Text

Requests That Proprietary Response to RAI Re AP600 Be Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR2.790.Affidavit, Encl
	ML20141G398
Person / Time
Site:	05200003
Issue date:	06/27/1997
From:	Mcintyre B; WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To:	Quay T; NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML19317C469	List: ML20141G398; NSD-NRC-97-5215, Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Responses to RAI Re AP600.Responses Provided for Listed Rais.Proprietary Response Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790;
References
	AW-97-1131, NUDOCS 9707070292
	Download: ML20141G398 (116)
	v • d • e

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v Westinghouse Energy Systems Ba 355 Electric Corporation Pittsburgt) Pennsylvania 15230-0355 AW-97-1131 June 27,1997 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ATTENTION:

T.R. QUAY APPLICATION FOR WITHHOLDING PROPRIETARY INFORMATION FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE l

SUBJECT:

AP600 Response to Requests for Addition Information

Dear Mr. Quay:

The application for withholding is submitted by Westinghouse Electric Corporation (" Westinghouse")

pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b)(1) of Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations. It contains commercial strategic information proprietary to Westinghouse and customarily held in confidence.

The proprietary material for which withholding is being requested is identified in the proprietary version of the subject report. In conformance with 10CFR Section 2.790, Affidavit AW-97-1131 accompanies this application for withholding setting forth the basis on which the identified proprietary information may be withheld from public disclosure.

Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that the subject information which is proprietary to Westinghouse be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 10CFR Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations.

Correspondence with respect to this application for withholding or the accompanying affidavit should reference AW-97-1131 and should be addressed to the undersigned.

l l

Very truly yours, j

w l

Brian A. McIntyre, Manager i

Advanced Plant Safety and Licensing cc:

Kevin Bohrer NRC 12H5 9707070292 970627 l

PDR ADOCK 05200003 A

PDR i

j AW-97-1131 AFFIDAVIT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA:

L ss l

l COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY:

.i Before me, the undersigned euthority, personally appeared Brian A. McIntyre, who, being by l

me duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is authorized to execute this Affidavit on j

behalf of Westinghouse Electric Corporation (" Westinghouse") and that the averments of fact set forth in this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief:

x Yf

., 1 a) l Brian A. McIntyre, Manager Advanced Plant Safety and Licensing L

i Sworn to and subscribed l

before me this 27 day j

of %

,1997 Notary Public Notarial Seal Rose Mane Payne, Notary Public Montoevillo Boro, Alleghony Coun_ty My Commission Expires Nov. 4,2000 Member,Pennsylvans Asscccuonof No: aries,

4 oise.

t i

AW-97-1131 l

i i

(1)

I am Manager, Advanced Plant Safety And Licensing, in the Advanced Technology Basiness l

j Area, of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation and as such, I have been specifically delegated the function of reviewing the proprietary information sought to be withheld from public disclosure in connection with nuclear power plant licensing and rulemaking proceedings, and am authorized to apply for its withholding on behalf of the Westinghouse Energy Systems Business Unit.

i 1

i (2)

I am making this Affidavit in conformance with the provisions of 10CFR Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations and in conjunction with the Westinghouse application for 1

withholding acmmpanying this Af6 davit.

i (3)

I have personal knowledge of the criteria and procedures utilized by the Westinghouse Energy Systems Business Unit in designating information as a trade secret, privileged or as confidential commercial or financial information.

l l

l (4)

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b)(4) of Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, the following is furnished for consideration by the Commission in determining whether the information sought to be withheld from public disclosure should be withheld.

l l

(i)

The information sought to be withheld from public disclosure is owned and has been j

held in confidence by Westinghouse.

l 1

(ii)

The information is of a type customarily held in confidence by Westinghouse and not i

l customarily disclosed to the public. Westinghouse has a rational basis for determining i

the types of information customarily held in confidence by it and, in that connection, utilizes a system to determine when and whether to hold certain types of information in confidence. The application of that system and the substance of that system constitutes Westinghouse policy and provides the rational basis required.

s osses

.~

AW-97-1131 e

Under that system, information is held in confidence if it falls in one or more of several types, the release of which might result in the loss of an existing or potential I

competitive advantage, as follows:

(a)

The information reveals the distinguishing aspects of a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.) where prevention of its use by any of Westinghouse's competitors without license from Westinghouse constitutes a competitive economic advantage over other companies.

(b)

It consists of supporting data, including test data, relative to a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.), the application of which data secures a competitive economic advantage, e.g., by optimization or improved marketability.

(c)

Its use by a competitor would reduce his expenditure of resources or improve his competitive position in the design, manufacture, shipment, installation, assurance of quality, or licensing a similar product.

(d)

It reveals cost or price information, production capacities, budget levels, or commercial strategies of Westinghouse, its customers or suppliers.

(e)

It reveals aspects of past, present, or future Westinghouse or customer funded development plans and programs of potential commercial value to l

Westinghouse.

j 1

(f)

It contains patentable ideas, for which patent protection may be desirable.

There are sound policy reasons behind the Westinghouse system which include the following:

I

AW-97-1131 (a)

The use of such information by Westinghouse gives Westinghouse a competitive advantage over its competitors. It is, therefore, withheld from disclosure to protect the Westinghouse competitive position.

(b)

It is information which is marketable in many ways. The extent to which such information is available to competitors diminishes the Westinghouse ability to sell products and services involving the use of the information.

(c)

Use by our competitor would put Westinghouse at a competitive dbadvantage by reducing his expenditure of resources at our expense.

i 1

(d)

Each component of proprietary information pertinent to a par.icular competitive advantage is potentially as valuable as the total i ompetitive i

advantage. If competitors acquire components of proprietary information, any j

one component may be the key to the entire puzzle, thereb / depriving i

Westinghouse of a competitive advantage.

(e)

Unrestricted disclosure would jeopardize the position of prominence of Westinghouse in the world market, and thereby give a market advantage to the competition of those countries.

1 (f)

The Westinghouse capacity to invest corporate assets in research and i

l development depends upon the success in obtaining and maintaining a l

competitive advantage.

1 l

(iii)

The information is being transmitted to the Commission in confidence and, under the provisions of 10CFR Section 2.790, it is to be neceived in confidence by the l

Commission.

(iv)

The information sought to be protected is not available in public sources or available i

information has not been previously employed in the same original manner or method to the best of our knowledge and belief.

OtHHe

l AW-97-1131 l

l 0

t l

(v)

Enclosed is Letter NSD-NRC-97-5215, June 27,1997 being transmitted by Westinghouse Electric Corporation QV) letter and Application for Withholding Proprietary Information from Public Disclosure, Brian A. McIntyre OV), to Mr. T. R. Quay, Office of NRR. The proprietary information as submitted for use by Westinghouse Electric Corporation is in response to questions concerning the AP600 plant and the associated design certification application and is expected to be applicable in other licensee submittals in response to certain NRC requirements for justification of licensing advanced nuclear power plant designs.

This information is part of that which will enable Westinghouse to:

I (a)

Demonstrate the design and safety of the AP600 Passive Safety Systems.

(b)

Establish applicable verification testing methods.

l (c)

Design Advanced Nuclear Power Plants that meet NRC requirements.

(d)

Establish technical and licensing approaches for the AP600 that will ultimately result in a certified design.

(e)

Assist customers in obtaining NRC approval for future plants.

Further this information has substantial commercial value as follows:

(a)

Westinghouse plans to sell the use of similar information to its customers for purposes of meeting NRC requirements for advanced plant licenses.

(b)

Westinghouse can sell support and defense of the technology to its customers in the licensing process.

l

i.

. AW-97-1131 1

i 1

Public disclosure of this proprietary information is likely to cause substantial harm to j

the coupetitive position of Westinghouse because it would enhance the ability of 1

- competitors to provide similar advanced nuclear power designs and licensing defense

{

services for commercial power reactors without commensurate expenses. Also, public

'f disclosure of the information would enable others to use the information to meet NRC i

requirements for licensing documentation without purchasing the right to use the information.

t i

The development of the technology described in part by the information is the result of l

t applying the results of many years of experience in an intensive Westinghouse effort j

and the expenditure of a considerable sum of money.

I j

In order for competitors of Westinghouse to duplicate this information, similar technical programs would have to be performed and a significant manpower effort, l

having the requisite talent and experience, would have to be expended for developing analytical methods and receiving NRC approval for those methods, t

i 1

1 1

Further the deponent sayeth not.

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l l to Westinghouse Letter DCP/NRC0940 June 27,1997 l

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i

-f-Question 720.387 The deterministic evaluation of ex-vessel fuel coolant interactions (Appendix B to Revision 9 of j

the PRA) indicates that the impulse loads from ex-vessel steam explosions would fail the reactor -

l cavity floor and wall structures, but that the embedded steel liner will stay intact. The evaluation i

also indicates that containment vessel integrity will not be compromised by the displacement of

i the RPV due to the impulse loading. Please submit additional details regarding the calculation of

-l containment vessel strains referenced in Section B.3.2.1 and the calculation of maximum lift of the RPV referenced in Section B.3.2.2.

Response

As described in Appendix B, which presents the discussion of the ex-vessel severe accident phenomena, the reactor pressure vessel and the containment vessel dynamic response was defined using time history analyses. These structures were subjected to the dynamic impulse steam blast impulse loadings rimulated by triangular pulse loadings. 'Ihe models used were j

equivalent one-degree of freedom dynamic models. The equations of motion are defined in the j

reference'given below:

t i

Timoshenko, S D.H. Young, and W. Weaver, Jr, Vibration Problems in Engineering. J.

]

Wiley & Sons, Fourth Edition.1974.

I They are provided below:

x = b(1 sinpt) i k t

- pt,

.]

i Q, ' t sinpt 1(i-l) 1 i

(

i)~

t (t - t ) + 2 s np t - t (t s t $ t )

2 i

x=

i 2

Pt:(1 - f ).

k t

pri

_i.

2 i

G '- sinpt +21 sinp(t - t ) sinp(t - t,)'

i_

(t 51) x=,

2 k

pt, pt (t - t )

P(1-t).

2 i

where:

i p = forced circular frequency and the other terms are defined in the figure below:

l l

l i

i I

l 4

Do,38 7 -1 l..

i

lc i

ie l

O Qi................

l l

l

/

t ti t2 i

As stated in Appendix B, a 13 foot length was used for the containment vessel steel. This I

is considered the minimum length that could be subjected to a tensile strain. It is based on half of the length associated with the cracked concrete as shown in Figure 720.387-1.

Each side of the 26 foot length is assumed conservatively to be stretched by the full deflection of the failed concrete B Six inches is an upper bound deflection value that is applicable to the range of AP600 soil stiffnesses. Results are shown in Figure 720.387-2.

The percentage upper bound strain or elongation is calculated below:

p = [6/(13 x 12)] x 100

)

= 3.8%

Therefore, the containment vessel strain, which is less than 4 percent, is much less than the ultimate strain capacity associated with the containment vessel material which is 22 percent or greater of elongation. The percent elongation is obtained from tests for SA537 Class 2 material used for the containment and materials with similar chemical properties. Test data was available for 389 tests.

The controlling steam blast impulse loading is best approximated by a triangular pulse (shown above) having a duration of 0.004 seconds. The calculation of the maximum displacement of the reactor pressure vessel follows the same time history dynamic formulation as described for the triangular impulsive load until time t is greater than t. The results at time 1 are used to calculate 2

2 the maximum displacement since this formulation does not account for gravity effects. The potential energy associated with mass M as it is lifted to its maximum height is equated to the l

difference between the kinetic energy defined using the maximum velocity (approximately at j

j time tz) and the strain energy of the piping. Shown in Figure 720.387-3 is a plot of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) uplift obtained from this analysis as a function of system frequency. The system stiffness is defined by the reactor coolant piping. As the piping plastically deforms, the hPo. 3 8 7 - 2.

i t

6 frequency decreases. : A lower bound frequency of I hertz is considered. This results in an uplift of six feet. Even if the piping Instantaneously failed, which is not expected, the uplift would still be around 22 feet. As seen in Figure 720.387-4, the reactor pressure vessel will not leave the

)

- refueling canal area.

j PRA Revision: None.

i' I

I 1

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\\

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1 i

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~?20.387-3 i

.. ~..

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Figure 720.3871 Containment Vessel Steel Subjected to Elongation Due to Ex-VesselSewere Accident l

g f

XXX.Xb.

/

t..

h m L.-..

l Y Yk i

. ens I I

Y I

I C: l 6

1 EJ i

p r

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is usu

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~

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W 7-LG j

U

..{_ r v

I 6

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h h g

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-aw D

~

Q ft" O f =': g)

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h.

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'-Q i

+

?.

1 3

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s a-n...

..a. x x

p d

q s'

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\\.

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_f See Enlarged Area j. '. x;

/....

\\

'~/_

r M..'i '.

~ \\' [ j cracked concran

> 26' b

L y J Area

,2o.3 e7 -4

.- ~ -

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Figure 720.387 2 I

6 I

Ex Vessel Steam Explosion Elongation (Deflection) of Containment Vessel Steel Vs. Soil Stiffness t

14 00 dr -

ii ', -

1 " N 9, i

l 7-12.00 N '-

cu 0 '-.

i, 6 10.00

.?',>

5

' i,.

- liagion Applinatie se Arges l ";ig., ',

3 8.00 n, <

k " d, '.y,, ",!iir t..,..;,g

l 5, 6.00 7'"5'I$>,..Er9iir>

m, er,-

i 3

o 4

4.00

'o.

.o.. '

'i qlif;.

i, ,..kMNj!h: ;'l.2 ; i,r;p,y],

Y h

..ut +l t

1 2.00

,r m

y g.

0.00

~

s.e 1

200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 I

i Stiflhess Kips / cubic 4oot h

l I

I i

t i

r i

I h

l 1

(

,20.382-s

le i

o 1

[

Figure 720.387 3 j

j.

RPV Motion Based on a Spring / Mass System i

l Subjected to an Impulse Load 1

Frequency vs uit I

i M

l

\\

=0 i

15 i

E i

5 10 5

i W-0 001 0.1 2

4 6

8 10 30 50 70 90 200 Frequency [Ha]

j l

l I

l i

l 7 a o. 3 8~J -lo

r-I t

'f:

I j

Figure 720.387-4 RPV Elevation Sketch i

I Elevation 135'. 3' i

i Refueling Canal Well

[

i l'

t i

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l Elevotion 107'. 2'

/\\

l l

1 Meactor pressure Approximately l

g Vesset 26' 3

Barrel I

Bio Shield Well J

I

\\/

1 Lower Vessel Head l

l'

_;) 20.303 ~

_ _ _ _.. _. _. ~. _. _ _. _.. _ _. _ _... _.

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OITS #5033 From January 9,1997 HCLPF Review Meeting:

[

Meeting Open Item 1: The staff requested that Westinghouse include part of Chapter $5, the HCLPF methodology l

and values,in the standard safety analysis report.

i L

Response

The June 26,1992 Westinghouse Application for Final Design Approval and Design Certification consists of the f

Standard Safety Analysis Report, the AP600 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Report, and the Inspection, Test, j

Anlayais, and Acceptance Criteria. Westinghotase understands that different branches of the NRC are reviewing the seismic margins analysis, which is housed in PRA Chapter 55. The staff reviewing the HCLPF methodology and

[

l values is typically used to reviewing material and writing their SER input based on what is provided within the i

SSAR, hence the request by the staff to house this material in the SSAR. The staff should use both the SSAR and j

the PRA to write their SER input, and thus, the HCLPF methodology and values will remain within Chapter 55 of

'}

the PRA.

i i

If the staff's question is more directed to what information will be in the AP600 Design Control Document, that will

]

be discussed between Westinghouse and the staff following Final Design Approval. This timing of the DCD is 1

consistent with what has been agreed upon by Westmghouse and NRC management.

l SSAR/PRA Revision: None.

)

l l

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! to Westinghouse Letter DCP/NRC0940 June 27,1997 3

i W

i l

4 i

l

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Question 720.387 l

The deterministic evaluation of ex-vessel fuel coolant interactions (Appendix B to Revision 9 of l

the PRA) indicates that the impulse loads from ex-vessel steam explosions would fail the reactor i

i cavity floor and wall structures, but that the embedded steel liner will stay intact. The evaluation also indicates that containment vessel integrity will not be compromised by the displacement of the RPV due to the impulse loading. Please submit additional details regarding the calculation of containment vessel strains referenced in Section B.3.2.1 and the calculation of maximum lift of the RPV referenced in Section B.3.2.2.

Response

As described in Appendix B, which presents the discussion of the ex-vessel severe accident phenomena, the reactor pressure vessel and the containment vessel dynamic response was defined using time history analyses. These structures were subjected to the dynamic impulse steam blast impulse loadings simulated by triangular pulse loadings. The models used were equivalent one-degree of freedom dynamic models. The equations of motion are defined in the reference given below:

Timoshenko, S, D.H. Young, and W. Weaver, Jr, Vibration Problems in Encineering. J.

Wiley & Sons, Fourth Edition,1974.

They are provided below:

x = b(1

"#')

(0$t5t) i k

I, pt,

~

Qi t

sinpt 1(I-f) 1 SinP(f-I )

2 i

t t (t - 'i) + 2Pf ('2 - 's )(f5151) x=

i 2

k t

pt, i

2 i

G 1 sinp(t - t ) sin p(t -(2) x=,

- sinpt +2 i

(1 5 ')

2 pt (1 - f )

P(1-f).

k pti 2

i 2

i where:

p = forced circular frequency and the other terms are defined in the figure below:

l l

l De,38'4 -I

I a

0 0'

l l

t l

t ti t

As stated in Appendix B, a 13 foot length was used for the containment vessel steel. This is considered the minimum length that could be subjected to a tensile strain. It is based on half of the length associated with the cracked concrete as shown in Figure 720.387-1.

Each side of the 26 foot length is assumed conservatively to be stretched by the full deflection of the failed concrete B. Six inches is an upper bound deflection value that is applicable to the range of AP600 soil stiffnesses. Results are shown in Figure 720.387-2.

The percentage upper bound strain or elongation is calculated below:

p = [6/(13 x 12)] x 100

= 3.8%

i Therefore, the containment vessel strain, which is less than 4 percent, is much less than the ultimate strain capacity associated with the containment vessel material which is 22 percent or greater of elongation. The percent elongation is obtained from tests for SA537 Class 2 material used for the containment and materials with similar chemical propenies. Test data was available for 389 tests.

7he controlling steam blast impulse loading is best approximated by a triangular pulse (shown j

above) having a duration of 0.004 seconds. The calculation of the maximum displacement of the reactor pressure vessel follows the same time history dynamic formulation as described for the triangular impulsive load until time t is greater than t. The results at time 1 are used to calculate 2

2 the maximum displacement since this formulation does not account for gravity effects. The potential energy associated with mass M as it is lifted to its maximum height is equated to the difference between the kinetic energy defined using the maximum velocity (approximately at time t ) and the strain energy of the piping. Shown in Figure 720.387-3 is a plot of the reactor 2

pressure vessel (RPV) uplift obtained from this analysis as a function of system frequency. The system stiffness is defined by the res.ctor coolant piping. As the piping plastically deforms, the j

l "Mo. 3 8 7 - 2.

fj..

1

.6 frequency decreases. A lower bound frequency of I hertz is considered. This results in an uplift of six feet. Even if the piping Instantaneously failed, which is not expected, the uplift would still be around 22 feet. As seen in Figure 720.387-4, the reactor pressure vessel will not leave the refueling canal area.

PRA Revision: None.

t i

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~7 20. 387-3

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Figure 720.3871 Containment Vessel Steel Subjected to Elongation Due to Ex-Vessel Severe Accident 4

3 4

~

1 J

YX'X b, s z

F,

t b*

=r v,4, i

t

Y i

c M

f i

i MF 4

M '.

f pl e

rp

==1 4

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4/

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pl I

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.-Q

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r r

-m,=-

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gl u--

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, $ -)..'.

, '- ~

f _ ;.. R:. /....

r, -of. : t *.

~\\'?')

Cracked Canense

> 26' b

Enlarged Area

,20,3 e7 -4

r-L c.

l..

6 I

f f

i l.-

i f

Figure 720,387-2 i

1 1

I Ex-Vessel Steam Explosion f

Elongation (Deflection) of Containment Vessel Steel Vs. Soil Stiffness t

14.00 i

s.p. :,

j 94;..!,

m,?

j{ '.

j t:1, i

.l.!,.. jS :

t

'3 j )

10.00 t

I f ], i, Mli:.,

f

"':n" i i u~~

1,. " -

)

,[

.' f Algies AppileeMele M n[s

~

8.00 n

r

= C, 24 ;. 3,,,,.

F,' !? ' il.A M j

8.00

,".:i; pig gil l', ' ;

}

m 4.00 4

cn.L W

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gas!

+

- " 7 ' ES.Ein i..,;3 ;1 Eit.r- '!.ai 01 i17j it' w& ' r '

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<g j

i 0.00 200 300 400 500 800 700 800 900 1000 stiftnees kips / cubic.#oot 1

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7 :a o,'3 8 4 - 5

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Figure 720.387 3 l

' RPV Modon Based on a Spring / Mass System Subjected to an Impulse lead i

l l

l Frequency vs LNt 25 20 u

1 E

5-10 l

6

^

0.001 0.1 2

4 6

8 10 30 60 70 90 230 Frequency [Ha]

i 1

1 i

i

( -.

I 1

""/ 2o. 3 67 -lo

s*

I i

Figure 720.387-4 RPV Elevation Sketch Elevation 135' 3" Refueling Canal Wall Elevation 107' 2'

/\\

l Reactor Pressure Approximately q

Vessel 25' Barrel Blo. Shield Wall V

Lower Vessel Head 7 ap. 387 - +

s*

l j

OITS #5033 From January 9,1997 HCLPF Review Meeting:

Meeting Open Item 1: The staff requested that Westinghouse include part of Chapter 55, the HCLPF methodology and values, in the standard safety analysis report.

Response

The June 26,1992 Westinghouse Application for Final Design Approval and Design Certification consists of the Standard Safety Analysis Report, the AP600 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Report, and the Inspection, Test, Anlayais, and Acceptance Criteria. Westinghouse understands that different branches of the NRC are reviewing the seismic margins analysis, which is housed in PRA Chapter 55. The staff reviewing the HCLPF methodology and values is typically used to reviewing material and writing their SER input based on what is provided within the SSAR, hence the request by the staff to house this material in the SSAR. The staff should use both the SSAR and the PRA to write their SER input, and thus, the HCLPF methodology and values will remain within Chapter 55 of the PRA.

If the staff's question is more directed to what information will be in the AP600 Design Control Document, that will be discussed between Westinghouse and the staff following Final Design Approval. This timing of the DCD is consistent with what has been agreed upon by Westinghouse and NRC management.

SSAR/PRA Revision: None.

