ML20138C872
| ML20138C872 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/06/1987 |
| From: | Zech L NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Gejdenson S HOUSE OF REP., INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8712070031 | |
| Download: ML20138C872 (60) | |
Text
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.'/ UNITED STATES ,
.V S, 'r, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
{ $ WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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'% November 6, 1987 (oM.
CHA!PMAN
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1 The Honora'ble Sam Gejdenson, Chairman
- . Subconunittee on General Oversight and Investigations Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs U.S. House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Enclosed is the NRC response to your October 9,1987 request for documents l concerning the threat of sabotage and terrorism to NRC-licensed facilities by i both " insiders" and external attackers. .
l Our response to certain questions is based on the distinction made by the Commission between radiological and non-radiological sabotage. NRC's primary concern is the prevention of radiological sabotage; i.e., deliberate acts that could lead to a radioactive release endangering the public health and safety.
The protection requirements designed to prevent acts of radiological sabotage also provide a degree of protection against industrial sabotage. This distinction is reflected in our response, which differentiates between acts of radiological sabotage (no such acts), industrial sabotage (1 instance), and a number of events involving tampering and vandalism.
Although we had to conduct a comprehensive search of a large volume of material on an expedited basis, we are reasonably satisfied that the documents identi-fied in the enclosure are responsive to your request. In the event that additional material is subsequently identified, we will promptly infom you.
J Please note that we have identified, but have not provided, classified i documents and documents originated and controlled by other agencies. Under Executive Order 12356 we are not authorized to release infomation or documents originated and controlled by another agency (Third (Agency Ruleh however, we would be pleased to arrange a classified briefing for you concerning the documents classified by NRC. ,, g,
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Please note also that the documents listed in Part B of Question 12 and Part B of Question 14 are not in the Commission's Public Document Room and are therefore not available to the public. Since these documents have )
not been publicly disclosed, we request that you preserve their confidentiality by restricting access and use to the Members and staff of the Subcommittee.
- Sincerely, L.
Lando W. Zech, r.
Enclosure:
As stated I l
l l cc: Rep. Denny Smith
00ESTION 1. A list of all incidents of sabotage, attempted sabotace, and suspected sabotage, that have occurred at any NRC-lidensed facility since 1977. Describe each incident, and the results of any investigation thereof, whether the incident was' done by an " outsider" or " insider," when and where is occurred, and the response to the incident by the NRC and the NRC licensee.
ANSWER.
Attached is NUREG-0525, " Safeguards Sunmary Event List (SSEL)." This document incorporates events pre-dating the NRC through December 31, 1986.
,The SSEL is the most complete published descriptive listing of various types of events of possible safeguards interest. The specific resolution is not always recorded, but is usually included for the more noteworthy incidents.
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l 00ESTION 2. A list of all threats to NRC-licensed facilities since 1977.
Please describe each threat, when and where it occurred, and the response to the threat by the NRC licensee.
ANSWEk,
- 1. NUREG 0525, " Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)." This document incorporates events pre-dating NRC through December 31, 1986 and is enclosed in response to Question 1. l
- 2. Preliminary Notifications of Events and Other Reports, January 1987 --
l October 9, 1987, (Attachment 1 Question 2). These will be incorporated in the next revision to the SSEL.
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- 3. Listing of other threats to NRC-licensed facilities which are not included in the SSEL (Attachment 2, Question 2).
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G9dtVUIGeIER_IUSEBIS_UQI_IUCLYkED_10_IdE SSE6 -
The threats listed below were assessed to be not credible. lhese threats, unl i }:e the majority of threats which are received by telephnne, usuel l y tool: the form of a written communication 1.e. t4 letter. The assessment of these written threats was conducted by assessment tec.sms ave 11able to the NRC through a jointiv funded NHC/ DOE pro.)ect. ,
J a ni.i %r y 11. 1480 Nuclear Fuel Services Erwin, Tennessee Boinb threat. Assessed as not credible, apparent boar.
January 11. 1980 Indian Point Consolidated Edtson Co.
Westchester County, N ~Y General threat demanding immediate shutcown of facility.
As sess ed as not credible, apparent hoan.
July 13, 1981 Diablo Canyon Pacific Gas and Electric Co. )
San Ltus Obispo County, CA 1 Threat to blow up Diablo Canyon. Assessed as not credible, apparent hoax.
j 5/11/82 Unidentified Facility General threat to attack nuclear power plant.
Assessed as not credible, apparent hos:: .
7/21/82 "
San Onofre Southern California Edison Co.
San Diego County, CA Alleged theft of SNM from facility. Assessed as not credible, apparent hoax.
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CUESTION 3. A list of all " Safeguards Events" since 1980 including dCtual or attempted theft of special nuclear material (SNM);
actual or attempted acts or events which interrupt normal operations at power reactors due to unauthorized use of or 1
tampering with machinery, components, or controls; all threats made against facilities possessing SNM; and i
safeguards systems failures impacting the effectiveness of i
the system. )
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ANSWER.
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- 1. NUREG-0525, " Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)," through Revision 13, July 1987, which incorporates events through December 31, 1986. (See Attachment, Question 1). NOTE
- A list of random failures of safeguards equipment has not been published. In such cases licensees are required to implement compensatory measures so that the effectiveness of safeguards is
- not reduced. )
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- 2. " Summary of Incidents That May Have Involved Deliberate Acts Directed Against Plant Equipment in Vital Areas of Operating Reactors (1980-1982)."
1 (Attachment 1, Question 3).
