the safe opention of the p!ct is fo emostin ce company's mini in an April 24 interview with the NRC revicw poup, Wampler nid the radiopaphs he reviewed between August 1983 and Jeuary 19S4 "had been approved ud sitting amund since early 1982"and that Yankee Atomi:'s own tevi:w "wu turnir.g up almost 19% to 20% riject rue over and above whu I wu bringing to them."
According to Wampler, prior to November 22,1983, he and Yankee Atomic's radlegraphic reviewers infonnally pused questionable radiopaph back sad forth.
Yankee Atoml: qua!]:y assurtnce engineer Dick Julian would ca!! Wampler and uk him to review _
k radiograph Elm pa:ksges that he,Jdian, thought were quesdouble. De packages had been awreved
,- I by Pullman Higfsins before Jdian reviewed them.
If Wampler agreed with Julia's interpretation that a weld or weld pa:kage wu rejectable, Wampler would hand carry the package ba:k to Pu!!tnsa.Higgins and have the weld re radiographed. If a reps.i wu warruted a weld, repair order would be generated. - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ __ _
But, according to Wampfer, the entim procedure vu accomplished without preparstion of Yankee _
Atomic dektency repons or other paperwork that wodd be maintained u a qurJity record.
At a November 22,1983 meeting,it wu agreed that Yankee Atoml:' rejection of a weld or weld pa:kage Wampler uid.
wedd thereafter be documented on a!! rsrepiphie packages containing rejectable indicuions, It is unclear u this time whether the inforreal nuwe of the review and appuent gap in the paper t f %ould be a violation of NRC reguladons, but those in Congress eyeing the luue art concerned. ',
mDu Airoso, Mh2h!qton
L
~ .
CONNEi.LY Fil ES FOIA FOR RECORDS OF CIA INVESilOATIONS OF HERSELF
$haren Connelly, former ductor of ce nood:shne4 Of&e of In5pector & Auditor (01A). hu fled a request under ce Freedom of Informapon Act Icr all NRC ic;ords dedirg with, among other l trungs. OIA insestigadens of Sharon Connelly.
Conne!!y wu a central $gure in ce agen:y's cer.troversid ant traidess investigadon of Roger For.
tuna,' deputy director of the ageney's Of$ce of Invesugadons. In 1988, Connelly arranged to pur:hase surrepdtiously made t:pe reecrdings of tele;hene conversations between Fortana and an antinuclear at, tivist. Ce ,elly raid 56.000 in cuh for de tapas, with the money coming from a alush fund set up by former Execudve Director for Operadons (EDO) Victor Stello (INRC,26 Feb.,1).
Severalinvesdgations have found th:t Ste!!o ud ConneUy circumvented the advice of the agen:y's general counsel in setting up the slush fund and buyltg the upe., .nd their a:tfon against Fonuna has repeatedly been chancterized u vindictive.
In het FO!A request, Connelly uks for copics of any sad all agency records and information, includ-ing, but not limited to, original and concurrence copies, notes, lettus, memoruda, drafu, minutes, d: aries, legs, calendars, tapes, trans:ripts, summaries, interview repons, NRC commission bricangs, eongressiortal brieSngs, EDO ad omer bricings of NRC of6cials, procedures, instru:tjens, Slcs, photognphs, ag e4rnents, handwritten notes, studies, data shecu, notebooks, books, tdephone mes-uges, voi:e re:ordit:gs, video recordings, :omputer primouts, and any o$er data compilatierts, interim ufor End reports, status reporu, and any and cJl o$er records re:evant to ud/cr generated in connec-tjen with"the icpi:s she cites.
~
Conndly wants all reeords on OIA's inquiry and investigation of Fortuna and the NRC Itupector Genen!'s (10) investigation of the way O!A har.d!cd the Fonuna invest'gation. She also wants my records pertaining to the NRC Generd Counsel's invo!vement in the inquiries related to Fortuna.
In addidon, she hu uked for records on O!A 10, and Genua! Cocasel involvunent in NRC's In-vesdgaden of Region IV security specialist James Kelly. NRC initiated u investiguion of Keuy in 1987, a month after he rnah negative statemenu about NRC's fitness for duty policy to Congren.
