ML20141H509
| ML20141H509 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 01/09/1986 |
| From: | Brian Bonser, Bradford W, Cantrell F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20141H497 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-85-43, 50-364-85-43, NUDOCS 8601140155 | |
| Download: ML20141H509 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000348/1985043
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UNITE 3 STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
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AT LANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-348/85-43 and 50-364/85-43
Licensee: Alabama Power Company
600 North 18th Street
Birmingham, AL 35291
Docket Nos.:
50-348 and 50-364
License Nos.:
Facility Name:
Farley 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted:
November 19 - December 18, 1985
Inspectors: bbO
b. 8>-r.
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W.H.BraQford
Qfite ' Signed
MLA &
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B. R. Bor0(er
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Approved by:
N/$M
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F. S. Cantrell, Ydo(4on Chief
Date Signed
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 105 inspector-hours on site
in the areas of licensee action on previous enforcement matters, monthly
surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, operational safety
verification, and new fuel receipt and inspection.
Results:
Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified in that
approved procedures were not adhered to during new fuel receipt and inspection.
This is discussed in paragraph 7.
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B601140155 860109
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ADOCM 05000348
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Licensee Employees Contacted:
J. D. Woodard, General Plant Manager
D. N. Morey, Assistant General Plant Manager
W. D. Shipman, Assistant General Plant Manager
R. D. Hill, Operations Superintendent
C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Superintendent
R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Superintendent
L. A. Ward, Maintenance Superintendent
L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Superintendent
J. E. Odom,. Operations Sector Supervisor
B. W. Vanlandingham, Operations Sector Supervisor
T. H. Esteve, Planning Supervisor
J. B. Hudspeth, Document Control Supervisor
L. K. Jones, Material Supervisor
R. H. Marlow, Technical Supervisor
L. M. Stinson, Plant Modification Supervisor
W. G. Ware, Supervisor, Safety Audit Engineering Review
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operations
personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members, and office
personnel.
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management
interviews throughout the report period and on December 18, 1985, with the
general plant manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection
findings were discussed in detail. The licensee acknowledged the violation.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the
inspector during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
This area was not inspected during this inspection period.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations were
in compliance with various TS requirements. Typical . of these requirements
were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant chemistry,
refueling water storage tank, emergency power systems, safety injection,
emergency safeguards systems, control room ventilation, and direct current
electrical power sources. The inspection verified that surveillance testing
was performed in accordance with the approved written procedure, test
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instrumentation was calibrated; limiting conditions for operation were met,
appropriate removal
and restoration of the affected equipment was
accomplished, test result met requirements and were reviewed by personnel
other than the individual directing the test; and that any deficiencies
identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by
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appropriate management personnel.
Typical of the surveillance items that were witnessed in part or in full
were various calibrations of the nuclear instrumentation radiation
monitoring systems instrumentation, battery testing, auxiliary feedwater
system testing, heat removal system testing, diesel generator testing and
reactor protection system testing.
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The following surveillance tests are discussed:
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a.
FNP-2-STPE33.28 - Reactor Trip Breaker Train B Operability Test.
On 12/16/85 during the performance of surveillance test STP-33.2B on
Unit 1 B train reactor trip breaker, the trip breaker was opened and
would not reclose.
The licensee declared a 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> LC0 and immediately began trouble-
shooting.
The problem was narrowed down to the breaker cubicle or a
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spurious trip signal.
The licensee then determined that there was no
problem with the trip breaker itself by placing a Unit 2 reactor trip
bypass breaker in the Unit 1 B train trip breaker cubicle and deter-
rgining that it also would not close. The problem was found in the trip
contact actuated by the Auto Shunt Trip trip button. The contact had
stuck in the closed position when the Auto Shunt Trip trip button had
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been depressed while performing the STP.
The problem with the contact was corrected and the surveillance test
was performed again to verify operability of the B train reactor trip
-breaker. The problem with the trip breaker did not result in a reactor
trip. The B train bypass breaker was closed throughout the entire
event.
The limiting condition for operation was not exceeded.
b.
FNP-2-STP-80.5 - Diesel Generator Operability With Safety Injection
Test Signal.
On 12/9/85 an 18 month surveillance test STP-80.5 was performed on 28
diesel generator. The surveillance test is designed to verify that on
a Safety Injection test signal the diesel will auto start and all
except specified essential auto diesel trips are automatically
bypassed.
During the performance of the test after the diesel had automatically
started, and in accordance with the test procedure, the Emergency Start
reset pushbutton on the Emergency Power Board was depressed. The 2B
diesel shutdown when the button was depressed.
This was contrary to
the requirements of the surveillance test.
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An evaluation by.the licensee determined that the shutdown signal came
from a shutdown relay, with a 140 second timer, which was energized
when the stop pushbutton or NEEP relay pushbutton was depressed earlier
in the procedure.
When the Emergency Start reset pushbutton was
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depressed before tne 140 second timer had timed out the 2B diesel-
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shutdown on a non-essential trip signal. This :ondition resulted from
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a circuit modification which the licensee had not
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eporated into the
test procedure; however, safety of the emergency diesels was not
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effected.
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The inspectors verified that the modification had gone through the
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licensee's internal review process which requires that an evaluation be
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made which would determine if a procedure change was required, a
training change notice be issued, and drawing changes be made if
required.
The reviewers determined that there was no safety
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significance to the diesel generator in regard to the affected
surveillance test, which is performed on a 18 month basis, and
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therefore, no procedure change would be required. A training change
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notice is in the issue process and the appropriate drawings are being
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changed. The operability of the diesel generator was not compromised.