9 0

. to Westinghouse Letter DCP/NRC0940 June 27,1997 l

i l

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

=

i i

Question: 720.389 The AP600 documentation regarding the Me AP model(Chapter 44 of PRA), indicates that the AP600 basemat is assumed to be limestone concrete in order to maximize non-condensable gas generation. If this same assumption was retained in the deterministic calculations, the time to beach the embedded liner can be substantially less than the 9 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months estimated in Appendix B of the PRA. Please provide estimates of the time of melt-through of the embedded liner and the time of containment overpressure failure (e.g., Service Level C) if alternatise concrete compositions are specified for the reactor cavity floor and walls. The range of compositions evaluated should include those that would minimize and maximize the time of liner melt-through.

Response

The analyses of the impact of core concrete attack following reactor vessel failure, for those accident 6equences in which there was not sufficient water in the reactor cavity to externally cool the reactor vessel, documented in Appendix B of the PRA were all performed.ssuming common limestone-sand concrete. Thus, the concrete erosion and the containment pressurization valtes provided in Appendix B of the PRA are applicable to common limestone. sand concrete.

There are two common types of concrete that could be assumed in the analyses: basaltic aggregate concrete (also known as siliceous concrete) and common limestone-sand concrete. While there are other special types of concrete, these two provide a reasonable bound on the concrete erosion and non-condensable gas generation when the core material is outside the reactor vessel in an uncooled state. Thus, they are the only two examined in this assessment.

If it were assumed that the containment basemat was basaltic concrete rather than the common limestone-sand concrete used in the Appendix B analyses.

the concrete erosion rates would increase duc to the lower decomposition energy of basaltic concrete compared to the common limestohe-sand concrete assumed in the Appendix B analyses, and the containment pressurization rate would decrease due to the lower carbon dioxide content of basal tic concrete a

compared to the common limestone. sand concrete assumed in the analysis.

The analyses documented in Appendix B (Section B.4.1), assuming common limestone-sand concrete, show that the containment pressure is about 40 psia (0.275 MPa) at 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . Similar analyses assuming basaltic concrete would result in a lower containment pressure at 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Since this is less than Service Level C for the AP600 containment, the containment pressurization is judged to be less critical compared to the concrete erosion for these accident sequences.

The analyses documented in Appendix B (Section B.4) show that the time for the core material on the reactor cavity floor in these accident sequences reaches the embedded containment liner is about 9 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months . Similar analyses assuming basaltic concrete would result in a smaller time interval for the same amount of concrete erosion.

The probability of an accident sequence that results in failure of the reactor vessel and the subsequent attack of the reactor cavity floor by core material must be kept in perspective in determining whether it is appropriate to specify I

a concrete composition for the AP600 reactor cavity floor. The AP600 PRA shows that most core damage sequences result in a flooded reactor cavity in which failure of the reactor vessel is prevented due to external cooling of the W westinghouse l

l i

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION g=

2 reactor vessel. Failure of the reactor vessel for these accident sequences is shown in the Level 2 PRA to be remote and speculative. Thus, the analyses in Appendix B of the PRA only relate to a very small fraction of the total core damage frequency for the AP600 in which the teactor cavity is not flooded at the time of core relocation in the reactor vessel or does not remain flooded in the near term after core relocation to the reactor vessel bottom head.

The risk analyses f,r these accident sequences presented in the AP600 PRA is conservatively based on a containment failure at the time of reactor vessel failure.

it is also important to note that in discussing the time of melt-through of the embedded liner, that it is very conservative to assume the start of a large fission product release at this time. Two factors which are not quantified in these analyses that assure that this assumption is conservative are the raength of the containment and the depth of corium above the liner at the time of melt through of tl.e embedded liner. The melt-through of the embedded liner does not create a pathway for release of fission products to the atmosphere. While the containment strength may be adversely affected by melt-through, the massive concrete basemat is likely to hold the containment shell in-place without any loss of integrity. If cracking of the concrete occurs in the basemat, these cracks will be filled with frozen core debris and cannot act as a conduit for release of the gaseous contain nent fission products as long as the top of the corium " pool"is above the elevation of the embedded liner. The analyses in Appendix B of the AP600 PRA show that the top of the " pool"is above the elevation of the embedded basemat for the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of core concrete attack.

The penetration of core debris in the reactor cavity for alternate concrete compositions can be estimated from considerations of the concrete thermodynamic properties. Common limestone-sand concrete has a typical melting point of 2395* F (1586* K) and characteristics of 602 BTUAbm (1400 kJ/kg) heatup enthalpy (the specific energy required to heat from 80* F (300* K) to the melting point),241 BTU /lbm (560 kJ/kg) heat of fusion, and 494 BTU /lbm (1150 kJ/kg ) decomposition energy. Basaltic concrete has a typical melting point of 2330* F(1550

K) and characteristic values of 763 BTU /lbm (1766 kJ/kg) heatup enthalpy,236 BTU /lbm (550 kJ/kg) heat of fusion, and 116 BTU /lbm (270 kJ/kg) decomposition energy. Thus, it takes 1337 BTU /lbm (3110 kJ/kg) for erosion of common limestone-sand concrete and 1112 BTU /lbm (2586 kJ/kg) for basaltic concrete. Concrete basemat crosio for the two types of concrete can be estimated by using a simple heat balance. Assuming that upward / downward heat transfer and downward / sideward erosion are identical for the two types of concrete, the heat balance shows that the basaltic concrete would crede about 20% faster than common limestone-sand concrete. Thus, it would be expected that analyses similar to those presented in Appendix B of the PRA, except assuming basaltic concrete under the reactor vessel, would show erosion to the embedded liner in about 7.2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

Given this time difference for melt-through of the embedded liner, it is also expected that the magnitude and characteristics of any fission product releases (conservatively assuming penetration of the embedded liner equates to containment failure) would be quite small.

PRA Revision: None.

l 72a38b2 i

W Westinghouse

i NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION g

E

=

Question: 720.390 Given the relatively short estimated time to melt through of the embedded liner in Appendix B, justify why a concrete composition that maumizes the time of melt-through is not prescribed as part of the AP600 design. Include an estimate of related costs to specify a particular concrete composition.

Response

The AP600 is designed for application at a wide range of sites. The concrete specification for AP600 imposes strength and durability requirements, but does not require a specific type of aggregate in order that locally available materials can be used. Specification of a particular composition for the portion below the reactor vessel would require special provision and associated increased costs at those sites where the local aggregate has a different composition.

Any special aggregate would have to be imported from a location where the special composition is availabh This aggregate and concrete mix would have to be maimained separate from other aggregates. A separate concrete mix design would have to be prepared and qualified. Separate storage facilities would be required for the aggregate.

The primary effect on plant cost would be: a) qualification of mix design with the special aggregate, b) transportation of aggregates, c) separate storage of aggregates (note that other concrete work would be in progress with local aggregates), and d) impact on construction schedule if the special concrete cannot be available when required. This concrete placement is generally on the critical path for construction of the plant.

The severe accident consequences shown in the AP600 PRA were based on the conservative assumption that containment failure occurs at the time of reactor vessel failure. The results of the PRA, based on this conservative assumption, show that the offsite risks are acceptable. This conclusion is primarily due to the low probability of severe accident sequences where the core debris can leave the reactor vessel. Since the PRA model conservatively assumes that all severe accident sequences with reactor vessel failure have a large early release, a cost benefit analysis of including a concrete specification in the design for severe accident considerations cannot be done since the benefits cannot be quantified with the PRA model.

The specification of concrete that is more resistant to erosion by core debris does not prevent melt-through of the basemat to the embedded liner. Such concrete would only delay (by a few hours) the melt-through of the embedded liner. Given the characteristics of the fission product releases associated with basemat melt-through and the l

associated consequences (e.g., from NUREG-1150) a significant reduction in consequences is not expected for a few i

hours delay in the releases.

Considering that the costs are not negligible, the probability of events leading to reactor vessel failure is extremely low and the reduction in consequences is low, it is qualitatively concluded that specifying a particular type of j

concrete for the AP600 containment basemat would not be cost effective.

PRA Revision: None.

I l

720.390-1 W Westirighouse

i 1

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Questicn: 720.396 i

Based on the description in Section 6.4.9 and Table 9-1 of the PRA, fault tree CM2NL (referenced in the footnote of Table 36-1) deals with failure of the CMT subsystem injecting water to the RCS following an intermediate LOCA, where the safety injection S-signal automatically actuates CMT operation. Please justify why a fault tree associated with a LOCA is used to quantify the availability of the CMT for CET node DP, since success at DP assures that no LOCA will occur. Justify that the treatment of the safety injection S-signal in the fault tree is applicable to all Level I core melt sequences assigned to accident class 3A.

Response

Since RAls 720.396 and 720.398 are related, the responses to these RAls are combined.

Westinghouse agrees with the NRC. He incorrect fault tree, which includes oper:. tor actions, was used in sequences for accident class 3A in the level 2 PRA. Therefore, appropriate fault tree files have been constructed and accident class 3A requantified to determine the effect of this change on the level 2 baseline PRA. The process for performing this evaluation is delineated in the paragraphs that follow.

Existing fault tree files for core makeup tank (CMT) and reactor coolant pump (RCP) subsystems were revised to remove operator actions to represent the scenario for accident class 3A. The operator actions were removed because of the insuf6cient time available for successful operator action. He process for requantifying the baseline PRA accident class 3A includes the following steps:

a)

Replace fault tree CM2NL with CM2AB. Fault tree CM2AB was selected because CMT actuation signals (high hot leg temperature and low wide-range steam generator level) in CM2AB correspond to the signals for actuating CMT for CET node DP.

Drop the basic events for operator actions LPM-MAN 02, CMN-MAN 01 and REC-MANDAS from the I&C subtrees in the output file for fault tree CM2AB. The affected 1&C subtrees are: SUB-CMT-ICl, SUB-CMT-IC2, SUB-CMT-IC3 and SUB-CMT-IC4.

Requantify the CM2AB fault tree file with the revised I&C subtrees. This output file is named a

CMT-DP,WLK; a copy of this file is provided in Table 720.396-1, b)

Replace fault tree RCN with RCT. Pault tree RCT was selected because it is modeled with the same actuation signals as CM2AB.

Drop the basic events for operator actions LPM-MAN 02 and RCN-MAN 01 from the I&C subtrees in the output file for fault tree RCT. The affected !&C subtrees are: SUB-RN-IC01, SUB-RN-IC02, SUB-RN-IC03, SUB-RPT-IC04, SUB-RPT-ICOS, SUB-RPT-IC06, SUB-RFT-IC07 and SUB-RPT-IC08.

Requantify the RCT fault tree file with the revised I&C subtrees. This output file is named RCP-DP.WLK; a copy of the top 200 cutsets from this file is provided in Table 720.396-2.

W westinghouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION m:

R., m c)

Requantify the baseline accident class 3A with the changes listed in (a) and (b) above.

Quantification of the at-power baseline accident class 3A by this process produced a large release frequency of 4.4E-09, which is 6 percent greater than the frequency of 4.2E-09 for this accident class reported in the PRA, Revision 9. Upon examination of the frequencies of the other at-power baseline accident classes, it is determined that the effect of an increase of 6 percent in the large release frequency for accident class 3A is insignificant; this increase of approximately 2.4E-10 in the large ralease frequency for accident class 3A represents a 1 percent increase in the total at-power baseline large release frequency. The requantification output file for this case is provided in Table 720.396-3.

Note:

In the PRA (Revision 9), the CM2NL and RCN fault tree files contain non-minimal cutsets with operator actions that were minimized by fault tree PRTA during quantification. Therefore, in actuality, removing the operator actions from the fault trees would not change the results.

In the process described above, fault trees with appropriate actuation signals were selected for this evaluation. In that regard, RCT was selected. However, RCT was conservatively modeled without crediting DAS actuation (neither automatic nor manual). Therefore, the 6 percent increase for accident class 3A is due to DAS automatic actuation not being credited in the RCT fault tree; hence, the result is conservative.

PRA Revision: None.

l i

l l

720.396-2 3 Westinghouse i

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INCORMATION 31!

TABLE 720396-1 (CMT-DP for Baseline Case) vER 1.6 File created by linking cut-dp.wlk wlINK2 ** ver. 4.02 **

61 109 1.145E-04

.00 1.00E-11 1 CCX-Av-LA 6.1000E-05

.0000E+00 2 CCX-BY-PN1 5.7000E-05

.0000E+00 3 CCX-EF-5AM 8.6200E-06

.0000E+00 4 CCX-IN-LOGIC-5W 1.1000E-05

.0000E+00 5 CCX-INPUT-LOGIC 1.0300E-04

.0000E+00 6 (Cx-IV-xR 2.4000E-05

.0000E+00 7 CCx-IV-xR1 2.4000E-05

.0000E+00 8 CCX-LS-FA 5.3700E-06

.0000E+00 9 CCx-PMXM001-Sw 1.1000E-05

.0000E+00 10 CCx-PMxMoD2-Sw 1.1000E-05

.0000E+00 11 CCx-SFTW 1.2000E-06

.0000Et00 12 CCX-TT-UF 1.1700E-04

.0000E+00 13 CCX-xMTR 4.7800E-04

.0000E+00 14 CCX-xMTR195 4.7800E-04

.0000E+00 15 CMA-CV 2.0000E-06

.0000E+00 16 CMA-PLUG 7.2700E-04

.0000E+00 17 CMAAv014tA 1.5900E.0000E+00 18 CMAAv015LA 1.5900E-03

.0000E+00 19 CMAOPOO1Es 7.2000E-07

.0000E+00 20 CMATK002AF 2.4000E-06

.0000E+00 21 CMa-Cv 2.0000E-06

.0000E+00 22 CMB-PLUG 7.2700E-04

.0000E+00 23 CMRAv014LA 1.5900E-03

.0000E+00 24 CMsAv015LA 1.5900E-03

.0000E+00 25 CMBOR001Es 7.2000E-07

.0000E400 26 CMeTK002AF 2.4000E-06

.0000E400 27 CMx-CV-Go 5.1000E-05

.0000E+00 28 CMx-TK-AF 1.2000E-07

.0000E+00 29 OAs 1.0000E-02

.0000E+00 30 ECOM0001 5.0800E-03

.0000E+00 31 ECIB5001TM 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 32 ECiss011TM 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 33 EC185012TM 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 34 EC1BS013TM 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 35 EC1BS111TM 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 36 EC155121TM 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 37 EC2ssOO2TM 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 38 EC2B5022TM 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 39 EC285023TM 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 40 EC2ss221TM 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 41 ED3s5051LF 4.8000E-06

.0000E+00 42 ED385DSITM 3.0000E-04

.0000E+00 43 ED3 moo 01 5.0400E-04

.0000E+00 44 ED3! coo 3 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 720.396-3

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION illHEW.

n 45 ED3 MOD 04 2.1900E-02

.0000E+00 46 ED3 MOD 06 3.4800E-04

.0000E+00 47 E03 MOD 07 3.0500E-04

.0000E+00 48 IDAMooO4 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 49 IDAM0007 2.1900E-02

.0000E+00 50 10s*o024 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 51 IDEM 0027 2.1900E-02

.0000E+00 52 13CMOD28 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 53 IDCM0031 2.1900E-02

.0000E+00 54 100M0032 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 55 IDOM0035 2.1900E-02

.0000E+00 56 PMAM0031 5.0200E-03

.0000E+00 57 PMBMOD32 5.0200E-03

.0000E+00 58 PMOOD33 5.0200E-03

.0000E+00 59 PMDMOD14 5.0200E-03

.0000E400 60 zO1DG001TM 4.6000E-02

.0000E+00 61 201 MOD 01 2.0200E-02

.0000E+00 1.

6.10E-05 1

CCX-AV-LA 2.

5.10E-05 1

CMX-CV-GO 3.

1.03E-06 2

DAS CCX-INPUT-LOGIC 4.

5.29E-07 2

CMA-PLUG CMB-PLUG 5.

2.28E-07 2

CCX-XMTR195 CCX-XMTR 6.

1.20E-07 1

CMX-TM-AF 7.

1.10E-07 2

DAS CCx-rMXM002-5W 8.

1.10E-07 2

DAS CCX-IN-LOGIC-5W 9.

1.10E-07 2

DAS CCN-PMXMOD1-SW 10.

8.62E-08 2

DAS CCX-EP-5AM 11.

5.59E-08 2

CCX-XMTR195 CCx-TT-UF 12.

3.14E-08 2

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC ED3M0007 13.

1.20E-08 2

CCX-$FTW DAS 14.

3.36E-09 2

CCX-IN-LOGIC-5W ED3M0007 15.

3.36E-09 2

CCX-PMXM002-5W ED3 MOD 07 16.-

3.36E-09 2

CCX-PMXM001-5W ED3 MOD 07 17.

2.63E-09 2

CCX-EP-5AM ED3M0007 18, 1.84E-09 3

CMA-PLUG CMBAv014LA CMsAv015LA 19.

1.84E-09 3

CMAAV014LA CMAAV015LA cme-PLUG 20.

1.74E-09 2

C.MATK002AF CMB-PLUG 21.

1.74E-09 2

CMA-PL.UG CMBTK002AF 22.

1.45E-09 2

CMA-CV CMa-PLUG 23.

1.45E-09 2

CMA-PLUG CMB-CV 24, 1.27E-09 4

DAS PMAM0031 PMBM0032 PMCM003) 25.

1.27E-09 4

OAS PWu90031 PMRMOD32 PMDM0034 26.

1.27E-09 4

DAs FNsM0032 PMCM0033 PMDM0034 27.

1.27E-09 4

DAS PMAM0031 FMCMOD33 PPOM0034 28.

1.14E-09 3

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC ED3M0001 ED3 MOD 04 29.

7.51E-10 3

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC ED3M0003 ECiss001TM 30.

6.77E-10 3

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC ED3M0004 ED3BSD$1TM 31.

5.53E-10 2

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC CCX-L5-FA 32.

5.23E-10 2

CMAOR001E8 CMB-PLUG 33.

5.23E-10 2

CMA-PLUG CMBOR001E8 720.396-4

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION W

ni l

34.

3.66E-10 2

CCX-5FTW ED3 MOD 07 35.

1.40E-10 3

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC ED3 MOD 01 EC185001TM 36.

1.40E-10 3

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC ED3 MOD 01 EC1850111M 37.

1.40E-10 3

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC ED3 MOD 01 EC155111TM 38.

1.21E-10 3

CCX-IN-LOGIC-5W ED3 MOD 01 ED3 MOD 04 39.

1.21E-10 3

CCX-PMXMOD2-5W ED3 MOD 01 ED3 MOD 04 40.

1.21E-10 3

CCX-PMXmD1-5W ED3 MOD 01 ED3M0004 41.

9.51E-11 3

CCX-EP-5AM ED3 MOD 01 ED3mD04 42.

8.34E-11 3

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC ED385051TM ECla5001TM 4 3.

8.34E-11 3

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC ED3BSD51TM EC185011TM 44.

8.34E-11 3

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC ED3BSD51TM EC185111TM 45.

8.02E-11 3

CCX-IN-LOGIC-5W ED3M0003 EC185001TM 46.

8.02E-11 3

CCX-FMXMOD2-5W ED3 MOD 03 EC185001TM 47.

8.02E-11 3

CCX-FMXM001-5W ED3 MOD 03 EC1850CITM 48, 7.99E-11 4

DAS PMBMOD32 PMCMOD33 IDDM)D32 49.

7.99E-11 4

DAS PMBM0032 PMDM0034 IDCMOD28 50.

7.99E-11 4

DAS PMCM0033 MDMOD34 IDBMOD24 51.

7.99E-11 4

DAS PMAMOD31 PMDMOD34 ID8 MOD 24 52.

7.99E-11 4

DAS PMAM0031 PMCMOD33 IDOMOD32 53.

7.99E-11 4

DAS PMAM0031 PMD40034 IDCmD28 54.

7.99E-11 4

DAS PMAM0031 PMCM0033 IDBM0024 55.

7.99E-11 4

DAS PMCM0033 PE M0034 IDAM0004 56.

7.99E-11 4

DAS PMAMOD31 PMBMOD32 IDCM0028 57.

7.99E-11 4

DAS PMBM0032 PMCMOD33 IDAM0004 58.

7.99E-11 4

DAS PMAMOD31 PMBM0032 IDDMOD32 59.

7.99E-11 4

DAS PMBMOD32 PmM0034 IDAM0004 60.

7.23E-11 3

CCX-IN-LOGIC-5W ED3 MOD 04 ED3e5D51TM 61.

7.23E-11 3

(CX-FMXM002-5W ED3MODC4 ED385D51TM 62.

7.23E-11 3

CCx-PMxm001-5W ED3 MOD 04 ED385D51TM 63.

6.50E-11 4

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC ED3 MOD 03 zo1DG001TM EC040001 64.

6.2eE-11 3

CCX-EP-5AM ED3 MOD 03 Ecla5001tM 65.

5.91E-11 2

CCX-IN-LOGIC-5W CCX-LS-FA 66.

5.91E-11 2

CCX-FMXM001-5W CCX-LS-FA 67.

5.91E-11 2

CCX-FMxM002-5W CCX-LS-FA 68.

5.66E-11 3

CCX-EP-5AM ED3 MOD 04 ED385051TM 69.

5.41E-11 3

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC CCX-IV-XR1 ED3 MOD 04 70.

4.63E-11 2

CCX-EP-5AM CCX-LS-FA 71.

3.86E-11 4

PMBM0032 PMCM003)

PMDM0034 E03 MOD 07 72.

3.86E-11 4

PMAMOD31 PMBM0032 PMOMOD34 ED3M0007 73.

3.86E-11 4

PMAMOD31 PMBMOD32 PMCM0033 ED3 MOD 07 74.

3.86E-11 4

PMAM0031 PMCED33 PE M0034 ED3 MOD 07 75.

2.98E-11 3

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC CCX-BY-PN1 EC0mD01 76.

2.85E-11 4

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC ED3M0003 ZO1 MOD 01 ECOMOD01 77.

1.81E-11 3

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC ED3 MOD 01 ED3 MODO 6 78.

1.64E-11 4

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC ED3 MOD 04 E03peJD03 EC185013TM 79.

1.59E-11 3

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC CCX-BY-PN1 EC1650011M 80.

1.59E-11 3

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC CCX-BY-PN1 EC285023TM 81.

1.59E-11 3

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC CCX-BY-PNI EC285002TM 82.

1.50E-11 3

CCX-IN-LOGIC-5W ED3 MOD 01 EC185001TM 83.

1.50E-11 3

CCX-IN-LOGIC-5W ED3 MOD 01 ECis5011TM 720.396-5

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION V.!

10 4 N

' h-84.

1.50E-11 3

CCX-IN-LOGIC-SW ED3MDD01 EC185111TM 85.

1.50E-11 3

CCX-PMxMOD2-5W ED3 MOD 01 Eclas001TM 86.

1.50E-11 3

CCX-FMxMOD2-5W Er3 MOD 01 EC185011TM 87 1.50E-11 3

CCX-PMXM002-SW ED3 MOD 01 EC185111TM 88.

1.50E-11 3

CCX-PWXMOD1-5W c)3M0001 EC185001TM 89.

1.50E-11 3

CCX-PMXMOD1-5W CD3M0001 EC185011TM 90.

