ML20138F683
| ML20138F683 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/28/1984 |
| From: | Kammerer C NRC OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS (OCA) |
| To: | Asselstine, Palladino, Roberts NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138F577 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-85-379, FRN-49FR27769 AB60-2-013, AB60-2-13, AB61-2-13, NUDOCS 8512160150 | |
| Download: ML20138F683 (12) | |
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladino Comissioner Roberts Comissioner Asselstine Comissioner Bernthal Comissioner Zech FROM': Carlton Kamerer, tor Office of Congre on 1 Affairs
SUBJECT:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND EPRI RESPONSES TO LLOYD AND FUQUA SUBCOMMITTEE QUESTIONS ON HEU/ LEU Following their hearing on;the need for research and test reactors to convert to LEU fuel, the Lloyd and Fuqua Subcomittees sent additional questions for the record to the State Department and EPRI as well as NRC.
The responses of the State Department and EPRI are attached for Comission information.
NRC's responses (CR-84-110) are currently in Comissioner offices for collegial action.
Attachments:
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- Unit ' States Deprrtment of State '
Washington, D.C. 20520 s-NOV 191984
Dear Madam Chairman:
In response to your letter of October 10, 1984 requesting additional information pursuant to the Department of State's testimony at the September 25, 1984 hearing on the conversion of Research and Test Reactors to Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Fuel, I am enclosing answers to your questions. We understand that these responses may be used to supplement the record of that hearing.
Please let me know if we can be of further assistance.
Sincerely, Robert F. Turner Acting Assistant Secretary Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs
Enclosure:
As stated.
The Honorable Marilyn Lloyd, Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy Research and Production, House of Representatives.
- 1. Q. Has there ever been either a successful or unsuccessful attempt to divert HEU fuel from a foreign research and test reactor?
A. To our knowledge, there has never been a successful or unsuccessful attempt to divert HEU from a foreign research and test reactor.
- 2. Q. Do you have any knowledge or information of any specfic threats aimed at foreign research and test reactor?
A. It should be kept in mind that most governments view terrorist threats as implicating their sovereign police pouers; and we would expect much of that information to be treated confidentially. The only information we have had concerning specific threats aimed at a foreign research reactor involves the 1982 Israeli attack which destroyed the Osirak reactor in Iraq.
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- 3. Q. You noted that many nations are either developing LEU fuels or have reactor conversion studies underway. Is trn(
other nation contemplating imposing a rule requiring conversions?
A. We are not aware that any other nation is presently contemplating a rule requiring conversion of domestic research reactors to low enriched uranium. Conversion of foreign reactors will take place, as a result of participation by foreign reactor operators in the RERTR program, in which a schedule for conversion is developed in conjunction with development and testing of low enriched fuels and technical studies of conversion of individuals reactors. HEU exports are simultaneously being phased out in conjunction with the development'of new LEU fuels. U.S. policy with regard to HEU exports provides a strong impetus to foreigners to move toward conversion.
- 4. Q. Does the Department of State have any assurances that if the NRC's proposed rule is implemented, other nations will impose similar requirements?
A. The Department of State has not sought or received any commitment from foreign governments that they will impose a similar requirement if NRC's proposed rule is implemented. As noted in the response to question 3 above, decisions by foreign governments to convert domestic reactors are being made in the context of their participation in the RERTR program and in light of U.S. policy on HEU exports.
- 5. Q. You noted that the actions of the NRC can be expected to have "some marginal effect on our future negotiations with foreign reactor operators." What weight'ing would you ittach to the NRC action compared to the other 8 considerations listed at the end of your testimony?
A. He do not believe it is possible to assign precise wei hts g or to rank the various factors which will influence foreign governments' attitudes toward conversion of their research reactors. However, we believe that some of the eight factors outlined in the State Department's testimony before the subcommittee on Energy Research and Production are clearly more important in terms of shaping foreigners' attitudes than widescale implementation of the proposed NRC rule. Of the eight considerations outlined, clearly the following will be of great importance to foreign reactor operators in addition to the gradual phasing out of HEU exports from the U.S.:
-- the development.of safe and reliable LEU fuels and their commercial availability;
-- the economics of conversion;
-- the availability of reprocessing services or back-end of the fuel cycle solutions for new fuels;
-- the regulatory steps which must be undertaken prior to conversion; and
-- the justifiable availability of HEU for operating reactors until the new fuels are ready.
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- 6. Q. Does the Department of State believe it would be necessary or helpful to the international nonproliferation efforts of the United States to convert domestic research and test reactors to LEU fuel?