Ear!ict this year, the NRC 10 launched his on invesdga:ian into whether senior agency ofBefals--
induding ConneUy-reta!!ated against Kelly for his congressiond tutimony (INRC,12 Feb.,14),
g Connelly asked that fees associated with responding to her FO'A request be waived "aisce I am an agency employee and this request is being made u a result of agtn:y actions involvirig me " She of-fered to review an itemited index of the documeets tumed up in conn:ction with hnt request "to avoid agency copying costs"of documents she does not want NRC COBRECTS COURT RECORD IN FORTUNA CASE, CONCEDES OIA AFFirAVITS' FALSE NRC legel offeists told a federal coun u the end oflast month that suders of the agency's now
[ defunct Of6:e of Inspector & Auditor (OIA) lied in affdavit the NRC lavestigator who was suspended after refusing to be inteniewed by (OIA),
Frederick Herr and Mark Resner, both depudes to former O!A dire:W Sharon Cocadly, han teen removed from their positions by NRC Inspector Generd David Williams, whose orace reptarW 014 in late 1989. Resnet remains on detail to the agency's security division, ed Herr la sdU on Mrniniser.tive
, leave.
\/l/ Fonuns deputy director of NRC's Oft:e ofInvesdrations (OD. was accused by OIA of conspirm with antinuclear activists to "tocole the arency."
( To pursue their case, OIA and then caecutive director for operations Victor SLc11o entered into a secret " consulting" contract with an informant, Douglu Ellison, ed purchased surreptitiously made tape recordings of Fortuna's telephone converta' ions. Although the :ontrut wu dated September 1, 1989, Resner and ConneUy had imerviewed the irJormant in August. - ~' ~
NRC threatened to are Fortuna but ended up ruspending him la February 1989 after he refused to submit to a cocn reported imerview without legal counsel present. He had been interviewed informaDy by O!A in November 1988, at which time he was told that he was not the subject of an investigation.
p dut when the Ol deputy direar brought suit aninst the stency in !ste Fstruary 1989. seeking to_
- prohibit NRC from conducung an on the record interview or from takina ey adverse iob_anton arainst
- - him, both Herr and Resner swore that O!A's invesugation of Fonur.: began in October November 1988, b_ not m August. -The sceret consuhing contract with the informam ,
form:m had not been publi:!y revealed when iterr and Resner signed tneir a!6daviu, which said-
"plaindff Fortuns was irterwiewed on the Ellison rrattet by rmu'W M+ D~" Mf-"-
r.o: on,. e eem en or ow Noven.n: 4.19p a: wh::$ t.'n: r.e p;c o:2 s.s.e g6ncrN ba:kgrounS gA intc min.ca t' 0:A Si.tseq.icn:ir.vougaton and ie.formuon chained h O! A led O!A to conclude that noter e.temew wo"M b: ne:esm. Beca.'se ce quesuont O!A pVned to uk pundff Fortuna 3 us at this seseq.;tr.:it. erWe* s ould fo:us on the rrrr.er Fenna performed tu officia: hues.O!A con. $
cluded 2:: Fon.e.1 m u now a ' subject'of the traesugauon."
o
- A:cering to NRC's corfteden of the record, n;bmited to the coun May 30 by Solicaor John Cor. :: --
des. "the inspe mt generrJ (Wstliams) has determined that,in contrast u nh sutemer.ts made in the Hest and Resner a!!Atvits, the O!A invesUgsdon of plaintff r.:tt:a!!y was inidaud in August 1958 and that - N--
2 h-no informedon de, eloped after O!A's November 4,1988 inerview of Mr. Fonuna led to his becomirs a 4.
'subje: 'of the OIA invutistson.
"Rader, the inspector general hu concladed that Mr. Fortuna w u a ' subject' from the outset of C
1W 6 k(D:$
O!A's invesu;suon."
g Although a House subcommittee asked NRC what loformation Herr and Resner obtained after g s ,gWg@
the November 1988 interview of Fonuna that led to his becoming the subject of a investigation, reither 2- Q the former OIA naffen nor the commission ever answered.
