ML20138H828

Physical Security Insp Rept 50-334/85-26 on 851120-22. Licensee Apparently Violated NRC Approved Physical Security Plan & Implementing Procedures When Employee Accessed Protected Area W/O Identification Check

ML20138H828
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	12/05/1985
From:	Lester Tripp, Troskoski W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20138H814	List: ML20138H810 ML20138H828
References
50-334-85-26, NUDOCS 8512170335
Download: ML20138H828 (3)

See also: IR 05000334/1985026

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No. 50-334/85-26

Docket No. 50-334 License No. DPR-66

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Licensee: Duquesne Light Company

One Oxford Center

301 Grant Street

Pitts. burgh, Pennsylvania 15279

Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1

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Inspection At: Shippingport, Pennsylvania

Inspection Conducted: November 20-22, 1985

Inspector: . . J

.. . Tr 6(oski, Senior Resident Inspector date

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Approved by: W. b. / 8I

L'. E. TM $p, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3A date

. Inspection Summary: Special Physical Security Inspection on November 20-22, 1985

(Inspection Report No. 50-334/85-26)

Areas Inspected: Special inspection to review the circumstances and the licensee's

actions relative to an apparent violation of the Physical Security Plan and per-

sonnel access control procedures which permitted a plant employee to access the

a protected area without proper identification. The inspection involved 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />

onsite by,the Senior Resident Inspector.

Results: The licensee appears to have violated the NRC approved Physical Security

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Plan and implementing procedures in that an employee was permitted to access the

protected area without obtaining his photo-identification badge.

8512170335

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

J. D. Sieber, General Manager, Nuclear Services

J. M. Lukehart, Director of Security

2. MC 92700 Onsite Follow-up of a Report of a Non-Routine Event

a. Background

A plant employee exited the plant protected area (PA) at approximately

10:00 a.m., November 19, 1985. At approximately 11:30 a.m., November

19, 1985, he returned to the primary access facility (PAF) where he met

a valve vendor that he knew at the badge counter. After an extended

conversation, the vendor left the PAF and the plant employee proceeded

through the access facility without obtaining his photo-identification

badge, was permitted access to the PA and went to his work place in the

plant, unescorted. At approximately 2:30 p.m., he became aware that he

didn't have his photo-identification badge and reported to the security

force that he had lost his badge. Security checked the computer access

control log which reflected that the employee exited the PA that morning

at 10:00 a.m. and that there was no subsequent entry. A check'of the

badge rack revealed that the badge was in its proper place in the rack.

The licensee advised the Senior Resident Inspector at 11:00 p.m. , Novem-

ber 20, 1985 that the employee accessed the PA without his photo-identi-

fication badge. The NRC Headquarters Duty Officer was advised of the

event by telephone at about 1:30 p.m., November 20, 1985.

b. NRC Inspector Findings

The inspector determined from a review of records and discussions with

the licensee that the plant employee had accessed the PA, unescorted,

without his photo-identification badge. Approximately 30 persons were

processed into the PA between 11:00 a.m. and-12:00 noon on November 19,

1985. Two PA entry aisles were open, with a number of the security force

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at'each, the access controller was'at his station, and the badge issuing

desk was properly manned. The access facility was not crowded and there-

were apparently no circumstances which would have precluded security

personnel from following approved personnel access procedures, according-

to the licensee.

A review of events by the inspector since June 1, 1984, indicates the

following access control (personnel) violations:

June 28, 1984 84-1 Authorized Person in PA w/o Badge.

November 17, 1984 84-2 Authorized Person in PA w/o Badge

August 20, 1985 85-1 Authorized Person Issued Wrong Badge

September 20, 1985 85-2 Authorized Person Issued Wrong Badge

November 19, 1985 .85-3 Authorized Person in PA w/o Badge

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Gaining unescorted access without a badge is an apparent' violation of

the NRC approved BVPS Physical Security Plan, Revision F, Dated November

5,1984, Paragraphs 3.2.1.4.a. 3.2.1.6.a and 3.2.1.6.g (50-334/85-26-01).

Ec. Licensee Actions

The following actions were initiated by the licensee as a result of this

event:

(1) ' Access control card readers, which were installed but not activated

at.the turnstiles leading to the PA, were activated. (Completed

November 22, 1985).

(2) Access control procedures for PA entry were modified to provide an -

additional measure of control (Completed November 22, 1985).

(3) ~ Disciplinary measures were initiated against the three involved

security personnel and the other plant employee. (Completed Novem-

ber 20, 1985 and November 22, 1985, respectively.)

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