ML20141J604
| ML20141J604 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Framatome ANP Richland |
| Issue date: | 08/18/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20141J597 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9708200132 | |
| Download: ML20141J604 (5) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES
.ye 2
S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I
WASHINOTON. D.C. 20h0001 l
DOCKET:
70 1227 LICENSEE:
Siemens Power Corporation Richland. WA
SUBJECT:
SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT:
AMENDMENT APPLICATION DATED MAY 22.
1997. VO POWDER AND/OR PELLET SHIPPING PAILS AND AMENDMENT TO ALLOWCOI4FORMANCEWITHNRC'SCERTIFICATEOFCOMPLIANCENO.9196 1.
U0, POWDER / PELLET SHIPPING PAILS l
BACKGROUND In a letter dated May 22. 1997. Siemens Power Corporation (SPC) applied for a license amendment in order to perform four o)erations with the new uranium dioxide (U0 ) powder and/or pellet inner pails-for the NT-IX shipping container (5apanese certificate. J/113/AF 85. Revision 4).
These o UC powder and/or pellet loading into the new inner pails, onperations site are:
transpor[ing the pails, storing the pails, and loading the Jails into NT-lX shipping containers at SPC. The new inner pails contain a aorated stai11ess-steel insert that allows more U0, to be placed inside than the inner pails previously used at SPC.
The new pails can contain a volume of 3.5 gallons-corresponding to 25 kg of UO, instead of 18 kg.
Based on NRC review and comments, the license amendment adds a new entry of "3.5-gallon containers" to Table 1-4.1 of SPC's license and describes the criticality safety controls to be used.
.SPC discussed the proposed amendment at a meeting in Richland. Washington with the NRC on July 1. 1997.
SPC submitted a more detailed description of the purpose of the amendment including reference documents on July 15. 1997. On August 1. 1997, the NRC issued a request for additional information (RAI).
Phone conversations between SPC staff and NRC staff during the week of August 4.1997. clarified the intended use of the new inner pails. SPC responded to the questions in the RAI i.. a letter dated August 8. 1997.
Due to an error in the August 8. 1997, submittal. SPC submitted a revised page 4-21 of the license on August 13. 1997.
DISCUSSION The staff has reviewed the information submitted by SPC and has performed a technical assessment of the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program for the activities associated with the use of the new inner pails.
These activities are filling, transporting, storing, and loading of pails into shipping containers.
The pails will contain UO, powder and/or pellets.
Part I of SPC's license requires assumed conditions of process variables to be at their credibly most reactive values.
These process variables include:
moderation, reflection mass, concentration, density, enrichment, heterogeneity, geometry, and spacing.
Based on the staff's review. SPC has assumed the credibly most reactive conditions in the analysis.
In accordance-o[TM o
7
2 with SPC's materials license. SPC has completed the criticality safety l
analysis (including second party review and required approvals) of the new pails.
Prior to packaging the increased amounts of UOf allowed by the boron stainless-steel sleeves, the ) roper application of required criticality l
controls will be confirmed, t1e procedures will be written, and the operators will be trained in the use of the new inner pails, i
i Each oi che four activities involving the inner pails is discussed below.
1.
Loading UO, Powder and/or Pellets into the New Inner Pails The pails are tare weighed and visually examined (the ends of the inserts are colored red with metal marker) to confirm the presence of the boron stainless-steel ring insert.
A plastic bag is inserted into the pail inside the ring.
The NT IX loading station is interlocked so that the filling rocess stops when the mass allowed in the containers is reached.
The bag is sealed. The pail lid is installed.
2.
Transporting the New Inner Palls Transportation of the inner pails will occur from the pail loading station to the storage area and from the storage area to the shipping container loading area.
There are four inner pails in a single tier on each 25"x25" steel pallet. There are two pallets on each forklift transport set side to-side forming a single tier of eight inner pails.
3.
Storing the New Inner Pails Four Sails are stored on each 25"x25" steel pallet.
The pallets are stored side-)y side forming a single tier of pails.