Nonethekss. Cerdea told the court NRC does nottelieve the court should do anything about the Q e 'E b%gJ muter. "The staurnems alleged to be enoneous b) the inspector general con:ern ba:kground (setualin. T- %.;
formadon." Cordes wrote,"and ue not material to the leg &l arpmenu made to the court !)y My partyA, ner to the cou.t's decision.
CW 7 tion."
"Hence, we do not suggest dat the court should tale any a: tion bued on this conteted informa.
3 h '- g :-
The federal coun dismiised Fonuna's complaint May 23,1989, maintainir.g that the NRC inves-yf t!gstor had "adequne administruive remedy to redress any possible adverse persoenel action" through the agency's g-ievance procedures.
g g f -- ](pgr Christine Kohl, an NRC adminntmive hw judge who s u usiped to decide Fortuna's cue, found W 32 b
that OlA did not follow its own procedures in its pursuit of Fortu .a and required the removal of a letter of repdmud from Fonuna's ;crsonnel tJc. Congrenional ud independent tedews have also c!cated
$g%yQP g$
Fonuna of any wrongdoing in the case and concluded that the charges against him wre trumped up. gaU NRC's inspector general wu expected to relcue hh own investigative report oc the scandal to certain Teoagressional comminees early this weci, ggg W Foauna's legr.! counsel, Julian Greenspun, said that Herr's and Resner's a'legedly false statement g g p.
were impenet to the case. "It is sign!hant because h shows that they (Herr ed Resner) were witung c7:t%
'E - M w to anything. If it wun't important, why did they lie? This w u a coyuup, and a coverup in the U.S. Dis.
get Coun." -Erir lindem. W.uAington gy gggg g3 gy; g.20 90 TOW 53 6,500.
FREHCH REGULATOIRS PRESS TO REVIEW NEXT ' ADVANCED' REACTOR TYPE French nuclear reguhtors are " impatient" to start examining the safety features of France's next; "advancef rea:ter type, but so far their hands are empty, reguhtory chief Mi:hej !.averie lamanted last week. Laverie, d! rector of the Service Central de Surete des Innallatforts Nucleairca (SCSIN), said that -- ~
if a new textot duign is to be ready to be built by the end of thb deca Ic in France, the dialogue bet.
ween operator, cons:n= tor, ed regulaton mint be compicud by 1995. And that, he said, meus that tbc draft advanced.rea::ct dulgn projecu "have to stan arriving" on his deak thh year.
In a meeting wid joumalists, Laverie expreued a touch of envy vis+via the U.S. NRC "I obscsyv -
thu our American ee!!cagues are already at work" examining advanced. rector projects in the U.S.,
Laverie said. "We are not. ! have been emphuhing to Electricite de Fru:s the urgera:y of beginning thh dialogte,"he said, so that "we can agtte (on a restor dulgn) by 1995." .
Laverie calculates that date by usuming that France's oldest FWR will have a life of about 30 yar:E -
even if the more recent onea may lut 40 years. Since Fessenheim.1 went oc line in 1977, the Ant replacement reactor will be needed no later than 1997, be estissaies. ' ~
Lavaris said the new reactnr typo "rnest incorporate all the progreu"made over put years, but may -
be quite different from today's reacton, the 1,400.MW. clan N4 FWRJ now pobed to cater service. The mon important change, from Laveria's vievpoint, would be to male them simplen " simpler technically, simpler to operate." They may not necesaarily be smaller, though. laiverie said he is in favor of wider margina in the new reactors; for exarnple, he said, secondary circulu could be duigned to be able to contain a steam generator tube leak and prevent reicasca of radioactive steam to the atrnosphere. Such circuits "certainly would be more musive and moro experuive" than current models, he said, "but we could gain a lot on the safety side." '
\
Laverie and SCSIN section director Piene Franck Chevet said that the Fren:h. German working
6 InsideNRC
-- . _ . . . _ . . = . _ . . . . ._
M NsIDF KR C.~ hes 18,1P90 An exclualve riport on the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Couunission
~
NO SIGNVIC ANT EVENTS E ARNS PGE TOP RA'ITNG FOR OPER ATIONS NRC as uded Portland General E!cetri: Co. (PGE) a top Category I ruing in the ana of ptet optadons in the agency's latest S ALP revicw of prforman:e at Trojan. Region V Administrator John Mutin said the absence of any signi5 cant operational events during the 15 month review pnod wu a primuy reason for the his radng.