A. The Department of State believes that the adoption of some form of the proposed NRC rule can be expected to have "some marginal effect on our future negotiations with foreign reactor operators." We believe, if the NRC decides to go forward with a proposed rule, that the most sensible approach would be to study conversion of some reactors that require fuel reloads.
Such an approach would make the domestic conversion program compatible with the RERTR program.
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- 7. Q. Who should bear the costs of any domestic conversion to low-enriched fuel ordered to assist in our international nuclear non-proliferation efforts?
A. First, we take exception to the concept inplied in the question .that the proposed domestic conversion should be undertaken to assist in our non-proliferation efforts. If the NRC goes forward with the proposed rule, in our view, the federal government should bear virtually all of the costs for a
conversion of domestic reactors to LEU fuels. These costs include not only fuel costs, but licensing costs and technical studies for reactor conversion. University research reactors provide valuable research and teaching tools. We see no reason why hard pressed universities should be forced to bear these
! costs and, possibly, to be forced to shut down because of the i
burden of expenses related to research reactor conversion.
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EPRI Electnc Power Research institute October 30, 1984 Dr. Harlan L. Watson Room D-374 ..
Rayburn House Office Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20515
Subject:
Response to Questions in october 10 Letter on HEU-LEU, from Committee on Science and Technology
Dear Dr. Watson:
- 1. Question: Is there any need to convert to low-enriched fuel?
Answer: On the basis that public interest is served by addressing the largest risks first and expending resources in proportion to the size of the risk reduction achieved, I would suggest the following priorities:
- 1. Return of the substantial tonnage of spent fuel containing highly enriched U-235 to the United States.
- 2. Reduction in enrichment of fuel shipped overseas years). to no more than 50% U-235 (in 1-3 .
- 3. Eventual reduction of fuel shipped overseas to about 20% enrichment (in 3-6 years).
- 4. Conversion of domestic research and testing reactors with power ratings in excess of 5 megawatts to about 50% enrichment when such fuel becomes available (in 3-6 years) and replacement is needed.
- 5. No scheduled conversion and enrichment of low power research reactors which have
" lifetime cores" until and unless fuel replacement becomes necessary for operational reasons, in that case, enrichments of 50% or less could be used. These priorities recognize the ranking of diversion risks as developed in the attached paper *.
- " Analysis of Diversion Risks of Plutonium or Highly Enriched Uranium", E.L. Z ebroski; Presented at Annual-Meeting of The Society for Risk Analysis, Oct. 1, 1984.
3412 Hillwew Avenue. Post Ofhce Box 10412, Pato Alto. CA 94303 Telephone (415: 855 2000 Washsngton Office 1800 Massachusetts Ave, NW Suste 100, Washington. DC 20036 (202) 872M ,
- 2. Question: Are augmented security' measures necessary because security at the present time is inadequate?
Answer: Security has been adequate historically since
'~ there has been no successful attempt at diversion or thef t of research reactor fuel in nearly 1500 reactor years of existence of such reactors. (Although at least 3 minor intrusion attempts have occurred. ) Howeve r ,
the NRC took substantial steps to upgrade security in 1983, and proposed still further augmentation in 1984 (following a Presidential directive to all Federal Agencies.) The augmented measures contemplate widespread use of tamper-resistant alarms and communications, some of which I understand are already implemented in many places. I believe that if these measures were uniformly implemented at all research reactors they would be adequate. I am not personally aware whether such implementation has been universally accomplished or not.
- 3. Question: Do you know why the 20% level was originally elected as a goal for LEU fuel?
Answer: I do not know the official reason for picking that level. Technically one can surmise that j
it was based on the increase in amount of material required, and the substantial increase in technical difficulty of making an explosive device work, as the enrichment is reduced. Many hundreds of kilograms would be required at 20%. I suggested the 50%
enrichment level would be adequate for small research reactors and for larger overseas research and test reactors for two reasons:
A. Where such conversion is justified it is technically feasible to implement it 3-5 years sooner and with much higher assurance of adequate fuel performance, than with 20%
enrichment.
B. With 50% enrichment or less, it would be necessary to postulate as a credible diversion hazard that the fuel from nearly all of the domestic research reactors-was
O simultaneously diverted or stolen, in order to make even a single nuclear device possible.*
- 4. Question: Would reprocessing of HEU fresh and
' irradiated fuel be necessary in order to use the material for a nuclear explosive device?
Answe r: Yes, reprocessing would be required for both types of material. However, for fresh fuel, the reprocessing could be done in conventional chemical facilities without shielding, whereas irradiated fuel requires more complex and expensive facilities to cope with the radiation levels present.
