B11907, IGSCC Program

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IGSCC Program
ML20138P340
Person / Time
Site: Millstone Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 12/31/1985
From:
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20138P338 List:
References
B11907, PROC-851231, NUDOCS 8512260065
Download: ML20138P340 (31)


Text

,__-. _ _ _ - -

Docket No. 50-245 B11907 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. I 1935 IGSCC Program 8512260065 851212 PDR ADOCK 05000245 G

PDR December,1985 m

e Table of Contents Dercription Section Abstract 1

Inspection Program and Results 2

Weld Overlays 3

Summary and Conclusions 4

Information Requested during 5

12/3/85 meeting between NUSCO and the NRC l'

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Section I I

Abstract k

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Millstone Unit No. I 1935 IGSCC Program s

e Abstract

- During the 1985 refueling outage, a comprehensive program addressing Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) was implemented at Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.1. This program included:

o a thorough inspection of susceptible welds, o

weld overlay repairs for six welds

- 5 in the Jet pump Instrumentation Nozzle Assemblies

- 1 in the Isolation Condenser o

Re-inspection of weld RCA3-1 The details of each of these items are included in the following sections.

i L_

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Section 2 Inspection Program and Results j

l l

E.

Description of the IGSCC Inspection Program

'During the' Millstone Unit No. I 1985 refueling outage, a total of 115 stainless steel welds were ultrasonically examined. In accordance with recommendations frc m the Staff (l), the 4" recirculation system..weldolets which were not ext. mined in 1984 were examined this outage and all were found to be acceptable. As shown in Table I, of the ll5 welds examined, six (6) welds were found to be rejectable by examination. Table 11 contains a description of the flaws found in the six (6) welds and the dispositions of each. All examinations were conducted based on the guidance of NUREG-1061.

Ultrasonic examinations for IGSCC were performed by EBASCO, Trutom, Nuclear : Energy Services (NES) and Northeast Utilities Service Company

'(NUSCO) personnel. lists the name, company _ affiliation and requalification date for the ultrasonic examination personnel used to carry out -

the inspection program. All ultrasonic examination personnel were requalified for IGSCC detection at the EPRI NDE Center in accordance with suggestions provided by the NRC(2) prior to performing ultrasonic examinations during the refuel. outage.

Additionally, ultrasonic examination technicians were given procedure training, master / slave system training, as well as written and practical' examinations as part of NU the on-site qualification for IGSCC

examination.

Samples containing actual IGSCC are used for the practical portion of the on-site qualification exercise.

Preliminary manual. ultrasonic examination results which contained suspected

-lGSCC indications ~ were provided to NUSCO for further evaluation and confirmation of results. NUSCO evaluations consisted of a four step program-consisting of:

(1)

Analysis of _the reported data (2)

Review of radiographs for I.D. geometry (3)

Comparison of data to previous examination results (4)

Weld re-examination using alternative techr.iques, including:

o I.D. creeping wave o

1.5 MHz,4MHz,550L5MHz transducers etc.

o Ultrasonic Data Recording and Processing System (UDRPs)

(*Where the welds were adequately accessible for the equipment)

If a disposition was not obtained via the use of the above listed methods, radiography and I.D. penetrant examinations were performed. Such was the case for several welds in the LPCI system.

(1)

D. M. Crutchfield letter to 3. F. Opeka, " Reinspection, Analyses and Repairs of the Reactor Coolant System Piping," dated June 26,1984.

(2)'

3. A. Zwolinski letter to 3. F. Opeka, " Piping Inspection Plan Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.1," dated August 14,1985.

Ten percent of the welds were examined using the master / slav'e system. The system was also used for several re-examinations of suspect welds by NUSCO personnel.

The final disposition of all weld indications was made by qualified NUSCO NOE

~ personnel based on the additional information obtained during the evaluation program and the initial results provided by the qualified examination technicians.