The licensee now recognizes that this subtle change to the diesel 140
second timer requires a procedure change. The licensee recognized this
during the performance of the STP and has changed the procedure.
This is considered to be an isolated event.
Inasmuch as this was
licensee identified, corrected promptly and was not a violation that
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could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's
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corrective action for a previous violation, a Notice of Violation will
not be issued.
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5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were
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observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with
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approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and
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were in conformance with Technical Specifications.
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The following items were considered during the review: limiting conditions
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for operations were met while components or systems were removed - from
service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities
were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as appli-
cable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to
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returning components or systems to service; quality control records were
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maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and
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materials were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented;
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and fire prevention controls were implemented,
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Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs to
assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance
which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities
were observed / reviewed:
Replacement of battery cells in Unit 1 auxiliary building 125 V DC
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battery.
2 B diesel generator.
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Unit I service water emergency recirculation valve - Header A
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(pressure switch replacement).
Unit 1 4160 V ACB's puffer tubes replacement.
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Unit I reactor trip breaker.
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Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the
report period.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected
emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return
to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary, diesel, and
turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions,
including fluid leaks and excessive vibrations.
b.
The inspectors verified compliance with selected Limiting Conditions
for Operation (LCO) and results of selected surveillance tests.
The
verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring
instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions and review of
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completed logs, records, and chemistry results.
The licensee's
compliance with LC0 action statements were reviewed as they happened.
The
following
systems
and components were
observed / verified
operational:
Station electrical boards in the control room and various elec-
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trical boards throughout the plant for proper electrical
alignment.
Certain accessible hydraulic snubbers.
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Accessible portions of service water and component cooling water
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systems.
Units 1 and 2 suction and discharging piping and valves on
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auxiliary feedwater system.
Diesel generators and support systems.
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Certain accessible portions of CVCS piping and valves to and from
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the charging /high head safety injection pumps.
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Cert'ain portions of RHR and cantainment spray systems.
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Portions of various other systems (safety-related and nonsafety-
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related).
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c.
The inspectors routinely attended met. tings with certain licensee
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management and observed various shift tcrnovers between shif t super-
visors, shift foremen, and licensed operators.
These meetings and
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discussions provided a daily status of plant operating, maintenance,
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and testing activities in progress, as well as discussions of
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significant problems.
d.
The inspector verified by observation and interviews with security
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force members that measures taken to assure the physical protection of
the facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the
organization of the security force; the establishment and maintenance
of gates, doors, and isolation zones; that access control and badging
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were proper; and procedures were followed.
e.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's plans and actions for cold
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weather operations.
The inspectors judge the plans and actions to be
adequate,
f.
The inspectors questioned the operability of the emergency air
compressors on Units 1 and 2.
These compressors are not included in
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the Technical Specifications.
Their function is to supply emergency
operating air to certain valves on the auxiliary feedwater system and
the main steam power operated relief valves in case of a complete loss
of the normal instrument air supply.
The surveillance which had been performed consisted of annual
mechanical. preventative maintenance procedure. This procedure required
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that comoressors to be disassembled and checked.
The compressor was
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- eassembled and operated for a short period of time.
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The licensee has prepared and initiated STP-65.0 " Emergency Air
Compressor Operability Test." This procedure is designated " Safety
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Related" and will be performed by operations personnel.
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The inspectors had no further questions.
Within the areas inspected, there were no violations or deviations
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identified,
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7.
Receist, Inspection and Storage of New Fuel (60705)
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On No/ ember 21, 1985, the licensee was unloading, inspecting and storing new
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fuel assemblies in the Unit 2 new fuel storage building.
The receipt and
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inspection of the fuel was carried out under FNP-0-FHP-3.0 " Receipt and
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Storage of New Fuel." The inspectors observed this operation for about 4
hour during the morning of November 21 and verified that the operators were
briefed on each step of the procedure prior to performing the work, each
operator was qualified Senior Reactor Operator who had no other duty
assignments other than the fuel handling.
At 2:35 p.m., during the unloading of the last new fuel cask, a new fuel
assembly fell from the cask during the unloading operation.
The new fuel
assembly cradle was being lifted by crane to the upright position. At the
vertical position one of the new fuel assemblies pushed open the top clamp
and fell out of the cradle.
The fuel assembly come to rest in a slight
twist position on the concrete floor. The damage observed was buckled grid
straps and crushing of the internal spacers between the fuel rods.
There
was no release of contamination; there were no personnel injuries. The fuel
assembly was sent back to Westinghouse corporation to be rebuilt.
The Fuel Handling Procedure, FNP-0-FHP-3.0 requires in step 4.12.4 "to
break, but do not unfasten, each of the clamping frame fastener nuts except
those on the top frame" prior to raising the new fuel carriage to the
vertical position. The incident was caused by the top frame fastener being
loosened while the assembly was in the horizontal position.
When the
assemblies reached the vertical position the assembly pushed open the top
frame fastener and fell out. The top frame fastener was released by a
licensed operator who came into the new fuel area as the last fuel
assemblies were being prepared for unloading.
The operator obtained a
wrench to help the other operators unfasten the clamp frame assemblies. He
had not been brie'ed on the procedure and was unaware that the top fasteners
were not to be loosened. The operator should have been briefed on the fuel
handling procedure prior to performing this work.
This is a violation for failure to follow an approved procedure (364/
85-43-01).
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