1.50E-11 3

CCX-FMXM001-SW ED3M0001 EC185111TM 91.

1.42E-11 4

DAS CCX-IV-XR EC185001TM IDEM 0027 92.

1.42E-11 4

DAS CCX-IV-XR EC185001TM IDDNOD35 93.

1.42E-11 4

DAS CCX-IV-XR EC185012TM IDBM0027 94 1.42E-11 4

DAS CCX-IV-XR EC185012TM IDDMOD35 95.

1.42E-11 4

DAS CCX-IV-XR EC185121TM ID8M0027 96.

1.42E-11 4

DAS CCX-IV-XR EC1BS121TM IDDMOD35 97 1.42E-11 4

DAS CCX-IV-XR EC285002TM IDCMOD31 98.

1.42E-11 4

DAS CCX-IV-XR EC285022TM IDCM0031 99.

1.42E-11 4

DAS CCX-IV-XR EC255221TM IDCMOD31 100.

1.42E-11 4

DAS CCX-IV-XR IDAMOD07 EC2sS002TM 101.

1.42E-11 4

DAS CCX-IV-XR IDAMOD07 EC2ss022TM 102.

1.42E-11 4

DAS CCX-IV-XR IDAM0007 EC2BS221TM 103.

1.32E-11 3

CCX-5FTW EDIMOD01 ED3 MOD 04 104.

1.21E-11 4

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC EDiseX)O1 ZO1DG001TM ECOM0001 105.

1.17E-11 3

CCx-EP-SAM ED3 MOD 01 EC185001TM 106.

1.17E-11 3

CCX-EP-SAM ED3MnD01 EC185011TM 107.

1.17E-11 3

CCX-EP-5AM E'D 3M0001 EC185111TM 108.

1.08E-11 3

(CX-INPUT-LOGIC ED3 MOD 04 ED3ssDs1LF 109.

1.08E-11 3

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC ED3BSD51TM ED3M0006

$UM OF CUTSET PROBABILITIES = 1.145E-04 CUTOFF PitOBASILITY = 1.000E-11 720.396-6 9

. m.

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION W

I l

Table 720.396-2 (RCP-DP for Baseline Case)

VER 1.6 File created by linking rcp-dp.wlk WLINK2 ** ver. 4.02 **

195 7506 7.353E-04

.00 1.00E-11 1 CCX-BC-5A 8.4000E-06

.0000E+00 2 CCX-BY-PN 4.7000E-05

.0000E+00 3 CCX-EP-5AM 8.6200E-06

.0000E400 4 CCX-IN-LOGIC-5W 1.1000E-05

.0000E+00 5 CCX-INPUT-LOGIC 1.0300E-04

.0000E+00 6 (CX-IV-XR 2.4000E-05

.0000E+00 7 CCX-PMA030 9.6900E-05

.0000E+00 8 CCX-rSenMool 1.4100E-04

.0000E+00 9 CCX-PMAM002 3.0400E-04

.0000E+00 10 CCX-PMs030 9.6900E-05

.0000E+00 11 CCX-FM8 MOD 1 1.4100E-04

.0000E+00 12 CCX-FMsM002 3.0400E-04

.0000E+00 13 CCX-FMCO30 9.6900E-05

.0000E+00 14 CCX-PMCM001 1.4100E-04

.0000E+00 15 CCX-PMcM002 3.0400E-04

.0000E+00 16 CCX-PMD030 9.6900E-05

.0000E+00 17 CCX-PMDMODI 1.4100E-04

.0000E+00 18 CCX-FnDMoo2 3.0400E-04

.0000E+00 19 CCX-FMXMOD1-5W 1.1000E-05

.0000E+00 20 CCX-FMxM002-5W 1.1000E-05

.0000E+00 21 CCX-sFTw 1.2000E-06

.0000E+00 22 CCX-TT-UF 1.1700E-04

.0000E+00 23 (CX-XMTR 4.7800E-04

.0000E+00 24 CCX-XMTR195 4.7800E-04

.0000E+00 25 EC0eco01 5.0500E-03

.0000E+00 26 ECiss001LF 4.8000E-06

.0000E+00 27 EC185001TM 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 28 ECIBS012TM 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 29 EC185121TM 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 30 ECIC8100RQ 1.4400E-05

.0000E+00 31 EC1CB100VO 4.2000E-03

.0000E+00 32 EC1 Moo 12 4.8000E-05

.0000E+00 33 ECIM00121 1.6800E-05

.0000E+00 34 EC2ss002LF 4.8000E-06

.0000E+00 35 EC2asOO2TM 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 36 EC285022TM 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 37 EC2ss221TM 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 38 EC2CB200RQ 1.4400E-05

.0000E+00 39 EC2Cs200Vo 4.2000E-03

.0000E+00 40 EC2M0022 4.8000C-05

.0000E+00 41 EC2 MOD 221 1.6800E-05

.0000E+00 42 ECX-CS-GC 7.3000E-04

.0000E+00 43 ECX-CB-GO 4.2000E-04

.0000E+00 44 ED1850%1TM 3.0000E-04

.0000E+00 720.396-7 W Westinghouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 45 ED1 MOD 03 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 46 E01 MOD 11 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 47 ED1M00113 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 48 ED285DSITM 3.0000E-04

.0000E+00 49 ED2 MOD 03 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 50 ED2 MOD 11 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 51 ED48SD51TM 3.0000E-04

.0000E+00 52 ED4M0011 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 53 EDiMOD112 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 54 IDABSDSitF 4.8000E-06

.0000E+00 55 IDAssDs1TM 3.0000E-04

.0000E+00 56 IDAMOD02 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 57 IDAMOD03 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 58 IDAMODO4 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 59 In4M0005 5.1600E-04

.0000E+00 60 IDAMOD06 4.3200E-05

.0000E+00 61 IDAMoD07 2.1900E-02

.0000E+00 62 IDAMODOS 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 63 IDessDo1LF 4.8000E-06

.0000Ee00 64 ID88SDDITM 3.0000E-04

.0000E+00 65 IDessDs1LF 4.8000E-06

.0000E+00 66 ID885351TM 3.0000E-04

.0000E+00 67 IDBFD013RQ 1.2000E-05

.0000E+00 68 IDEM 0009 1.9200E-04

.0000E+00 69 IDSMOD10 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 70 IDEM 0011 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 71 IDeMOD24 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 72 IDBM0025 5.1600E-04

.0000E+00 73 IDBM0026 4.3200E-05

.0000E+00 74 IDEM 0027 2.1900E-02

.0000E+00 75 IDBMOD36 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 76 IDCasDD1LF 4.8000E-06

.0000E+00 77 IDCBSDDITM 3.0000E-04

.0000E+00 78 IDC85D51LF 4.8000E-%

.0000E+00 79 IDCBSDs1TM 3.0000E-04

.0000E+00 80 IDCFD007RQ 1.2000E-05

.0000E+00 81 IDCMOD15 1.9200E-04

.0000E+00 82 IDCMOD16 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 83 IDCMOD17 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 84 IDCM0028 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 85 IDCM0029 5.1600E-04

.0000E+00 86 IDCMOD30 4.3200E-05

.0000E+00 87 IDCM0031 2.1900E-02

.0000E+00 88 IDCMOD37 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 89 IDDesDs1LF 4.8000E-06

.0000E+00 90 IDDBSDSITM 3.0000E-04

.0000E+00 91 IDDMOD22 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 92 IDDM0023 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 93 IDOM0032 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 94 IDDMOD33 5.1600E-04

.0000E+00 W Westinghouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

.4.

g 9.

h e_ _

95 IDOMoD34 4.3200E-05

.0000E+00 96 IDOMoD35 2.1900E-02

.0000E+00 97 Io0M0038 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 98 PMA0301AsA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 99 PMA0301BSA 1.3600E-03

.0000E+00 100 PMA0302ASA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 101 PM40302BSA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 102 PMAM0011 2.0900E-03

.0000E+00 103 PMAMOD12 2.0900E-03

.0000E+00 104 PMAMOD21 4.0700E-03

.0000E+00 105 Pt44 MOD 22 4.0700E-03

.0000E+00 106 PMAmoD31 5.0200E-03

.0000E+00 107 PMAxs00ASA 8.0000E-05

.0000E+00 108 PMs0301ASA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 109 PMs0301BSA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 110 PMB0302ASA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 111 PMs0302s5A 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 112 PMsMOD11 2.0900E-03

.0000E+00 113 PMsM0012 2.0900E-03

.0000E+00 114 PMsM0021 4.0700E-03

.0000E+00 115 PMsM0022 4.O?00E-03

.0000E+00 116 PMsMOD32 5.0200E-03

.0000E+00 117 PMaxs00ASA 8.0000E-05

.0000E+00 118 PMc0301ASA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 119 PMC0301sSA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 120 PMc0302ASA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 121 PMc0302BSA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 122 PMCM0011 2.0900E-03

.0000E+00 123 PMOsoD12 2.0900E-03

.0000E+00 124 PMO90021 4.0700E-03

.0000E+00 125 PMCM0022 4.0700E-03

.00uoE+00 126 PMcMoD33 5.0200E-03

.0000E+00 127 PMcxs00ASA 8.0000E-05

.0000E+00 128 F9400101ASA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 129 PMo0301BSA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 130 PMD0302ASA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 131 PMD0302s5A 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 132 PMDMOD11 2.0900E-03

.0000E+00 133 PMDMOD12 2.0900E-03

.0000E+00 134 PMDMOD21 4.0700E-03

.0000E+00 135 PeoMOD22 4.0700E-03

.0000E+00 136 FigoMoD34 5.0200E-03

.0000E+00 137 P90x500ASA 8.0000E-05

.0000E+00 138 RCICs051GO 4.2000E-03

.0000E+00 139 RCice052GO 4.2000E-03

.0000E+00 140 RC1CB053GO 4.2000E-03

.0000E+00 141 RCICsO54GO 4.2000E-03

.0000E+00 142 RCICB061GO 4.2000E-03

.0000E+00 143 RClCB062GO 4.2000E-03

.0000E+00 144 RCICs063Go 4.2000E-03

.0000E+00 720.396-9 kN M

+

i

=

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 145 RC1C8064GO 4.2000E-03

.0000E+00 146 RCITL195UF 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 147 RC2TL196UF 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 148 RC3rL197uF 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 149 RC4TL198UF 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 150 RPAEP0515A 1.7100E-04

.0000E+00 151 RPAEPO535A 1.7100E-04

.0000E+00 152 RPSEP0525A 1.7100E-04

.0000E+00 153 RPSEP054SA 1.7100E-04

.0000E+00 154 RPCEPO615A 1.7100E-04

.0000E+00 155 RPCEPO63sA 1.7100E-04

.0000E+00 156 RPDEPO62sA 1.7100E-04

.0000E+00 157 RPDEPO645A 1.7100E-04

.0000E+00 158 RPTM0001 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 159 RPTMOD02 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 160 RPTM0003 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 161 RPTMOD04 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 162 RPTM0005 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 163 RPTM0006 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 164 RPTMOD07 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 165 RPTMOD08 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 166 RPX-CS-Go 4.2000E-04

.0000E+00 167 SG10RO11SP 7.2200E-03

.0000E+00 168 SG10RO125P 7.2200E-03

.0000E+00 169 SG10RO15SP 7.2700E-03

.0000E+00 170 SGloR016se 7.2200E-03

.0000E+00 171 sGITLO110F 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 172 sGITLO120F 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 173 SGITLO15UF 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 174 SGITLOl60F

5. 2300E-03

.0000E+00 175 SG20R0135P 7.2200E-03

.0000E+00 176 SG20RO14SP 7.2200E-03

.0000E+00 177 sG20R0175P 7.2200E-03

.0000E+00 178 SG20RO18SP 7.2200E-03

.0000E+00 179 SG2TLO13UF 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 180 SG2TLO14UF 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 181 SG2TLO17UF 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 182 sG2TLO18Ur 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 183 ZANM0001 8.4000E-05

.0000E+00 184 ZANTR-2AHF 2.8800E-05

.0000E+00 185 2 ANTR-2BHF 2.8800E-05

.0000E+00 186 zo1DG001TM 4.6000E-02

.0000E+00 187 zo1M0001 2.0200E-02

.0000E+00 188 zo1M0004 1.2500E-03

.0000E+00 189 202DG0021N 4.6000E-02

.0000E+00 190 Zo2M0001 2.0200E-02

.0000E+00 191 Zo2M0004 1.2500E-03

.0000E+00 192 ZOx-0G-DR 4.4000E-04

.0000E+00 193 ZOX-DG-DS 2.8000E-04

.0000E+00 194 zox-PD-ER 1.3000E-04

.0000E+00 720.396-10

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION E!

'E m

[*

195 20X-PD-Es 2.0000E-03

.0000E+00 1.

4.20E-04 1

RPX-Cs-GO 2.

1.03E-04 1

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC 3.

1.76E-05 2

RCICs063GO RCICs064GO 4.

1.76E-05 2

RCICs061GO RCICs062GO 5.

1.76E-05 2

RCICs053GO RCICs054GO 6.

1.76E-05 2

RCICs051GO RCICs052GO 7.

1.10E-05 1

CCX-FMxMOD1-sw 8.

1.10E-05 1

CCX-FMxMOD2-sw 9.

1.10E-05 1

CCX-IN-LOGIC-5W 10.

8.62E-06 1

CCX-EP-5AM 11.

3.68E-06 2

RCICs063GO RPTM0008 12.

3.68E-06 2

RPTM0007 RCICs064GO 13.

3.68E-06 2

RC1Cs061GO RPTM0006 14.

3.68E-06 2

RPTMODOS RCICB062GO 15.

3.68E-06 2

RC1Cs053GO RPTM0004 16.

3.68E-06 2

RPTM0003 RC1Cs054GO 17.

3.68E-06 2

RC1Cs051GO RPTNOD02 18.

3.68E-06 2

RPTMOD01 RC1Cs052GO 19.

1.28E-06 2

RC1Cs064GO CCX-PMCMOD2 20.

1.28E-06 2

RC1Cs%3GO CCX-PMDM002 21.

1.28E-06 2

RCICs062GO CCX-FMCM002 22.

1.28E-06 2

RCIC8061GO CCX-PMDM002 23.

1.28E-06 2

RCICs054GO CCX-PMAM002 24 1.28E-06 2

RCits053GO CCX-PMsM002 25.

1.28E-06 2

RCICs052GO CCX-PMAM002 26.

1.28E-06 2

RCICs051GO CCX-FMsM002 27.

1.26E-06 2

RCICB063GO IDas5DSITM 28.

1.26E-06 2

RCICs063GO Ides 5DDITM 29.

1.26E-06 2

RCICs064GO IDCs50SITM 30.

1.26E-06 2

RCICs064GO IDCBSDDITM 31.

1.26E-06 2

RCICsO61GO Ides 5DSITM 32.

1.26E-06 2

RCICs061GO 108s5001T4 33.

1.26E-06 2

RC1Cs062GO IDCsSDSITM 34.

1.26E-06 2

RCICB062GO IDCs5DDITM 35.

1.26E-06 2

RCICs053GO IDesSDSITM 36.

1.26E-06 2

RCICs053GO IDassDDITM 37.

1.26E-06 2

RCICs054GO IDCaSOSITM 38.

1.26E-06 2

RCICs054GO IDCs5DDITM 39.

1.26E-06 2

RCirB051GO IDasSD51TM 40.

1.26E-06 2

RCICs051GO IDas5DDITM 41.

1.26E-06 2

RCICs052GO IDCsS051TM 42.

1.26E-06 2

RCICs052GO IDCs5001TM 43.

1.20E-06 1

CCX-5FTw 44.

7.67E-07 2

RPTMXX)7 RPTMOD08 45.

7.67E-07 2

RPTMODOS RPTM0006 46.

7.67E-07 2

RPTMODO3 RPTMODb4 47.

7.67E-07 2

RPTM0001 RPTM0002 48.

7.18E-07 2

RC1Cs064GO R/CEP0635A 49.

7.18E-07 2

RC1Cs063GO RPDEPO645A 720.396-11 W Westingflouse m

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 11 ' li di l

50.

7.18E-07 2

RCICs062GO RPCEP0615A 51.

7.18E-07 2

RCICsD61GO RPDEP0625A 52.

7.18E-07 2

RC1CaO54GO RPAEP053sA 53.

7.18E-07 2

RCICR053GO RPSEP054sA 54.

7.18E-07 2

RCICs052GO RPAEPOSISA 55.

7.18E-07 2

RCICs051GO RP8EP0525A 56.

5.92E-07 2

RCICs064GO CCX-PMCM001 57.

5.92E-07 2

RC1Cs063GO CCX-PMDMOD1 58.

5.92E-07 2

RCICe062GO CCX-FMcMcD1 59.

5.92E-07 2

RC1Cs061GO CCX-PPOMODI 60.

5.92E-07 2

RCICe054GO CCX-FMAM001 61.

5.92E-07 2

RC1Cs053GO CCX-PM8M001 62.

5.92E-07 2

RCICB052GO CCX-PMAMOD1 63.

5.92E-07 2

RCICe051GO CCX-FMsMOD1 64.

4.07E-07 2

RC1Cs064GO CCX-PMc030 65.

4.07E-07 2

RCicsO6 3GO CCX-FMD030 66.

4.07E-07 2

RCICB062GO CCX-PMCO30 67 4.07E-07 2

RC1Cs061G3 CCX-PMD030 68.

4.07E-07 2

RCICs054GO CCX-PMA030 69.

4.07E-07 2

RCICs053GO CCX-PMRO30 70.

4.07E-07 2

RCICs052GO CCX-PMA030 71.

4.07E-07 2

RCICs051GO CCX-PM8030 72.

2.66E-07 2

RPTM0008 CCX-PMCMOD2 73.

2.66E-07 2

RPTMOD07 CCX-PMDMOD2 74.

2.66E-07 2

RFTMOD06 CCX-PMCM002 75.

2.66E-07 2

RPTM0005 CCX-PMDMOD2 76.

2.66E-07 2

RPTM0004 (CX-FMAMOD2 77.

2.66E-07 2

RPTM0003 CCX-PMBMOD2 78.

2.66E-07 2

RPTMOD02 CCX-PMAPOD2 79.

2.66E-07 2

RPTMOD01 CCX-PMSM002 80.

2.63E-07 2

RPTDOD07 IDBBSDSITM 81.

2.63E-07 2

RPTM0007 IDessDDITM 82.

2.63E-07 2

RPTM0008 IDCBSDSITM 83.

2.63E-07 2

RPTM0008 IDCBSDDITM 84.

2.63E-07 2

RPTM0005 ID64SDs1TM 85.

2.63E-07 2

RPTM0005 IDBBSDDITM 86.

2.63E-07 2

RPTMOD06 IDCBSDs1TM 87.

2.63E-07 2

RPTMOD06 IDCBSDDITM 88.

2.63E-07 2

RPTNOD03 IDB85051TM 89.

2.63E-07 2

RPTMODO)

IDBBSDDITM 90.

2.63E-07 2

RPTNOD04 IDCasos1TM 91.

2.63E-07 2

RPTMODO4 IDCasDDITM 92.

2.63E-07 2

RPTM0001 ID8BSDSITM 93.

2.63E-07 2

RPTMOD01 Idee 5DDITM 94.

2.63E-07 2

RPTMOD02 IDCBSDSITM 95.

2.63E-07 2

RPTMODO2 IDCaSDDITM 96.

2.28E-07 2

CCX-XMTR195 CCx-xMTR 97.

1.50E-07 2

RPTMOD08 RPCEP0635A 98.

1.50E-07 2

RPTM0007 RPDEP06asA 99.

1.50E-07 2

RPTM0006 RPCEP0615A 720.396-12 9

m m.

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THulEHs r

n r.u _

100.

1.50E-07 2

RPTM0005 RPDEP062sA 101.

1.50E-07 2

RPTMODO4 RPAEP053sA 102.

1.50E-07 2

RPTM0003 RPBEP0545A 103.

1.50E-07 2

RPTM0002 RPAEPO515A 104.

1.50E-07 2

RPTM0001 RP8EP052sA 105.

1.27E-07 3

PMAMOD31 PMnM0032 PMCMOD33 106.

1.27E-07 3

PMm0031 PO M0032 PMDPOD34 107.

1.27E-07 3

PMAMOD31 PMCM0033 PMDMOD34 108.

1.27E-07 3

PMBM0032 PMCM0033 PMDM0034

109, 1.24E-07 2

RPTM0008 CCX-PMCMODI 110.

1.24E-07 2

RPTM0007 CCX-PMDM001 111.

1.24E-07 2

RPTM0006 CCX-PMCM001 112.

1.24E-07 2

PPTM0005 CCX-PMDPOD1 113.

1.24E-07 2

RPTM0004 CCX-PM40D1 114.

1.24E-07 2

arTM0003 CCX-PMSM001 115.

1.24E-07 2

RPTM0002 CCX-PMAMOD1 116.

1.24E-07 2

rpm 0001 CCX-PMRM001 117.

9.24E-08 2

CCX-FMCM002 CCX-FM[ MOD 2 118.

9.24E-08 2

CCX-PMAMOD2 CCX-PMBM002 119.

9.12E-08 2

ID68sDSITM CCX-PMCM002 120.

9.12E-08 2

IDesS001TM CCX-FMCM002 121.

9.12E-08 2

IOCasOs1TM CCx-PMmOD2 122.

9.12E-08 2

IDCasoo1TM CCX-PMDM002 123.

9.12E-08 2

IDBSsDs1TM CCX-FMAM002 124.

9.12E-08 2

IDessco1TM CCX-PMAM002 125.

9.12E-08 2

IDCBsDs1TM CCX-PMRMOD2 126.

9.12E-08 2

IDCBsDDITM CCX-PMBMOD2 127.

9.00E-08 2

IOCSSos1TM IDessDs1TM 128.

9.00E-08 2

IDCasDs1TM IDessDo1TM 129.

9.00E-08 2

IDCasoo1TM IoansD51TM 130.

9.00E-08 2

10CB5001TM IDBB5001TM 131.

8.49E-08 2

RPTM0008 CCX-FMCO30 132.

8.49E-08 2

RPTM0007 CCX-PMD030 133.

8.49E-08 2

RPTM0006 CCX-PMCO30 134.

8.49E-08 2

RPTM0005 CCX-PMD030 135.

8.49E-08 2

RPTM0004 CCX-FMA030 136.

8.49E-08 2

RPTM0003 CCX-PM8030 137.

8.49E-08 2

RPTM0002 CCX-MA030 138.

8.49E-08 2

RPTleJ001 CCX-FMe030 139.

6.9FE-08 3

RCICe064GO PMCMOD22 PMCM0021 140.

6.96E-08 3

RCICsO63GO PMDMOD22 PMDM0021 141.

6.96E-08 3

RCICs062GO PMCM0022 PMOOD21 142.

6.96E-08 3

RCIC8061Go PMOMOD22 P90M0021 143.

6.96E-08 3

RCIC8054GO PMAM0022 PMAM0021 144.