The final disposition and evaluation results are filed with the examination records for each weld, e

sp

Results of ICSCC Inspections October / November 1985 Outage Millstone Unit 1 Piping Systems -

Inspected Rejected Repair Recirculation 18 0

Shutdown Cooling 4

0 LPCI 51 0

RWCU 8

0 Core Spray 4

0

.lsolation Condenser 13 1

Weld Overlay Weld Overlays 7

0 Jet Pump Instrumentation 10 5

Weld Overlay Nozzle Assembly Total 115 6

6 Weld Overlays t

TABLE 1

- - -. -. -.., - - - -,, - -,.. - ~.,. -,

Table II Flaw Description and Disposition of Welds Rejected by Exam.! nation System Weld Flaws Disposition -

Isolation

_ ICAC-F-13

  1. 1).22" deep x 2.5" long at Weld Overlay Condenser 37"-39.5" clockwise. #2 and #3 of lesser depth. All flaws located in 8" length at 36"-3 7/8" Clockwise thru the 0 reference point at Top Dead Center of pipe.

Jet Pump 3PAF-2-SE

  1. 1).042" deep x.5" fong at 5.5"-6" Weld Overlay Instrument Clockwise. Note: Conservatively Nozzle "A" treated as a flaw. Examination was from Safe End side of weld only due to outside diameter geometric config-

'uration.

JPA3-2

  1. 1 and #2 both flaws combined are.1" Weld Overlay deep x 4.66" long at 39"-3.22" Clockwise thru the 0 reference point at Top Dead Center of the JPI nozzle.

3et Pump J PB F-2-S_E

  1. 1).09" deep x.5" long at 2.75"-3.25" Weld Overlay Instrument Clockwise. Recorded by examiner at Nozzle "B" center point 3" Clockwise 1/2" long.
  1. 2).06" deep x.625" long at 13.68"-

14.31" Clockwise. Recorded by examiner at center point I4" Clockwise 5/8" long.

Note: Conservatively treated as two flaws. Examination was from Safe End side of weld only due to outside diameter geometric configuration.

~,

Table 11 Flaw' Description and Disposition of Welds Rejected by Examination System Weld Flaws Disposition 3et Pump 3PB3-2

  1. 1).172" deep x 3600 intermittent.

Weld Overlay Instrument Recorded by examiner as 25% deep of -

Nozzle "B"

.688" nominal wall thickness.

JPB3-3

  1. 1).344" maximum depth x 3600 intermittent. Weld Overlay Recorded by examiner as 50% maximum depth of.688" nominal wall thickness.

Recirculation RCA3-1

  1. 1).090" deep x 21/2" long at 00 Accepted by
  1. 2).17,5" deep x 61/2" long at 23" Analysis in 1984 Counter Clockwise.

Note: Flaws match previous examination data from the 1984 outage. No change or new indications have been identified.

e SECTION 3 WELD OVERLAYS 4

e

Table til Millstone Unit No.1 ISI/NDE STATUS REPORT Welds Welds Welds System Scheduled Acceptable Rejectable Comments 28" RECIRC 3

3 0

Complete 22" RECIRC 1

1 0

Complete 18" LPCI.

46 46 0

Complete 16" LPCI 5

5 0

Complete ISO COND 1

1 0

Complete S.D. CLG 1

1 0

Complete 14" 5.D.CLG 1

1 0

Complete ISO CAP 1

1 0

Complete 12" RECIRC 4

4 0

Complete ISO COND 7

6 1

Complete

  • 5.D.CLG 2

2 0

Complete -

10" CORE SPRAY 4 4

0 Complete ISO ~COND 4

4 0

Complete

' 8" CLEAN-UP 8

8 0

Complete WELD OVERLAYS 13 13 0

Com plete *

  • 4" RECIRC BYP 3

5 0

Complete 3ET PUMP INSTR 10 5

5 Complete RECIRC SAFE ENDS 4

4 0

Complete RCA3-1 (UDRPS)

I i

1 Complete TOTAL 121 115 6

The examination scope was increased by four welds from the original inspection plan due to the rejection of weld ICAC-F-13.

