ML20138D338

Proposed Tech Specs,Allowing Count Rate on Source Range Monitor Channels Below Required Counts Per Second When Four or Less Fuel Assemblies in Quadrant or Adjacent. Significant Hazards Consideration Encl

ML20138D338
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	10/11/1985
From:	COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20138D336	List: ML20138D330 ML20138D338
References
0766K, 766K, NUDOCS 8510230242
Download: ML20138D338 (9)

Text

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ATTACHMENT B PROPOSED CHANGE TO APPENDIX A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION TO OPERATING LICENSES tPF-ll and NPF-18 Revised Pages:

NPF-11 NPF-18 3/4 9-3 3/4 9-3 8 3/4 9-1 B 3/4 9-1 0766K 8510230242 851011 PDR ADOCK 05000373 P PDR

REFUELING OPERATXONS 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.2 At least 2 source range monitor * (SRM) channels shall be OPERABLE # and inserted to the normal operating level with:

a. Continuous visual indication in the control room,

b. One of the required SRM detectors located in the quadrant where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed and the other required SRM detector located in an adjacent quadrant, and

c. The " shorting links" removed from the RPS cippuitry prior to and during the time any control rod is withdrawn and shutdown margin demonstrations. *

' APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5 ,

ACTION:

TAf Se%- [ f4 With the requirements of the above specification'not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS ** and insert all insertable  ;

control rods. ,

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.2 Each of the above required SRM channels shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. At least once per 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />s:

1. Performance of a CHANNEL CHECK, i

2. _ Verifying the detectors are inserted to the normal operating level, and

3. During CORE ALTERATIONS, verifying that the detector of an OPERABLE SRM channel is located in the core quadrant where CORE ,

ALTERATIONS are being performed and another is located in an adjacent quadrant.

"The use of special movable detectors during CORE ALTERATIONS in place of '

the normal SRM nuclear detectors is permissible as long as these special detectors are connected to the normal SRM circuits. <

• • Except movement of IRM, SRM or special movable detectors.

The normal or emergency power source may be inoperable.

"Not reouired for control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

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l LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 9-3 l

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.1 RE/.CTOR MODE SWITCH Locking the OPERABLE reactor mode switch in the Shutdown or Refuel position, as specified, ensures that the restrictions on control rod withdrawal and refueling platform movement during the refueling operations are properly activated. These conditions reinforce the refueling procedures and reduce the probability of inadvertent criticality, damage to reactor internals or fuel assemblies, and exposure of personnel to excessive radioactivity.

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3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION ,

The OPERABILITY of at least two source range monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the corej 4 gamo, '

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3/4.9.3 CONTROL ROD POSITION The requirement that all control rods be inserted during other CORE

-- ALTERATIONS ensures that fuel will not be loaded into a cell without a control rod.

3/4.9.4 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to fuel movement ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses. .

3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS The requirenent for comniunications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity condition during movement of fuel within the reactor pressure vessel.

3/4.9.6 CRANE AND HOIST

.The OPERABILITY requirements ensure that the cranes and hoists used for handling control rods and fuel assemblies within the reactor pressure vessel:

l (1) have sufficient load capacity for handling fuel assemblies and control rods, and (2) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from

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excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.

i LA SALLE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-1 l

REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.2 At least 2 source range monitor * (SRM) channels shall'be OPERABLE# and inserted to the normal operating level with: -

a. Continuous visual indication in the control room,

b. One of the required SRM detectors located in the quadrant where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed and the other required SRM detector located in an adjacent quadrant, and

c. The " shorting links" removed from the RPS cipguitry prior to and during the time any control rod is withdrawn and shutdown margin demonstrations.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5, ,

ACTION:

T N 5 e W 'T- R With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS ** and insert all insertable control rods.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.2 Each of the above required SRM channels shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. At least once per 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />s:

1. Performance of a CHANNEL CHECK,

2. Verifying the detectors are inserted to the normal operatirg level, and

, 3. During CORE ALTERATIONS, verifying that the detector of an l OPERABLE SRM channel is located in the core quadrant where CORE l ALTERATIONS are being performed and another is located in an

! adjacent quadrant.

^The use of special movable detectors during CORE ALTERATIONS in place of l the normal SRM nuclear detectors is permissible as long as these special detectors are connected to the normal SRM circuits.

• • Eicept movement of IRM, SRM or special movable detectors.

The normal or emergency power source may be inoperable.

Not required for control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

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LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 9-3 L

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.1 REACTOR MODE SWITCH Locking the OPERABLE reactor mode switch in the Shutdown or Refuel position, as specified, ensures that the restrictions on control rod withdrawal and refueling platform movement during the refueling operations are properly activated. These conditions reinforce the re. fueling procedures and reduce the probability of inadvertent criticality, damage to reactor internals or fuel assemblies, and exposure of personnel to excessive radioactivity.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of at least two source range monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity. condition of the corejh4 ,-h *, 0,y ,

3/4.9.3 CONTROL ROD POSITION The requirement that all control rods be inserted during other CORE ALTERATIONS ensures that fuel will not be loaded into a cell without a control rod.