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- 3. Preliminary Notifications of Events and Other Reports, January 1987 - l October 9, 1987. (See Attachment 1, Question 2). These will be incorporated in the next revision to the SSEL. ,
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l 4 Listing of other threats to NRC-licensed facilities which are not i
included in the SSEL. l (See Attachment 2, Question 2).
, , j ENCLCSUPE '.
SUMMARY
OF INCIDENTS THAT MAY HAVE INVOLVED DELIBERATE ACTS DIRECTED AGA!PST PLANT EQUIPMENT IN VITAL AREAS OF OPERATING REACTORS I (1980 - 1982) l 1980 Salem On Seotenber 10, 1980, following a reactor trio and initiation of auxiliary j
feedwater finw at Salem Nuclear Generatin? Station Unit 1, an anonymous caller notified the r.henistry staff of problems with the hydrazine addition i tank (which adds hydrazine to auxiliary feedwater). Samples were immediately taken of the tanks, which indicated sodiun (500 ppm) and chloride (1,200 ppm) i contamination. The tank which had not been used for chemical additions since the previous Unit 1 shutdown in June,1980, was removed from service.
The event did not involve degradation of essential safety-related eouipment or l reduction in the deoree of crotectica of the public health and safety. NRC ;
nonitored the licensee's subsecuent investigation of the incident.
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1981 Beaver Valley On June 5,1981, during a routine operator tour, three Auxiliary Feedwater Pumos' manual suction isolation valves at the Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station were found unchained and unlocked in violation of technical specification require-eents. The valves were found in their normal cositions. On the following day, a manual valve in the High Head Safety Injection Pumps' common suction line was found shut during a routine operator tour and was inmediately re-opened. The chains ind locks that normally secured this valve in the open oosition and those 9at secured the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump's suction valves were not found. Althouch the event did not result in any adverse effects on the health of the public or licensee personnel, it did represent
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i l a major degradation of essential safety-related equipment designed to l mitigate the consequences of a major occurrence such as a loss of coolant accident. Therefore, NRC reported the incic , < to the Congress as an -
abnormal occurrence. The licensee. NRC, and FBI investigated the inci:ent and a determination was made tnat the circumstances established tnat t.9e intent of the probaole perpetrator was to narass or emoarrass tne 'icensee rather than to connit raciological sabotaca On June 9, 1981, the NRC issued an immediate action letter formally confirming interim licensee commitments.to strengthen controls over and surveillance of essential safety-related equioment. Based upon the results of an on-site assessment conducted in August 1981, the NRC staf f has approved relaxing, somewnat, these stringent interim commttments.
Nine Mile point
- On Aug at 13, 1981, during a routine diesel generator operability surveil-lance test, a diesel generator, at the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant, failed to itart because a pet cock drain on the fuel ,011 final filter housing had been tampered with. Licensee pervennel immediately re-aligned the pst cock and the diesel generator subsequently starteo. An immediate check of the diesel generator supplying the other power train revealed that the analogous pet cock had also been misaligned. It aas immediately re-aligned. Althougn tne event did involve major cegradation of the j on-site back-up AC ::-er supply, there was no major reouction in the degree
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of protection of tre ..:lic realth or safety. The NRC mcnit: red the licensee's subsequent vestigation which confirmed tnat intentional l
tampering had occurred. A tca. current NRC safeguards inspection found no 1
items of non-compliance with NRC regulations.
l Palisades ,
On October 3,1981, a contractor employee found that the wire cluster insula- I tion and approximately.one-half of the individual wires had been cut in a.
safety-related instrumentation / control table, which was cart of the 7"I-relatee long tenn cooling Ndifications being cade during the ongoing outage at the l Palisades Nuclear Dower Station. ~he licensee searched the area for other damage and conducted a walkdown of all safety-related systems for operacility prior to olant start-uo af ter the cutace. The event did not involve major degradation of essential safety-related equicment or a major reduction in the degree of protection of the public health and safety. The MRC monitored the licensee's investigation of the event and conducted a scecial inspection which identified no items of non-cenoliance with MRC regulations.
1 Dresden '
On October 14, 1981, during routine coerator rounds at Dresden Nuclear oower Station Unit 3, a diesel generator erergency fuel shutof f valve was found mispositioned. The licensee immediately re-aligned the valve, checked the other diesel generators, and verif f ed tnat the systems were operational. The event did not involve major degradation of essential safety-related equipment or a major reduction in the degree of protection of the public health and safety. The NRC nonitored the Ikensee's investigation of the incident.
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.4-l y 1982 Salem On May 1, 1982, during an inspection of the hot shutdown panel prompteoa'y ~
the failure of the control room wide range level recorder for a steam gener-ator at Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1, an instrument and centrol engineer found the terminals snorted by a metal cable clip. A review of tne recorder trace indicated that this had occurred on April 28. The event did not involve major degradation of essential safety-related equipment or a major reduction in the degree of protection of the public health and safety.
Subsequently, the licensee ccmoleted an investigation which found that authorized modification work had been conducted in the cabinet and concluded that the event may have occurred by accident and that tampering was unlikely due to the amount of effort involved to accomolish a relatively insignificant act. A special NRC inspection, which included safeguards measures in place during this period, was conducted June 14-18, 1982.
Brunswick On May 14, 1982, during an outage at Brunswick Unit 2, twelve incore source range and intermediate range monitoring neutron detector guide tubes were found to be bent where the tubes exit the vessel. This was identified as a possible deliberate act on Jure 2,1982, when the licensee's review of the event failed
! to identify a cause :r the damage that was related to ongoing maintenance
! activities. Althougr - e event did not result in any adverse effects on the health and safety of the public or licensee personnel, it would have repre-4 sented a major degradation of essential safety-related equipment designe'd to 1
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mitigate the consequences of an occurrence such as an overoower transient had the condition not been detected prior to start-up of tne Unit. On June a .
