ML20138D756
| ML20138D756 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 12/05/1985 |
| From: | Ronald Bellamy, Pasciak W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138D693 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-85-42, 50-278-85-42, NUDOCS 8512130293 | |
| Download: ML20138D756 (4) | |
See also: IR 05000277/1985042
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report Nos. 85-42/85-42
Docket Nos.
50-277/50-278
License No.
DPR-44/0PR-56
Priority
Category
C
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Licensee:
Philadelphia Electric Company
2301 Market Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101
Facility Name:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 2, 3
Meeting At: NRC Region I, King of Prussia PA
Meeting Conducted: November 14, 1985
Prepared by:
(M. k.
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N er u- U N F
date
Radiation Protection Section
Approved by: M k.
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R.R.Bellamy, Chief,EP&RQ,DRSS
date
Meeting Summary:
Enforcement Conference at NRC Region I, King of Prussia,
Pennsylvania, on November 14, 1985, to discuss the several transportation
problems and the findings of 50-277/85-39; 50-278/85-40. The specific topics
discussed at the meeting were radwaste transportation shipments that occurred
on or about October 16, July 28, July 7, May 30, and April 17, 1985; causes of
problems associated with these shipments; and the licensee's corrective
actions.
The meeting was attended by NRC and license management and lasted about
115 hours0.00133 days <br />0.0319 hours <br />1.901455e-4 weeks <br />4.37575e-5 months <br />.
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DETAILS
1.
PARTICIPANTS
Philadelphia Electric Company
M. J. Cooney, Manager, Nuclear Production
S. L. Daltroff, Vice President, Electric Production
R. S. Fleischmann, Superintendent, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
A. E. Hilsmeir, Senior Health Physicist
W. J. Knapp, Director, Radiation Protection Section
F. D. Lear, Licensing Engineer
W. T. Ullrich, Superintendent, Nuclear Generation Division
U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission
J. M. Allan, Deputy Regional Administrator
R. R. Bellamy, Chief, Emergency Preparedness and
Radiological Protection Branch
R. Bores, Technical Assistant, DRSS
P. Clemons, Radiation Specialist
J. M. Grant, Reactor Engineer
J. Gutierrez, Regional Counsel
D. J. Holody, Enforcement Specialist
T. P. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector
T. T. Martin, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
T. E. Murley, Regional Administrator
W. J. Pasciak, Chief, BWR Radiological Protection Section
R. W. Starostecki, Director, Division of Reactor Projects
2.
Purpose
The Enforcement Conference was held at the request of NRC Region I to
discuss five transportation problems. The discussions at the meeting
focused on the events; the identified deficiencies; their significance
and cause; and the licensee's planned and completed corrective actions.
3.
Discussion
On October 16, 1985, Philadelphia Electric Company (PECO) snipptJ_ radio-
active waste material described as. centrifuged resin, packaged in 14
palletized high integrity containers (HICs). On October 18, 1985, a
representative of the State of South Carolina inspected the shipment
upon its arrival at the burial site at Barnwell, South Carolina and
found_that lifting cables for the top pallet in the cask were entangled
and not easily accessible. The cask was not accepted by the burial site.
On April 17, 1985, a violation was also identified at Barnwell which was
very similar to this one (Shipment No. 0485-156).
Centrifuged resin was
packaged in PECO HICs contained in a cask and the top pallet D-ring and
hook were pinned under the pallet.
The off-loading process required un--
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necessary exposure to burial site personnel. The State of South Carolina
issued a warning letter.
Regarding the April 17, 1985 violation, the licensee explained that this
occurred because the rigging cables were stuffed alongside the HIC's on
the top pallet. Normally they are put on top but this could not be done
because the vendor provided a cask to the licensee that had a slightly
thicker lid and the cask could not be closed with the cables on top. The
Radwaste Supervisor incorrectly expected that the lifting cables would
remain along side and not drop down during transport. The licensee took
action by emphasizing the importance of following procedures to their
staff and requested that the vendor not provide the cask with the thick
lid in the future.