6.96E-08 3

RCics053GO PMsM0022 PMs40021 145.

6.96E-08 3

RCICB052GO PMAMOD22 PM4 MOD 21 146.

6.96E-08 3

PC1Cs051GO PMBM0022 PMe40021 147.

5.59E-08 2

CCX-XMTR195 CCX-TT-ur 148.

5.20E-08 2

CCX-PMCM002 RPDEP064sA 149.

5.20E-08 2

RPCEP063sA CCX-PROMOo2 720.396-13

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDmONAL INFORMATION 1

150.

5.20E-08 2

CCx-PMCMOD2 RPDEPO625A 151.

5.20E-08 2

RPCEP0615A CCx-PMDM002 152.

5.20E-08 2

CCx-PMAMOD2 RP8EP05454 153.

5.20E-08 2

RPAEP0535A CCx-PMaMOD2 154 5.20E-08 2

CCx-PMAMDD2 RPSEPOS25A 155.

5.20E-08 2

RPAEP0515A CCx-PMsMOD2 156.

5.13E-08 2

IDBBSDSITM RPCEPO635A 157.

5.13E-08 2

Idee 5DDITM RPCEPO635A 158.

5.13E-08 2

IDCBSDSITM RPDEP0645A 159.

5.13E-08 2

IDCa5DDim RPDEP0645A 160.

5.13E-08 2

Idea 5D51TM RPCEP0615A 161.

5.13E-08 2

Ides 5DDITM RPCEPO615A 162.

5.13E-08 2

IOCs5D51TM RPDEP0625A 163.

5.13E-08 2

IDCs5DDITM RPOEP0625A 164.

5.13E-08 2

Ides 5D51TM RPAEP0535A 165.

5.13E-08 2

Ides 5DDITM RPAEPO535A 166.

5.13E-08 2

IDCBSD51TM RPBEP0545A 167 5.13E-03 2

IDCs5DDITM RP8EP0545A 168.

5.13E-08 2

RPAEPO515A IDBBSD51TM 169.

5.13E-08 2

RPAEP0515A IDeBSDDITM 170.

5.13E-08 2

IOC85D51TM RP8EP0525A 171.

5.13E-08 2

IDCBSDDITM RPBEP0525A 172.

5.04E-08 2

RCIC8063GO IDEF0013RQ 173.

5.04E-08 2

RCICs064GO IDCFDCO7RQ 174.

5.04E-08 2

RCICB061GO IDSFD013RQ 175.

5.04E-08 2

RCICs062GO IDCFD007RQ 176.

5.04E-08 2

RCICs053GO IDeF0013RQ 177.

5.04E-08 2

RC1Ca054GO IDCFD00?RQ 178.

5.04E-08 2

RCICs051GD IDBF0013RQ 179.

5.04E-08 2

RCICB052GO IDCFD007RQ 180.

4.62E-08 3

RCICB064GO PMCMOD21 EC185001TM 181.

4.62E-08 3

RCICs064GO PMCMOD21 EC185012TM 182.

4.62E-08 3

RC1Cs064GO PMCM0021 EC185121TM 183.

4.62E-08 3

RCICB063GO PROMOD 21 EC285002TM 184.

4.62E-08 3

RCICs063GO PMD80D21 EC285022TM 185.

4.62E-08 3

RCICs063GO PaoMOD21 EC285221TM 186.

4.62E-08 3

RCICs062GO PMCM0021 EC155001TM 187.

4.6?E-08 3

RCICB062GO PMCM0021 EC185012TM 188.

4.62E-08 3

RCice062GO PMCMOD21 EC185121TM 720.396-14 W Westinghouse

,-a,..

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION f

189.

4.62E-08 3

RCICs061GO PMDM0021 EC2sS002TM 190.

4.62E-08 3

RCICs061Go PM m0021 EC?sSO22TM 191.

4.62E-08 3

RCICB061GO PnOM0021 EC2BS221TM 192.

4.62E-08 3

RC1CB054GO P9% MOD 21 ECisS001TM 193.

4.62E-08 3

RCICB054GO Pe%M0021 EcisSO12TM 194 4.62E-08 3

RCICB054GO Pe% MOD 21 ECisS121TM 195.

4.62E-08 3

RC1Cs053Go PMBM0021 EC2sS002TM 196.

4.62E-08 3

RCICB053GO PMsMOD21 EC2sS0721M 197.

4.62E-08 3

RCICs053Go PMsM002*.

EC2ss221TM 198.

4.62E-08 3

RCICB052GO PMAMOD21 EC1sS001TM 199.

4.62E-08 3

RC1CB052GO PMAM0021 EC185012TM 200.

4.62E-08 3

RCICs052GO PMAM0021 EC1ss121TM 720.396-15

HRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Table 720.396-3 (Accident Class 3A for Baseline Case Large release Frequency Results)

VER 1.6 File created by linking atwsrai.in WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 **

40 87 4.417E-09

.00 1.00E-13 1 ATW-Mee01 3.3000E-02

.0000E+00 2 ATW-Mee01C 5.1700E-01

.0000E+00 3 ATW-Mee03 5.luo0E-02

.0000E+00 4 ATW-Mee04 5.2000E-02

.0000E+00 5 ATW-MAN 04C 5.2600E-01

.0000E+00 6 ATW-MANOS 5.2000E-03

.0000E+00 7 ATW-MAN 06C 5.0000E-01

.0000E+00 8

CCX-AV-8.A 6.1000E-05

.0000E+00 9 CCX-INPUT-LOGIC 1.0300E-04

.0000E+00 10 CCX-FMS-HARDWARE 7.8900E-05

.0000E+00 11 CCX-5FTW 1.2000E-06

.0000E+00 12 CCX-TRNSM 4.7800E-04

.0000E+00 13 CCx-Xwin 4.7800E-04

.0000E+00 14 (CX-xMTR195 4.7800E-04

.0000E+00 15 DAS 1.0000E-02

.0000E+00 16 EC185001TM 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 17 ED385051TM 3.0000E-04

.0000E+00 18 ED3M0001 5.0400E-04

.0000E+00 19 ED3M0003 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 20 to3M0004 2.1900E-02

.0000E+00 21 ED3M0007 3.0500E-04

.0000E+00 22 IEV-ATW-5 2.0500E-02

.0000E+00 23 IEV-ATW-T 1.1700E+00

.0000E+00 24 IEV-ATWS 4.8100E-01

.0000E+00 25 MDAS 1.0000E-02

.0000E+00 26 MSHTPOO1RI 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 27 M5HTP002RI 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 28 OTH-MGSET 1.7500E-03

.0000E+00 29 OTH-PRES 2.0000E-03

.0000E+00 30 OTH-PRESU 3.2700E-01

.0000E+00 31 OTH-5GTR 1.0000E-02

.0000F+00 32 PMAMoo31 5.0200E-03

.0000E+00 33 PMBMOO32 5.0200E-03

.0000E+00 34 PxX-AV-LA 9.6000E-05

.0000E+00 35 RCX-RB-FA 8.1000E-06

.0000E+00 36 RPX-CB-GO 4.2000E-04

.0000E+00 37 SGAOR--DAS-SP 7.2200E-03

.0000E+00 38 SGATL--DAS-UF 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 39 SGBOR--DAS-SP 7.2200E-03

.0000E+00 40 SGBTL--DAS-UF 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 1.

3.01E-09 5

IEV-ATW5 ATW-MANO3 CCX-XMTR CCX-XMTn195 ATW-MAN 04C 2.

6.95E-10 5

IEV-ATW-T ATW-MANOS CCx-xxTR CCx-XMTR195 ATW-MAN 06C 3.

1.58E-10 5

IEV-ATW5 CCX-5FTW ATW-MANO3 DAS ATW-MAN 04C 4.

1.28E-10 5

IEV-ATW-5 ATW-MANO3 CCX-xMTR CCX-xMTR195 ATW-MAN 04C 720.396-16 W Westinghouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION J

5.

8.26E-11 5

IEV-ATWS CCX-5FTW ATW-MANO3 M5HTP002RI ATW-MAN 04C 6.

8.26E-11 5

IEV-ATWS CCX-5FTW ATW-MANO3 M5HTP001R1 ATW-MAN 04C 7.

5.71E-11 5

1EV-ATWS ATW-MANO3 CCX-xMTR CCX-XMTR195 MuS 8.

5.25E-11 4

IEV-ATW5 OTH-MGSET CCX-5FTW ATW-MANO3 9.

1.75E-11 8

OTF-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-M4NO3 DAS ATW-MAN 04C ATW-MAN 01C OTM-5GTR 10.

1.39E-11 5

IEV-ATW-T ATW-MANOS CCx-XMTR CCX-XMTR195 MuS 11.

1.00E-11 5

IEV-ATW5 OTH-MGSET ATW-MANO3 CCX-XMTR CCX-XMTR195 12.

9.18E-12 8

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW5 CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 M5HTP002RI ATW-MAN 04C ATW-MAN 01C OTH-5GTR 13.

9.18E-12 8

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW5 CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 MSHTPOGIRI ATW-MAN 04C ATW-MAN 01C OTH-5GTR 14.

9.15E-12 4

IEV-ATW5 CCX-5FTW ATW-MANO3 ED3M0007 15.

7.55E-12 5

IEV-ATWS CCX-5FTW ATW-MANO3 CCX-XMTR ATW-MAN 04C 16.

7.55E-12 5

IEV-ATWS CCX-5FTW ATW-MANO3 CCX-TRNSM ATW-MAN 04C 17.

6.73E-12 5

IEV-ATW-5 CCX-SFTW ATW-MANO3 DAS ATW-MANO4C 18.

5.84E-12 7

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW5 OTH-MG5ET CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 ATW-MAN 01C OTH-5GTR 19.

4.96E-12 6

IEV-ATW5 CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CCX-XMTR ATW-MAN 04C DAS 20.

4.96E-12 6

IEV-ATW5 CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CCX-TRNSM ATW-MANO4C DAS 21.

3.52E-12 5

IEV-ATW-S CCX-5FTW ATW-MANO3 M5HTP002RI ATW-MANO4C 22.

3.52E-12 5

IEV-ATW-S CCX-5FTW ATW-MANO3 MSHTP001RI ATW-MAN 04C 23.

3.43E-12 7

OTH-PRE 5u IEV-ATWS RCX-R8-FA DAS ATW-MAN 04 ATW-MAN 01r.

OTH-5GTR 24.

3.00E-12 5

IEY-ATWS CCX-5FTW ATW-MANO3 DAS MDAS 25.

2.44E-12 5

IEV-ATW-5 ATW-MANO3 CCX-XMTR CCX-XMTR195 MDAS 26.

2.43E-12 5

IEV-ATW-T OTH-MG5ET ATW-MANOS CCX-XMTR CCX-XMTR195 27 2.24E-12 4

IEV-ATW-S OTH-MGSET CCX-5FTW ATW-MANO3 28.

1.79E-12 7

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA MSHTP002RI ATW-MANO4 ATW-MAN 01C OTH-5GTR 29.

1.79E-12 7

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-R8-FA M5HTP001RI ATW-MAN 04 ATW-MAN 01C OTH-5GTR 30.

1.74E-12 5

IEV-ATWS ATW-MANO3 CCX-XMTR CCX-XMTR195 E03 mod 07 31.

1.57E-12 5

IEV-ATWS CEX-5FTW ATW-MANO3 MSHTP002RI MDAS 32.

1.57E-12 5

IEV-ATWS CCX-5FTW ATW-MANO3 MSHTPPOIRI MDAS 33.

1.02E-12 7

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 ED3M0007 ATW-MAN 01C OTH-5GTR 34.

9.68E-13 IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA CCX-XMTR ATW-MANO4 DAS 35.

9.68E-13 5

IEV-ATW5 RCX-RS-FA CCX-TRNSM ATW-MAN 04 cAS 720.396-17 g

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 36.

8.39E-13 8

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-PUS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CCX-XMTR ATW-MAN 04C ATW-MAN 01C OTH-SGTR 37.

8.39E-13 8

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CCX-TRMSM ATW-MAN 04C ATW-MAN 01C OTH-SGTR 38.

8.23E-13 6

IEV-ATWS CCX-SFTW ATW-MANO3 SGAOR--DAS-SP SG80R--DAS-SP ATW-MAN 04C 39.

7.48E-13 8

IEV-ATW-5 OTH-PRESU CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 DAS ATW-MAN 04C ATW-MAN 01C OTH-SGTR 40 7.37E-13 8

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 DAS ATW-MAN 04C ATW-MANOV RPX-CB-GO 41.

7.36E-13 6

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS OTH-MGSET RCX-RB-FA ATW-MAN 01 OTH-SGTR 42.

5.96E-13 6

IEV-ATWS CCX-SFTW ATW-MANO3 SGAOR--DAS-SP SG8TL--DAS-UF ATW-MAN 04C 43.

5.96E-13 6

IEV-ATWS CCX-SFTer ATW-MANO 3 5GATL--DAS-UF SGBOR--DAS-SP ATW-MAN 04C 44.

5.68E-13 4

IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA ED3 mod 07 CCX-TRNSM 45.

5.68E-13 4

IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA ED3M0007 CCX-XMTR 46.

4.32E-13 6

IEV-ATWS CCX-$FTW ATW-MANO3 SGATL--DAS-UF SG87L--DAS-UF ATW-M m04C 47.

4.26E-13 5

IEV-ATW-5 OTH-MGSET ATW-MANO3 CCX-XMTR CCX-XMTR195 48.

4.24E-13 5

IEV-ATW-T ATW-MANOS CCX-XMTR CCX-XMTR195 ED3 MOD 07 49.

3.91E-13 8

IEV-ATW-S OTH-PRESU CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 MSHTP002RI ATW-MAN 04C ATW-MAN 01C OTH-SGTR 50.

3.91E-13 8

IEV-ATW-5 OTH-PRESU CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 MSHTP001RI ATW-MAN 04C ATW-MAN 01C OTH-SGTR 51.

3.90E-13 4

IEV-ATW-5 CCX-SFTW ATW-MANO3 ED3 MOD 07 52.

3.85E-13 8

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-PMS-MARDsARE ATW-MANO3 MSHTP002RI ATW-MAN 04C ATW-MAN 01C RPX-CB-GO 53.

3.85E-13 8

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 MSHTFOOlRI ATW-MAN 04C ATW-MANO1C RPX-CB-GO 54, 3.34E-13 8

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 DAS MDAS ATW-MAN 01C OTH-SGTR 55.

3.31E-13 5

IEV-ATWS.

CCX-SFTW ATW-MANO3 ED3 mod 01 ED3 mod 04 56.

3.22E-13 5

IEV-ATW-5 CCX-SFTW ATW-MANO3 CCX-XMTR ATW-MAN 04C 57.

3.22E-13 5

IEV-ATW-S CCX-SFTW ATW-MANO3 CCX-TRNSM ATW-MAN 04C 58.

2.88E-13 5

IEV-ATWS CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 ED3 MOD 07 CCX-TRNSM 59.

2.88E-13 5

IEV-ATWS CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 ED3 mod 07 CCX-XMTR 60.

2.62E-13 7

IEV-ATWS CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 DAS ATW-MAN 04C PM4M0031 PMBMOD32 720.396-18

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION b

f 61.

2.49E-13 7

IEV-ATW-5 OTH-MGSET OTH-PRESU CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MNO3 ATW-MAN 01C 62.

2.45E-13 7

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS OTH-MGSET CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 ATW-MAN 01C RPX-CB-GO 63.

2.19E-13 5

IEV-ATWS CCX-SFTW ATW-MANO3 ED3 mod 03 EC1BSOO1TM 64.

2.11E-13 6

IEV-ATW-5 CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CCX-XMTR ATW-MAN 04C DAS 65.

2.11E-13 6

IEV-ATW-5 CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CCX-TRMSM ATW-MAN 04C EMS 66.

2.08E-13 7

OTH-PRES IEV-ATWS CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 DAS ATW-MAN 04C 67.

1.97E-13 5

IEV-ATWS CCX-SFlW ATW-MANO3 ED3 mod 04 ED3dSDSITM 68.

1.86E-13 5

IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA CCX-XMTR MDAS DAS 69.

1.86E-13 5

IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA CCX-TRNSM 90AS DAS 70.

1.86E-13 6

IEV-ATW-5 CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 DAS ATW-MAN 04C RPX-CB-GO 71.

1.81E-13 8

OTH-PRESP IEV-ATWS CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 DAS ATW-MAN 04C ATW-MAN 01C CCX-INPUT-LOGIC 72.

1.74E-13 8

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 MSHTP002RI MDAS ATW-MAN 01C OTH-SGTR 73.

1.74E-13 8

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 MSHTP001RI ATW-MAN 01C MDAS OTH-SGTR 74.

1.68E-13 8

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 DAS ATW-MAN 04C ATW-MAN 01C PXX-AV-LA 75.

1.64E-13 7

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA CCX-XMTR ATW-MAN 04 ATW-MAN 01C OTH-SGTR 76.

1.64E-13 7

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA CCX-TRNSM ATW-MAN 04 ATW-MAN 01C OTH-SGTR 77.

1.46E-13 7

IEV-ATW-5 OTH-PRE 5U RCX-RB-FA DAS ATW-MAN 04 ATW-MAN 01C OTH-SGTR 78.

1.44E-13 7

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA DAS ATW-MAN 04 ATW-MA.W1C RPX-CB-GO 79.

1.43E-13 5

IEV-ATWS CCX-SFTW ATW-MANO3 CCX-XMIR MDAS 80.

1.43E-13 5

IEV-ATWS CCX-SFTW ATW-MANO3 CCX-TRNSM MDAS 81.

1.36E-13 OTH-PRES IEV-ATWS OTH-MGSET RCX-RB-FA OTH-SGTR 82.

1.28E-13 6

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA ED3 MOD 07 ATW-MAN 01 OTH-$GTR 83.

1.28E-13 5

IEV-ATW-5 CCX-SFTW ATW-MANO3 DAS poAs 84.

1.22E-13 4

IEV-ATW-5 OTH-MGSET RCX-RB-FA RPX-CB-GO 720.396-19 g

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION M'

f 85.

1.09E-13 7

OTH-PRES IEV-ATWS CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 M5HTP002RI ATW-swa04C OTH-5GTR 86.

1.09E-13 7

OTH-PRES IEV-ATW5 CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-DMNO3 M5HTP001RI ATW-MAN 04C OTH-5GTR 87.

1.07E-13 8

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 DAS ATW-MAN 04C ATW-sMN01C CCX-AV-LA SUM OF CUT 5ET PROBABILITIES = 4.417E-09 CUTOFF PROBABILITY = 1.000E-13

=

720.396-20 3 Westinghouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION mr.nse:

M Question: 720.397 Based on the description in Tables 9-2i and 9-7, fault tree CM2NL includes operator actions CMN-MAN 01 and LPM MAN 02. CMN-MAN 01 addresses manual actuation of CMTs if automatic actuation fails during a LOCA (Section 30.6.16), and LPM MAN 02 addresses failure to recognize the need for RCS depressurization during LOCAs (Section 30.6.3) Justify why these actions can be credited in the focussed PRA, rather than using a different version of the fault tree (without operator actions) for the focussed PRA.

Response

Since RAls 720.397 and 720.399 are related, the responses to these RAls are combined.

Westinghouse agrees with the NRC. He incorrect fault tree, which includes operator actions, was used in sequences for accident class 3A in the level 2 PRA. Herefore, appropriate fault tree files have been constructed and accident class 3A requantified to determine the effect of this change on the level 2 focused PRA. The process for performing this evaluation is delineated in the paragraphs that follow.

Existing fault tree files for core makeup tank (CMT) and reactor coolant pump (RCP) subsystems were revised to remove operator actions to represent the scenario for accident class 3A. The operator actions were removed because of the insufficient time available for successful operator action. The process for requantifying the focused PRA accident class 3A includes the following steps:

a)

Replace CM2NL with the focused CM2AB fault tree. Unlike the baseline case, the existing focused CM2AB fault tree does not have I&C subtrees. Therefore, in this evaluation, the CM2AB output file is renamed CMT DP.WLK but its contents remains unchanged; a copy of this file is provided in Table 720.397 1.

b)

Replace RCN with the focused RCT fault tree. Fauh tree RCT was selected because its actuation signals correspond to the signals for RCP trip for CET node DP.

l Drop the basic events for operator actions LPM-MAN 02 and RCN-MAN 01 from the I&C subtrees

=

in the output file for fault tree RCT. He affected I&C subtrees are: SUB-RPT-IC01, SUB-RPT-IC02, SUB-RPT IC03, SUS-RI'T-IC04, SUB-RFF ICOS, SUB-RPT-IC06, SUB-RP"r-IC07 and SUB-RPT-IC08.

Requantify the RCT fault tree file with the revised I&C subtrees. This output file is named RCP-l DP.WLK; a copy of the top 200 cutsets from this file is provided in Table 720.397-2.

j c)

Requantify the focused accident class 3A with the changes listed in (a) and (b) above.

m.

4 720.397-1 l

T Westinghouse 1

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION t::

Quantification of the at-power focused accident class 3A by this process produced a large release frequency of 2.2E-07, which is approximately 11 percent greater than the frequency of 2.0E-07 for this accident class reported in the PRA, Revision 9. Upon examination of the frequencies of the other at-power focused accident classes, it is determined that the effect of an increase of 11 percent in the frequency for accident class 3A is insignificant; this increase of 2.2E-08 in the large release frequency for accident class 3A represents a 4 percent increase in the total at-pow. < Focused large release frequency.. The top 200 cutsets from the output file for this evaluation is provided in Tabic 720.397-3 (Accident Class 3A for Focused Case Large Release Frequency Results).

PRA Revision: None.

72a397-2 T westinghouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Table 720397-1 (CMT-DP for Focused PRA Case) vER 1.6 File created by linking cat-dp.wik wtINK2 " ver. 4.02 "

15 12 1.127E-04

.00 1.00E-11 1 CCx-Av-LA 6.1000E-05

.0000E+00 2 CMA-CV 2.0000E-06

.0000E+00 3 CMA-PLUG 7.2700E-04

.0000E+00 4 CMAAv014LA 1.5900E-03

.0000E+00 5 CMAAv015LA 1.5900E-03

.0000E+00 6 CMAOR001Es 7.2000E-07

.0000E+00 7 CMATK002AF 2.4000E-06

.0000E+00 8 cme-CV 2.0000E-06

.0000E+00 9 CMB-PttG 7.2700E-04

.0000E+00 10 CMsAv014LA 1.5900E-03

.0000E+00 11 CMsAv015LA 1.5900E-03

.0000E+00 12 cms 0R001EB 7.2000E-07

.0000E+00 13 CMBTK002AF 2.4000E-06

.0000E+GO 14 CMx-CV-Ce 5.1000E-05

.0000E*00 15 CMx-TK-AF 1.2000E-07

.0000E+00 1.

6.10E-05 1

CCx-AV-LA 2.

5.10E-05 1

CMX-CV-GO 3.

5.29E-07 2

CMA-PLUG CMB-PLUG 4.

1.20E-07 1

CMx-TK-AF 5.