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j 3, the NRC issued a confirmation of action letter femally confirming the - !
licensee's commitment to strengthen controls over and conduct special !
surveillances of essential safety-related eouipment orior to start-uo of either Unit 2 or Unit 1, which nad trioped on June 2 due to an unrelated l instrument problem.
Salem On August 9,1982, Salem Fuclear Generating Station Unit I was manually tricoed in response to an event cau ed by the No.12 Station Essential Controls Inverter Breaker beino in the Mff" cosition. All safety systems I responded normally to the manual trip. ' subsecuent investigation deter-1 nined that the "off" cosition of the breaker was not associated with any ,
automatic protection action but rather could, accarently, only be achieved manually. Thus, deliberate action was suspected. As an imediate action, the licensee began performing a number of additional surveillances of safety-relatad equipment for both units. No other discrepancies were found and the plant resumed operation on Auoust 10. The event did not involve ]
l major dagradation of essential safety-related eouiement or reduction in the !
degree of protection of the public health and safety. The NRC and fbi investigated and a detemination was made that, if the act was deliberats, l the motivation could have been curiosity. However, it was also concluded that personnel in tre area could have accidently tricoed the control system i circuit breaker whicn resembles a wall switch for room lighting. j
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. . . l Salem On August 16, 1982, durino a routine operator tour at Salem Muclear Generatino
- Station Unit 2, the manual isolation stop valves for each set of two 3ir -
l start notors (four total) for the 2C Diesel Generator were found in the snut position. Subsequent investigation by site personnel found no reason for the cositioning of the valves t3 have been chanced since they had been 4
. verified coen the crevious day. Cue to the possibility of deliberate
- tampering, the licensee conducted oceraoility checks of essential safety-related equipment in addition to continuing the precautionary measures initiated in resconse to the August 9 event (see orevious entry). The event did not involve rajor degradation of essential safety-related eouipment or major reduction in the degree of cratection of the public health and safety.
l The licensee, MRC, and FBI investigated and a determination was made that, if the act was del f oerate, the intent acceared to have been harrassment of management as cocosed to causing harm to the oublic or olant employees.
On August 18, the NRC issued a confirmation of action letter formally e
confimino licensee commitments to strengthen controls over and surveil-4 lance of essential safety-related eouiement.
i Salem
) On Septes6er 3,198C. licensee personnel, investicating the cause of an unplanned gaseoss radioactive release from the Salem Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Auxiliary Buil11ng, found a drain valve on the vent line from the Volume Control Tare :en. No authorization had been given to nanipulate this valve and the :ensee's initial conclusion was that this was an act of tamoering. As an i nediate action, the licensee conducted operability checks of essential safety-related eouioment in addition to the precaution-ary measures committed to in the NRC confirmatory action letter (see previous
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entry). The total radioactive release resulting from the valve being ocen !
was estimated to be 19 curies of Xenon-133, which was well withi,n the regul3 tory limits for routine radioactive releases, from approximately 11:00 a.m.
l to 9:00 p.m. on Scotember 3. The event did not involve ma,jor decradation of l l
essential safety-related eoutonent or c'aior reduction in the degree of protection of public health and safety. The licensee subseouently conducted a detailed review and investication which revealed that the valve would ocen af ter being repeatedly stru;:k by a nearby cage door during entry into this area. The cresence and contamination of a maintecance crew at the time the release began and the absence of knowledge or report of anyone else in the immediate area substantiated the conclusion that the valve opening was accidental rather than the result of tamoering.
Maine Yankee On November 18, 1982, durino a refueling cutace at the Maine Yankee Nuclear oower Station, about a cupful of metal chios, two bolts, and two nuts were discovered inside the oil reservoir for the lube oil pumos for the No.1 Reactor Coolant Pumo. The reservoir had been inscected on November 16 during l a filter change-out and no debris had been discovered at that time. The licensee inspected the lube oil reservoirs for the other two reactor coolant pumps and found no indications of debris. The event did not involve major degradation of essential safety-related eculoment or reduction in the degree of protection of t*e ruolic health and safety. On 'Jovember 19, the NRC issued l
' a confimatory acte 'etter formrily confimino licensee ccmmitments to increast l
surveillance of esseattal safety-related equiceent and to perfom additional cce' bility checks crior to blant start-uo. The NRC is also monitoring the progress of the licensee'n investigation.
9 QUESTION 4 A list of all violations of physical security regulations by NRC licensees since 1980. Please. describe each violation, when and where it occurred, NRC and licensee response to the violation, the amount of any fine imposed as a result of such -
violations, and any corrective action required.
ANSWER.
Attachment A is a list of all civil penalties issued for safeguards violations occurring since 1980, and a brief description of each case in the attached copies of the Enforcement Notification. No licensee response is provided for the reasons given below.
Attachment 8 is a printout of violations of security regulations by NRC licensees during 1987. Due to delays in getting inspection reports into.the computer system, the report is over 95% complete thru mid-August and less complete from then to the present time. It should be noted that the report provides a brief description of each event, when and where it occurred, the NRC response by severity level, but does not list a licensee response. As a general matter, licensees are always required to take corrective action in response to a finding of violation. To gather specific licensee responses for these particular events would require each of the 5 Regions to compile all correspondence between licensees d NRC offices pertaining to each event.
Such an effort would require numerous staff-days of effort. If the Subcommittee would like in*'ormation on a specific licensees' response to a particular incident, we can gather such information.