4.
Loading the Inner Pails into the Shipping Container Each shipping container holds three new inner pails.
In the container loading area, the three ) ails are stacked vertically in the center of a 25"x25" steel pallet. There sla11 be at most nine of these stacks at the container loading area any one time for a total of 27 inner pails.
The stacks shall be attended until loaded into the container overpack.
Criticality Safety Controls The amendment adds to Table 1-4.1 of SPC's license a new component:
" Containers nominal 3.5-gallon or less." The types of criticality controls listed in Table 1-4.1 for the new component are:
VOL (Volume control). FNA (Fixed neutron absorber). CCM (Concentration control of moderators). MCU (Mass control of uranium). ARA (Control of array size), and SPA (Control of spacing from other fissile units),
' Credible Accident Scenarios SPC investigated credible accident scenarios:
U0 control violations, fixed neutron absorber removai, mass violations. moderator spacing violations (both
y,1 x
- n 4
3 within the array and from interaction with other in transit material), and spills.
SPC determined that the loss of a single criticality control did not lead to a criticality accident.
NRC Staff Neutron Interaction Analysis The neutron interaction analyses for each of the four o)erations were performed by NRC staff using KENO V a calculations.
KE10 is a Monte Carlo neutronics code that can be used for calculating k eff values for configurations of SNM at fuel cycle facilities.
The code uses probabilistic techniques to determine the results of neutron interactions.
From these results, the effective multiplication of neutrons can be computed.
When Nuclear Criticality Safety is based on computer code calculations.
Chapter 4 of the SPC license requires the (k-eff42 sigma) value for normal l
o)erations be no greater than the quantity (0.95 - calculational bias) and the (c-eff+2 sigma) value for abnormal operations to be no greater than the
-quantity (0.97 - calculational bias). Calculational bias was determined to be 0.00151.
Thus, normal operations limit (k eff+2 sigma) values to less than 0.948 and abnormal operations limit (k-eff+2 sigma) values to less than 0.968.
Normal operations are calculated for the most reactive values, not excluded by referenced controls or systems parameters including moderation, reflection, mass, and other control parameters.
Abnormal operations are calculated for i
control failure of one or more of those parameters.
All four operations (loading U0, powder / pellets into pails, transporting pails, storing pails, and loading pails into shipping containers) were analyzed using enrichment of 5.0 wt.% U-235 for the U0 powde~: materials of.
stainless-steel for the wall and lid of the pail. ARH-660 specified borated stainless-steel for the insert, regular-concrete for reflection on the bottom.
and water for reflection of the top: and dimensions of the pails and arrays of pails from reference diagrams. The 44-group cross-section library was used to take advantage of the most recent available nuclear data.
The storage of the pails was modeled as an infinite single tier array, The most reactive normal operating condition resulted in a (k eff+2 sigma) calculation less than 0.948 and the most reactive abnormal operating condition resulted in a (k-eff+2 sigma) calculation of less than 0.968.
Since the most reactive normal-operating condition results in a (k-eff+2 sigma) value less than.the normal operating limit and the most reactive abnormal operating condition results in a (k-eff+2 sigma) value less than the abnormal operating limit all four operations with the pails are safe.
CRITICALITY SAFETY REVIEW
-Based on information submitted by the licensee, the staff has reasonable assurance that SPC will follow its commitments in Chapter 4 of its license concerning the use of passive, engineered, and administrative controls to
- prevent a nuclear criticality during each of the four operations during normal operating conditions.
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The staff has reviewed and simulated the control failure sequences postulated by SPC.
Based on this review, the staff concludes that there is reasonable assurance that SPC has examined all credible control failure sequences and that a nuclear criticality will not occur by ensuring that no single failure will cause an inadvertent nuclear criticality.
Based on this review, the staff has reasonable assurance that a sufficient l
margin of safety exists to prevent a nuclear criticality durin each of the four operations during both normal and abnormal operating cond tions.