The examination scope was increased by six weld overlays from the original inspection plan due to the addition of welds ICAC-F-13, JPAF-2, JPAJ-2, JPBF-2, 3PB3-2 and JPB3-3, which were found to be rejectable during the 1985 inspection.

Weld Categories per NUREG-1061 Category "A":

Resistant material welds and welds of non-resistant to resistant material that were corrosion resistant clad welded (CRC).

Requirement:

5% by pipe size inspected each outage Category "B":

Non-resistant material welds with IHSI applied and welds of non-resistant to resistant material that were heat sink welded (HSW).

Requirement:

10% by pipe size each outage Category "C":

Non-resistant material Requirement:

25% by pipe size each outage and all welds that were not inspected to IEB 82-03 and 83-02 inspection requirements this outage.

Category "S":

Supplementalinspections required by NUSCO.

Category "A A": Additional Category "A" LPCI Systern welds, inspected beyond the minimum requirements of NUREG-1061.

Categorv "AC": Additional Category "C" LPCI system welds inspected beyond the minimum requirements of NUREG-1061.

SYSTEM: LPCI "A" Header Weld Designation Category Pipe Diarreter Acceptable Rejectable CCAJ-17 C

18" X

CCAJ-18 C

18" X

CCA3-19 C

18" X

CCA3-20 C

18" X

CCAJ-21 C

18" X

CCAJ-23 S

18" X

CCAJ-24 S

18" X

CCA3-25 S

18" X

CCA3-26 S

18" X

SYSTEM: LPCI "B" Header Weld Designation Category Pipe Diameter Acceptable Rejectable CCB3-16 C

18" X

CCB3-17 C

18" X

CCB3-18 C

18" X

CCB3-19 C

18" X

CCB3-20 C

18" X

CCB3-21 S

18" X

CCB3-22 S

18" X

CCB3-22A S

18" X

CCB3-22B S

18" X

CCB3-23 S

18" X

CCB3-24 S

18" X

CCBJ-25 S

18" X

CCB3-26 S

18" X

CCB3-27 5

18" X

CCB3-SC-1 S

12" X

SYSTEM: LPCI "A" Header Weld Designation Category Pipe Diameter Acceptable Rejectable CCA3-3 C

18" X

CCAJ-4 C

18" X

CCA]-5 C

18" X

CCA3-6 C

18" X

CCA3-7 C

18" X

CCA3-8 C

18" X

CCA3-9 C

18" X

CCA3-10 C

16" X

CCA3-11 C

16" X

CCAJ-12 C

18" X

CCA3-13 C

18" X

CCAJ-14 C

18" X

i CCAJ-15 C

18" X

l CCAJ-16 C

18" X

l CCA3-2 AC 18" X

1

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SYSTEM: LPCI "B" Header Weld Designation Category Pipe Diameter Acceptable Rejectable CCB3-5 AC 16" X

CCB3-6 A

16" X

CCB3-9 AA 16" X

CCB3-1 AC 18" X

CCB3-2 AC 18" X

CCB3-3 AC 18" X

CCB3-4 AC 18" X

CCB3-10 C

18" X

CCB3-ll C

18" X

CCB3-12 C

18" X

CCB3-13 C

18" X

CCB3-14 AC 18" X

CCB3-15 AC 18" X

SYSTEM: Clean Up Supply Header Weld Designation Category Pipe Diameter Acceptable Rejectable CUAJ-2 A

8" X

CUA3-4 C

8" X

CUA3-5 C

8" X

CUA3-6 C

8" X

CUA3-7 C

8" X

CUAJ-7A B

8" X

4

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-1 4

SYSTEM: Shutdown Cooling Header Weld Designation Category Pipe Diameter Acceptable Rejectable SCCF-1 S

12" X

SYSTEM: Shutdown Cooling Header "A" Weld Designation Category Pipe Diameter Acceptable Rejectable SCA3-1 A

14" X

SYSTEM: Recirc Bypass Weldolet and Cap Weld Designation Category Pipe Diameter Acceptable Rejectable RCA3-PB-1 S