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2-Ouestion 4 (Continued) -
The severity level scale is 1-5 with 1 being the most severe level of l
! violation and five being the least severe level of violation. The highest severity level of incident in the report is "3". On pages 56 and 85 the listing of severity levels of "2" is a clerical error and has been co'rrected l by pen markup. Both of these should have been recorded as severity level I
l "5". In cases where there is no severity level listing or text, no I
i deficiencies were noted during the inspection.
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QUESTION 5. Any and'all documents concerning the loss of three or four off-site power sources for the Palo Verde nuclear plant in May 1985; this would include, but not be limited to, any memoranda, notes of meetings, SECY papers.
ANSWER.
- 1. Preliminary Notification of Safeguards Event, PNS-V-86-03, dated May 15, 1986 and PNS..V-86-03A, dated May 21, 1986. (Attachment 1. Question 5).
- 2. Conversation record dated May 15, 1986 between Gaskin and Falkenberry.
(Attachment 2, Question 5).
- 3. Memorandum from R. F. Burnett to J. G. Davis, dated May 16, 1986, subject
" Incident at Palo Verde," with attachments. One attachment, an FBI 'twx, contains third agency material controlled by that agency (Executive Order 12356, Part 3) and is not attached. (Attachment 3, Ouestion 5).
- 4. FBI twx, dated May 16, 1986, not attached because it is third agency material controlled by that agency (Executive Order 12356, Part 3).
- 5. Conversation record dated May 16, 1986 between Kasun and FBI is not attached because it contains third agency material controlled by that p agency (Executive Order 12356, Part 3).
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, , , Question 5. (Continued) 4
- 6. Conversation record dated May 19, 1986 between Davidson and FBI is not 4
attached Secause it contains third agency material controlled by that agency (Executive Order 12356, Part 3).
- 7. FBI twx, dated May 19, 1986, not attached because it is third agency i
material controlled by that agency (Executive Order 12356, Part 3).
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, 8. Note from Gramann to lessler, subject, "Palo Verde," dated June 20,
} 1986. (Attachment 4, Ouestion 5).
- 9. NUREG-0090, Vol. 9, No. 2, Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences (Attachment 5, Question 5).
- 10. Memorandum from T. A. Rehm to J. R. De1 Medico, dated September 15, 1986, subject, " Request for Inforn.ation on Palo Verde," with attachment.
(Attachment 6, Question 5).
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QUESTION 6. Any and all documents concerning the June 1987 Iranian threat to attack nuclear reactors in the United States; this would include, but not be limited to, any and all (draft and final) correspondence, notes, memoranda, notes of meetings, and SECY papers. ,
ANSWER.
- 1. NRC Information Notice No. 87-27, " Iranian Official Implies Vague Threat to U.S. Resources," dated June 10, 1987. (Attachment 1, Ouestion 6).
- 2. Preliminary Notification of Safeguards Event, PNS NMSS 87-01, dated June 10, 1987. (Attachment 2,0uestion6).
- 3. Memorandum from G. McCorkle to H. L. Thompson, Jr. , dated June 11, 1987, subject, " Items of Interest." (Attachment 3, Question 6).
- 4. Memorandum from R. F. Burnett to H. L. Thompson, Jr., dated June 15, 1987, subject " Initial Licensee Response to Information Notice Regarding Implied Iranian Threat." (Attachment 4, Question 6).
- 5. Message from North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) to Regional Councils, dated July 30, 1987. (Attachment 5, Question 6).
- 6. Two draft questions and answers, undated. (Attachment 6, Question 6).
Ouestion 6.. (Continued) 7. Draft " Remarks Concerning Recent Iranian Statements," undated. (Attach-ment 7, Question 6).
- 8. Memorandum from Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., to Victor Stello, Jr. , dated
- October 21, 1987, subject, " Dissemination of classified Material to Licensees."
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- 9. Numerous classified documents somewhat related to the threat are identified in response to other questions. (It is noted that no classified documents have been included.)
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d OVESTION 7A. A list of all research reactors in the United States using !
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} highly enriched uranium (HEU) in excess of'one kilogram.
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ANSWER.
l Our answer below is a list of all non-power reactors licensed by the NRC, s
! which possess more than one kilogram of high-enriched uranium and their i
i status with regard to HEU-LEU conversion. This list is also responsive in
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[ part to Question 7(D).
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i HEU-LEU D6cket Non-Power Conversion l Number Reactors Status Remarks-
- 50-20 M.I.T. No Funding i
j 27 WASHINGTON STATE No Funding
- 54 CINTICHEM No Funding Unique Purpose Exemption Requested 62 U OF VIRGINIA Conversion Schedule ,
} Submitted (CSS) i
. 73 GENERAL ELECTRIC NTR No Funding i 83 U OF FLORIDA CSS i
! 87 WESTINGHOUSE ZION To Decommission HEU removed from facility i
i 128 TEXAS A&M TRIGA No Funding
- 134 WORCESTER POLYTECH CSS Conversion SAR submitted 139 0 0F WASHINGTON No Funding i 150 OHIO STATE CSS Conversion SAR submitted i,
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Question 7 (Continued) ,
HEU-LEU Docket Non-Power Conversion Number Reactors Status Remarks l l
? 156 WISCONSIN No Funding 160 GEORGIA TECH No Funding
., 163 GA' TECHNOLOGIES No Funding 182 PURDUE CSS l
184 N.B.S. No Funding Unique Purpose Exemption Requested 186 MISSOURI-COLUMBIA No Funding Unique Purpose Exemption Requested 193 RHODE ISLAND CSS 199 MANHATTAN COLLEGE CSS 223 LOWELL CSS 243 OREGON STATE No Funding 396 VIRGINIA CAVALIER To Decommission General Electric's reactor requires a unique fuel geometry. The LEU fuel plates currently being fabricated by 00E contractors are unsuitable and special fuel elements would have to be produced in order to implement conversion. At present, there is no known fabricator of such a unique fuel geometry, either HEU or LEU. Thus, regardless of whether funding is made available, conversion of the General Electric reactor probably is not feasible in the near future.