1.84E-09 3

CMA-PLUG CMBAv014LA CMBAv015LA 6.

?.84E-09 3

CMAAv014LA CMAAv015tA CMB-PLUG 7.

1.74E-09 2

CMATK002AF cms-PL UG 8.

1.74E-09 2

CMA-PLUG CMBTK002AF 9.

1.45E-09 2

CMA-CV CMB-PLUG 10.

1.45E-09 2

CMA-PLUG CMB-CV 11.

5.23E-10 2

CMADR001EB CMS-PtuG 12.

5.23E-10 2

CMA-PLUG CMBOR001Es SUM OF CUTSET PROBABILITIES = 1.127E-04 CUTOFF PROBABILITY = 1.000E-11 l

720.397-3 W Westinghouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION nii 9

i Table 720.397-2 (RCP-DP fDr Focused PRA Case)

VER 1.6 File Created by linking rCp-dp.wlk WLINK2 ** ver. 4.02 **

110 1301 1.381E-03

.00 1.00E-11 1 CCX-5Y-PN 4.7000E-05

.0000E+00 2 CCX-EP-SAM 8.6200E-06

.0000E+00 3 CCX-IN-LDGIC-Sw 1.1000E-05

.0000E+00 4 CCX-INPUT-LOGIC 1.0300E-04

.0000E+00 5 CCX-IV-XR 2.4000E-05

.0000E+00 6 CCX-F9eosoD1-Sw 1.1000E-05

.0000E+00 7 CCX-PMXM002-Sw 1.1000E-05

.0000E400 8 CCX-SFTw 1.2000E-06

.0000E+00 9 CCX-TT-UF 1.1700E-04

.0000E+00 10 CCX-XMTR 4.7800E-04

.0000E+00 11 CCX-XMTR195 4.7800E-04

.0000E+00 12 IDABSD51LF 4.8000E-06

.0000E+00 13 InAssDs1TM 3.0000E-04

.0000E+00 J

14 IDAM0002 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 1

15 IDAMoD03 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 16 IDAMoD04 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 17 IDAMoDOS 5.1600E-04

.0000E+00 18 IDBBSDD1LF 4.8000E-06

.0000E+00 19 IDessDDITM 3.0000E-04

.0000E+00 20 IDessos1LF 4.8000E-06

.0000E+00 21 IDessDs1TM 3.0000E-04

.0000E+00 22 IDerD013RQ 1.2000E-05

.0000E+00 23 IDSMoD10 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 24 IDsMooll 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 25 IDeMoD24 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 26 IDBMcD25 5.1600E-04

.0000E+00 4'

27 IDCasDD1LF 4.8000E-06

.0000E+00 28 IDCBSDDITM 3.0000E-04

.0000E+00 29 IDCBSDSILF 4.8000E-06

.0000E+00 30 IDCBSDSITM 3.0000E-04

.0000E+00 31 IDCFD007RQ 1.2000E-05

.0000E+00 32 IDCMoD16 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 33 IDCMoD17 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 34 IDCMoD28 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 35 IDCMoD29 5.1600E-04

.0000E+00 36 IDD8SDS1LF 4.8000E-06

.0000E+00 37 IDDesD51TM 3.0000E-04

.0000E+00 38 IDOMoD22 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 39 IDDMoD23 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 40 IDDMoD32 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 41 IDDMoD33 5.1600E-04

.0000E+00 42 PMA0301ASA 1.1600E-03

.0000E400 43 FMA0301ssA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 44 PMAMooll 2.0900E-03

.00COE+00 W Westinghouse 720.397-4

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION t

45 PMAM0021 4.0700E-03

.0000E+00 46 PMAMoo31 5.0200E-03

.0000E+00 47 PMAXsOOASA 8.0000E-05

.0000E+00 48 PMB0301ASA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 49 PMs0301esA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 50 PMsMooll 2.0900E-03

.0000E+00 51 PMBM3021 4.0700E-03

.0000E+00 52 PMBMOol2 5.0200E-03

.0000E+00 53 PMBKs00ASA 8.0000E-05

.0000E+00 54 PMcO301ASA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 51 PMCO301esA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 Sfi FNoooll 2.0900E-03

.0000E+00 D PMCM0021 4,0700E-03

.0000E+00 58 PMcMoo33 5.0200E-03

.0000E+00 59 PMCXsOOASA 8.0000E-05

.0000E+00 60 PMD0301AsA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 61 PMD03018sA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 62 PMDM0011 2.0900E-03

.0000E+00 63 PMtmoo21 4.0700E-03

.0000E+00 64 PMDMOo34 5.0200E-03

.0000E+00 65 PMDxs00ASA 8.0000E-05

.0000E+00 66 RC1Ce051GO 4.2000E-03

.0000E+00 67 RCICs052Go 4.2000E-03

.0000E+00 68 RCICs053Go 4.2000E-03

.0000E+00 69 RCICs054GO 4.2000E-03

.0000E+00 70 RCICs061GO 4.2000E-03

.0000E+00 71 RCics062GO 4.2000E-03

.0000E+00 72 RCICs063GO 4.2000E-03

.0000E+00 73 RCICs064Go 4.2000E-03

.0000E+00 74 RCITL195UF 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 75 RC2TL1960F 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 76 RC3TL197UF 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 77 RC4TL198uF 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 78 RPAEP051sA 1.7100E-04

.0000E+00 79 RPAEP053sA 1.710CE-04

.0000E+00 80 RPsEP0525A 1.7100E-04

.0000E+00 81 RPsEP054sA 1.7100E-04

.0000E+00 82 RPCEP0615A 1.7100E-04

.0000E+00 83 RPCEP0635A 1.7100E-04

.0000E+00 84 RP0tP062sA 1.7100E-04

.0000E+00 85 RPDEP064sA 1.7100E-04

.0000E+00 86 RPTM0001 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 87 RPTMOD02 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 88 RPTM0003 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 89 RPTMOD04 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 90 RPTMODOS 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 91 RPTM0006 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 92 RPTMOD07 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 93 RPTMOD08 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 94 RPx-Co-GO 4.2000E-04

.0000E+00 720.397-5 W Westinghouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION lii!!!M!Iq lif 95 SG10RO115P 7.2200E-03

.0000E+00 96 SG10R0125P 7.2200E-03

.0000E+00 97 5G10R0155P 7.2200E-03

.0000E+00 98 SG10R0165P 7.2200E-0 3

.0000E+00 99 SGITLO11UF 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 100 SGITLO12UF 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 101 SG1TLO15UF 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 102 SG1TLOl6UF 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 103 SG20R0135P 7.2200E-03

.0000E+00 104 SG20RO145P 7.2200E-03

.0000E+00 105 SG20R0175P 7.2200E-03

.0000E+00 106 SG20R0185P 7.2200E-03

.0000E+00 107 SG2TLO13UF 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 108 SGZTLO14UF 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 109 SG2TLO17UF 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 110 SG2TLO18UF 5.2300E-03

.0000E+00 1.

4.20E-04 1

RPX-CR-GO 2.

1.03E-04 1

CCX-INPUT-LOGIC 3.

4.70E-05 1

CCX-8Y-PN 4.

2.40E-05 1

CCX-IV-XR 5.

1.76E-05 2

RCICs063GO.

RCICB%4GO 6.

1.76E-05 2

RCICs061GO RCICs062GO 7.

1.76E-05 2

RCICs053GO RCICs054GO 8.

1.76E-05 2

RCICs051GO RCICs052GO 9.

1.71E-05 2

RCICB064GO 594CMOD21 10.

1.71E-05 2

RCICs063GO PfeM0021 11.

1.71E-05 2

RCice062GO PMCM0021 12.

1.71E-05 2

RCICs%1GO PlesquD21 13.

1.71E-05 2

RCICB054GO PMAMOD21 14.

1.71E-05 2

RCICa053GO PMBMOD21 15.

1.71E-05 2

RC1Cs052GO PMAMOD21 16.

1.71E-05 2

RCICB051GO PMBMOD21 17.

1.66E-05 2

PMCM0021 PaeMOD21 18.

1.66E-05 2

PMAM0021 PMeM0021 19.

1.10E-05 1

CCX-Pre 0E001-5W 20.

1.10E-05 1

CCX-IN-LOGIC-Sw 21.

1.10E-05 1

CCX-PMxM002-5w 22.

8.78E-06 2

RCIC8064GO PMCMOD11 23.

8.78E-06 2

RCICB%3GO PMDMOD11 24.

8.78E-06 2

RCICs062GO 590CMOD11 25.

8.78E-06 2

RCICs061GO PfeM0011 26.

8.78E-06 2

RCICB054GO PMAMOD11 27.

8.78E-06 2

RCICs053GO PMesquD11 28.

8.78E-06 2

RC1CB05?GO PM4M0011 29.

8.78E-06 2

RC1Cs051GO PMOM0011 30.

8.62E-06 1

CCX-EP-5AM 31.

8.51E-06 2

PMCM0021 PeeMOD11 32.

8.51E-06 2

PMCMOD11 PMOMOD21 33.

8.51E-06 2

PanAM0021 PMBMOD11 34.

8.51E-06 2

PMAMOD11 59EB840D21 e

720.397-6

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 35.

4.87E-06 2

RCICs064GO PMCO30185A 36.

4.87E-06 2

RCICs064GO PMCO301ASA 37.

4.87E-06 2

RCICB063GO Peo0301ssA 38.

4.87E-06 2

RCICB063GO FNDO301ASA 39.

4.87E-06 2

RCIC8062GO PMCO301ssA 40.

4.87E-06 2

RCIC8062GO PMCO301ASA 41.

4.87E-06 2

RCIC8061GO PMD0301ssA 42.

4.87E-06 2

RCICs061GO PPOO301ASA 43.

4.87E-06 2

RCics054GO PMA0301ssA 44 4.87E-06 2

RCIC8054GO PMA0301ASA 45.

4.87E-06 2

RCICs053GO PMs030185A 46.

4.87E-06 2

RCICB053GO PMs0301ASA 47.

4.87E-06 2

RCIC8052GO PMA0301ssA 48.

4.87E-06 2

RCIC8052GO PMA0301ASA 49.

4.87E-06 2

RCICB051GO Par 0301s5A 50.

4.87E-06 2

RC1Cs051GO F94n0301ASA 51, 4.72E-06 2

PMCM0021 PD00301sSA 52.

4.72E-06 2

PMCMOD21 PMD0301ASA 53.

4.72E-06 2

PMCO301sSA F90 MOD 21 54.

4.72E-06 2

PMCO301ASA PMDMOD21 55.

4.72E-06 2

PMAM0021 PMs0301ssA 56.

4.72E-06 2

PMAPOD21 PMB0301ASA 57.

4.72E-06 2

PruG301BSA PMsM0021 58.

4.72E-06 2

PMA0301ASA PMsM0021 59.

4.37E-06 2

PMCM0011 PMDMOD11 60.

4.37E-06 2

PMAM0011 PMBM0011 61.

3.68E-06 2

RCICs063GO RPTM0008 62.

3.68E-06 2

RPTMOD07 RCICs064GO 63.

3.68E-06 2

RC1Cs061GO RPTMOD06 64 3.68E-06 2

RPTMODO5 RCICs062GO 65.

3.68E-06 2

RCICB053GO RPTM0004 66.

3.68E-06 2

RPTMOD03 RCICs054GO 67.

3.68E-06 2

RCICs051GO RPTMOD02 68.

3.68E-06 2

RPTMOD01 RCICs052GO 69.

3.57E-06 2

RPTM0008 PMCM0021 70.

3.57E-06 2

RPTMOD07 PMDM0021 71.

3.57E-06 2

RPTMODO6 PMCM0021 72.

3.57E-06 2

RPTMODOS PMDMOD21 73.

3.57E-06 2

RPTMOD04 PruM0021 74 3.57E-06 2

RPTM0003 PMBM0021 75.

3.57E-06 2

RPTM0002 PMAM0021 76.

3.57E-06 2

SPTM0001 PeeMOD21 77.

2.42E-06 2

PMCM0011 PMD030185A 78, 2.42E-06 2

PMOOD11 PMDO301ASA 79.

2.42E-06 2

PMC0301s5A PMDM0011 80.

2.42E-06 2

PMCO301ASA P90M0011 81.

2.42E-06 2

PMAMOD11 PMs0301ssA 82.

2.42E-06 2

PouM0011 PMB0301ASA 83.

2.42E-06 2

PMA0301s5A PMBM0011 84.

2.42E-06 2

PMA0301ASA PMsMOD11 W Westinghouse

-c

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

[

85.

2.17E-06 2

RCICs064GO IDCMOD29 86.

2.17E-06 2

RCICs063GO IDDMOD33 87.

2.17E-06 2

RC1Cs062GO IDCMOD29 88.

2.17E-06 2

RC1Cs061GO IDDMOD33 89.

2.17E-06 2

RCICs054GO IDAMUDOS 90.

2.17E-06 2

RCIC8053GO IDBM0025 91.

2.17E-06 2

RCICs052GO IDAMODOS 92.

2.17E-06 2

RCICB051GO IDeMOD25 93.

2.10E-06 2

PMCMOD21 IDDMOD33 94 2.10E-06 2

IDCM0029 PDOMOD21 95.

2.10E-06 2

PMAMOD21 IDBM0025 96.

2.10E-06 2

IDAMODOS PusMOD21 97.

1.83E-06 2

RPTM0008 PMcM0011 98.

1.83E-06 2

RPTN0007 PMDM0011 99.

1.83E-06 2

RPTM0006 PMCM0011 100.

1.83E-06 2

RPTMODOS PpOM0011 101.

1.83E-06 2

RPTM0004 PMAPOD11 102.

1.83E-06 2

RPTM0003 PMBM0011 103.

1.83E-06 2

RPTM0002 PMADOD11 104.

1.83E-06 2

RPTMOD01 PMBtOD11 105.

1.35E-06 2

PMCO301BSA fMD0301sSA 106.

1.35E-06 2

PMc0301BSA PMD0301ASA 107.

1.35E-06 2

PMCO301ASA PMDO301sSA 108.

1.35E-06 2

PMCO301ASA PpOO301ASA 109.

1.35E-06 2

PMA0301BSA PMB0301sSA 110.

1.35E-06 2

twA0301sSA rMs0301ASA 111.

1.35E-06 2

PMA0301ASA PMs0301sSA 112.

1.35E-06 2

PMA0301ASA PMB0301ASA 113.

1.33E-06 2

nCICs064GO IDCMOD28 114.

1.33E-06 2

RCICsO63GO IDDM0032 115.

1.33E-06 2

RCIC8062GO IDCM0028 116.

1.33E-06 2

RCICB061GO IDDM0032 117 1.33E-06 2

RCICB054GO IDAM0004 118.

1.33E-06 2

RCICs053GO IDBMOD24 119.

1.33E-06 2

RC1Cs052GO IDAM0004 120.

1.33E-06 2

RCICB051GO IDBM0024 121.

1.29E-06 2

PMcMOD21 IDOMOD32 122.

1.29E-06 2

IDCM0028 PMDMOD21

123, 1.29E-06 2

PMAM0021 IDBMOD24 124.

1.29E-06 2

IDAMODO4 PMBMOD21 125.

1.26E-06 2

RCICB064GO IDCBSDSITM 126.

1.26E-06 2

RCICB063GO IDD8SDSITM 127.

1.26E-06 2

RCICB063GO IDRBSDSITM 128.

1.26E-06 2

RCICB063GO IDSBSDDITM 129.

1.26E-06 2

RCICs064GO IDCBSDDITM 130.

1.26E-06 2

RC1Cs062GO IDCBSDSITM 131.

1.26E-06 2

RCICB061GO IDDBSDSITM 132.

1.26E-06 2

RCIC8061GO ID8BSDSITM 133.

1.26E-06 2

RCICs061GO IDBBSDDITM 134.

1.26E-06 2

RCICB062GO IDCBSt01TM 720.397-8 g

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 135.

1.26E-06 2

RCICs054GO IDA85051TM 136.

1.26E-06 2

RCIC8053GO IDas5051TM 137.

1.26E-06 2

RCIC8053GO IDaB5DDITM 138.

1.26E-06 2

RC1Cs054GO IDCBSD51TM 139.

1.26E-06 2

RC1CB054GO IDCBSDDITM 140.

1.26E-06 2

RCics052GO IDABSD51TM 141.

1.26E-06 2

RCICs051GO IDas5D51TM 142.

1.26E-06 2

RCIC8051GO IDas5DDITM 143.

1.26E-06 2

RCICs052GO IDCs5051TM 144.

1.26E-06 2

RCICs052GO IDCBSDDITM 145.

1.22E-06 2

PMCM0021 IDDs5051TM 146.

1.22E-06 2

IDCs5D51TM PMDMOD21 147.

1.22E-06 2

IDas5D51TM PMCM0021 148.

1.22E-06 2

1D885001T4 PMCM0021 149.

1.22E-06 2

IDCs5DDITM PMDMOD21 150.

1.22E-06 2

PMAMOD21 IDas5D51TM 151.

1.22E-06 2

IDAs5D51TM PMsM0021 152.

1.22E-06 2

Ides 5DDITM PMAMOD21 153.

1.22E-06 2

IDCBSD51TM PMBMOD21 154.

1.22E-06 2

IDCs5DDITM PMBM0021 155.

1.20E-06 1

CCx-5FTw 156.

1.08E-06 2

PMCMOD11 IDOM0033 157.

1.08E-06 2

IDCMOD29 PMDreE11 158.

1.08E-06 2

PMAMOD11 IDBMOD25 159.

1.08E-06 2

IDAMODOS PMBMOD11 160.

1.02E-06 2

RPTM0008 PMCO301BSA 161.

1.02E-06 2

RPTN0008 PMCO301ASA 162.

1.02E-06 2

RPTMOD07 PMD030185A 163.

1.02E-06 2

RPTMOD07 PMD0301ASA 164.

1.02E-06 2

RPTMODO6 PMCO30185A 165.

1.0?E-06 2

RPTM0006 PMCO301ASA 166.

1.02E-06 2

RPTMODOS PMD03Ols5A 167 1.02E-06 2

RPTMODOS Pee 0301ASA 168.

1.02E-06 2

RPTMODO4 PMA030185A 169.

1.02E-06 2

RPTMODO4 PMA0301ASA 170.

1.02E-06 2

RPTM0003 Pus 030185A 171.

1.02E-06 2

RPTM0003 PMs0301ASA 172.

1.02E-06 2

RPTMOD02 PMA030185A 173.

1.02E-06 2

RPTMODO2 PMA0301ASA 174.

1.02E-06 2

RPTMn001 PMs030185A 175.

1.02E-06 2

RPTM0001 PM80301ASA 176.

7.67E-07 2

RPTMOD07 RPTM0008 177.

7.67E-07 2

RPTM0005 RPTMODO6 178.

7.67E-07 2

RPTM0003 RPTM0004 179.

7.67E-07 2

RPTM0001 RPTM0002 180.

7.18E-07 2

RCICs064GO RPCEP0635A 181.

7.18E-07 2

RCIC8063GO RPDEP0645A 182.

7.18E-07 2

RCIC8062GO RPCEP0615A 183.

7.18E-07 2

RC1Cs061GO RPDEP0625A 184.

7.18E-07 2

RCICs054GO RPAEF0535A 720.397-9 9

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ll!!M!ilil ti!

p!

w.-.

185.

7.18E-07 2

RCICs053GO RPSE P0545A 186.

7.18E-07 2

RCICs052GO RPAEP0515A 181 7.18E-07 2

RC1Cs051GO RPSEP0525A 188.

6.96E-07 2

PesogoD21 RPDEP0645A 189.

6.%E-07 2

RPCEP06354 PMDMOD21 190.

6.%E-07 2

PMo40D21 RPDEP0625A 191.

6.96E-07 2

RPCEP0615A PaqDMOD21 192.

6.%E-07 2

PMwe0D21 RPSEP0545A 193.

6.%E-07 2

RPAEP0535A M4BMOD21 194 6.96E-07 2

PMMe0021 RPSEP0525A 195.

6.%E-07 2

RPAEP0515A PMeMOD21 196.

6.63E-07 2

PetOu0011 IDDMOD32 197.

6.63E-07 2

10090028 PMDMOD11 198.

6.63E-07 2

PM4eDD11 IDOMOD24 199.

6.63E-07 2

IDAMoD04 PMeMOD11 200.

6.27E-01 2

PMCMDD11 IDD85051TM i

t 720.397-10 e-m*--

L

. = * -

-e-e-

t ee

w--*e

- m w-r m

.---a-e m

m m -2.

.mm.m m-- m mm

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Table 720.397-3 (Accident Class 3A for Focused PRA Case - Large Release Frequency Results)

VER 1.6 File created by linking atwsrai.in WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 **

118 3937 2.221E-07

.00 1.00E-13 1 ADN-MAN 01 3.0200E-03

.0000E+00 2 ADX-EV-5A 3.0000E-05

.0000E+00 3 ALL-IND-FAI.