The utility, however, was given a low Category 3 rating in the uea of maintenece/ surveillance, Manin said the S ALP boud "considened the planning, a:heduling, and oversight of ma-intensnee/surveillan:e work activities to be weak, and the qulity of associated procedures and work in-stru:tfons to be in need ofimprovement." Some imnrevemect wu noted at the end of the period,but, Manin said,"this area clearly wurants close future scrudny by PGE management."
According to Nucleonics Week, Trojan, a 1,178.MW, Westinghouse PWR, had a grou espacity fac-ter in 1989 of 56.61%.Through April 1990, the unit's caps:ity factor wu 61.83%.
In the area of raSologi:a! controls, the 5 ALP report noted that total collecdve dose hu beca iDereu- 7
- ing since 1987,with the 1989 total at 423 person rem.The report said that the development of a q "hes!sy ALARA prcgram wu hindered by plantwide problems with inefficient outage coordination, U -
in:cesistent job scope evalunion, and ineffective planning."
The report noted that PGE has taken steps to " enhance its Trojan mansgement team and to imple- gg h
ment broad scope improvements through the nu: lear division improvement plan "The reprt said, oW M- '
however, that many of the changes have yet to occur and sevral key management positions wrs vacant, beirg temporuity filled, or w ett in transition u the S ALP period ended, and therefore, the O resul:.: of PGE's effcc.s ue only recendy itginning to be observed. ]
- 4. -
Q$Q U s NRC INVES'nGATION PROBF7 ALLEGAT10NS OF FAULTY SEABROOK WELDlHG $
A two month NRC Investigwon aimed at rtsolving questions about tbc lategrity of certain Scatrook pipe welds and related quality umrance matters is corting to a close, with a report expected to be draf h8 ted by the end of the mocth, Q , /.
Lee Sressari the NRC senior manager leading the investigaden, declined to discuts detalls of the qENJT report. Spessard said the group wu chutered "to do na after the fa:t independent evaluadoc"of pipe gh we! ding and nondestructive cuminuion setivities a Seabrock, :;-p 4 NRC launched the inde;endent team investigation about one month after the commission anthodaed C' full power operation of the controversial plant (INRC.12 March 51 Desolte the commiss!on's March 1 vote okaying full power opercion, NRC and coegress}onal cafers and consultants have been podnit M over years o. inspection reports, radiographs, and oNr records to determine if welds foe sa piping at Seabrook meet regulatory requirements and if a paper trall, supporting that conclusion, eatus. * %
(7 Qcesdons about the integrity of the welds-or at least the imegrity of the qcality assursnee program' g) for the welds-came to light sia years ago during a Department of Labor grievance bearing involving a Oq- ---
former Seabrook contrut worker, The worker, Joseph Wampler, wu employed by Pullman Higgins Co. W Pg
. a piping contrutor for Seabrook from August 1983 to Juuuy 1984. He wu fired on the grourda thu he f wu uncooperadvs and caused hen at work.
g;fgA
[ In his brief tenure at Seabrock,Wampler wu assigned to cumine hunieds of backlogged weld radforraohs. Of those he revlewed.Wam;ter re%cted about 20%3ither becase the radiog sph could W C'>-
1 EM -
( _not be read beeme it had not been shot properly or had faded, or because the tsdictr Dh showed a weld
\ that did not rnect code. Wampler alleged that one of the reasons he wu 6 red wu because he re}ected too many of the weld tsdiograph , l Not until earlier thh year did NRC make a cuncerted effort to invesdrate Warnpler's information.