4" weldolet X

RCAJ-PB-2 S

4" weldolet X

RCB3-PB-1 S

4" weldolet X

RCB]-PB-2 S

4" weldolet X

RCA3-30 A

4" CAP X

SYSTEM: Core Spray Header "B" Weld Designation Category Pipe Diameter Acceptable Rejectable CSB3-13A B

10" X

CSB3-14 C

10" X

CSB3-15 C

10" X

CSB3-16 C

10" X

SYSTEM: Clean Up Return Header Weld Designation Category Pipe Diameter Acceptable Rejectable CUB 3-18 C

8" X

CUB 3-19 C

8" X

SYSTEM: Isolation Condenser Piping Weld Designation Category Pipe Diameter Acceptable Rejectable ICAC-F-13 C

12" X

ICAC-F-14 C

12" X

ICAC-F-16A A

12" X

ICAC-F-8 C

16" X

  • 1CAC-F-15 C

12" X

  • ICAC-F-16 C

12" X

1

  • ICAC-F-12 C

12" X

  • ICAC-F-12A C

12" X

  • Additional welds required to be inspected due to rejectable indication in ICAC-F-13.

I

s SYSTEM: Ir.olation Condenser Return Header Weld Designation Category Pipe Diameter Acceptable Rejectable ICB3-5 C

10" X

ICBJ-6 C

10" X

ICB]-7 C

10" X

ICBJ-8 A

10" X

SYSTEM: Recire Risers Weld Designation Category Pipe Diameter Acceptable Rejectable RRC3-1 B

12" X

RRC3-2 B

12" X

RRC3-4 B

12" X

RRF3-3 B

12" X

SYSTEM: Recire System Discharge Header "A" Weld Designation Category Pipe Diameter Acceptable Rejectable RMA3-4 B

22" X

RMA3-RRC B

28" X

SYSTEM: Recirc System Weld Designation Category Pipe Diameter Acceptable Rejectable RCA3-1 C

28" X

RCA3-SC-1 B

16" X

RCA3-1A B

28" X

RCA3-2 B

28" X

SYSTEM: 3et Pump Instrumentation Nozzle "A" and "B" Weld Designation Category Pipe Diameter Acceptable Rejectable JPAF-1 S

5" X

JPAF-2 S

4" X

JPA3-1 S

8" X

JPA3-2 S

12" X

3PA3-3 S

12" X

JPBF-1 S

5" X

JPBF-2 S

4" X

3PBJ-l S

8" X

f JPB3-2 S

12" X

JPB3-3 S

12" X

SYSTEM: Recirc Riser Safe Ends Weld Designation Category Pipe Diameter Acceptable Rejectable

- RRCF-1 S

12" X

RREF-1 S

12" X

RRFF-1 S

12" X

RRGF-1 S

12" X

SYSTEM: Recirc System Weld Overlays Weld Designation Category Pipe Diameter Acceptable Rejectable RRAJ-4 S

12" X

RRBJ-l S

12" X

RRBJ-2 S

12" X

RRCJ-3 S

12" X

RREJ-3 S

12" X

R RFJ S 12" X

SYSTEM: Isolation Condenser Supply Header Weld Designation Category Pipe Diameter Acceptable Rejectable ICBJ-CAP AC 14" X

SYSTEM: Isolation' Condenser Weld Overlays Weld Designation Category Pipe Diameter Acceptable Rejectable ICAC-F-3 5

-16" X

~

  • ICAC-F-13 S

12" X

SYSTEM: Jet Pump Instrumentation Nozzles A&B Weld'Ove.-lays Weld Designation Category Pipe Diameter Acceptable Rejectable

  • JPAF-2 S

4" X

  • JPAJ-2 S

12" X

  • JPBF-2 S

4" X

' *3PBJ-2 S

12" X

+3PBJ-3 S

I T' X

  • overlays applied during 1985 refuel outage

.J

Millstona Unit No. I 1985 IGSCC Program Weld Overlay Design and Implementation Scope:

Weld overlays were applied to six (6) weld joints; one (1) on the Isolation Condenser Piping System and five (5) on the Jet Pump Instrumentation Nozzle Assemblies. The listing of welds and overlay designs implemented appear in Table 1.