1.0000E-03

.0000E+00 4 ATw-atANO3 5.2000E-02

.0000E+00 5 CCX-AV-LA 6.1000E-05

.0000E+00 6 CCX-sV-PN 4.7000E-05

.0000E+00 7 CCX-EP-SAM 8.6200E-06

.0000E+00 8 CCX-14-LOGIC-Sw 1.1000E-05

.0000E+00 9 CCX-INPUT-LOGIC 1.0300E-04

.0000E+00 10 CCX-IV-xR 2.4000E-05

.0000E+00 11 CCX-PMS-HARDWARE 7.8900E-05

.0000E+00 12 CCX-PMxM001-sw 1.1000E-05

.0000E+00 13 CCx-PMxM002-sw 1.1000E-05

.0000E+00 14 CCX-FMXM004-sw 1.1000E-05

.0000E+00 15 CCX-SFTw 1.2000E-06

.0000Ev00 16 CCX-TT-UF 1.1700E-04

.0000E+00 17 CCX-xMTR 4.7800E-04

.0000E+00 18 CCx-XMTR195 4.7800E-04

.0000E+00 19 CMA-PLUG 7.2700E-04

.0000E+00 20 cms-PLUG 7.2700E-04

.0000E+00 21 CMx-CV-GO 5.1000E-05

.0000E+00 22 CMX-TK-AF 1.2000E-07

.0000E+00 23 IDABSDSILF 4.8000E-06

.0000E+00 24 IDARSD51TM 3.0000E-04

.0000E+00 25 IDAMODO2 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 26 IDAM0003 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 27 IDAMoD04 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 28 IDAmoDOS 5.1600E-04

.0000E+00 29 Ides 5DDILF 4.8000E-06

.0000E+00 30 IDsesDDITM 3.0000E-04

.0000E+00 31 IDessDs1LF 4.8000E-06

.0000E400 32 IDsBSD51TM 3.0000E-04

.0000E+00 33 IDsFD013RQ 1.2000E-05

.0000E+00 34 IDBMOD10 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 35 IDeMooll 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 36 IDBM0024 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 37 IDeMoD25 5.1600E-04

.0000E+00 38 IDCBSDD1LF 4.8000E-06

.0000E+00 39 IDCasDDITM 3.0000E-04

.0000E+00 40 IDCasos1LF 4.8000E-06

.0000E+00 41 IDCBSDSITM 3.0000E-04

.0000E+00 42 IDCFDOO7RQ 1.2000E-05

.0000E+00 43 1DCM0016 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 44 IDCM0017 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 720.397-11 W Westirighouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 45 locMoo28 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 46 IDcM0029 5.1600E-04

.0000E+00 47 IDossos1LF 4.8000E-06

.0000E+00 48 Icossos1TM 3.0000E-04

.0000E+00 49 IooM0022 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 50 IcoM0023 2.7000E-03

.0000E+00 51 IcoM0032 3.1700E-04

.0000E+00 52 IDoM0033 5.1600E-04

.0000E+00 53 IEV-ATw-5 2.0500E-02

.0000E+00 54 IEV-ATw-T 1.1700E+00

.0000E+00 55 IEV-ATwS 4.8100E-01

.0000E+00

$6 IWNTK001AF 2.4000E-06

.0000E+00 57 LPM-D%N01 1.3400E-03

.0000E+00 58 OTH-PRE 5u 3.2700E-01

.0000E+00 59 OTH-5GTR 1.0000E-02

.0000F+00 60 PCNHR001ML 2.4000E-06

.0000E+00 61 PMA0301ASA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 62 PMA0301sSA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 63 PMAM0011 2.0900E-03

.0000E+00 64 PMAM0021 4.0700E-03

.0000E+00 65 NAMOD31 5.0200E-03

.0000E+00 66 PMAx500ASA 8.0000E-05

.0000E*00 67 PM80301ASA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 68 PMsO30185A 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 69 PM8M0011 2.0900E-03

.0000E+00 70 PMsM0021 4.0700E-03

.0000E+00 71 PMsM0032 5.0200E-03

.0000E+00 72 PMex500ASA 8.0000E-05

.0000E+00 73 PMc0301ASA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 74 PMc0301ssA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 75 PMcM0011 2.0900E-03

.0000E+00 76 PMCM0021 4.0700E-03

.0000E+00 77 PMcM0033 5.0200E-03

.0000E+00 78 PMcx500ASA 8.0000E-05

.0000E+00 79 mo0301ASA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 80 PM00301ssA 1.1600E-03

.0000E+00 81 PMoM0011 2.0900E-03

.0000E+00 82 PMDM0021 4.0700E-03

.0000E+00 83 PMDMOD34 5.0200E-03

.0000E+00 84 PMDx500ASA 8.0000E-05

.0000E+00 85 PMS-RTSWITCH 3.0000E-05

.0000E+00 86 PRAAV108tA 1.0900E-03

.0000E+00 87 PRAAV108TM 5.0000E-04

.0000E+00 88 PRsAV108tA 1.0900E-03

.0000E+00 89 PRBAV108TM 5.0000E-04

.0000EM)0 90 PXX-AV-LA 9.6000E-05

.0000E+00 91 RC1cs051GO 4.2000E-03

.0000E+00 92 RcicsOS2GO 4.2000E-03

.0000E400 93 Rcics053GO 4.2000E-03

.0000E+00 94 RcicB054GO 4.2000E-03

.0000E+00 720.397-12 W Westinghouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION w

i i

d 95 RCICB061GO 4.2000E-03

.0000E+00 96 RCICB062GO 4.2000E-03

.0000E +00 97 RCICs063GO 4.2000E-03

.0000C+00 98 RCICs064GO 4.2000E-03

.0000E+00 99 RCN-MAN 01 4.1300E-03

.0000E+00 100 RCX-RB-FA 8.1000E-06

.0000E+00 101 RPAEP0515A 1.7100E-04

.0000E+00 102 RPAEPO535A 1.7100E-04

.0000E+00 103 RPBEP052SA 1.7100E-04

.0000E+00 104 RPSEPOS4SA 1.7100E-04

.0000E+00 105 RPCEPO615A 1.7100E-04

.0000E+00 106 RPCEP063SA 1.7100E-04

.0000E+00 107 RPDEP062SA 1.7100E-04

.0000E+00 108 RPDEP0645A 1.7100E-04

.0000E+00 109 RPTM]OO1 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 110 RPTMODO2 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 111 RPTMcD03 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 112 RPTDoD04 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 113 RPTMODOS 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 114 RPTMDDO6 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 115 RPTMoD07 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 116 RPTD0D08 8.7600E-04

.0000E+00 117 RPX-CS-GO 4.2000E-04

.0000E+00 118 SUC-PRESU 6.7300E-01

.0000E+00 1.

4.91E-08 4

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-5FTW ATW-MAN')3 2.

3.10E-08 4

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RS-FA OTH-SGTR 3.

2.39E-08 4

OTM-PRESU IEV - A*W-T CCX-SFTW ATW-MANO3 4.

2.02E-08 4

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW5 CCX-SFTW ATW-MANO3 5.

1.57E-08 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 OTH-SGTR 6.

1.27E-08 4

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA OTH-SGTR 7.

9.81E-09 4

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-SFTW ATW-MANO3 8.

9.36E-09 5

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T ATW-MANO3 CCx-xMTR CCx-XMTR195 9.

6.45E-09 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 OTH-5GTR 10.

4.55E-09 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T ATW-MANO3 CCX-XMTR CCX-XMTR195 11.

3.85E-09 5

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATWS ATW-MANO3 CCX-XMTR CCX-XMTR195 12.

2.68E-09 4

soc-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-R8-FA RPX-CB-GO 13.

1.87E-09 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS ATD-MANO3 CCX-XMTR CCX-XMTR195 14.

1.36E-09 5

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RPX-CB-GO 15.

1.30E-09 4

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-R8-FA RPX-CB-GO 16.

1.10E-09 4

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA RPX-CB-GO 17.

9.45E-10 4

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-SFTW ALL-INO-FAIL 18, 9.10E-10 3

IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA PXX-AV-LA 19.

8.61E-10 4

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-5 CCX-$FTW ATW-MANO3 20.

6.59E-10 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-fHS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 R PX -CB -GO 21.

6.21E-10 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ALL-IND-FAIL OTH-SGTR 22.

5.58E-10 5

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW5 CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RPX -C8 -GO 23.

5.43E-10 4

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-S RCX-RB-FA CTH-5GTR 24.

5.35E-10 4

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA RPX-C8-GO 25.

4.61E-10 4

IEV-ATW-T CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 PXX-AV-LA 26.

4.59E-10 4

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-SFTW ALL-IND-FAIL 720.397-13 9

m

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION g

27.

4.18E-10 4

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-5 CCX-SFTW ATW-MANO3 28.

3.89E-10 4

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA CCX-AV-LA 29.

3.88E-10 4

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-SFTW ALL-IND-FAIL 30.

3.74E-10 3

IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA PXX-AV-LA 31.

3.25E-10 4

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-R8-FA CMX-CV-GO 32.

3.19E-10 4

O TH-PR ESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA CCX-INPUT-LOGIC 33.

3.02E-10 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ALL-IND-FtJL OTH-SGTR 34.

3.00E-10 4

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-R8-FA CCX-BY-PN 35.

2.75E-10 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-S CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MNO3 OTH-SGTR 36.

2.71E-10 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RPX-CB-GO 37.

2.55E-10 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ALL-IND-FAIL OTH-SGTR 38.

1.97E-10 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CCX-AV-LA 39.

1.93E-10 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-R8-FA ADN-MN01 OTH-SGTR 40.

1.89E-10 4

IEV-ATWS CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 PXX-AV-LA 41.

1.89E-10 4

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATv-T RCX-RB-FA CCX-AV-LA 42.

1.89E-10 4

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-SFTW ALL-IND-FAIL 43.

1.80E-10 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T ALL-IND-FAIL CCX-XMTR CCX-XMTR195 44.

1.65E-10 5

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CMX-CV-GO 45.

1.64E-10 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-S ATW-MANO3 CCX-XMTR CCX-XMTR195 46.

1.62E-10 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CCX-INPUT-LOGIC 47.

1.60E-10 4

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA CCX-AV-LA 48.

1.58E-10 4

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RS-FA CMX-CV-GO 49.

1.53E-10 4

SUC-FRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA CCX-IV-XR 50.

1.52E-10 5

$UC-FRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CCX-BY-PN 51.

1.46E-10 4

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RR-FA CCX-BY-PN 52.

1.34E-10 4

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-R8-FA CMX-CV-GO 53.

1.31E-10 4

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA CCX-INPUT-LOGIC 54.

1.24E-10 5

OTM-PRESU IEV-ATE CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ALL-IND-FAIL OTH-SGTR 55.

1.23E-10 4

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA CCX-BY-PN 56.

1.13E-10 5

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCIC8063GO RCIC8064GO 57.

1.13E-10 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCIC8061GO RCICB062GO 58.

1.13E-10 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RC1C8053GO RCIC8054GO 59.

1.13E-10 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RC1C8051GO RCIC8052GO 60.

9.76E-11 6

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 ADN-HANO1 OTH-SGTR 61.

9.58E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CCX-AV-LA 62.

8.74E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T ALL-IND-FAIL -

CCX-XMTR CCX-XMTR195 63.

8.55E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA LPM-MAN 01 OTH-SGTR 64.

8.10E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MNO3 CCX-AV-LA 65.

8.01E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CMx-CV-GO 66.

7.96E-11 5

OTH-PPESU IEV-ATW-S ATW-MANO3 CCX-XMTR CCX-XMTR195 67.

7.92E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-R8-FA ADN-MAN 01 OTH-5GTR 68.

7.77E-11 4

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-R8-FA CCX-AV-LA 69.

7.75E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CCX-IV-XR 70.

7.44E-11 4

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA CCX-IV-XR 71.

7.40E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATWS ALL-IND-FAIL CCX-XMTR CCX-XMTR195 72.

7.38E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CCX-BY-PN 73.

7.02E-11 4

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA CCX-PMXM001-SW 74.

6.77E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CMX-CV-Go 75.

6.65E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CCX-INPUT-LOGIC 720.397-14 g

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 76.

6.50E-11 4

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA CMX-CV-GO 77.

6.38E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA ALL-IND-FAIL OTH-SGTR 78.

6.29E-11 4

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA CCX-IV-XR 79.

6.24E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CCX-BY-PN 80.

5.99E-11 4

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-RS-FA CCX-BY-PN 81.

5.70E-11 6

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RC1C8063GO RCIC8064GO 82.

5.70E-11 6

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RCIC8061GO RC108062GO 83.

5.70E-11 6

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RCIC8053GO RCIC8054GO 84.

5.70E-11 6

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RCIC8051GO RCIC8052GO 85.

5.60E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-R8-FA RCIC8064GO PMCM0011 86.

5.60E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-R8-FA RCIC8063GO PMDM0011 87.

5.60E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RC1C806?GO PMCMOD11 88.

5.60E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RS-FA RCIC8061GO PMDM0011 89.

5.60E-11 5

SUC-PRE 5U IEV-ATW-T RCX-R8-FA RCIC8054GO PMAM0011 90.

5.60E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCIC8053GO PM8mo11 91.

5.60E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCIC8052GO PMAM0011 92.

5.60E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-R8-FA RCIC8051GO PM8M0011 93.

5.50E-11 4

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-R8-FA CCX-EP-SAM 94.

5.47E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCIC8063GO RCIC8064GO 95.

5.47E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCIC8061GO RCIC8062GO 96.

5.47E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCIC8053GO RCIC8054GO 97.

5.47E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCIC8051GO RCIC8052GO 98.

5.30E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-R8-FA RCIC8064GO PMCM0021 99.

5.30E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RS-FA RCIC8063GO racM0021 100.

5.30E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCIC8062GO P900D21 101.

5.30E-11 5

OTH-PRE 5U IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCIC8061GO P90 MOD 21 102.

5.30E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-R8-FA RCIC8054GO PMAM0021 103.

5.30E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCIC8053GO PM8M0021 104.

5.30E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCIC8052GO PMAMOD21 105.

5.30E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCIC8051GO PM8 MOD 21 106.

5.13E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RS-FA PMCMOD21 PMDM0021 107.

5.13E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA PMAM0021 PMBMOO21 108.

4.69E-11 4

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-S RCX-RB-FA RPX-CB-GO 109.

4.63E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA RCIC8063GO RCIC8064GO 110.

4.63E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA RCIC8061GO RCIC8062GO 111.

4.63E-11 5

SUC-PRE 5U IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA RC1C8053GO RCIC8054GO 112.

4.63E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA RC1C8051GO RCIC8052GO 113.

4.33E-11 6

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 LPM-MAN 01 OTH-SGTR 114.

4.01E-11 6

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 ADN-MAN 01 OTN-SGTR 115.

3.94E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CCX-AV-LA 116.

3.77E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CCX-IV-XR 117.

3.59E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS ALL-IND-FAIL CCX-XMTR CCX-XMTR195 118.

3.55E-11 5

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CCX-PMXM001-SW 119.

3.51E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA LPM-MAN 01 OTH-SGTR 720.397-15 W Westinghouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION g

120.

3.41E-11 4

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA CCX-FMXM001-5W 121.

3.41E-11 4

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-R8-FA CCX-IN-LOGIC-5W 122.

3.41E-11 4

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-R8-FA CCX-PMXMOO2-5W 123.

3.29E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CMX-CV-GO 124 3.19E-11 5

5UC-PRESU IEV-ATW5 CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CCX-IV-XR 125.

3.11E-11 5

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RS-FA RCIC8064GO PMCO301ASA 126.

3.11E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RC1Cs064GO PMCO301BSA 127.

3.11E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RS-FA RCIC8063GO PMD0301ASA 128.

3.11E-11 5

5UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCICRO63Go Poe030185A 129.

3.11E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCICB062GO PMCO301ASA 130.

3.11E-11 5

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCIC8062GO PMCO30185A 131.

3.11E-11 5

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB+FA RCicsO61GO PMD0301ASA 132.

3.11E-11 5

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCIC8061GO PMD030185A 133.

3.11E-11 5

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-R8-FA RCIC8054GO PMA0301ASA 134.

3.11E-11 5

5UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RS-FA RCICs054GO PMA030185A 135.

3.11E-11 5

5UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCICB053GO PMB0301ASA 136.

3.11E-11 5

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RC1Cs053GO PMs030185A 137.

3.11E-11 5

5UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RS-FA RCICB052GO PMA0301ASA 138.

3.11E-11 5

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RC1CB052GO PM4030185A 139.

3.11E-11 5

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCICs051GO PMB0301ASA 140.

3.11E-11 5

5UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCICB051GO PMB030185A

141, 3.06E-11 4

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA CCX-IV-XR 142.

3.03E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW5 CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CCX-8Y-PN 143.

2.88E-11 4

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW5 RCX-RB-FA CCX-PMXM001-5W 144.

2.84E-11 6

5UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RCice064GO PMO0011 145.

2.84E-11 6

5UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RCICB063GO PMDMOD11 146.

2.84E-11 6

5UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RC1Cs062GO PMCM0011 147.

2.84E-11 6

5UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RCICB061GO Pa0 MOD 11 148.

2.84E-11 6

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RC1CB054GO PMAMOD11 149.

2.84E-11 6

5UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RCICs053GO PMB40011 150.

2.84E-11 6

50C-PRE 5U IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RCIC8052GO PMAMOD11 151.

2.84E-11 6

5UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RCICs051GO PMBMOD11 152.

2.79E-11 5

5UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA PMCMOO11 PMDMOD11 153.

2.79E-11 5

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA PMAM0011 PMBMOD11 154.

2.78E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 CCX-EP-5AM 155.

2.77E-11 6

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RC1CsO63GO RCIC8064GO 156.

2.77E-11 6

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RCICB061GO RC1CB062GO 157.

2.77E-11 6

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RCICB053GO RCIC8054GO W Westinghouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION il "lii 158.

2.77E-11 6

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RCICs051GO RCIC8052GO 159.

2.72E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RS-FA RCICB064GO PMCMOO11 160.

2.72E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCICB063GO PMDM0011 161.

2.72E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RE-FA RCICB06?GO PMCMOD11 162.

2.72E-11 5

OTM-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-R8-FA RCIC5061GO PMOM0011 163.

2.72E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-R8-FA RCICs054GO PMAMOD11 164.

2.72E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RC1Cs053GO PMBM0011 165.

2.72E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCICs052GO PMAMOD11 166.

2.7?E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RS-FA RCIC8051GO PMBMOD11 167.

2.68E-11 6

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RCICs064GO PMCM0021 168.

2.68E-11 6

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RC1Cs063GO PMDMOD21 169.

2.68E-11 6

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RCICs062GO PMCMOD21 170.

2.58E-11 6

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MAN 03 RC1Cs061GO PMDMOD21 171.

2.63E-11 6

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RC1Cs054GO PMAMOD21 172.

2.68E-11 6

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RCICs053GO PM8 MOD 21 173.

2.68E-11 6

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RCICs052GO PMAMOD21 174.

2.68E-11 6

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RCICs051GO PM8 MOD 21 175.

2.67E-11 4

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA CCX-EP-5AM 176.

2.64E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA PMCM0021 PMDMOD11 177.

2.64E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA PMCM0011 PMDMOD21 178.

2.64E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-R8-FA PMAM0021 PMBMOD11 179.

2.64E-11 5

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RS-FA PMAM0011 PMBMOD21 180.

2.62E-11 5

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW5 RCX-R8-FA ALL-IND-FAIL OTH-5GTR 181.

2.61E-11 5

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ALL-IND-FAIL RPX-CB-GO 182.

2.60E-11 6

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 PMCM0021 PMDm D21 183.

2.60E-11 6

OTH-PRESU IEV-ATW-T CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 FMAM0021 PMBMOD21 184.

2.38E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-5 CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RPX-CB-GO 185.

2.35E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCICs063GO RPTMOD08 186.

2.35E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RS-FA RPTMOD07 RCIC8064GO 187.

2.35E-11 5

50C-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RC1CB061GO RPTMOD06 188.

2.35E-11 5

5UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RPTMODOS RCIC8062GO 189.

2.35E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RCICB053GO RPTNODO4 190.

2.35E-11 5

5UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RS-FA RPTM0003 RCIC8054GO 191.

2.35E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-R8-FA RCICs051GO RPTMOD02 192.

2.35E-11 5

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW-T RCX-RB-FA RPTMOD01 RC1Cs052GO 193.

2.34E-11 6

$UC-PRESU IEV-ATW5 CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RCIC8063GO RCICB064GO 194.

2.34E-11 6

50C-PRE 5U IEV-ATW5 CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RCICB061GO RCICB062GO 720.397-17 W Westinghouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION iut tui l

195.

2.34E-11 6

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATWS CCX-FMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RCICB053Go RCIC8054GO 196.

2.34E-11 6

5UC-PRESU IEV-ATW5 CCX-PMS-HARDWARE ATW-MANO3 RC1Cs051GO RCICs052GO 197 2.30E-11 5

50C-PRESU IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA RCICB064Go PMcMooll 198.

2.30E-11 5

5UC-PRESU IEV-ATW5 RCX-RS-FA RCICs063GO PMDM0011 199.

2.30E-11 5

SUC-PRE 50 IEV-ATWS RCX-RB-FA RCics062GO PMCM0011 200.

2.30E-11 5

SUC-PRESU IEV-ATW5 RCX-RB-FA RCICB%1GO PMOMOO11 W Westhghouse

.. m

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

!!E %

1 Question: 720.398 Based on the description in Section 6.4.25 and Table 26-2d.2 of the PRA, fault tree RCN (referenced in the footnote of Table 36-1) deals with failure to trip all four RCPs following an intermediate LOCA. Please justify why a fault tree associated with a LOCA is used to quantify the availability of RCP trip for CET node DP, since success at DP assures that no LOCA will occur.

Response

Since RAIs 720.396 and 720.398 are related, the responses to these RAls are combined. Refer to the response for RAI 720.396 for the response.

PRA Revision: None.

1 720.398-1 W Westinghouse

l 4

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

=

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ik g;

Ouestion: 720.399 Based on the description in Tables 26-d.2 and 26-8, fault tree RCN includes operator actions RCN-MAN 01, REC-MANDAS, and LPM-MAN 02. RCN-MAN 01 addresses manual backup if automatic trip fails during a small LOCA or transient (Section 30.6.37), REC-MANDAS addresses failure to actuate manual DAS ESF functions using the cues provided by DAS (Section 30.6.58), and LPM-MAN 02 addresses failure to recognize the need for RCS depress-urization during LOCAs (Section 30.6.3). Justify why these actions can be credited in the focussed PRA, rather than nsing a different version of the fault tree (without operator actions) for the focussed PRA.

Response

REC MANDAS and DAS cues are not credited in the focused PRA.

Since RAls 720.397 and 720.399 are related, the responses to these RAls are combined. Refer to the response for RAI 720.397 for the response.

PRA Revision: None.

T Westinghouse

l NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION m

an l

Question: 720.401 i

The discussion of sequence 1 AP-1 in Section 34.4.13.1 states that the temperatures of the hot leg and SG tubes were monitored for creep rupture potential based on the Larsen-Miller correlation, and the creep rupture of the SG tubes occurred first. Please provide: (1) plots of the accumulated damage (creep damage index) versus time for key RCS components, (2) clarification of the criteria used to determine when SG tube failure occurred.

Response

i In all high pressure core melt sequences modeled in the AP600 level 2 PRA, the steam generator tubes are assumed to fait due to creep rupture before any other component in the RCS. This assumption is a conservatism to address the effect of uncertainties on the outcome of the calculation. These uncertainties include material properties, steam generator tube thinning and cracking over the life of the plant, and secondary system pressure. The AP600 level 2 PRA does not rely on the failure of a component preventing the failure of another component which could produce a large release to the environment. For example, hot leg nozzle failure is not credited for preventing steam generator tube failure and mitigating a potential bypass sequence.

In the AP600 MAAP4 analyses presented in chapter 34 of the PRA, the code is set up to fail the steam generator tubes when the tube temperature reaches 1340*F (1000*K), not on the creep damage fra:ction. This treatment causes the tubes to fail before the code predicts hot leg nozz!c creep damage to reach the failure va'ue of 1.0, even though the tube creep damage is also less than 1.0. In the attached plot of creep damage in sequence I AP-1 as calculated by MAAP4, the steam generator tube cre p damage is higher than the hot leg creep damage and increasing rapid y, but both are below 1.0.

l PRA Revision: None.

j Case 1AP-1 1AP DOWihAhi St0UthCt 0.5-INCH RCS LtAN Hol tog

S t eam Ge ne r a t or Tube 6E-01

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. 4[- D 1 --

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2[-01 --

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10 20 30 40 50 60 l

T i rne (br) l 720.401-1 W Westinghouse ee

1 NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION l

innass=E t

Question: 720.402 i

Please provide additional information describing the quantification of CET node DP for accident class 6 seque Table 36-1 indicates that for accident class 6 sequences, CET node DP is quantified based on failure of operl actuate ADS. However, no value for this failure rate is provided, and the fault trees or analyses used to determine

{

the value are not identified or discussed.