Wampfer's allegadens, whl:h were surf aced by anti Seabrook activist Stephen Comley, ted to the now.
\ (Mondenedinquiry. N At first, NRC senler emeiah uid the 20% rdut rate cited by Wampler was "not unusual"in the industry. The agency staffers, ci,ing "some confusion over the exact nature of Mr. Wampler's fanetlon*' at Pu!!manfliigilns, have s!nce pulled back from that staternent, but are holding to the posi-
l
,tpeg me 70ctr reject rs:c. by itse:!. is of *co Iv mr4 relem:c in messing overall plant safety.
NRC4 :on$$tn:e m the mitgnty of the w ends et te wemag rvr,a appcus to be bued largely on t o LNngs "1Kt the k of the rad;egnphs"ccndu:ted by Yankee Ato nic Ele:W Co. and a re::nt NRC review of 100 w eld radiopaphs.
Responding to questions from Sen. Edm ard K Medy (D Mus.), NRC uid the compey, " deemed it g
prudera to do an independent 100% resiew" of N!me Higgins radiognph work. In the beginnirig, the 100# review w as "a ongoir.;, informt! process." NRC said, but in 1984 Yankee formalized the teview by ad:pting a written pro:edure "which contained provisions to review all ufety related vendor and
- site generated radiographs."
i nere sppears, however, to be some disarrument bersten the licensee and NRC over whether the 1984 wnuen procedures,in fact.cor.tmlled the 100% weld radiograph review, i
New Hr/npshire Yankee spckesman Ron Sher told Inside N.R.C. that procedures for the 100%
~
review "had ajways b:en the sa ne." Cont.Ty to NRC's understanding, the 1984 wrican procedure ap.
plied to another Yankee review prograrnwot the 100% review.
Accordlag to Sher. in 1984, Yukee adopted a program w hereby they dupliemed a variety of Boo-destructive exam! nations that had already been conducted Those included radiopaphy, liquid penetrant, at d esgneti: particle enmina: ions. done on a number of randomly selected s c!ds. 'Itat effort aimed to check the adequacy of Yankee con:racters' nondestn:c:ive eurninaden operadons, but did not constitute a 100% review.
The info mrJity of the process cah on, and the concomiunt !a:k of reecrds on the effort, troubles ,
. cottnssional crises who argue that relying on such an inferrna!, scantily documented teview indicues noncomp'ian:e with NRC's quality atsurance criteria. These enti:s a: knowledge that there is no
'k , eyidence of speci8e defective welds, but_they a gue then is ques:fonabic basis for NRC certi6 cation that
_ the w eldmr we done in accord with NRC regulstions.-
Spokesman Sher coted that the Yankee 100 % revie v was not a regulatory requirement. Ruber, it wu a step beyond whu NRC nguluions called for ed therefore, not beholds to NRC documenta-tion tequiremenu. "It's not a reqdtement...but its the type of ceasenative appron:h we've always taten u Scabrook," Sher nid.
Asked to further explore the a; parent con:rsdictico in Yankee ed NRC undetPWg of the role the 1984 written preced.;tes p ayed in the 100% review, Sher uid it would be "inapwiste" to respond to addidona! inquiries thu " para!!el" the NRC intcitigadon. "Given t!us is pa:t of the ,
, regulatory review, the apprepriate forum for us to answer these (quenions)is NRC," Sher Mi Sher added that the compey believes it hu " demonstrated to NRC thu the welds and wcld records meet NRC ud code reqdrements,"He said he wu aware Inside N.R.C. *1.1 ta' king to Seabrook's '
crides ed contended that the Seabrook's "de4cated opponents willprobably never be sadsfbd with what we do at Seabrook." But he added, "we w ant to usure the gener:J public" thu the safe operulo of the plet is foremost in the company's mini in an April 24 intervisw with the NRC renew group, Wampler uid tha reog aphs he rtYiewed between August 1983 and Jugary 1954 "had teen approved and sitting areced since early 1982"and thu Yankee Atomi:'s own r riew "wu turning up almost 19% to 2M rsject ruc over and aboys whu !
wu bringing to them."