3/4.9.4 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor suocriticality prior to fuel movement ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity condition during movement of fuel within the reactor pressure vessel.

3/4.9.6 CRANE AND HOIST The OPERABILITY requirements ensure that the cranes and hoists used for handling control rods and fuel assemblies within the reactor pressure vessel:

(1) have sufficient load capacity for handling fuel assemblies and control rods, and (2) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from l excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during l lifting operations.

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 9-1

INSERT A

, unless the following conditions are met:

a. No more than four (4) fuel assemblies are present in each core quadrant associated with an SRM;

b. While in core, these four fuel assemblies are in locations adjacent to die SRM; and

c. In the case of movable detectors, detector location shall be selected such that each group of fuel assemblies is separated.by at least two (2) fuel cell locations from any other fuel assemblies.

0766K

ATTACHMENT C SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Commonwealth Edison has evaluated the proposed Technical Specification Amendment and determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration. Based on the criteria for defining a significant hazards consiceration established in 10 CFR 50.92, operation of LaSalle County Station Unit 1 and 2 in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:

1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because positive assurance of subcriticality is provided by analyses for four or fewer assemblies loaded around the SRM locations;

2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because no new modes of refueling operation are being proposed; and

3) Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety since the margin to criticality is unaffected by the proposed Technical Specification Amendment.

Based on the preceding discussion, it is concluded that the proposed change clearly falls within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or component, the consequences of previously evaluated accidents will not be increased and the margin of safety will not be decreased. Therefore, based on the guidance provided in the Federal Register and the criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(c), the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration.

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. ATTACHMENT D

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l. GENERAL $ ELECTRIC DeuCLEAR ENERGY BusNEss CPERATIONs -

GENERAL ELECTRIC CCNPANY e 175 cURTNER AVENUE o SAN JOSE, CAuf0RN:A 95125 mn ok 174 ,

May 28, 1985 . cc: H. E. Bliss -

REP:85-099 P. R. Mattson Mr. J. L. An'derson Fuel Buyer -

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY Fuel Department, 234 E <

P. 0. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 ,

SUBJECT:

LaSalle Core Leading Procedures ,

DearM %nderson:

l This letter responds to your request for information concerning the loading of bundles around source range monitors (SRMs) during refueling at i ~LaSalle Units 1 and 2. Edison would like to modify their Technical Specifications to permit four fuei bundles to be loaded around each SRM to

- obtain the Technical Specification counts per second (cps) from the SRMs.

i General Electric has performed fuel reactivity (k-effective) calcula-tions which demonstrate that any four General Electric fuel bundles arranged in a square (2x2) array will have a k effective of less than 0.95 when: (a)aminimumof12inchesexistsbetweenthemandanysur- -

rounding bundles, (b) they are at their maximum reactivity exposure, and (c)theyareinanuncontrolledstate. This analysis was based on the

. General Electric lattice physics models previously reviewed and approved by the NRC. The loading of any combination of four General Electric fuel e bundles around each SRM prior to obtaining the Technical Specificattor. cps should not, therefore, constitute a safety concern.

Edison would begin refueling by loading two exposed fuel bundles around each SRM and then attempting to observe at least the Technical

. Specification cps. These bundles would be those scheduled to occupy those

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locations in the next cycle. If an acceptable count rate is then observed, '

e . spiral loading of the core would proceed. If insufficient counts were

'. observed, additional high exposure fuel bundles would be inserted to.

complete the 2x2 array around each SRM to attempt to reach a minimum of

. the Technical Specification cps. These additional fuel bundles would normally not have been loaded in these locations and would be so inserted

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solely'to assist in the SRM instrumentation check.

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'.'- If, at this point, the minimum of the Technical Specification cps was l l

not obtained, refue1% would be halted until the SRM instrumentation was E -

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YiRoX TELEc'oPIER 295 ; 5-20-E5: 3:44 PN;

' CCITT 03 + 13122944291 ; 72 FROM 6132

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GENERAL $ ELECTRIC Mr. J. L. Anderson May 28, 1985 checked.

If the required count rate is observed, then spiral loading would proceed from the center of the core outward, eventually encountering the fuel bundles previously loaded around the SRMs. The core configuration present, at this time, would be different from the scheduled full core loading in fwo respects. First, the core would only be partially loaded.

and..second, the second pair of bundles loaded around each SRM ma different from the bundles scheduled to occupy those locations. ySobelong as the cold reactivities (zero voids) of the high sxposure fuel bundles temporarily loaded around the SRMs are individually less than the cold reactivities of the respective bundles scheduled for those locations, the cold shutdown bounds marginreloaded the partially calculation performed for the scheduled core loading core.

The selection of the four bundles to be initially loaded around each SRM is, thus, not arbitrary, but the aforementioned criterion is not expected to hamper refueling operations.

If you have any further questions on this subject, please don't hesitate to contact us.

Very truly yours, LtL R. E. Parr Senior Fuel Project Manager Edison Projects M/C 174; (408) 925-6526 rem .

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