Question 7 (Continued) ;
. (B) Describa security measures required of research reactor 5 licensees?
ANSWER. ,
Non-power reactor licensees, (i.e., research and test reactors), who possess less than a formula quantity (i.e., strategic special nuclear material in any combination in a quantity of 5,000 grams or more computed by the formula, grams = (grams contained U-235) + 2.5 (grams V-233 + grams plutonium) of strategic special nuclear material but more than 1,000 grams of uranium-235 l ,
(contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope) or l l more than 500 grams of uranium-233 or plutonium or in a combined quantity of more than 1000 grams when computed by the equation, grams = (grams contained U-235) + 2 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium) are subject to the general provisions of 10 CFR 50.34(c), and 10 CFR 73.40(a) and the more explicit 4
i requirements of 10 CFR 73.67(a), (b), (c) and (d). These reouirements include controlled access areas (CAA) that are protected by intrusion i
alarms. Entry into a CAA is controlled by a badging and lock system to limit access to authorized or escorted individuals. Vehicles and packages leaving the CAA are searched on a random basis. Also, a security organization, t
consisting of at least one watchman per shift and having communication capability to an appropriate response force, and response procedures, is required.
flon-power reactor licensees who possess fomula quantities of strategic special j nuclear material are subject-to the above provisions as well as 10 CFR 73.60.
This regulation includes requirements for vault-type rooms for storage of
Ouestion 7. (Continued) 4-
! materials, and searching for firearms and explosives before entry into areas where material is available, (material access areas). Methods to observe
- individuals' within material access areas on a continuing basis are also required to assure that special nuclear material is not diverted.
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- Licensees are exempt from the 10 CFR 73.60 and 10 CFR 73.67 reouirements to the extent that they possess, use, or transport
- (i) special nuclear material
- which is not readily teparable from other radioactive material and which has a l total external radiaticn dose rate in excess of 100 rem per hour at a distance I of 3 feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding, or (ii) sealed plutonium-beryllium neutron sources totaling 500 grams or less contained I plutonium at an on-site or contiguous site, or (iii) plutonium with an 1
isotopic concentration exceeding 80 percent in plutonium-238.
i l Recognizing that many nor.-power reactors had on hand unirrrdiated high l enriched uranium fuel that was not needed for current operations, the a
Commission on September 27, 1985, ordered licensees to show cause why they should not move to a secure facility (i.e., A Department of Energy facility cr :
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensed fuel cycle facility that protects s
formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material) all unirradiated d,.
high enriched uranium fuel presently on-site except for that needed to replace one failed element for each different type element in the core. Facilities that required replacement elements for refueling are also allowed to maintain an inventory of not more than the amount of fuel depleted in a 90-day period of normal operation. All affected licensees have moved the fuel in accordance I
with the terms of the Order, i
Ouestion 7. (Continued) (C) What actions is the NRC taking to require that research 1 l
reactors using highly enriched uranium be converted to
, the use of low enriched fuels?
i ANSWER. ,
l The NRC is proceeding in accordance with 10 CFR 50.64, which was published in l the Federal Register on February 25,1986 (51 FR 6514) and became effective on March 27, 1986. This rule requires that licensees possessing HEU convert to LEU provided that Federal Government funding and LEU fuel acceptable to the NRC is available. Exemptions to this reouirement can be requested in accordance l
with 10 CFR 50.64(c)(1). In accordance with 10 CFR 50.64(c)(2)(1), licensees -
have been requested to supply their status and plans for conversion.
In FY-87 one order was issued by the NRC for HEU-LEU conversion on July 7, 1987, and th licensee (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute) has completed th'e conversion. The NRC evaluated 2 low enriched fuels and has found them acceptable. These evaluations are in NUREG Report 1281, " Evaluation of the Qualification of SPERT Fuel for Use in Non-Power Reactors" and in NUREG Report 1282, " Safety Evaluation Report on High-Uranium Content, Low-Enriched Uranium-Zirconium Hydride Fuel for TRIGA Reactors." A third fuel, Uranium Silicide plate type fuel is being evaluated. Completion of this review would provide acceptable fuels for 18 of the 24 reactors that have to convert. The Department of Energy has provided fundice 'or 10 of these reactors and has considered 8 more in their future budge *.arv planning. (See response to question 7(D) for details on the remaining 6 reactors.)
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Question 7. (Continued) 4 (D) When, if ever, will the NRC require all research reactors utilizing HEU be either shutdown or converted to the use of low enriched fuels?
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ANSWER. -
l The NRC will implement conversion to LEU fuel in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.64. As stated previously, conversion will be implemented when Federal Government funding and LEU fuel acceptable to the l NRC is available.
1 O.f the remaining 24 reactors which come under this rule, ten have funding from 00E and have submitted schedules for conversion and eight more are 3
being considered in DOE's future budget planning. Two are planning to decommission, and one of these does not have any HEU on site. The remain'ing d
'our are industry non-power reactors for which the DOE has not planned future funds in their budget. Two of these have requested unique purpose exemptions (Cintichem and National Bureau of Standards). The NRC has decided to revisit
- the funding issue for the industry non-power reactors in FY-88 to see what action may be needed. For instance, if the unique purpose exemptions are approved, then no funding would be needed for these 2 reactors. The 2 remaining industry non-power reactors are GA Technologies and General Electric. GA Technologies will have to add new fuel periodically over the next several years, and - c is part of its normal operating expense. GA l also is the sole source of -EU TRIGA fuel but has ceased fabricating it.