S. Question: Would it be appropriate to consider exempting all those reactors with lifetime cores?
Answer: Yes. This question is adressed more fully in the response to question number (l). (Second part of question on the the amount of material required for a "high technology" device.) High technology devices involve 10-20 kilograms of U-235 in the form of metal.
The typical research reactor with lifetime core operates with less than 5 kilograms of HEU. AccGrdingly, even for high technology devices, from two to four research reactor inve.ntories would be required assuming no losses in processing, and as a practical matter three to five typical research reactor inventories would be required.
- 6. Question: What leverage does the U.S. have in insisting that HEU existing in foreign sites be returned? Are there even good records of where this material is?
Answer: At present the U.S. makes substantial charges for receiving and reprocessing the material, including the cost for eventual storage for the radioactive wastes. Those charges, I believe, are set on a " full amortization basis" which implies that the reprocessing and waste disposal facilities are amortized
- Dr. Carson Ma rk , formerly in charge of weapons design at Los Alamos also endoresed consideration of enrichments near 50% for this purpose.
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D with a short life time leading to high charges per unit of fuel received. In addition, the sending country must bear the cost of packaging and shipping. The net effect of this is that there is little or no incentive to return the spent fuel because of
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the high costs. It would be in the national interest, and extremely cost-effective in investment of taxpayer money in terms of risk reduction, to charge at most the actual marginal operating costs only for reprocessing and waste disposal since the amortization costs are actually fully " sunk" costs. Also, reasonable credit for the value
- of the U-235 recovered can be a substantial offset to the cost of reprocessing. For many countries this would be sufficient leverage to motivate the return of spent fuel. In cases in which this was not effective, normal diplomatic pressures and economic incentives could be used to encourage the return of HEU. In respect to location of these materials, my understanding is that the IAEA maintains records for all or most of the countries involved and the NRC and DOE have been improving their access to such record keeping. I suspect the main deficiency is slow reporting of transactions involving intermediate transfers of such fuel in past years.
- 7. Question: How would you rank the risk of diversion of HEU from domestic research and test reactors relative to other HEU sources?
Answer: This question is covered under question number (1) and the reference listed. The actions (1), (2), and (3) in the reply to Question 2 address a risk about ten times larger than (a) in action (4). Action (4) addresses a risk about ten times larger than that in item (5).
- 8. Question: What are the potential threats to reactor facilities? How would conversion from HEU to LEU address these threats?
Answer: The threats to research facilities generally, are not restricted to research reactors.
These include threats of damage to equipment, l
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O theft of materials or equipment, injury to personnel, and damage to facilities. In addition, symbolic actions for media attention, ranging from graffiti to vandalism to pointless damage, have occurred in some types of research facilities, such as c ompute rs . (These have not actually occurred at research reactors, however, to my knowledge.)
The conversion from HEU to LEU does not f
address most of these threats except for the possible theft of material. Conversion to LEU has the advantage that officials could say, in the event of thef t, or attempted intrusion or thefts, that there is no possibility of making a nuclear explosive.
However, the same statement could be made with HEU if the inadequate amounts of material at any research reactor are taken into account.
- 9. Question: What are some of the societal impacts of the loss of some research reactors?
Answer: One can speculate on the kinds of impacts, but the quantitative extent would require considerable studies. It would depend upon how many and which reactors were af fected.
Cle'arly there would be loss of both research (medical, physical, and chemical research) and training capabilities. The long term effect would be to move the center of gravity of such capabilities even more rapidly overseas with negative long term consequences in health, research, and training.
- 10. Question: What changes would you recommend to decrease the diversion risks at university reactors?
Answer: (Summing up from previous questions).
- 1. Assure comprehensive implementation of 1983 and 1984 security measures, including general implementation of modern tamper-resistant alarm and communication capabilities.
- 2. Provide for direct communication from research reactor facilities to Department of Energy emergency response teams. (The present system involves a chain of at l
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1 least four telephone calls, between different agencies. This guarantees excessive delay in useful response by DOE in the event such response were needed.
,, (This single change, available at very low cost, probably gives a greater degree of risk reduction than all of the other measures so far considered. It faces the obvious obstacle of jurisdictional questions between various agencies.)
- 3. For the two or three research reactors which have significant power levels and operating factors that fresh fuel is frequently required, consider a gradual transition to 50% enrichment, or ..
thereabouts, over a period of some years as in when such fuel becomes available and adequately tested.
- 4. For " lifetime core" reactors, implement the security steps discussed above, but do not mandate conversion to LEU. If fuel replacement eventually does become necessary, consider use of enrichment near 50%.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to these questions.
Sincer ly ours, E. L. Zeb o ki Chief Nuc ar Scientist EL2/nw
Attachment:
SRA Paper h
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