Design:

The design of the weld overlays used for Millstone Unit No. I during the 1985 refueling outage was accomplished using -the computer program PC-CRACK, developed by Structural Integrity Associates. Inputs into the program Are: the source equations for ASME Section XI Table IWB-3641-1 with the stress ratio, Pm+Pb Sm for the unrepaired joint; the pipe wall thickness; and a factor of safety (2.773 was used in all cases).

Using these inputs, the program calculates the weld overlay thickness for through-wall cracks in the unrepaired pipe -using an iteration coataining these steps:

(1)

Calculate the allowable a/t using the source equations (including the factor of safety) for.the given stress ratio.

(2)

.\\ssume an applied weld overlay of arbitrary thickness t.

(3)

Reduce the stress ratio in proportion to the increase in wall thickness resulting from the applied overlay (Note: The pipe wall thickness becomes (t+

t) with the application of the overlay).

(4)

Recalculate the allowable a/t corresponding to the adjusted stress ratio.

If the calculated a/t from step (4)is larger than the allowable value determined in step (1), steps (2) through (4) are repeated (the weld overlay thickness is increased) until the solution converges to the allowable a/t for the adjusted stress level.

All weld overlays (six) designed during the 1985 MP1 outage were full structural weld overlays, which are based on an assumed 100% throu h wall, 3600 around c

the pipe circumference postulated flaw.

Implementation:

The weld overlays were applied by GAPCO. Initial overlay layers that did not pass PT examination and did not exhibit a delta ferrite measurement greater than 8FN were not included in the final design overlay thickness. All overlays were deposited using the automatic GTAW process utilizing ER308L/ERNiCr-3 weld wire depending on the base metal to be overlayed.

Materials:

All weld filler metal met the following specifications as applicable.

Weld Wire Specification ER 308L ASME,Section II, Part C, SFA5.7, Maximum carbon content.015% and a delta ferrite level of IlFN.

ERNiCr-3 ASME,Section II, Part C, SFA5.14.

Inspection:

All weld overlays were subjected to a liquid penetrant inspection of the first layer that exhibited a delta ferrite level greater than 8FN and the final layer.

Angled beam longitudinal wave techniques were used for detection and sizing of flaws in the overlay and required base material. Zero degree longitudinal wave examinations are performed on new overlays to detect lack of bonding or clustered small flaws in the overlay and at the base material interface. All examinations are performed manually by EPRI qualified individuals using EPRI suggested techniques.

s O

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a w

TABLE IV WELD OVERLAY DESIGN Weld Designation / Pipe Size b + Ph-

~

Overlay Design Bounding Flaw Size 3 m ICAC-F-13 1.0 toverlay = 0.43" a/t = 1.0 12".68" wall Loverlay = 4.2" L = 3600 JPB3-3 0.35 toverlay = 0.2" a/t = 1.0 12".68" wall Loverlay = 4.2" L = 3600 JPB3-2 0.36 toverlay = 0.2" a/t = 1.0 12".68" wall Loverlay = 4.2" L = 3600 JPBF-2 0.46 toverlay = 0.12" a/t = 1.0 4".377" wall Loverlay = 4.0 L = 3600 3PA3-2 0.37 toverlay = 0.2" a/t = 1.0 12".68" wall Loverlay = 4.2" L - 3600 JPAF-2 0.52 toverlay = 0.12" a/t = 1.0 L verlay = 4.0" L = 3600 4".337" wall o

F 0

J e

SECTION 4

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS 3

1 i

Summary and Conclusions The 1985 IGSCC program exceeds the provisions of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and the guidelines of NUREG-1061. This is true since the percentages of welds, per pipe size, inspected meet or exceed NUREG-1061

. guidelines, Also, the morough inspection program using recently requalified inspection personnel and equipment (including ultrasonic imaging and

" master / slave" scanning) give a high degree of confidence that the welds inspected do not contain IGSCC. Further, where IGSCC has been mitigated by weld overlays, the design implementation and inspection procedures result in a safe weld joint.