1 l
J
l Question 7. (Continued) l Thus, once the existing supply is consumed GA might have to start phasing I
in LEU, even without government funding, but probably no earlier than 1990.
I General Electric's reactor requires a unioue fuel geometry. The LEU' fuel
~
plates currently being fabricated by DOE contractors are un' suitable and special fuel elements would have to be produced in order to implement l l
conversion. At present, there is no known fabricator of such a unique fuel 1
geometry, either HEU or LEU. Thus, regardless of whether funding is made available, conversion of the General Electric reactor probably is not feasible in the near future. l l
l l
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l 1
i 1
Any and all correspondence dated after Auaust 1, 1982 QUESTION 8.
between the NRC and NRC licensees concerning the reduction of the'use of highly enriched uranium at research reactors.
I 4
l ANSWER.
i l i October 7, 1987 Letter from Ohio State University i
September 2, 1987 Letter to Washington State University i 4
l j August 21, 1987 Letter from Washington State University l.
July 9, 1987 .
Letter from Cintichem, Inc.
- July 7, 1987 Letter to Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute i
May 26, 1987 Letter from Worcester Polytechnic Institute May 14, 1987 Letter from University of Florida l- April 20, 1987 Letter to University of Missouri - Rol.la April 20, 1987 Letter to Manhattan College April 20, 1987 Letter to University of Lowell April 20, 1987 Letter to Rhode Island Atomic Energy Commission l April 20, 1987 Letter to University of Virginia a
April 20, 1987 Letter to Ohio State University April 20, 1987 Letter to Worcester Polytechnic Institute April 20, 1987 Letter to Iowa State University April 17, 1987 Letter to University of Florida April 14, 1987 Letter to Purdue University April 1, 1987 Letter 'com University of Lowell March 27, 1987 Letter from Westinghouse Electric Corporation March 26, 1987 Letter ' rom University of Florida Tq rr w ,- r*r
4 i * '
Question 8. .(Continued) (
i t
March 25, 1987 Letter from Manhattan College
.' March 23,.1987 Letter from Ohio State University
! tiarch '23, 1987 Letter from Iowa State University l March 23, 1987 Letter from Worcester Polytechnic Institute
! March 23, 1987 Letter from Rhode Island Atomic Energy Comission March 18, 1987 Letter frem University of Washington March 17, 1987 Letter from Purdue University i
March 12, 1987 Letter from Massachusetts Institute of Technology I March 4, 1987 Letter from National Bureau of Standards
! March 1987 Letter from University of Virginia February 27, 1987 Letter from National Bureau of Standards j . February 25, 1987 Letter from General Electric j February 12, 1987 Letter from GA Technologies, Inc.
! February 11, 1987 Letter to Cintichem, Inc.
1 February 11,1987 Letter to National Bureau of Standards
) February 5, 1987 Letter from Department of Energy to National Bureau of Standarcs T
l February 3, 1987 Letter from University of Missouri lJ- January 27, 1987 Letter from Texas A&M University 4
January 8, 1987 Letter from Washington State University January 6, 1987 Letter from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute December 31, 1986 Letter to Massachusetts Institute of Technology December 30, 1986 Letter tc Cintichem, Inc.
December 30, 1986 Letter to National Bureau of Standards December 29, 1986 Letter ' rom University of Wisconsin December 19, 1986 Letter ' rom Georgia Institute of Technology
Ouestion 8. (Continued) December 11, 1986 Letter from Massachusetts Institute of Technology December 10, 1986 Letter from Oregon State University November 14, 1986 Letter to 32 different organizations .
November 3, 1987 Letter from Westinghouse Electric Corporation October 21, 1986 Letter ' rom General Electric October 3, 1986 Letter from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute September 29, 1986 Letter from Westinghouse Electric Corporation September 26, 1986 Letter from University of Missouri September 25, 1986 Letter from Massachusetts Institute of Technology September 19, 1986 Letter from National Bureau of Standards September 18, 1986 Letter from Cintichem, Inc.
September 16, 1986 Letter from General Electric March 10, 1986 Letter to Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute March 3, 1986 Letter fram Rhode Island Atomic Energy Commission December 17, 1985 Letter to Texas A&M University December 17, 1985 Letter to National Bureau of Standards December 17, 1985 Letter to University of Michigan December 17, 1985 Letter to GA Technologies, Inc.
December 17, 1985 Letter to Rhode Island Atomic Energy Commission December 17, 1986 Letter to Purdue University November 21, 1985 Letter to Oregon State University November 20, 1985 Lettec ' rom Georgia Institute of Technology November 19, 1985 Letter ' rom Manhattan College November 18, 1985 Letter 9 University of Washington November 6, 1985 Letter *.o Worcester Polytechnic Institute October 30, 1985 Letter 'ron Westinghouse Electric Corcoration
I i . . . !
~
-Ouestion 8. (Continued) 4, i !
October 25, 1985 Letter from Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- -October 23, 1985 Letter from University of Florida E
! October 22, 1985 Letter form Washington State University l l October 21, 1985 Letter from lowa State University October ?.1, 1985 Letter frem University of Virginia
! October 18, 1985 Letter from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute a
i October 17, 1985 Letter from Ohio State University 1
October 14, 1985 Letter from University of Washington l October 11, 1985 Letter from Oregon State University October.10, 1985 Letter from University of Wisconsin Octo'ber 10, 1985 Letter from Cintichem, Inc.