Regarding the October 16, 1985 shipment, new regulatory requirements
resulted in pallets and lifting cables being buried with the HICs.
previously the containers were dumped off the pallets at the burial site
and the pallets and lifting cables were returned with the cask. As a
result, the vendor designed-lighter, less-costly lifting cables.
The
licensee described that the lighter cables move around more in transport,
and that this was the cause of the October 16, 1985, problem. The licen-
see is currently working with the burial site in developing a modification
that will prevent the movement and entanglement of the lifting cables.
The initial modification included a disk that was placed on the top pallet
of HICs to which the lifting cables are attached. The licensee is still
working on this modification with the burial site.
On May 30, 1985, a drum with radwaste that was shipped to Richland,
Washington was not packaged " strong and tight" (Shipment No. 103-85) but
was punctured when it arrived at the burial site. There was no leakage or
loss of contents because the contents of the drum had been solidified with
concrete prior to shipment.
This was a violation of 10 CFR 71.5 and 49
CFR 173.425 (b)(1) and was discussed in NRC Combined Inspection Report
50-277/85-27; 50-278/85-25.
The NRC issued a Severity III level Notice of
Violation for this event.
The licensee described their studies of similar solidified 55 gallon drums
purposely rammed with fork lifts to attempt to reproduce the type of hole
that was in the punctured drum. They were not able to demonstrate that
holes similar to the one in the punctured drum could have been made by
the fork lift apparatus. They also stated that they did not-believe any
other phase of the drum filling and loading operation could have caused
the puncture and they expressed their belief that it either occurred in
transport or at the burial site. Nevertheless, the licensee revised the
fork lift drum loading procedures to emphasize care in handling and re-
emphasized training of the fork lift operators in the revised procedures.
On or about July 7,1985, a cask containing control rod blades (Shipment
No.145-85) was shipped with improperly filled out shipping papers.
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Before reaching the burial site the licensee realized that the papers were
incorrect and halted the shipment and supplied proper shipping papers.
The activity contained in the cask was incorrectly entered on the papers.
This was a violation of several NRC requirements and Severity Level IV and
V Notice of Violations were issued.
This problem was licensee identified.
The problem occurred because of poor communication and inadequate QC review
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prior to the release of the cask for shipment. The licensee's corrective
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actions involve separate verification of consistency by QC and HP groups.
The actions were timely and appeared to be adequate.
On or about July 28, 1985, a shipment was made similar to the July 7, 1985,
shipment described above (Shipment No.169-85).
Upon inspection at
Barnwell, South Carolina, removable contamination was found which exceeded
the 220 dpm/cm2 NRC limit.
Contamination was measured at the 320 and 480
dpm/cm2 levels.
The contamination was not readily accessible until the
cask was removed from the trunion cup at the burial site. This was a vio-
lation of 10 CFR 71.87(i)(2) and a Severity Level IV Notice of Violation
was issued to the licensee.
The licensee described that this occurred because of the cask design.
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Water trapped in the velocity limiters of the control rod blades needs to
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drain out of the cask when it is lowered onto the trailer bed. The cask
is not designed to route the water to a point where it can be collected,
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but flows into the trunion cup area.
This area cannot be easily decontam-
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inated without unbolting the cask from the trunion cup and lifting it
back up, thus exposing the inside of the trunion cup. The licensee has
developed a modification to their procedure which requires that the cask
be lifted off the trailer as described above so that the trunion cup can
be decontaminated. Also the vendor is being requested to consider a modi-
fication to the cask to allow collection of the trapped water.
4.
Concluding Statements
Licensee management concluded by stating their belief that this series of
transportation events do not represent a programmatic breakdown of their
radwaste transportation program.
NRC Region I management acknowledged that plans and corrective actions
presented appeared to adequately address the issues.
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