- 11. CONFORMANCE WITH ANSI N14.1-1990 The NRC's Certificate of Compliance No. 9196 for Model UX-30 transport packages requires that the uranium hexafluoride (UF ) cylinders be inspected, 6
tested, maintained, assembled, ard used in accordance with ANSI N14.1-1990.
ANSI N14.1 requires the use of A5fM B32, alloy 50A solder for tinning the threads on the cylinder plug and valve.
However. recently the United States Enrichment Corporation informed NRC that they have been tinning plugs and valves with ASTM B32 alloy Sn50. Sn40A. or a mixture consisting of two parts 50A and one part 40A for some time.
Section 6.5 of Part I of SPC's license, dated October 28. 1996, states that "new UF cylinders purchased by SPC shall 6
conform to ANSI N14.1." Consequently, there is a likelihood that SPC's cylinders may not be in compliance with License SNM-1227.
NRC recently determined that the alternative solders stated above do not affect the ability of the 30B cylinder to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 71 for transportation. On April 15. 1997 NRC approved revision 10 to the Certificate of Compliance (No. 9196).
The revision authorizes the use of alternative solder materials used to tin the threads on the cylinder plug and valve.
For the same reasons, the NRC has determined that these alternative solders are appropriate for the storage and handling of 30B cylinders at the SPC facility.
Therefore, the NRC staff recommends the following license condition:
Notwithstanding Section 6.5 of Part I of the license dated October 28, 1996, new uranium hexafluoride (UF ) cylinders purchased by SPC onall 6
conform to ANSI N14.1 or to the tinning requirements s)ecified in NRC's Certificate of Compliance No. 9196 for Model UX-30 paccages.
ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW The staff has determined that the following conditions have been met:
1.
there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite:
2.
there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure:
3.
there is no significant construction impact: and
5 4.
there is no significant increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological accidents.
Accordingly, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(c)(11), neither an environmental assessment nor an environmental impact statement is warranted for this action.
CONCLUSION The NRC. staff.has reviewed the proposed amendment and has determined that the
- proposed changes will have no adverse effect on public health and safety or the environment.
Therefore, approval of the amendment application is recommended.
1 The Region IV inspection staff has no objection to this proposed amendment.
Princi31e Contributors:
- Harry L Felsher Kimberly J. Hardin Susan D. Chotoo i
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Mr.lL. J. Maas-
.c Manager, Regulatory Compliance
.:Siemens Power Cor) oration 2101 Horn Rapids Road P.O. Box 130 Richland. Washington 99352-0130
SUBJECT:
-AMENDMENT-APPLICATION DATED MAY 22. 1997. UO POWDER AND/0R PELLET SHIPPINGPAILS.(TACNO.30978)ANDAMENDMENiTOALLOWCONFORMANCE WITH NRC'S CERTIFICATE OF COMPLlANCE NO. 9196
Dear Mr. Mass:
In accordance with your application dated May 22. 1997, and supplem-O dated July 15 and August 8,1997, and pursuant to Part 70 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Special Nuclear Material License SNM-1227 is hereby l
amended to allow Siemens Power Curporation (SPC) to perform four operations l
with the new uranium dioxide (U0,) powder and/or pel iet inner pails for the L
NT-IX shi ping container (Japanese Certificate J/113/AF-85. Revision 4).
According y. Safety Condition S-1 is modified to include the dates of May 22.
July 15.
gust 8 and August 13.' 1997.
In addition, to allow use of uranium hexafluoride cylinders which conform to NRC's Certificate of Compliance No.-9196 for Model No. UX-30 packages, Safety Condition S-3 has been added to your license and reads:
Notwithstanding Sec; ion 6.5 of Part I of the license dated October 28, 1996, new uranium hexafluoride (UF ) cylinders purchased by SPC shall 6
conform to ANSI-N14.1 or to the tinning requirements s)ecified in NRC's Certificate of Compliance No. 9196 for Model UX-30 paccages.
All other conditions of the license shall remain the same.