October 10, 1985 Letter from University of Missouri October 8, 1985 Letter from North Carolina State University q Cctober 8, 1985 Letter from Virginia Tech October 8, 1985 Letter from University of Missouri-Rolla October 4, 1985 Letter from Worcester Polytechnic Institute October 24, 1984 Letter from Rhode Island Atomic Energy Comission October 23, 1984 Letter from Rhode Island Atomic Energy Comission October 22, 1984 Letter frcm Rhode Island Atomic Energy Comission August 6, 1984 Letter from Rhode Island Atomic Energy Comission August 2, 1984 Letter to North Carolina State University June 29, 1984 Letter ' rom University of Misseuri June 25, 1984 Letter ' rom Ohio State University June 22, 1984 Let9 ' rom Texas A&M University June 22, 1984 Letter rom Ohio State University June 22, 1984 Letter 'com Ohio State University
Cuestion 8. (Continued) , ,
June 21, 1984 Letter from North Carolina State University a June 21, 1984 Letter from North Carolina State University June 20, 1984 Letter from Rhode Island Atomic Energy Commissins
. June 18, 1984 Letter from North Carolina State University
- l June 14, 1984 Letter from University of California, Los Angeles r ebruary 7, 1984 Letter from Massachusetts Institute of Technology January 23, 1984 Letter from GA Technologies, Inc.
Novemi;er 9,1983 Letter from Oregon State University November 8, 1983 Letter from Purdue University i November 4, 1983 Letter from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University i November 3, 1983 Letter from University of Missouri
) November 2, 1983 Letter from University of Washington i November 1, 1983 Letter from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University i
October 31, 1983 Letter from University of Missouri 1 October 20, 1983 Letter from University of Missouri-Columbia ,
October 18, 1983 Letter from University of Wisconsin October 17, 1983 Letter to Washington State University l
October 17, 1983 Letter to University of California October 7, 1983 Letter to Washington State University September 13, 1983 Letter from University of Missouri March 2, 1983 Letter to Massachusetts Institute of Technology December 13,1982 Letter from Massachusetts Institute of Technology November 24, 1982 Letter from Massachusetts Institute of Technology
-_ _ _ . _. __ _ - . _ . ~ _ . . - _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ .
8 I QUESTION 9._ All correspondence between Representative Edward J. Markey and the NRC concerning the threat of sabotage and terrorism at NRC-licensed facilities.
ANSWER. .
- 1. Letter datt!d December 17, 1982 from Rep. Markey to Nunzio Palladino (Attachment 1, Question 9).
- 2. Letter dated February 7,1983 from Nunzio Palladino to Rep Markey (Attachment 2, Question 9).
- 3. Lette'r dated June 7,1983 from Rep. Markey to Nunzio Palladino (Attachment 3, Question 9).
- 4. Letter dated June ?.7,1983 from Nunzio Palladino ~ to Rep. Markey (Attachment 4, Question 9).
- 5. Letter dated September 7,1983 from Rep, tarkey to Nunzio Palladino (Attachment 5, Question 9).
- 6. Letter dated January 25, 1984 from Nunzio Palladino to Rep. Markey
-(Attachmenc 6, Question 9).
QUESTION 10. August 17, 1982 NRC Statement of Policy on Use of High-Enriched Uranium in Research Reactors, including all drafts of this statement.
ANSWER.
See 2 attachments 1. 47 FR 37007 8/24/82
, ,. 1 l
00ESTION 11. SECY 87-28, NRC/ DOE Comparability Peview Team Findings of l Safeguards Programs at Fuel Facilities.
! ANSWER.
j 1. SECY 87-28 and a draft SECY 87-28 are classified Confidential National
- Security Information and are not included in our submittal. In addition i
- the documents contain information classified by another agency and I l subject to the third agency rule set forth in Excutive Order 12356, l Part 3.
)
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_ _ . . _ , - ~s
1 l
QUESTION 12. Any and all documents dated after January 1, 1983 concerning the development and issuance of an NRC rule, regulation, or policy to revise the design basis threat for both radiological sabotage and theft; this would include, but not be limited to, any and all (draft and final) correspondence, notes of meetings, SECY papers, regulations, and policy statements.
ANSWER.
Documents responsive to this request are provided in Parts A and 8, which follow. Note that the document: in Part 8 are not in the Comission's Public Document Room and are therefore not available to the public. Since these documents have not been publicly disclosed, we request that you preserve their confidentiality by restricting access and use to the Members and staff of the Subcomittee.
k(dB @?dM60%
Question 12 Part A ,
- 1. Memorandum, dated April 10,1978, " Operating Assumption Covering the Use of and Reliability placed in Information from the Intelligence Community,"
from L.V. Gossick, NRC, to C.V. Smith et al. , NRC. (Attachment 1, Question 12).
- 2. Generic Threats to 00E Nuclear Di ograms and Facilities," dated January, 1983. Document is classified and is not provided. !nformation origi-nated and controlled by another agency is withheld. (Executive Order 12356, Part 3).
- 3. Note, dated January 18, 1983, from R.F. Burnett to J. Davis. Memorandum dated January 14, 1983, from G. McCorkle to R.F. Burnett, titled " Semi-Annual Design Basis Threat Review and Attachment A." Attachment B not included as contains information classified by another government agency and is subject to the third agency rule (Executive Order 12356, Part 3), (A**.achment 2, Question 12).
l
Question 12. (Continued) 4. Memorandum, dated August 3,1983, from G. McCorkle to R.F. Burnett, titled, " Semi-Annual Threat Review." (Attachment 3, Question 121
- 5. Teletype, dated December 28, 1983, from NRC to Naval Investigative.