. According to Wampler, prior to November 22, !?8:, he and Yankee Atomic's rsdlographic reviewers ,
informally pused questionable radiognphs back and fcrth.
Yekee Atomic quallry anurance engineer Dick Julian wodd call Wampler am! uk him to review radiognph film psekales that he,Jdia, thought were questionable.The packages had been aptroyed by Pc!! man EE3 ins before Juhan reviewed them.
If Wampler agreed with Julian's interpretation that a we!d or st!d pack.sge wrJ rejectable, Wampler would hand cany the pa:kage ba:k to Pulltnan.Higgins and have the weld re radiographed.11a repair wu warranted, a weld, repair order would be generatai - - - ~ ~ ~ ~ _ . , , , _ _
But, according to Wampfer, the entiit procedure wu a:complished without greparation of Yankee Atomic de8:len:y reports or other paperwork that would be maintained as a quality neoni.
At a November 22,1983 meedng, it wu agreed thu Yukee Atom!c's rejection of a wt!d or weld pa:kage would thereafter be documented on all radlographic packages contairdng rejectable indication Wampler uid.
It is unclear at this dme whether the informni nstare of the review and apparent gap in the pap would bc : violation of NRC regulations, but those in Conpess eyeing the inue are concerned.A,
\)/
-.-,0ce Mrcso, Woshinston m
CONNELLY FILES FO!A FOR RECORDS OF CIA INVESTIGATIONS OF HERSELF i J ,
Sharon Connelly, former doc:.or of ec noudatcha Off:e of Inspecor & Auditor (O!A) hu fled a request under the Freedem of Intennauen Act Ier all NRC tc:ords dedir.i; with, arr.org oder h things 01A investigsuons of Staron Connelly.
Connelly was a centrrJ 6gure in the agen:y's c;tcoversial and frAless investigaden of Roger For-tuna, deputy director of the agen:y's Off ce ofInvesdgadons. In 1988, Connelly aninged to parthase surrepddeusly made tape recordings of telcphene conscrsations between Fortuna and an at:Unu;kar a:-
dvm. Connelly paid $6.000 in cuh for de tapes, wid the money coming from a slush fund set up by former Execudve Director for Operadons (EDO) Vi: tor Stello (INRC,26 Feb.,1).
Severa invessgadens have found that Ste!!o and ConneUy cir:umvented the advice of the agen:y's general counsel in setting up the slush fund and buying de tapes, and their action against Fonuna has re;atedly been chars:terited u vindiedve.
In het FO!A request, Connelly uts for copies of any and all agency records and infonnation, includ-ing, but not limited to, original and concunence evpies, notes, letters, memoranda, drafu, minute.s, dianes, logs, calendars, tapes, transcripts, summaries, intervicw repcets, NRC commission bricings, cor.gressional brie 6ngs, EDO and other brief ags of NRC offcials, procedures, instru:tions,6les, photopephs, areements, handw ritten notes, sidies, dau shecu, notebooks, books, telephone mes-sages, voice re:ordit:gs, video re:ordings :omputer printouu, and any other data compiladens, interim an?'or final reports, status tepons, and any and ed r,,her records relevant to and/or generned in connec-tion win"de topics she cites, Connelly wanu all recerds on OIA's inquiry and invesdgaden of Fortuna and the NRC Inspector Genera!'s (10) invesdgadon of the way OIA tandled the Fonuna investiguion. She also want.1 any r:ccrds pentining to the NRC General Counsel's invohement in the inquiries related to Fonuna.
In addition, she has uked for records on OIA. !0, and Genua! Counsel involvement in NRC's in-vesdgetion of Region IV secenty specialist James Xelly. NRC initimed an investigation of KeUy in 1987, a mond afte.r he rnade negadve noemenu about NRC's acess-for-duty policy to Congn43.