Respor.se:

[

The calculation of the failure probability for accident class 6 at node DP on the containment event tree is summarized below.

t An examinatien of accident class 6 core damage cutsets show that PRHR is available in most of the dominant cutsets. His causes the RCS pressure to drop, and the RCS loss through the break diminish, such that operators will have a long time period (at the order of hours) to actuate ADS. if they failed to actuate it initially, in that case, even if core damage is postulated very conservatively, the fission product release would be mostly contained or attenuated in the water inventory of the faulted steam generator. The core damage cutsets where i

this situation exists are identified and are labeled with an asteries (*)in Table 720.402-1. Only the top 28 core

' damage cutsets for accident class 6 are used for this purpose. These cutsets make up 81.5% of the total core damage frequency for accident class 6. The remaining cutsets are assumed to go to high pressure core damag with containment bypass type of release (e.g., RCS is at high pressure and DP fails) without any further i

investigation.

t Table 720.402-2 shows the calculation of the DP node success and failure probabilities for accident class 6. For 1

this purpose, the top 28 core damage cutsets are classified as either:

1.

PRHR is successful and ADS fails by operator error (total frequency f2) 2.

PRHR and ADS are successful; sump recirculation fails (total frequency f3) 3.

PRHR and/or ADS fails, i

l l

The third type of cutsets are classified as DP failure; the second type of cutsets are classified as DP success.

The first type of cutsets are classified as DP success if the operator actuates ADS after the core damage. A screening human error probability (HEP) of 0.1 is used for this purpose. The operator has hours to perform this action, thus this HEP value is deemed to be conservative.

1 The DP node success probability p is calculated as:

i p := (f2 * (1-HEP) + f3) / F where F is the total core damage frequency of accident class 6.

De calculation and results are shown in Table 720.402-2. The DP success probability is 0.517.

PRA Revision: None.

l l

l' 720.402-1 I

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDmONAL INFORMATION di" "l.i.i.

p 1

TABLE 720.402-1 POS-6 OOMIMANT CORE DAM GE CUTSETS PRHR/ ADS CDF COBONENT STATUS 1 1.02E-09 INITIATING EVENT - STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE EVENT OCCURS 5.20E-03 IEV-5GTR PRHR 1.02E-09 Operator has a 11.7%

OPERATOR FAIL 5 TO DIAGNOSE SGTR EVENT 1.84E-03 CIB-MAN 00 AVAILABLE 11.71 %

long time period COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF RCP BREAKERS FAIL TO OPEN 4.20E-04 RPX-CB-GO ADS FAILED to actuate ADS.

COND. PROS. OF REC-MANOA5 (FAILURE OF MANUAL DAS ACT.)

5.06E-01 REC-MANDA5C DUE TO CONO. PROS. OF ADN-MAN 01(OPER. FAILS TO ACT. ADS) 5.00E-01 ADN-MAN 01C HUMAN ERROR 2 8.59E-10 INITIATING EVENT - STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE EVENT OCCURS 5.20E-03 IEV-5GTR PRHR 8.59E-10 Operator has a 9.86%

OPERATOR FAILS TO ACTUATE CVS IN AUX. SPRAY MODE IN SGTR EVENT 3.10E-03 CVN-MANDO AVAILABLE 9.86 %

long time period OPERATOR F AILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS (SGTR IF PRZ SPR FAILS) 5.00E-01 ADF-MAN 01 ADS FAILED to actuate ADS.

COD 990N CAUSE FAILURE OF RCP BREAKERS FAIL TO OPEN 4.20E-04 RPX-CS-GO DUE TO COND. PROB. OF REC-MANDAS (FAILURE OF MANUAL DAS ACT.)

5.06E-01 REC-MANDASC HUMAN COND. PROB. OF ADN-MAN 01(OPER. FAILS TO ACT. ADS) 5.00E-01 ADN-MAN 01C ERROR 3 6.64E-10 INITIATING EVENT - STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE FVENT OCCURS 5.20E-03 IEV-5GTR PRHR/ ADS 7.63%

COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PMS ESF OUTPUT LOGIC SOFTWARE 1.10E-05 (CX-FMXMOO1-5W FAILED OPERATOR faits TO ACTUATE A SYSTEM USING DAS ONtY 1.16E-02 REC-MANDAS 4 6.12E-10 CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS 1.00E-02 OTH-5GTR PRHR AND 6.12E-10 ADS is already 7.03%

INITIATING EVENT - LOSS OF CONDENSER EVENT OCCURS 1.12E-01 IEV-LCOND ADS 7.03 %

successful.

FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV) 2.10E-02 OTH-5L50V1 AVAILABLE Sump Recirculation COMMrM CALFSE FATLURE OF 4 SQUIB VAtVES IN RECIRC LINES 2.60E-05 IwX-Ev4-5A fails.

5 5.72E-10 INITIATING EVENT - STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE EVENT OCCURS 5.20E-03 IEV-5GTR PRHR/ ADS 6.57%

COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF OUTPUT LOGIC SOFTWARE 1.10E-05 CCX-FMXMOO1-5W FAILED FAILURE OF MANUAL DAS HARDWARE 1.00E-02 noAS 6 5.20E-10 INITIATING EVENT - STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE EVENT OCCURS 5.20E-03 IEV-5GTR PRHR/ ADS 5.97%

CO*W40N CAUSE FAILURE OF OUTPUT DRIVERS 8.62E-06 CCx-EP-SAM FAILED OPERATOR FAILS TO ACTUATE A SYSTEM USING DAS ONLY 1.16E-02 REC-MANDAS 7 4.59E-10 CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS 1.00E-02 OTN-5GTR PRHR AND 4.59E-10 ADS is already 5.27%

INITIATING EVENT - LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT OCCURS 1.20E-01 IEV-LOSP ADS 5.27 %

suCCes5ful.

FAILURE TO RECOVER OFFSITE AC POWER IN 30 MINUTES 7.00E-01 OTH-ROS AVAILABLE Sump Recirculation FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (5V/PORV) 2.IDE-02 OTH-5L50V1 fails.

COpeoN CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 5Q018 vat.VES IN RECTRC (INES 2.60E-05 IWM-EV4-5A 8 4.48E-10 INITIATING EVENT - STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE EVENT OCCURS 5.20E-03 IEV-5GTR PRHR/ ADS 5.14%

CO8940N CAUSE FAILURE OF' OUTPUT DRIVERS 8.62E-06 CCX-EP-SAM FAILED FAILURE OF MANUAL DAS HARDWARE 1.00E-02 aoAS 720.402-2 3 Westingh0Use

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TABLE 720.402-1 PDS-6 DOMINANT CORE DAMAGE CUTSETS PRHR/ ADS CDF COPOEENT STATUS 9 3.15E-10 INITIATING EVENT - MAIN STEAM LINE STUCK-OPEN SV OCCURS 1.21E-03 IEV-SLB-V PRHR AND 3.15E-10 ADS is already 3.62%

CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS 1.00E-02 OTH-5GTR ADS 3.62 %

successful.

COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQUIB VALVE 5 IN RECIRC LINE5 2.60E-05 Iwx-EV4-5A AVAILASLE Su i Recirculatiott faits.

10 2.49E-10 INITIATING EVENT - STEAM GENERATOR TUSE RUPTURE EVENT OCCURS 5.20E-03 IEV-5GTR PRHR AND 2.49E-10 ADS is already 2.86%

OPERATOR FAILS TO DIAGNO5E SGTR EVENT 1.84E-03 CIS-MANDO ADS 2.86 successful.

CO894DN CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQUIS VALVL5 IN RECIRC LINES 2.60E-05 Iwx-EV4-SA AVAILABLE Sum Recirculatfort fails.

11 1.81E-10 INITIATING EVENT - ST[AM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE EVENT OCCURS 5.2OE-03 IEV-5GTR PRHR AND 1.81E-10 ADS is already 2.08%

OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE MSIV FOR FAILED SG 1.34E-03 CIB-MAN 01 ADS 2.08 %

successful.

COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQUIS VALVES IN RECIRC LINES 2.60E-05 Iwx-EV4-5A AVAILABLE Sump Recirculation faits.

12 1.47E-10 INITIATING EVENT - STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE EVENT OCCURS 5.20E-03 IEV-5GTR PRHR AND 1.47E-10 ADS is already 1.69%

AOV MSIV V0a08 FAILS TO CLOSE 1.09E-03 SG8AV040LA ADS 1.69 %

successful.

COR940N CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQUIS VALVES IN RECIRC LINES 2.60E-05 Iwx-EV4-SA AVAILA8LE Sump Recirculatiort fails.

13 1.12E-10 CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS 1.00E-02 OTN-5GTR PRHR AND I.12E-10 ADS is already 1.29%

INITIATING EVENT - LOSS OF CONDENSER EVENT OCCURS 1.12E-01 IEV-tCOND ADS 1.29 %

successful.

FAILURE OF A SECONOARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV) 2.10E-02 OTM-5L50V1 AVAILABLE Sump Recirculatiort COpO10N CAUSE FAILURE OF TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (IRwST. SAT) 4.78E-04 Iwx-xMTR fails.

OPERATOR FAILS TO ACTUATE CONT. sum *P RFCIR. (LEVEL SIGNAL. FAlts)1.00E-02 REN-MAN 04 14 9.54E-11 INITIATING EVENT - STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE EVENT OCCURS 5.20E-03 IEV-5GTR PRHR AND 9.54E-11 ADS is already 1.10%

COP 940N CAUSE FAILURE OF SENSORS IN HIGH PRESSURE ENVIRONMENT 4.78E-04 CCx-xMTR ADS 1.10 %

successful.

COP 940N CAUSE FAILURE OF CMT/5 UMP LEVEL HEATED RTD SENSORS 3.84E-05 CMX-VS-FA AVAILABLE Recirculation 15 9.05E-11 CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS 1.00E-02 OTH-5GTR PRHR AND 9.05E-11 ADS is already 1.04%

INITIATING EVENT - LOSS OF COMPRESSED AIR EVENT OCCURS 3.48E-02 IEV-LCAS ADS 1.04 %

successful.

FAILURE OF A SECONOARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV) 1.00E-02 OTH-SL50V2 AVAILASLE Sump Recirculatiott COMMON CAUSE FAltVRE OF 4 SQUIB VALVE 5 IN RECIRC LINES 2.60E-05 Twx-EV4-5A fails.

16 8.43E-11 CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS 1.00E-02 OTH-5GTR PRHR AND 8.43E-11 ADS is already 0.97%

INITIATING EVENT - LOSS OF OFF5ITE POWER EVENT OCCURS 1.20E-01 IEV-LOSP ADS 0.97 %

successful.

FAILURE TO RECOVER OFF51TE AC POWER IN 30 MINUTES 7.00E-01 OTH-ROS AVAILASLE Sump Recirculation FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIOE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SY/PORV) 2.10E-02 OTH-5L50V1 fails.

COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (IRwST, SAT) 4.78E-04 Iwx-xMTR OFFRATOR FAILS TO ACTUATF CONT. SUMP RFCIR. (tFVEL SIGNAL FAILS)1.00E-02 REN-MAN 04 W Westinghouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION kl TABLE 720.402-1 PDS-6 DOMINANT CORE DAMAGE CUT 5ETS PRHR/ ADS CDF COBO4ENT STATUS 17 7.24E-11 INITIATING EVENT - STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE EVENT OCCURS 5.20E-03 IEV-5GTR RHR AND

~

0.83%

COP 990N CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS AND PL5 SOFTWARE 1.20E-06 CCX-5FTW ADS FAIL.

OPERATOR FAlt5 TO ACTUATE A SYSTEM USING DAs ONLY 1.16E-02 REC "roAS 18 6.48E-11 INITIATING EVENT - STEAM LINE UPSTREAM OF MSIV OCCURS 3.72E-04 IEV-SLB-U PRHR ANO 6.48E-11 ADS is already 0.74%

SINGLE CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS 6.70E-03 OTH-5GTR1 ADS 0.74 %

successful.

CO*940N CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN RECIRC LINES 2.60E-05 IwX-EV4-5A AVAILABLE Su q Recirculation faits.

19 6.46E-11 INITIATING EVENT - STEAM GENERATOR TURE RUPTURE EVENT OCCURS 5.20E-03 IEV-5GTR PRHR AND 6.46E-11 ADS is already 0.74%

COpeq0N CAUSE FAILURE OF SENSORS IN HIGH PRES 5URE ENVIRONMENT 4.78E-04 CCx-XMTR ADS 0.74 %

successful.

Cope 90N CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN RECIRC LINES 2.60E-05 IWX-EV4-54 AVAILABLE Su q Recirculation faiss.

20 6.46E-11 INITIATING EVENT - STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE EVENT OCCURS 5.20E-03 IEV-5GTR PRHR AND 6.46E-11 ADS is already 0.74%

COnequN CAUSE FAILURE OF PZR LEVEL SENSORS 4.78E-04 CCX-XMTR)35 AD5 0.74 %

successful.

COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN RECIRC LINES 2.60E-05 IWX-EV4-5A AVAILABLE Sump Recirculation fails.

21 6.24E-11 INITIATING EVENT - STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE EVENT OCCURS 5.20E-03 IEV-5GTR PRHR AND 0.72%

Copes 0N CAUSE FAILttRE OF PMS AND PLS SOFTWARE 1.20E-06 CCX-5FTW ADS FAIL.

FAftuRE OF MANUAL DAs HARDWARE 1.00E-02 meas 22 5.78E-11 INITIATING EVENT - MAIN STEAM LINE STUCK-OPEN SV OCCURS 1.21E-03 IEV-SLB-V PRHR AND 5.78E-11 ADS is already 0.66%

CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS 1.00E-02 OTH-5GTR ADS FAIL.

0.66%

successful.

COhe40N CAUSE FAILURE OF TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (IRWST. BAT) 4.78E-04 IWX-XMTR OPERATOR faits TO ACTUATE CONT. SUMP PECTR. (LEVEL SIGNAL FAILS)1.00E-02 REN-MANO4 Sug Recirculation faiss.

23 5.00E-11 INITIATING EVENT - INTERFACING SYSTEMS LOCA EVENT OCCURS 5.00E-11 IEV-15 LOC NOT I

0.57%

APPLICABLE 24 4.80E-11 INITIATING EVENT - STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE EVENT OCCURS 5.20E-03 IEV-5GTR PRHR 4.80E-11 Operator has a 0.55%

CVS MECHANICAL FAILURE OF ADV V084 AND CV V085 TO OPEN 2.88E-02 CVMODOS AVAILABLE 0.55 %

long time period OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS (SGTR IF PRZ SPR FAILS) 5.00E-01 ADF-MAN 01 ADS FAILED to actuate ADS.

Cope 10N CAUSE FAILURE OF RCP BREARER5 FAIL TO OPEN 4.20E-04 RPX-C8-GO DUE TO COND. PROS. OF REC-MANDAS (FAILURE OF MANUAL DAS ACT.)

5.06E-01 REC-MANDASC Htm4AN OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS 3.02E-03 ADN-MAN 01 ERROR 25 4.7]E-1).

INITIATING EVENT - STEAM GENERATOR TUSE RUPTURE EVENT OCCURS 5.20E-03 IEV-5GTR PRHR 4.71E-Il Operator has a 0.54%

SFW Mov VO67A FAIL 5 TO OPEN 1.41E-02 FWM00067A AVAILABLE 0.54 %

long time period COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF RCP BREAKERS FAIL TO OPEN 4.20E-04 RPX-CB-GO ADS FAILED to actuate ADS.

COND. PROS. OF REC-MANDAS (FAILURE OF MANUAL DAS ACT.)

5.06E-01 REC-MrMM5C DUE TO OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS 3.02E-03 ADN-MAN 01 HUMAN ERROR W Westinghouse m

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TABLE 720.402-1 PDS-6 DOMINANT CORE DAPMGE CUTSETS PRHR/ ADS CDF CODD4ENT STATUS 26 4.71E-11 INITIATING EVENT - STEAM GENERATOR TUSE RUPTURE EVENT OCCURS 5.20E-03 IEV-SGTR PRHR 4.71E-11 Operator has a 0.54%

SFw Mov V028 FAILS TO OPEN 1.41E-02 FWMODO28 AVAILABLE 0.54 %

long time period COm940N CAUSE FAILURE OF RCP BREAAERS FAIL TO OPEN 4.20E-04 RPX-CB-GO ADS FAILED to actuate ADS.

COND. PROB. OF REC-9%NOAS (FAILURE OF MANUAL DAS ACT.)

5.06E-01 REC-MANDASC DUE TO OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS 3.02E-03 ADN-MAN 01 HUMAN ERROR 27 4.57E-11 INITIATING EVENT - STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE EVENT OCCURS 5.20E-03 IEV-SGTR PRHR AND 4.57E-11 ADS is already 0.52%

OPERATOR FAILS TO DIAGNOSE SGTR EVENT 1.84E-03 CIB-MAN 00 ADS 0.52 %

successful.

COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF TANR LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (IRWST, BAT) 4.78E-04 IWX-XMTR AVAILABLE Sun'p Recirculation OPERATOR FAILS TO ACTUATE CONT. SUMP RECIR. (LEVEL SIGNAL FAILS)1.00E-02 RFN-MAN 04 fails.

28 4.54E-11 INITIATING EVENT - STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE EVENT OCCURS 5.20E-03 IEV-SGTR PRHR 4.54E-11 Operator has a 0.52 CVS MECHANICAL FAILURE OF AOV V081 FAILS TO CLOSE 2.71E-02 CVM0007 AVAILABLE 0.52 %

long time period OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS (SGTR IF PR2 SPR FAILS) 5.00E-01 ADF-MAN 01 ADS FAILED to actuate ADS.

COMPON CAUSE FAILURE OF RCP BREAKERS FAIL TO OPEN 4.20E-04 RPX-CB-GO DUE TO COND. PROB. OF REC-MANDAS (FAILURE OF MANUAL DAS ACT.)

5.06E-01 REC-MANDASC HUMAN OPFRATOR FAILS TO MANURtY ACTUATF ADS 3.02E-03 ADN-MAN 01 ERROR W Westingl100Se

-~

I l

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION tmt 2:nt:

l TABLE 720.402-2 CALCULATION OF DP NODE PROBABILITY FOR ACCIDENT CLASS 6 USING 28 DOMINANT CORE DAMAGE CUTSETS F=

8.71E 09 Total Frequency for PDS-6 Cutsee Freauency E

O I

1 1.02E49 1.02 E49 1.02 E49 2

8.59E 10 8.59E 10 8.59E 10 3

6.64E 10 j

i 4

6.12E 10 6.12E 10 6.12E 10 5

5.72E 10 6

5.20E 10 7

4.59E 10 4.59E 10 4.59E 10 l

8 4.48E 10 9

3.15E 10 3.15E 10 3.15E 10 10 2.49E 10 2.49E 10 2.49E 10 l

11 1.81E 10 1.81E 10 1.81E 10 12 1.47E 10 1.47E 10 1.47E 10 1

13 1.12E-10 1.12E 10 1.12E 10 14 9.54E 11 9.54E 11 8.54E 11 15 9.05E 11 9.05E 11 9.0$E 11 16 8.43E 11 8.43E 11 8.43E 11 17 7.24E 11 18 6.44E 11 6.48E 11 6.48E 11 1

19 6.46E 11 6.46E 11 6.46E 11 20 6.46E 11 6.46E 11 6.46E 11 21 6.24E-11 22 5.78E 11 5.78E 11 6.78E-11 1

23 5.00E 11 24 4.80E-11 4.80E 11 4.80E 11 25 4.71E 11 4.71E 11 4.71E 11 26 4.71E 11 4.71E 11 4.71E 11 27 4.57E-11 4.57E 11 4.57E-11 28 4.54E 11 4.54E 11 4.54E 11 Totals 7.10E 09 81.51 % 4.71 E40 54.08 % 2.07E OS 2.64E49 f0 f05 fi f15 f2 f3 Note that top 28 cutsets add up to 81.5% of the PDS-6 total frequency; the remsening 18.5%

are not consdered forpotental DP node recovery; thas as conservative.

COLUMNS E = Frequency of cutsets where successful ADS depresourtsetion potential exists.

G = Frequency of cutg.a where ADS failed by operator error: P RHR is successful.

I = Frequency of cutsets where P RHR and ADS are successful; sump recrcunsten failed.

EQUATIONS AND CALCULATIONS f t = f2 + f3 f2 = total frequency of cutsets where ADS faned by operster error: P4tHR is successful, f3 = total fregumcy of cutsets where P RHR and ADS are successfut; sump recirculation faits.

HEP =

0.1 failure probability of operator acten to actuate ADS after core damage.

DP (successi =

5.17E41 ff2 * (1 HEP) + f3 ilF 4.83E 01 DP IfaAel

=

720 402-6 l

W Westinghouse

l NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION l

um fili

)

Ei i

Ouestion: 720.404 Although the probability of a pre-existing opening in containment (PO) was considered in the Level 1 success criteria for large LOCAs (Section 6.4.8), PO does not appear to have been considered in quantifying the probability of containment isolation in the Level 2 PRA. PO is not discussed in Chapter 37 or reflected in Table 37-1, and is not included within fault tree CIC. Please confirm this apparent omission, and provide a reassessment of Level 2 and 3 results given proper consideration of a pre-existing opening.

Response

OTH-PO, the probability of a pre-existing opening in the containment was inadvertantly oinitted from the calculation of the failure probability of containment isolation in fault trees CIC and CID. The probability value for OTH-PO j

is 1.2x10 if this value is added to the fault tree results for CIC (1.65x10') the result is an increase of 7.3% in the d

faiture probability of 1.77x10-8, If OTH-PO is added to fault tree CID results (2.64x10), the increase is 4.5% in the failure probability of 2.76x10 Assuming that including OTH-PO in the level 2 PRA increases the containment

)

isolation failure frequency (3.61x10" per year) by 7.3%, the new CI frequency is 3.87x10 ' per year. This is an 4

net increase of 2.6x10-" per year. The at-power large releases frequency is 1.82x10' per year. The increase in the large release frequency by including OTH-PO is 0.15%, which is negligible. The increase in the frequency to Cl does not affect the results of the level 3 PRA.

PRA Revision: None.

l l

l 1

i 720.404-1 T Wes!!nghouse l

t NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Ouestion: 720.405 The quantification of CET node IS for accident class ID is not described in Chapter 37. Documentation should be provided.

Response

Accident Class 1D is a partially depressurized non-LOCA sequence. The frequency of accident class ID is negligible with respect to the frequency of accident class 3D, the partially depressurized LOCA sequences. As the plant responses are very similar, the 3D and ID sequences and frequencies are lumped together for quantification in the level 1 and 3 PRA. Section 37.3.7 and Table 37-1 will be updated in PRA Revision 10 to document this binning.

PRA Revision:

l Revise Chapter 37 asfollows:

l 37.3.7 Accident Class 3D/ID l

Accident classes 3D and ID consist of fault sequences for which partial depressurization only occurs...