Enclosed are copies of the revised Materials License SNM-1227 and the Safety Evaluation Report, which includes the Categorical Exclusion determination.
If you have any questions, please contact Harry Felsher (301-415-5521) or Susan Chotoo (301-415-8102) of my staff.
Sincerely.
Ogawu4 Michael F. Weber Chief Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards. NMSS Docket 70-1257 License SNM-1227 gg HE CENTER COPi Amendment 4
Enclosures:
1.
Materials License SNM-1227 2.
Safety Evaluation Re) ort
- DISTRIBUTION: w/ encl. (Control No.-
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Docket 70-1227 PUBl.IC NRC File Center SHO Region IV FCLB R/F FCSS R/F NMSS R/F FCOB
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Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganizatmn Act of 1974 (Public Law 93 438), and Title 10, Code of 'l d i ederal Regulations, Chapter I, Parts 30,31,32,33,34,35,36,39,40 and 70, and m reliance on statements and representations herciofore made O i by the licensee, a license is heteb) iwued authorizing the beensee to recen e, acquire. powew, and tr
- w r by product, source, and special nuclear i
! material designated below; to use such material for the purposch) und at the placem designatt ' re to deliser or transfer such material to ib h{h perwns authori/ed to recene it in accordance with the regu ill be deemed to contam the conditions $
specified in Section 183 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. and is subject to all uFs.abb rules, regulations, and orders of the ;l Nuclear RcFulatory Commiwion now or hereaf ter in ef fect and to any conditions specified below, jol 5
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1.icensee
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- 10. This lica se shall be deemed to contain two sections:
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! l l j Safeguards Conditions. These sections are part of the license, and the licensee
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FOR irtE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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A J:J Date: August 18. 1997 By: Mic ael F. Weber 5
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t
WASHtNGTON, D.C. 20666-0001
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DOCKET:
70-1227 (l
LICENSEE:
Siemens Power Corporation Richland. WA
SUBJECT:
SAFETY EVALVATION REPORT:
AMENDMENT APPLICATION DATED MAY 22.
l 1997. UO POWDER AND/OR PELLET SHIPPING PAILS. AND AMENDMENT TO l
- ALLOW C0f4FORMANCE WITH NRC'S CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE NO. 9196 I.
U0, POWDER / PELLET SHIPPING PAILS BACKGROUND in a letter dated May 22, 1997. Siemens Power Corporation (SPC) applied for a license amendment in order to aerform four oaerations with the new uranium i
dioxide (UO ) powder and/or peilet inner pails for the NT-IX shipping container ($apanesecertificate.J/113/AF-85. Revision 4).
These operations transporfing the pails, pellet loading into the new inner pails, on-sitestoring the pails, and lo Jails into NT-IX are:
U0 powder and/or shipping containers at SPC. The new inner pails contain a aorated stainless-steel. insert that allows more U0, to be placed inside than the inner pails previously used at SPC.
The new pails can contain a volume of 3.5 gallons corresponding to 25 kg of UO, instead of 18 kg.
Based on NRC review and comments, the license amendment adds a new entry of "3.5-gallon containers" to Table I-4.1 of SPC's license and describes the criticality safety controls to be used.
SPC discussed the proposed amendment at a meeting in Richland Washington with the NRC on July 1.1997.
SPC submitted a more detailed description of the purpose of the amendment including reference documents on July 15. 1997.
On-August 1. 1997, the NRC issued a request for additional information (RAI).
Phone conversations between SPC staff and NRC staff during the week of August 4.1997, clarified the intended use of the new inner pails.
~;
responC d to the questions in the RAI-in a letter dated August 8, 1997.
Due to an error in the August 8, 1997, submittal. SPC submitted a revised page 4-21 of =the license on August 13. 1997.
DISCUSSION The staff has reviewed the information submitted by SPC and has performed a technical assessment of the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program for the activities associated with the use of-the new inner pails.
These activities are filling, transporting. storing, and loading of pails into shipping containers. The pails will contain UO, powder and/or pellets.