In view of these facts, Northeast Utilities has concluded that no unreviewed safety questions currently exist with respect to IGSCC at Millstone Unit No.1.

Finally, the flawed joint accepted by analysis (RCA3-1) and treated by Induction Heating Stress Improvement (IHSI) in 1984 showed no evidence of crack growth.

This result serves to assure the validity of the conclusions in the original analysis, thereby providing justification for operation for another refuel cycle.

I

Section 5 Information Requested During 12/3/85 Meeting between NUSCO and the NRC 9

0

Additional Information Requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Item #1 NRC Request: Provide weld designations of the welds that received IHSI last refuel outage.

Response

See Attachment #1 Item #2 NRC Request: Provide the names of UT inspectors that were requalified at EPRI for IGSCC and the dates they requalified.

Response

See Attachment #2 Item #3 NRC Request : Provide a sketch of the Inconel weld overlay design.

Response

See Attachment #3 Item #4 NRC Request: Provide thickness measurements of the weld overlays and basemetal thicknesses.

Response

See Attachment #4 for weld overlay thicknesses and Section 3, Table I for basemetal thicknesses.

Item #5 NRC Request: How many IGSCC susceptible welds were not inspected over the last two refuel outages.

Response

Seven (7) inaccessible inner diameter butt welds have not been inspected.

The welds are part of flued-head penetration assemblies located on the Reactor Water Clean-up System (2); Low Pressure Coolant Injection (2);

Core Spray (1); Isolation Condenser (2) piping systems. One of the two core spray inaccessible welds was PT examined from the I.D. when made accessible during last year's core spray piping replacement, and found to be free of defects.

Item #6 NRC Request: Last refuel outages SER identified eight (8) IGSCC susceptible welds on the 4" recirculation bypass caps that were not inspected. Why were only 5 welds expected this outage?

Response

There are only 4 IGSCC susceptible welds on the 4" bypass lines. These are the weldolet to pipe welds which were inspected and found acceptable (see Section 2). The other 4 welds are corrosion-resistant cladded weldolet to cap welds and are not susceptible to IGSCC. These have been classified category

'A' welds per NUREG-1061, as presented to the NRC, in our submittal on July 1,1985.

Per NUREG-1061 only 5% of these welds (category A) required inspection, therefore only one of the four bypass cap welds was inspected this year and found acceptable.

Item #7 NRC Request: Provide delta ferrite measurements for all stainless steel weld overlays applied this refuel outage.

Response

See Attachment #5.

Attachment #1 WELDS TREATED BY INDUCTION HEATING STRESS IMPROVEMENT RCA3-l

  • RMA3-4 RCB3-10 RCA3-1A RMAJ-RRC RCB3-11 RCAJ-2 RMAJ-2 RCB3-12 RCA3-3 RMAJ-3 RCB3-13 RCA3-SC-1 RRA3-1 through 3 RCB3-14 RCA3-4 RRB3-1 through 4 RCBJ-CC-1 RCAJ-5 RRCJ-l through 4 RCB3-15 RCA3-6 RRD3-1 through 4 RCB3-16 RCA3-7 RR E3-1, 2, 4 RMB3-3 RCA3-8 RCBJ-l RMBJ-2 RCA3-10 RCB3-1 A RMB3-4 RCA3-11 RCB3-2 RMB3-RRH RCA3-12 RCB3-3 RMB3-5 RCA3-13 RMB3-1 RCA3-14 RCB3-4 RRF3-2 through 4 CCA3-1 RCB3-5 RRG3-1 through 4 RCAJ-15 RCBJ-6 RRH3-1 through 4 RMA3-1 RCB3-7 RR33-1 through 4 RMA3-5 RCB3-8 RRK3-1 through 4 l

NOTE: RCA3-9 and RCB3-9 are not susceptible to IGSCC and, therefore were not treated.