Revision to Table 37-1, add 1D to the 3D row:

Table 37-1 Summary Table for Containment Isolation Isolation (CET NODE IS) l 3D/lD CIC l

720 m T wesunpous.

1 i

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Question: 720.406 The quantification of CET node RFL for accident classes ID, JA, and 3C is not described in Chapter 38.

Documentation should be provided.

Response

PRA Chapter 38 will be revised in PRA Revision 10 to include discussion of Accident Classes 3C and 3A. Accident Class sequences and frequencies are lumped with accident class 3D (see RAI 720.405). Table 38-1 will be revised to ir,clude these accident classes.

PR/. Revision:

Revise Section 38.3.5 to include accident class 1D:

l 38.3.5 Accident Class 3D/ID l

Accident classes 3D and ID bin accident sequences that are partially depressurized such that sufticient gravity injection fails. For success at node RFL, full depressurization must be achieved. Therefore, the core debris l

cannot be reflooded and a failure probability of 1 is applied for RFL in accident class 3D/ID.

Add thefollowing sections:

38.3.7 Accident Class 3C Accident class 3C bins sequences that are initiated by a large failure of the reactor vessel below the top of the core. Core damage is a single failure cutset and occurs due to the inability to fully reflood the core before the reactor cavity fills with water above the level of the failure. The vessel failure depressurizes the RCS and the ADS is actuated providing a flowpath into the vessel and a vent pathway for the steam from the vessel.

Therefore as the cavity fills with water, the vessel and the damaged core are reflooded by the progression of the accident. Therefore, a failure probability of 0 is assigned to accident class 3C.

38.3.8 Accident Class 3A Accident class 3A bins ATWS sequences which produce core damage. The failure of the RCS piping due to overpressure in the 3A sequences is assessed at node DP, and failure is assigned to the bypass release category BP. Therefore, at node RFL for accident class 3A, the RCS piping is intact and the coolant inventory losses are mitigated. The core is covered and cooled. Node RFL is assigned a failure probability of 0 for accident class 3A.

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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

=

g Revision to Table 381, add thefollowing rows:

Table 38-1 Summary Table for Reflooding (CET NODE RFL) 3D/lD 1

3C 0

3A 0

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720.m-2 T westinghouse

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4 to Westinghouse Letter DCP/NRC0940 June 27,1997

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4 NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION y

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Question: 720.407 The Westinghouse submittal dated April 21,1997, (NSD-NRC-97-5078A) contains calculations and results for one vessel failure mode, i.e., localized small failure (0.06 m diameter hole at the transition between the hemisphere and the cylinder) leading to a dripping flow of metallic melt at 3.8 m/s. What is the basis for the 0.06 m diameter hole?

Also, the pool depth at vessel failure is taken to be 3.89 m (see Table B-1 on page B-15 of an earlier submittal dated December 12, 1996). Is the lower head submerged in this case? Finally, what are the coolant temperature and system pressure for this case?

Response

ne analyses in Appendix B of the AP600 PRA are deterministic analyses to show the consequences of reactor vessel failure on the integrity of the containment structure. The main body of the AP600 PRA provides evidence to show that if the reactor vessel bottom head remains submerged and the reactor coolant system is depressurized, failure of

)

the reactor vessel and transfer of the core material to the reactor cavity is physically unreasonable.

l It was recognized that the reactor vessel failure mode had a significant degree of uncertainty and that the mode of vessel failure could impact the subsequent analyses of the ex-vessel phenomena on containment integrity. Thus, an arbitrarily large and arbitrarily small failure of the reactor vessel were assumed as conditions to study the ex-vessel

]

phenomena. For the localized small failure case, a value for the initial failure size of approximately 23.6 inches (60 cm) was taken as a typical failure size that would drain the metallic portion of the in-vessel core debris to the reactor cavity before the oxide portion. The assumptions and modeling of the core debris transport from the failed reactor i

vessel to the reactor cavity are given in Reference B-6 of Appendix B of the AP600 PRA. In both cases, it was assumed that the reactor vessel bottom head was initially submerged but that the water level could not be maintained.

%e reactor coolant system is depressurized and water in the reactor cavity is assumed to be at 155'F (342'K) which represents 43'K of subcooling. He elevation of the top of the core in-vessel and the height of the water on the outside of the reactor vessel were assumed to be 12.8 feet (3.89 meters) at the beginning of the analysis. Note that the cavity configuration used in the analyses does not exactly match the final AP600 cavity configuration, but the differences should not significantly impact the results or conclusions drawn from these deterministic analyses. In both cases the water level is calculated to rapidly decrease after reactor vessel failure due to heat transfer from the core released from the reactor vessel and, in the case of the localized failure, continued heat transfer through the reactor vessel for as long as the bottom head is in contact with the water in the reactor cavity.

PRA Revision: None.

720.407-1 W Westinghouse l

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6 NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION an ng

.:n Ouestion: 720.409 In Table B-3 on page B-17 of the December 12,196, submittal the melt temperature and superheat for the hinged vessel failure mode are shown to be 1890 K and 80 K respectively. The melt is predominantly oxidic, at least, it is supposed to be. Therefore, melt temperature and superheat quoted do not appear to be correct.

Response

1 As described in detail in reference B-6 of Appendix B to the AP600 PRA, the analysis of the temperatures of the initial portion of the melt released from the reactor vessel for both the localized and hinged failure modes is metallic.

'Ihe melt conditions specified in Table B-3 therefore represents the metallic portion of the release from the reactor vessel in the first second after vessel failure. In the case of the hinged vessel failure mode, the oxidic portion of the melt would follow very shortly after vessel failure and as described in reference B-6, this component of the core

{

debris has distinctively different characteristics, including temperature and superheat. However, tne result of the ex-vessel steam explosion analysis show that only the first component of the release from the reactor vessel determines j

the characteristics of the most pronounced steam explosion. Thus, it is appropriate to use the metallic component l

of the core debris for the ex-vessel steam explosion analyses for both reactor vessel failure cases.

1 PRA Revision: None.

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P to Westinghouse Letter DCP/NRC0940 June 27,1997 i

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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 1

Question: 480.1041 The event used for the containment external pressure analysis (loss of all AC) is beyond design basis.

(a) What is the justification for considering a beyond design basis event instead of a design basis event for the maximum external pressure analysis?

(b) How would the consequences of a DBA event compare with those of a beyond-design basis event.

Response

The loss of all ac power is a design basis event for the AP600 design. SSAR subsection 15.2.6 describes the loss of ac power esent as the loss of power to the plant auxiliaries caused by a complete loss of the offsite grid accompanied by a turbine-generator trip. The onsite standby ac power system remains available but is not credited to mitigate the accident.

The consequences of a beyond design basis event are equivalent since the climatic conditions leading to the design basis event are the worst possible for an acceptable site. The difference for a severe accident condition is credit for operator action can be assumed to occur earlier to terminate the event.

SSAR Revision: None.

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[ Westinghouse I

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l NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION i

Question: 480.1043 i

Provide the staff with justification that the scenario described in the SSAR is the bounding event for containment i

external pressure loads. Discuss what other events were considered and how it was determined that these were not bounding. In particular, discuss if an inadvertent actuation of the PCCS was considered, and why this occurrence is not bounding.

Response

Several events were considered as potential limiting conditions for external containment pressure transients. The events included but rejected as not being limiting for the following justification include:

1.

Failed fan cooler controller unit: This event is limited by the minimum temperature (40*F) of the chilled water j

system and thus is bounded by the loss of ac event with minimum cooling temperatures of -40'F with a i

significantly larger cooling surface.

2.

Maximum ambient temperature change: his event is limited in the rate of change of temperature as well as the final external minimum temperature. His event is bounded by the minimum temperature condition since I

the change in internal containment temperature would be moderated by the containment shell being at a higher initial temperature.

)

3.

Purge system operation with inlet purge isolation valve failed closed: This event is limited by the capability of the containment exhaust fans. The fans have a shutoff pressure of less than the calculated external pressure value calculated for the loss of all ac event.

4.

Primary sampling system operation: His system utiliz.es an ejector to draw containment atmosphere to the sampling system and return the flow to the containment atmosphere. He system operates at a very low flow rate (relative to containment volume) and is a closed system such that the containment pressure cannot be effected.

5.

Inadvertent IRWST drainage: Inadvertent draining of the entire IRWST (protected by technical specifications and four redundant level instruments) results in a negative pressure transient of less than 1.0 psi.

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I NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ti:g a:n 1

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6.

Inadvertent PCS operation: The maximum heat transfer from containment for the external pressure transient was l

chosen without PCS operation based on the following justifications:

The heated water within the PCS water storage tank (minimum temperature of 40 F) would tend to heat the i

containment shell particularly at the elevated flow rates for the first 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months when compared to the extreme cold temperature.

Under extremely cold conditions the water will potentially freeze on the containment shell providing i

additional insulation thus mitigating heat transfer.

The extremely cold air has very low potential partial steam pressure and thus cannot support significant i

evaporative cooling.

SSAR Revision: None.

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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

! ! =__ x n-Question 480.1044 j

What is the objective / basis of the minimum backpressure analysis, given that the AP600 has no safety-related pumps.

That is, in what analyses is the mimmum containment pressure bounding? How does this relate to containment conditions during long term recirculation cooling of the core?

Response

The AP600 SS AR subsection 15.6.5.4A and 4C ECCS performance analyses utilize minimum containment pressures i

obtained from analyses performed using the WGOTHIC computer code. The use of a low containment pressure j

boundary condition is generically limiting in 10CFR50.46 ECCS analyses. Assumptions in modeling which produce a conservatively low calculated pressure are applied in the WGOTHIC analyses for AP600 SSAR Chapter 15.6.5.

For the large break LOCA analyses in subsection 15.6.5.4A, these assumptions are identified in Reference 480.1044-

1. The long-term cooling analyses of subsection 15.6.5.4C use the conservative results of WGOTHIC analyses which use assumptions as indicated in Reference 480.1044-2, including modeling the maximum flow rate of the safety-related PCS. Only safety-related systems are modeled in these WGOTHIC analyses for SSAR Chapter 15. The impact of containment backpressure on long-term recirculation cooling of the AP600 core is investigated in Reference j

480.1044 3.

References:

480.1G44-1. Hochreiter, L. E., et. al., "WCOBRAfrRAC Applicability to AP600 Large Break Loss-of. Coolant Accident," Westinghouse Electric Corporation, WCAP-14171, Revision 1 (Proprietary), October 1996.

I 480.1044-2. Garner, D. C., et. al., "WCOBRATTRAC OSU Long-term Cooling Final Validation Report,"

Westingbouse Electric Corporation, WCAP-14776, Revision 2 (Proprietary), Appendix B, May 1997.

440.1044-3. Response to AP600 RAI 440.646, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, June 1997.

SSAR Revision: NONE 480.104&1 T Westinghouse 1

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o NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Question 480.1050 State the breaks for which the NOTRUMP code, rather than SATAN VI, was used to calculate the mass and energy release for the containment subcompartment analysis, and provide the rationale for using one code instead of the other for a given break. Also, for each code, provide a descriptive summary of the primary system nodalization as it pertains to the subcompartment analysis. 'Ihat is, discuss any conservatisms made in the noding and releases that are specific to the subcompartment analysis (e.g., modeling of break node, assumed boiling regimes for heatup of primary fluid, etc.).

Response

The NOTRUMP computer code is used to calculate the mass / energy releases for the double-ended pressurizer spray line break scenarios. The models of the NOTRUMP code have been validated for small break LOCA events in Westinghouse PWRs (Reference 480.1050-1) and for the AP600 specifically (Reference 480.1050-2). NOTRUMP is the appropriate code for analyzing postulated small break LOCA events in the AP600. For other subcompartment pressure analysis cases reported in Chapter 6 of the AP600 SSAR, the critical flow correlation from SATAN-V, as documented in Reference 480.1050-3, was applied together with the local fluid pressure and enthalpy to establish the mass / energy releases. For the double-ended pressurizer spray line break mass / energy release analysis case, NOTRUMP is run to model the more complex depressurization that occurs with vapor and subcooled liquid being released through the two sides of the break.

The NOTRUMP nodalization of AP600 is provided and discussed in Section 4 of Reference 480.1050-4; it has been validated by simulations of the OSU and SPES test facilities. The noding diagram from Reference 480.1050-4 is used as is, with flow paths connected to the cold leg and the pressurizer vapor space being used to represent the pressurizer spray line break flow paths for the mass / energy release analysis.

The NOTRUMP calculation of pressurizer spray line break releases uses the Henry-Fauske/ homogeneous equilibrium critical flow correlation as described in Reference 480.1050-2. This model predicts both the subcooled critical flow from the cold leg side of the break and vapor flow from the pressurizer side. For the AP600 pressurizer subcompartment analyses, this simple modeling does not consider any of the spray line piping details or the frictional pressure drop associated with the pipe, valves, etc. Therefore, the mass and energy releases predicted by NOTRUMP are conservatively high; by ignoring the spray line piping flow resistance, the pressure at the break location is overpredicted.

i 480.1050-1 T Westinghouse 1

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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

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References:

480.1050-1. Meyer, P. E., et. al., "NOTRUMP - A Nodal Transient Small-Break and General Network Code,"

Westinghouse Electric Corporation, WCAP-10079-P-A (Proprietary),

WCAP-10080-P-A (Non-Proprietary), August 1985.

480.1050-2. Fittante, R. L., et. al., "NOTRUMP Final Validation Report for AP600," Westinghouse Electric Corporation, WCAP-14807, Revision 1, January 1997.

480.1050-3. Shepard, R. M. et. al., " Westinghouse Mass and Energy Release Data for Containment Design," WCAP-8264 P-A, Revision 1, August 1975.

480.1050-4. WCAP-14601, Revision 1, "AP600 Accident Analyses - Evaluation Models," Westinghouse Electric Corporation.

)

SSAR Revision: NONE i

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) to Westinghouse 1

Letter DCP/NRC0940 l

June.27,1997

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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION i

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I Question 440.645 In the context of the application of the WC/T to the AP600, containment pressure is a boundary condition which impacts the windows solution of primary interest to the staff-reactor vessel water level. Westinghouse is requested l

to provide the following information concerning the use of the WC/T windows approach for AP600 calculations.

(a) How is the containment pressure coupled to the injection temperature?

(b) How are the Sump and IRWST level boundary (or initial) conditions determined for LTC?

(c) How is reactor vessel water level affected by the variations in containment pressure during and between windows?

l (d) How is the OSU measured vessel level related to the AP600 calculated level at containment pressures higher than atmospheric?

(e) How is the time required to drain the IRWST determined? Since time determines the decay heat, how was this calculation qualified?

2 Responses:

440.645a. The AP600 containment pressure during long-term cooling is computed using the WGOTHIC computer l

I code. WGOTHIC nodalization is a lumped parameter model of the containment. The liquid temperature in each compartment is among the variables computed in a WGOTHIC run; this temperature is a function of the mass / energy releases input and the condensate return assumption. Thus, for the AP600 SSAR long term cooling calculation, containment pressure and sump temperature conditions are established from the same WGOTHIC calculation. The IRWST temperature is identified from the value at the end of the corresponding NOTRUMP case at the beginning of long-term cooling IRWST injection.

The 2 inch cold leg break cases presented in the AP600 SSAR are executed with a conservative sump boundary condition; the sump temperature is increased from the WGOTHIC-calculated value to the saturation temperature for the WGOTHIC-computed containment total pressure.

l 440.645b. The large break LOCA IRWST level boundary conditions are set to be consistent with the sump levels j

identified for the case being investigated, as described in the SSAR subsections. For the small break cases in SSAR i

subsections 15.6.5.4C.4 through 12, each IRWST injection window is based on the IRWST level of 107.2 ft, which is a bounding low hydraulic driving head from the tank; the initial minimum water level of the IRWST is 130 ft.,

per the AP600 Technical Specifications.

440.645-1 T Westinghouse 1

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The sump injection windows presented in SSAR subsection 15.6.5.4C utilize the sump levels established by l

calculating the floodup of containment subcompartments. For the double-ended DVI line breaks, the WGOTHIC-calculated 107.2 ft sump level is applied. Within the AP600 containment, there are curbs installed to prevent overflow from a filled containment sump into unfilled subcompartments. The curbs extend to the 108.2 ft elevation.

The WGOTHIC containment model does not include these curbs and thus underpredicts the sump Hoodup level for the 2-inch cold leg break case. The Goodup level used in the SSAR subsection 15.6.5.4C 2-inch break cases is 108.2 l

ft, the level at which overflow into unfilled subcompartments can physically occur. His level is in fact reached i

during the 2-inch LOCA event according to a separate, simple subcompartment floodup computation. This simple l

calculational method is also applied to identify the sump level for the AP600 " wall to wall" floodup calculation in SSAR subsection 15.6.5.4C.3-8.

1 440.645c. The reactor vessel water level is somewhat affected by the containment pressure during a window mode calculation. For the possible impact of a containment pressure change during a window, refer to the response to RAI l

440.646. The WGOTHIC calculations performed show that the magnitude of the containment pressure change during IRWST injection after the NOTRUMP analysis of the two-inch break case is complete is smaller than that analyzed for the RAI 440.646 response. The same is true for the pressure change during the sump injection phase to beyond 200,000 seconds, and these changes occur over thousands of seconds. The containment pressure change during the time span of each window analyzed for the SSAR is small. Therefore, the response to RAI 440.646 addresses the vessel water level impact of containment pressure changes on window mode analyses. For conservatism, the initial l

long-term cooling performance of AP600 during small break LOCAs is computed by NOTRUMP in the AP600 SSAR subsection 15.6.5.4B assuming that the pressure in containment equals 14.7 psia.

l 440.645d. OSU test SB 19 was performed at a simulated containment pressure to investigate the effect of backpressure on the 2-inch cold leg break ECCS performance. As shown in the attached figures, the observed core and upper plenum levels in SB19 were [

l

]" Therefore, containment pressure is judged to be of medium importance for AP600 long-term cooling events. WCOBRAffRAC-predicted levels for the AP600 plant would be expected to show a similar pressure sensitivity.

440.645e. He IRWST drain time is calculated by simple, standalone NOTRUMP and WGOTHIC calculations.

Please refer to WCAP-14601, Revision 1, subsection 5.2 for further information.

l SSAR Revision: None W Westinghouse I

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' WESTINGHOUSE PROPRIETARY CtASS 2 F a c i l i t y/ 0 9 /. 2116:09:57 68 30893 1995 Neme OSU Test Number.

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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION e.

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I Question 440.646 Containment pressure has not been a parameter in the OSU experiments. In addition, coupled WC/T and WGOTHIC solutions have not been submitted and containment pressure change scenarios have not been clearly investigated or 4

discussed. Westinghouse needs to provide sufficient justification that the long term cooling solution is essentially stable considering fluctuations of containment pressure. Wesunghouse should demonstrate that during long term l

cooling, upon initiation of core boiling, if containment pressure were to drop to atmospheric (or close to it), that the mercased boiling would not create a high enough pressure in the vessel to prevent (temporarily) DVI flow or result in core uncovery and accelerate boiling, which could lead to a diverging core cooiing solution. Westinghouse'should also address what physical parameters would prevent this scenario and how is WC/T able to provide a reliable response to such a transient?

i

Response

Test SB19 at the Oregon State University facility did simulate an increased containment pressure condition; the effect of higher pressure was small, as described in the response to RAI 440.645d. Fluctuations in AP600 containment pressure might occur during long-term cooling as a result of actions to better cool the containment and thereby reduce the pressure. However, independent of any actions postulated to improve external containment cooling, there remains a significant heat transfer resistance in the 1-5/8 inch thick painted steel shell. The heat transfer resistance of same is approximately 0.007 sq.ft.-F-hr/ BTU, so even if high coefficients of heat transfer are assumed for internal convection and external heat transfer due to some postulated enhancement action, the AP600 containment pressure

)

is not subject to phenomena which would cause rapid changes.

To illustrate the long-term cooling solution is stable for a credible magnitude change in the AP600 containment pressure, the two-inch break sump injection case presented in SSAR subsection 15.6.5.4C has been enalyzed assuming the containment pressure suddenly drops by 5 psia, from 25 to 20 psia. The WCOBRA/ TRAC SSAR window was restarted at 3200 seconds with this instantaneous pressure reduction in the containment modeled. For this new window the sump temperature is taken from the results of the WGOTHIC calculation for this break. The calculated results are presented in the attached figures and compared with the reference SSAR calculation.

During the initial 100 seconds after the sudden reduction of the containment pressure, the downcomer level drops and the injection flow is zero or negative as the reactor vessel levels adjust to the sudden drop in containment pressure. After 300 seconds the system has established a new quasi-steady-state condition consistent with the pressure boundary condition. The 3500-4000 second parameters from the reduced containment pressure window are compared with the SSAR window presented in subsection 15.6.5.4C.3.5.

The downcomer level is roughly 1.0 ft. lower in the new calculation than in the window at 25 psia, as presented in SSAR Figure 15.6.5.4C.3.5-1. The collapsed liquid in the core is also a bit lower on the average than in the SSAR window. 'Ihe vapor void fractions in the two core nodes are both comparable to the SSAR reference case. The collapsed core liquid level decreases as the saturation temperature decreases with the pressure. The predicted core vapor flow rate increases immediately at the start of the window, as flashing of core liquid occurs due to the pressure reduction. As the transient proceeds, by 3500 seconds the vapor flow rate returns to near the 25 psia containment pressure value from the SSAR.

I 440.646-1 W Westinghouse

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Y NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ir mn e

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Between 3500 seconds and the end of the WCOBRAfl'RAC run the average upper plenum collapsed liquid level is approximately 0.2 ft. below the corresponding level for the SSAR case. During the run, on several occasions there is a redistribution of mass between core and upper plenum due to core voiding, with core collapsed level decreasing and the upper plenum collapsed level increasing by a corresponding amount. Similar, but less pronounced redistributions are evident in the SSAR subsection 15.6.5.4C.3.5 window. In both cases, the core remains well-covered and well-cooled during the window analyzed. The variations in cladding temperature shown in Figure l

440.646-6 correspond to the variations in local pressure (and satueation temperature).

The flow through the ADS Stage 4 valves is fairly consistent over the entire length of the 20 psia contamment pressure window. Once the initial adjustment to lower containment pressure is complete, continuous injection from the sump is predicted through the DVI nozzles. The mass loss that occurs in the initial 100 seconds due to the temporary lack of DVI injection is the amount necessary to readjust the inventory to the equilibrium level associated with the reduced pressure. The sump flow provides continued, effective core cooling during this scenario. The level adjustment to lower values as a consequence of the reduced pressure is consistent with the impact of reduced pressure as observed by comparison of OSU Tests SB01 and SB19. The predicted cooling, as indicated by the figure of PCT, remains stable despite the pressure perturbation.

SSAR Revision: None i

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1997: 06:59:08 PM EDT 3044796121368 AP600 VESSEL BASED ON THE OSU TEST WODEL LO-LEVEL 3

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ML20141G398

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