Part I of SPC's license requires assumed conditions of process variables to be at their credibly most reactive values. T.hese process variables include:
moderation, reflection, mass, concentration, density, enrichment, heterogeneity, geometry, and spacing.
Based on the staff's review. SPC has assumed the credibly most reactive conditions in the analysis.
In accordance e
i
9
-2 with SPC's materials license. SPC has completed the criticality safety analysis (including second party review and required approvals) of the new pails.
Prior to packaging the increased amounts of UO allowed by the boron stainless-steel sleeves, the ) roper application of req,uired criticality controls will be confirmed, tie procedures will be written, and the operators will be trained in the use of the new inner pails.
Each of the four activities involving the inner pails is discussed below.
1.
Loading UO, Powder and/or Pellets into the New Inner Pails The pails are t e e weighed and visually examined (the ends of the inserts are colored red with metal marker) to confirm the presence of the boron stainless-steel ring insert.
A plastic bag is inserted into the pail inside the ring.
The NT-IX loaPig station is interlocked so that the filling process stops when the mass allowed in the containers is reached. The bag is sealed. The pail lid is installed.
l 2.
Transporting the New Inner Pails L
Transs tation of the inner pails will occur from the pail loading station to r
the storage area and from the storage area to the shipping container loading area. There are four inner pails in a single tier on each 25"x25" steel pallet.
There are two pallets on each forklift transport set side-to-side forming a single tier of eight inner pails.
3.
Storing the New-Inner Pails Four Jails are stored on each 25"x25" steel pallet.
The pallets are stored side-)y-side forming a single tier of pails.
4.
Loading the Inner Pails into the Shipping Container Each shipping container holds three new inner pails.
In the container loading area, the three Jails are stacked vertically in the center of a 25"x25" steel pallet.
There slall be al most nine of these stacks at the container loading
-area any one time for a total of 27 inner pails.
The stacks shall be attended until loaded into the container overpack.
Criticality Safety Controls The amendment adds to Table I-4.1 of SPC's license a new component:
" Containers nominal 3.5-gallon or less." The types of criticality controls
. listed in Table I-4.1 for the new component are:
VOL (Volume control). FNA (Fixed neutron absorber). CCM (Concentration control of moderators). MCU (Mass control of uranium). ARA (Control of array size), and SPA (Control of spacing from other fissile units).
Credible Accident Scenarios SPC investigated credible accident scenarios:
U0 control violations. fixed neutron' absorber removai. mass violations, moderator spacing violations (both
y,.n c
y v
~. -
~
3 within the array and from interaction with other in-transit material), and spills.
SPC determined that the loss of a single criticality control did not lead to a criticality _ accident.
NRC Staff Neutron Interaction Analysis l
The neutron interaction analyses for each of the four o)erations were
-performed by NRC staff using KENO V.a calculations.
KE10 is a Monte Carlo neutronics code that can be used for calculating k-eff values for l
configurations of SNM at fuel cycle facilities.
The code uses probabilistic technique 5 to determine the results of neutron interactions.
From these results, the effective multiplication of neutrons can be computed.
L When Nuclear Criticality Safety is based on computer code calculations, l
Chapter 4 of the SPr license requires the (k-eff+2 sigma) value for nnrmal i
o)erations be no greater than the quantity-(0.95 - calculational bias) and the (c-eff+2 sigma) value for abnormal operations to be no greater than the quantity (0.97 - calculational bias).
Calculational bias was determined to be 0.00151.
Thus normal operations limit (k-eff+2 sigma) values to less than 0.948 and abnormal operations limit (k-eff+2 sigma) values to less than 0.968.
Normal operations are calculated for the most reactive values, not excluded by referenced controls or systems parameters including moderation, reflection, r
)-
mass, and other control parameters.
