ML20141M060
| ML20141M060 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 05/27/1997 |
| From: | Mccoy C SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 50-424-97-03, 50-424-97-3, 50-425-97-03, 50-425-97-3, LCV-1009-A, NUDOCS 9706040166 | |
| Download: ML20141M060 (6) | |
Text
_ _., _
C. K. McCoy Southern Nuclear Vice President Operating Company,Inc.
Vogtle Project 40 Invemess Center Parkway l
P.O. Box 1295 Birmingham. Alabama 35201 I
Tel 205 992.7122 Fax 205.992.0403 l
SOUTHERN Ra l
COMPANY May 2,,,
1997 Energy to Serve)$urWorld*
Docket No.
50-424 50-425 LCV-1009-A U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Ladies and Gentlemen:
l VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT l
REPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION l
I Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) submits the enclosed information for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) in response to a violation identified in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Report Nos.
l 50-424; 425/97-03, which concerns an inspection conducted from March 3-7,1997.
l In the enclosure, a transcription of the violation precedes SNC's response.
Should you have any questions feel free to contact this office.
I Sincerely, l'8/f ' '
l C. K. McCoy
[
CKM/AFS l
Enclosure:
Reply to NOV 50-424;425/ 97-03 l
cc: Southern Nuclear Operatina Comoany Mr. J. B. Beasley, Jr.
Mr. M. Sheibani l
NORMS l
U. S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission Mr. L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator Mr. L. L. Wheeler, Licensing Project Manager, NRR Mr. C. R. Ogle, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle 1
9706040166 970527."
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VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT-UNITS 1 & 2 REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC INSPECTION REPORTS 50-424.425/97-03 VIOLATION 50-424.425 /97-03-03 The following is a transcription of the violation as cited in the Notice of Violation (NOV) followed by its response.
"During an NRC inspection conducted on March 3-7,1997, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the ' General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions.' NUREG 1600, the violation is listed I
below:
License Condition E of the Vogtle Operating License, dated March 17,1997, states in part that Southern Nuclear shall fully implement and maintain in efv t all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, guard ec training and qualifications, and safeguards contingency plans...and to the authority of10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p).
Section 6.6 A of the licensee's Physical Security Plan, Revision 33, dated September 12,1996, stetes that the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) are continuously manned by at least one authorized person.
Contrary to the above, from January 1996 to March 1997, the Vogtle Security Response Plan, Revision 3, Phase 2, defined a deployment strategy that allowed the CAS to be left unmanned during a contingency.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement III)."
RESPONSE TO VIOLATION 50-424.425 /97-03-03 Admission or Denial of the Violation:
We do not agree that a violation of regulatory requirements occurred. Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) complied with all provisions of the Commission approved physical security. guard training and qualifications, and safeguards contingency plans.
Basis for Disputine the Violati.m:
l Background - Licensee Initiatives to Enhance Response Actions In 1995 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) began preparations for the NRC's Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) scheduled to be performed at VEGP in early 1996. During OSRE preparation, VEGP personnel initiated a new target analysis based upon critical equipment and 1
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT-UNITS 1 & 2 REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC INSPECTION REPORTS 50-424.425/97-03 4.
4 risk assessment. Essentially this involved a fundamental change in interdiction strategy for the plant as a whole and, among other things, led to the enhancement of the VEGP Security Response Plan, i.e., the deployment plan. In our opinion, the enhanced plan significantly increased the effectiveness of the VEGP security force's capability to protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a).
The new target analysis also revealed that in a subset of the scenarios analyzed, greater assurance ofinterdiction to protect certain areas could be achieved consistently with a pre-planued method of response.
In addition to other OSRE preparatory activities (such as increased Plant Operations and Security training, new target analysis, and the installation of hardened defensive positions throughout the plant), VEGP Security personnel observed other licensees' OSREs. Another licensee effectively used a similar deployment strategy to the one now in questien. After examining the alternatives, VEGP decided that utilizing this similar j
deploymem strategy for a subset of scenarios to protect vulnerable targets achieved high assurance of security effectiveness and was consistent with the overall purpose of the NRC regulations for response to the design basis 1
threat.
No Deployment in Violation of NRC Requirements There has been no actual attempt of radiological sabotage or a security contingency / emergency event at VEGP that resulted in the implementation of the CAS deployment as outlined in the specific deployment strategy at issue.
Therefore, the CAS has always been continuously manned, and the requirements of the Physical Security Plan's Section 6.6 have always been met. In the same way, Southern Nuclea has fully implemented and maintained in effect all provisions of the Commission approved VEGP physical security, guard training and qualifications, and safeguards contingency plans. A " shadow force" has been utilized during training drills and OSRE scenarios.
Contingencies and CAS Response We question whether, in the case of an actual security response that warranted implementation of the subject deployrnent strategy, a violation of License Condition E or Section 6.6 A would occur. We note that a reasonable interpretation of Security Plan Section 6.6. A, arid the parallel provision 10 CFR 73.55 (e)(1)... address " steady state" or " static" conditions and the safeguards capabilities necessary to assure timely detection and assessment in order to more effectively respond to the threat.