  • contains flaw.

i 1

Attachment #2 Personnel Requalified by EPRI for Detection of IGSCC Name Company Date Requalified Charles Pattillo Ebasco Sept.17,1985 Dan Nowakowski Ebasco Sept; 10, -1985 Tom Pederson Ebasco Sept.17,1935 Roger Soriano Trutom Sept. 24,1985 Rick Pfannenstiel Trutom Sept. 27,1985 Robert Bouck Ebasco Sept.10,1935 Peter Durand NUSCO Oct,11,1935 Steve Sikorski NUSCO Sept. 24,1935 Neal MacNamara NES Nov.5,1985

)

i 9

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Attachment #3 Jet Pump Instrumentation Nozzle Assembly inconel Weld Overlay Design

.12 "

H-2,,

= i i_L

/\\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\\\

N b

(

4"Diamber o

8"x'[

58-166 Eccentric.

W T?r I

304.s.s.

\\)\\ \\ \\ \\ \\ V v'/q+l l

,\\

t l

I

\\

l' [

1 Inconel Weld Overlay Design Typical of Both JPI Nozzles l

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Attachment #4 WELD OVERLAY THICKNESSES

FIRST LAYER FINAL LAYER LAYER THICKNESS (WOL Design

(>8FN)

Thickness)

A B

C A

B C

A B

C 00

.910

.881

.860 1.403 1.408 1.324 493

.527

.464 ICAC-F-13 900

.910

.992

.865 1.399 1.505 1.355 489

.513

.490

(.430) 1800

.893

.926

.942 1.401 1.448 1.465 508

.522

.523 2700

.910 1.012

.956 1.408 1.535 1.443 498

.523

.487 00 1.470

.800

.820 1.670 1.080 1.090 200

.280

.27 0 3PB3-3 900 1.430

.820

.830 1.670 1.080 1.100 240

.260

.270

(.200) 1800 1.500

.820

.830 1.710 1.120 1.110 210

.300

.280 2700 1.430

.840

.840 1.710 1.090 1.100 280

.250

.260 00

.800

.840

.770 1.030 1.070 1.020 230

.230

.250 3PA3-2 900

.850

.800

.780 1.060 1.050 1.030 210

.250

.250

(.200) 1800

.810

.810

.780 1.060 1.050 1.050 250

.240

.27 0 2700

.810

.840

.780 1.020 1.060 1.030 210

.220

.250 00

.420

.380

.380 JPAF-2 900

.410

.370

.390

(.120) 1800

.460

.370

.390 Inconel 82 2700

.450

'.460

.460 00

.900

.920

.840 1.130 1.130 1.110

.230

.210

.27 0 3PB3-2 900

.900

.930

.860 1.190 1.220 1.130

.290

.290

.27 0

(.200}

1800

.920

.930

.890 1.250 1.27 0 1.220

.330

.340

.330 2700

.880

.890

.860 1.110 1.17 0 1.190

.230

.280

.330 00

.773

.475

.665 JPBF-2 900

.323

.424

.409

(.120) 1800

.326

.418

.391 Inconel 82 2700

.317

.364

.417

  • all measurements in inches 9

Attachment #5 Weld Overlay Delta Ferrite Measurements Weld Layer Delta Ferrite Level JPAJ-2 8FN was reached on 1st layer 1

8 FN 3 additional layers 2

10.8 FN 9.97 average 3

11.1 FN JPBJ-2 8FN achieved on 2nd layer 2

8 FN 4 additional layers 3

10.8 FN 4

10.5 FN 10.6 average 5

12 FN 6

12 FN ICAC-F-13 8FN achieved on 2nd layer 2

9.3 FN 7 additional layers 3

10.0 FN 4

10.5 FN 5

10.4 FN 10.4 average 6

10.9 FN 7

11.3 FN 8

10.4 FN JPBJ-3 8FN achieved on 1st layer 1

8 FN 4 additional layers 2

10 FN 3

10.6 FN 9.8 average 4

10.4 5

10 FN