Abncrmal operations are calculated for control failure of one or more of those parameters, All four operations (loading UO, powder / pellets into pails. transporting pails. storing pails, and loading pails into shipping containers) were analyzed using enrichment of 5.0 wt.% U-235 for the U0 powder; materials of stainless-steel for the wall and lid of the pail. ARH-660 specified borated stainless-steel for the insert, regular-concrete for reflection on the bottom, and water for reflection of the top; and dimensions of the pails and arrays of pails from reference diagrams. The 44-group cross-section library was used to take advantage of the most recent available nuclear data.
The storage of the pails was modeled as an infinite single tier array.
The most reactive normal operating condition resulted in a (k-eff+2 sigma) calculation less than 0.948 and the most reactive abnormal operating condition resulted in a (k-eff+2 sigma) calculation of less than 0.968.
Since the most reactive normal operating condition results in a (k-eff+2 sigma) value less than the normal operating-limit and the most reactive abnormal operating condition results-in a (k-eff+2 sigma) value less than the abnormal operating limit. all four operations with the pails are safe.
CRITICALITY SAFETY REVIEW l
Based on information submitted by the licensee, the staff has reasonable assurance that SPC will' follow its commitments in Chapter 4 of its license concerning the use of passive, engineered, and administrative controls to prevent a nuclear criticality during each of the four operations during normal operating conditions.
I
4 The staff has reviewed and simulated the control failure sequences postulated by-SPC. Based on this review, the staff concludes that there is reasonable assurance that SPC has examined all credible control failure seqJences and that a nuclear criticality will not occur by ensuring that no single failure
-will cause an inadvertent nuclear criticality.
Based on this review, the staff has reasonable assurance that a sufficient margin of safety exists to prevent a nuclear criticality during each of the four operations during both normal and abnormal operating conditions.
II.
CONFORMANCE WITH ANSI N14.1-1990 The NRC's Certificate of Compliance No. 9196 for Model UX-30 transport packages requires that the uranium hexafluoride (UF ) cylinders be inspected.
6 tested, maintained, assembled.-and used in accordance with ANSI N14.1-1990.
ANSI N14.1 requires the use of ASTM B32, alloy 50A solder for tinning the threads on the cylinder plug and valve.
However, recently the United States Enrichment Corporation informed NRC that they have been tinning plugs and valves with ASTM B32, alloy Sn50. Sn40A -or a mixture consisting of two parts 50A and one part 40A tor some time.
Section 6.5 of Part I of SPC's license.
t l
dated October 28. 1996, states that "new UF6 cylinders purchased by SPC shall conform to ANSI N14.1." Consequently, there is a likelihood that SPC's cylinders may not be in compliance with License SNM-1227.
NRC recently determined that the alternative solders stated above do not affect the ability of the 30B cylinder to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 71 for transportation. On April 15. 1997. NRC approved revision 10 to the Certificate of Compliance (No. 9196).
The revision authorizes the use of alternative solder materials used to tin the threads on the cylinder plug and valve.
For-the same reasons, the NRC has determined that these alternative solders are appropriate for the storage and handling of 30B cylinders at the SPC facility.
Therefore, the NRC staff recommends the following license:
condition:
-Notwithstanding Section 6.5 of Part I of the license dated October 28.
1996, new uranium hexafluoride (UF ) cylinders purchased by SPC shall 6
conform to ANSI N14.1 or to the tinning requirements s)ecified in NRC's Certificate of Compliance No. 9196 for Model UX-30 paccages.
ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW The staff has determined that the following conditions have been met:
1.
there is' no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amou1ts of any effluents that may be released offsite:
2.
there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure:
3.
there is no significant construction impact; and
^
5 4.
there is no significant increase in the potential' for or consequences
--from radiological accidents.
Accordingly, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(c)(11), neither an environmental assessment nor an environmental impact statement is warranted for this action.
CONCLUSION The NRC staff has reviewed the proposed amendment and has determined that the proposed changes will have no adverse effect on public health and safety.or the environment. Therefore, approval of the amendment application is recommended.
The_ Region IV inspection staff has no objection to this proposed amendment.
Princiole Contributors:
Harry D. Felsher Kimberly J. Hardin Susan D. Chotoo 1