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VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT-UNITS 1 & 2 REILY TO NOTICE OF VIOL.ATION NRC INSPECTION REPORTS 50-424.425/97-03 Detection and assessment at the initiation of an actual event is paramount in the decision to respond. In order to assure prompt response to "a single act," i.e., a violent external assault, the redundant alarm stations must accomplish their primary purpose of threat detection and assessment in order to recognize the need to implement a particular deployment strategy. At this point in the contingency scenario, security personnel should be free to assume any position deemed necessary to effectively respond to the actual threat. To require continuous manning of the CAS and SAS, or other positions such as perimeter compensatory posts performing similar duties of intrusion detection and assessment after response to the initial threat, may be contrary to the most effective security response objective. We appreciate the NRC's current reading of the provision and suggest that it be revisited in light of the overall objective of security effectiveness.
First, we observe that no regulation expressly limits or precludes the deployment of available resources (including personnel from the CAS or SAS) in responding to contingencies. For example, we are unaware of any regulation that states that all detection and assessment capabilities must be maintained during a response to an actual threat. The purpose of the regulatory requirement to maintain detection and assessment capability in the alarm station has already been fulfilled when the design basis threat scenario dictates a transition to a response force. Second, the NRC's own "OSRE Lessons Learned" correspondence dated September 22,1995, recognizes and comments that the main concern with deploying from alarm stations is to maintain command and control. We feel that command and control is not jeopardized by utilizing the subject deployment method at VEGP. Third, the VEGP Physical Security Plan's Section 6.6 appears to recognize that there may be circumstances that necessitate the abandonment of an alarm station and gives the precautions for securing the facility and transferring command and control to the other alarm station. In support of our interpretation is the design requirement that alarm stations be redundant so that in case of a single act, whether it be due to fire, toxic environment, or an attempt of radiological sabotage, i.e. design basis threat, the capability of calling for assistance or otherwise responding to an alarm is not removed. In a similar way, the Physical Security Plan's Section 3.3 " Suspension of Safeguards" appears to contemplate deviations from steady state or static pre-threat requirements such as the subject deployment strategy.
By way of analogy, Tit'e 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations also requires that the control room be manned at all times. Nevertheless, the NRC recognizes that there may be times when the control room must be evacuated and regulations require that the design and plant operating procedures be written to accommodate this situation with remote shutdown capabilities.
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VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT-UNITS 1 & 2 REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC INSPECTION REPORTS 50-424.425/97-03 This is an exact parallel to the violation cited above for security. The regulations allow for and anticipate deviations during emergency conditions from the Technical Specifications and Emergency Plans with proper approval.
OSRE - High Assurance Demonstrated During the VEGP OSRE, the physical security system and tactical response i
j force demonstrated the ability to successfully protect against the design basis threat by utilizing the improved interdiction logic and the specific deployment strategy. Both the Region and Staff representatives witnessed this deployment method and have been aware of VEGP's inclusion of this deployment strategy in its Response Plan since February 1996. The NRC OSRE observed, tested, and documented that the improved interdiction logic was "an intelligent and eflicient use of response assets," and " demonstrated an effective protection strategy." The OSRE report further states "however the strategy may not be in strict compliance with the Security Plan.... This should be explored by the licensee." No tracking mechanism for closure, i
such as an URI or IFI, was ever issued by the NRC. We suggest that this reflects a lack of compliance concern with using the subject deployment strategy.
In response to this observation, the licensee requested that this specific deployment method be expressly approved for addition to the Security Plan by submission of a 10 CFR 50.90 amendment request. After almost a year of dialogue between NRR and licensee, the licensee solicited an NRR visit in order to expedite resolution of the request. During the visit in March 1997, 2
the NRC security inspector communicated a non-compliance and cited a i
potential violation. Please be reassured that had a non-compliance been voiced at an earlier time, we would not have retained the subject deployment i
strategy pending NRR review of the amendment request.
Request to Reconsider a Compliance-Based NOV i
As stated previously, we are asking the NRC to reconsider their interpretation of compliance to contingency prerequisites during the required responses to actual threats, such as VEGP's deployment strategy with CAS operator response. The VEGP deployment plan recognizes and trains personnel to take actions determined by the licensee to be necessary in support of the general performance objective of 10 CFR 73.55 (a) to provide 4
high assurance of security effectiveness in defense of the design basis threat.
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VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT-UNITS 1 & 2 REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC INSPECTION REPORTS 50-424.425/97-03 i
We feel that the creation, maintenance and use of the plan, as a training document that suppons and increases this level of high assurance for overall security effectiveness required by 10 CFR 73.55(a), is not a compliance issue. We feel that this violation fails to appropriately factor this broader performance goal, resulting in an unnecessary cost without offsetting benefits. This violation both discourages and penalizes licensees for being proactive in their efforts to contemplate new approaches and logic for difficult contingency scenarios - potentially those beyond design basis requirements - and train officers for the most effective response in these i
situations.
I Corrective Measures Pending Further NRC Review 4
When the NRC clearly communicated a position that the subject deployment strategy was a potential violation in March 1997, immediate compensatory actions J
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were taken and are continuing to be followed. These measures essentially involve additional staffmg on an on-going basis. We also note that the NRR staff recently denied our amendment request to revise the Security Plan with Amendment 31, per letter dated April 30,1997. Although separate from this violation, we feel that a more detailed justification to address the basis for the denial can be provided; we request the Region's suppon during the resolution of this issue. In addition, we will explore with the NRR Staff other regulatory relief which is consistent with the i
NRC's interpretation of Section 6.6 A of the Physical Security Plan.
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