Earlier this year, the NRC !" launched hiJ own invesdgadoc into whether senior agency of$ cia!>-
including ConneDy-rmlimed against Kelly for his conpessionsJ testimony (INRC,12 Feb.14).
g Connelly uked that fees usociated with responding to het FO!A request be waived "since I am an agency employee and this request is being made as a result of agen:y actions involving me,"She of-fered to review an iternized index of the dccumecu turned up in connection with her request "to avoid agency copying cosu" of documents she does not want.
NRC CORRECTS COURT RECORD IN FORTUNA CASE, CONCEDES OIA AFF1 DAY d FALSE NRC legal of5cials told a fede-al coun n Ge end oflast month that staHers of the agency's now
[ defunct Of5cc of Inspector & Auditor (OIA) lied e aff daviu the NRC lavesugeor who wu suspended after refusing to be intenitwed by (OIA),
Frederick Herr and Mark Resnu, both depudes to former OI A director Shsruc Cocnelly, have been removed from their posidons by NRC Inspector General David Winiaru, whose ofsce replaced 01A in late 1989. Resner remains on detal to the egency's security division, aM Herr is still t,n administruive
{ leave.
\ (( i 1
with antinuclear activists to " topple the arency."Fonura, deputy directo
/
\ To pursue their case. 01A and then erecutive director for operadona Victer Stello entered into a secret " consul 0ng"contm:t with an informant, Douglu Ellison, and purchased surreputiously made- - -
tape recordings of Fonuna's telephone conversadons. A! bough the contract wu dated September 1, 1980, Resner and Connelly had iruerviewed the informant in August. - - ~
NRC threvened to are Fortuna but ended up surynh him in FebrLary 1989 aftce he refuted to submit to a court reponed interview without lega' co esent. He had been inscrviewed informally by OIA in November 1988, at which time he was to wu not the subjen of an investigation.
('-' Jul when the 01 deputy director brought suit agt. _,. peSy in I 4.Echur2_lML5eekinr to_5 prohibit NRC from conducting an on the regor? interview or from tt. king ansdvergjob action aninst__
l him, both Hen and Pesner swore that O!A's i . cigation of Fortuna txcan in October.Novemter 1988, not m August.
- k. The secret consulting contract with the informant and the slush fund set up by S ,
fortnam had not been publicly revealed when lien and Resner signed their af6daviu, which said:
"Naindff Fortuns was interviewed on the Ellison r suer by myself sed defenem her infort stiv.
p-
', r.o; on.tse % st. . ) o. oWt S wtts d. lvbb 61 w hl.n Smt r t p.vu 4J time (tPt ra) t&tyrout.c g3 <u; infomuca in C:A swegnarauyetion sad irfornavon ohnc4 h O!A led CI A to sotclude est a. $er memcw *ould t't nueswp Brcane the quesures Ol A p'arned to uk plaan'.'f! Fonea at this sLbsc4.tt:it.arut* u e,;ld fe:ss on ce me,nt.cr Fcnana Mrfo*med his of 6cial douts OlA tun.
k%
chdeJ th:.t Fon_r.a w u now a 'sdjut'of the m*esupporo" Attordirg to NRC's terfubon of the rtcord, ntmiutd to the coun May 30 by Solicitor John Cet.
= h ~-)o{g
- des. "$e inspe.:t:r genend (Williams) hu determined that,in convut usth satemenu made in the Hr.rt und Resner a!!.t.sviu, the OI A investpden of pit.inuff a:tca))y w u iniuaad in Awgat 1958 ud thu no mformation developed after OlA's Nosert.ber 4,1988 inurvie w of Mr. Fonur.a led to his tuomsg a
'2 Q O 6 Uz$,4-
- sdj:4t'of the O!Ainvutighdon.
EW$
"Ruher, es inspector general hu concladed that Mr. Fortuna w u a ' subject'(mm the outset of O!A's investignion." $ h.3 y %q Although a llouse subcommittee uked NRC what laformatlon Herr and Resner obtained after the November 1988 interview tif Fonuna that led to his buemkg de subject cf e invutigttion, neither gt- Q[khu 3 the formr3 0!A staffers not the comminion ever uswered. L .-
^Nonetheltu. Cordu told the coun NRC does not beline the eourt should do anythirt about the @ W L t--
' matter. "The statemeras alltged to be erToneous by the inspector genera) con:em background futual in. N
. formadon,"~Cordes wrote. "and are rot rnaterial to the legal ugumenu made to the court by any prty nor to the cou t's decillon.
aO CN g q) :,
tion."
