ML20140E102
| ML20140E102 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 01/15/1986 |
| From: | Keimig R, Meyer G, Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140E082 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-334-85-26-EC, NUDOCS 8602030180 | |
| Download: ML20140E102 (3) | |
See also: IR 05000334/1985026
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION
REGION I
REPORT OF ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE ON INSPECTION REPORT 50-334/85-26
Docket:
50-334
Licensee:
Duquesne Light Company
P. O. Box 4
Shippingport, Pennsylvania
15077
Facility:
Beaver Valley Unit 1
Meeting Date:
December 19, 1985
Meeting Place: NRC Region I Office, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania
Written by:
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. Meyer, P16 ject Engineer
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Approved by:
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/L Tripp, C ief, Reactor Projects Section 3A, DRP
Date
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R. Keimig, Chief', S
uards Section, DRSS
Date
Enforcement Conference (12/19/85) Summary:
The licensee discussed the details of the November 19, 1985 incident involving a
worker's entry into the plant without an identification (ID) badge.
This incident
was compared with the four other ID badge incidents which had occurred in the pre-
vious 18 months.
The incidents were categorized into three basic scenarios, and
corrective actions were described which had been implemented to prevent each of
the three scenarios.
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DETAILS
1.
Attending Personnel
Duquesne Light Company (DLC)
J. Carey, Vice President, Nuclear Groap
J. Sieber, General Manager, Nuclear Services
T. Jones, General Manager, Nuclear Operaticns
J. Lukehart, Director of Security
NRC
J. Allan, Deputy Regional Administrator
R. Starostecki, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
E. Wenzinger, Chief, Projects Branch No. 3, DRP
J. Joyner, Chief, Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch, Division
of Radiation Safety and Safeguards (DRSS)
L. Tripp, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3A, DRP
R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section, DRSS
W. Troskoski, Senior Resident Inspector
J
G. Meyer, Project Engineer, DRP
D. Holody, Enforcement Specialist
2.
Review of November 19, 1985 Incident
Duquesne Light Company (DLC) reviewed the details of the November 19, 1985
incident and agreed that the details in Inspection Report 50-334/85-26 were
accurate.
The incident involved a radiological technician, authorized for
entry, who neglected to obtain his identification (ID) badge upon re-entering
the protected area and was allowed to enter by the access control guards.
He later discovered that he had no badge and reported it as lost.
The ID
badge was found in its proper place in the badge rack at the gate.
3.
Review of ID Badge Incidents
DLC reviewed the following five ID badge incidents of the past 18 months and
categorized each as one of the three scenarios.
Date of Incident
Scenario
Description
June 28, 1984
Entry without badge
Authorized person very familiar
to guard force.
November 17, 1984
Badge lost in protected Hypothesize that found badge was
area
turned in but erroneous log in
procedure did not acknowledge
it.
1
.
..
3
Date of Incident
Scenario
Description
August 20, 1985
Entry with wrong badge
Adjacent badge issued and later
self-discovered after entry.
September 20, 1985 Entry with wrong badge
Adjacent badge issued and later
self-discovered.
Repeat of
8/20/85 incident.
November 19, 1985
Entry without badge
Authorized person re-enters pro-
tected area.
Repeat of 6/28/84
incident.
4.
Corrective Actions
a.
To prevent entry without a badge, DLC has activated the previously in-
stalled card readers on the turnstiles. This occurred on November 22,
1985.
b.
To prevent entry with the wrong badge, the badge issue procedure was
revised to include specific actions required of the guards, and the
guards were trained in the new procedure.
The revised issuing procedure
was implemented on November 22, 1985.
c.
To prevent improper handling of lost badges, the procedure logging in
returned badges has been revised.
This was accomplished following the
November 1984 lost badge incident.
d.
Disciplinary action was taken against the guards directly involved in
the wrong badge and no badge incidents and against the plant personnel
,
in the last no badge incident.
e.
To further emphasize the importance of access control measures, memoranda
dated September 20 and November 27, 1985 were issued to plant personnel
and the security force stating that everyone is responsible for following
access control procedures and that failure to do so would be the basis
for disciplinary action.
5.
Enforcement Action
The enforcement action for the November 19, 1985 incident was not discussed
with DLC.
Subsequent to the meeting, the enforcement action was decided and
is presented in the transmittal letter.
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