"Hence, we do not suggut that the coun should tale any ution bued on this corrected informa.
T ,cs, 3 W' - y' The federal coun dismine.d Fonuna's cornplaint May 25,1969, maintaining that the NRC inves.
tlgator had " adequate administruive icmedy to redrcu any pulble advene personnel action" through g g
- g~.n-f-
the aget.cy's grievance procedurcs. W 3F" Chrisdne Kohl, as NRC administrative hw judge whe wu usigned to decide Fortuna's cue, found that O!A did not follow lu own procedurts in la parsult of Fonut.a sad required the removal of a lattar
$p 3
of reprimand from Fonuna's personnel ale. Congrentonal ud indepadent reviews have sjso cleared Fonuna of any wrongdekg in the cue and concluded thu de chuges agahst hirn were trumped up, g$gDk 0
@NRC's inspector general wu expected to rtleue h!s own invertJguist reprt on the scand.al to catala congrtstional comminees cariy this weel gD '
Fonuna's legal counsel, Julian Gruntrus, sald that Herr's ard Re.inct*: ellegedly fabe statement g $,
Ot g7 g w ere imponant to the cr.te. "It is sign!Acar.t because it shows that f ey Geir ud hesner) w cre wnung
, - M. O w to anything. If it wun't imponant. *hy did they lle7 Ttus w u a covt.vp; ud s ra vetup in the U.5. Dii.
i inct Coun."--bic Lindema, nWe^ BY RNES AS @ br 90 TOML G 8,500.
FRENCH REGULATohS PRESS To Ri! VIEW NEXT ' ADVANCE 0' REACTOR TYPE-French nuclear reguhters are " imp:ient" to stan esamin6g the safety feuutes of France's next,
" advanced" renter type, but to fu their huds ue empty, re guhtary ch!ct Micha! !.avetic lunented last week. ! averic, d! rector of me Servke Central de Surete des tr.ata!!adons Nucleaires (SCSIN), aald that if a new rea: tor design is to be ready to be built by the end of this decade in France, the dialogue bet.
ween operstor, cons:ru: tor, ud reruhtors must be comple:cd by 1995. And that, he said, means thu the draft advanced.rer:or design projecu "have to stan arriving" on ble duk this year, -
In a meeting with journalists,1. aver!s expreased a touch of cavy vis.a.vis the IJJ. NRC, "I observs - --
the our Ameti:an colleagues ue alnady at work"examinkg advuced.re.a: tor projecu la the U.S.,
l.averic said, "We are not. I have bean emphutzbg to E!cetricite de Pan:s the urgency of beglaning this dhlogve,"_he said, ao that "we can agtse (on a reactor dasip) try 1i93." .
1.averic calculates #? date by usaming that France's old st FWR will have a life of about 30 yearsi " - ~
even if the more recent onec may tut 40 yean $!nce Feuenhelm.1 stat on line in 1977, the Am replacament rea: tor w!!! be m4ed no later than 1997,14 settmataa.
1.avark uid the new reactar type "must incorporate all the progtsaa"made ovat put years, but snay be quite different from today's reactors, the 1,400 MW clus N4 FWRs now poised to entar arvke,79 most important change, from Laverie's vtewpoint, would be to make them simplet: "almnlet technically.
aimpler to operate."They rney not necessarily be smaller, though t averie said he la b 3 'or of wider margins in the new reactors: (cf ezample, he said, secondary circulu could be designed to be abla to contain'a stearn generstor tube leal and present relenes of radioactive steam to the atmosphere. Such circuits :"certainly would be more mushe and more eapensive" thu et .itnt models, he said, "but we would gain a lot on the safety side." d
\U ;
1.averie and SCSIN section director Fitne Franck Chevet said that the French Oume working
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