Service, title "0uestions Regarding Truck Bombs." (Attachment 4, j Question 12).
- 6. SECY 84-337, Review of Coordination of Safeguards Requirements of NRC and 00E. This docurrent is classified Confidential National Security l Information and is not included in this submittal. In addition, it I
contains information classified by another agency and is subject ;
to the third agency provisions of Executive Order 12356, Part 3. l l
- 7. Memorandum, dated January 19, 1984, from G. McCorkle to R.F. Burnett, !
titled " Semi-Annual Threat Environment Review d4'." (Attachment 5, 1
Question 12). l l
- 8. Memorandum, dated January 19, 1984, from J.G. Davis to R.C. DeYoung, titled "Recuest for Issuance of Information Notice Re: Design Basis Threat and Review of Vehicle Access Controls." (Attachment 6, Question 12)'.
- 9. Memorandum, dated Januarv 27, 1984, from R.F. Burnett to G. McCorkle, titled " Design Basis % eat." (Attachment 7, Question 12).
l Question 12. (Continued) ,
- 10. IE Information Notice No. 84-07, dated February 3,1984, titled,
" Design-Basis Threat and Review of Vehicular Access Controls."
(Attachment 8, Question 12). ,
- 11. - Memorandum, dated February 6,1984, from G. McCorkle to R.F. Burnett, titled, " Design Basis Threat / Vehicle Obstacle Rulemaking." (Attachment 9, Question 12).
- 12. Public Affairs Release No. 84-18, dated February 6,1984, titled "NRC Staff Suggests Licensees Should Review Vehicle Access Procedures."
(Attachment 10, Question 12).
1
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- 13. Memorandum, dated March 8,1984, from R.F. Burnett to D. Mausshardt, titled, " Meeting with Mr. Udell of Congressman Markey's staff."
(Attachment 11, Ouestion 12).
- 14. Note, dated April 3,1984, from G. McCorkle to B. Burnett, titled
" Protection of Description of Design Basis Vehicle" and Attachment dated March 30, 1984. (Attachment 12, Question 12).
- 15. Letter, dated April 9,1984, # rom R. A. Erickson to M.I. Lewis. (Attach-ment 13, Question 12).
- 16. Memorandum, datec April 26, 1984, from R.F. Burnett to G. McCorkle,
)
3
] titled, " Design Basis Threat." (Attachment 14. Question 12).
' Ouestion 12. (Continued) 17. Memorandum, dated July 31, 1984, from G. McCorkle to R.F. Burnett, titled, " Semi-Annual Design Basis Threat Review #5." (Attachment 15, Question 12).
- 18. Memorandum, dated August 14, 1984, from R.F. Burnett to J.G. Davis, titled, " Truck Bomb Threa t." (Attachment 16, Ouestion 12).
- 19. Memorandum, dated September, 1984, from R.F. Burnett to R.J. Brady, titled " Classification of Draft Issue Papers Re: Truck Bomb Threat."
(Attachment 17, Question 12).
- 20. SECY-85-24, dated January 23, 1985, " Consideration of Modification of NRC Design Basis Threat Statement." Document is classified and is not provided.
- 21. Memorandum, dated February 8,1985, from G. McCorkle to R.F. Burnett, titled, " Semi-Annual Thre t Environment Review #6." Attachment 18, Ouestion 12).
- 22. Memorandum, dated June 14, 1985, " Background and Suggested Talking Points for June 19 Meeting on Design Basis Threat," from J.E. Zerbe, NRC, to the Commission. Document is classified and is not provided.
/
- 23. Memorandum, dated E 1, 1985, " Commission Meeting on Threat Level and Physical Security,' from N.J. Palladino, NRC, to W.J. Dircks, NRC.
(Attachment 19, Question 12).
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Question 12. (Continued) 24. Copies of Briefing slides for July 12, 1985 Comission Meeting. Three of 14 slides 6'* classified and are not provided. (Attachment 20, Question 12).
- 25. Letter, dated July 22, 1985, from Representative E.J. Markey to Chairman Palladino. (Attachment 21, Question 12).
- 26. Briefing text,14 pages for July 23, 1985 Comission Meeting. Four of 14 pages are classified and are not provided. (Attachment 22, Question 12).
- 27. Memorandum, dated July 29, 1985, from G. McCorkle to R.F. Burnett, titled " Semi-Annual Design Basis Threat Review #7." (Attachment 23, Question 12).
- 28. Note, dated July 31,1985, "Comission Meeting September 4,1985," from E.Q. Ten Eyck, NRC to G.W. McCorkle, NRC. (Attachment 24, Question 12).
- 29. Memorandum, dated August 2, 1985, " Staff Requirements -- Discussion on Threat Level and Physical Security...," from S.J. Chilk, NRC to W.J. Dircks, NRC. (Attachment 25, Question 12).
- 30. Memorandum, dated August 13, 1985, from R.F. Burnett to J. Davis, titled " Review of Sa -lu uds Related Threat. (Attachment 26, Ouestion 12).
I 1
Question 12. (Continued) 31. Pemorandum, dated September 17,1985, " Differences between 00E and NRC Physical Protection at Facilities Possessing Weapons . Usable Nuclear MatePiel," from N. J. Palladino, NRC, to W. J. Dircks, NRC. Document is classified and is not provided.
- 32. Letter, dated September 23, 1985, from R. F. Burnett, NRC, to C. Schmitt, 00E. Document is classified and is not provided.
- 33. Letter, dated August 24, 1985, from R. F. Burnett, NRC, to R. Robinson. Department of State. (See Attachment 6, Question 15).
- 34. Letter, dated August 30, 1985 from R. F. Burnett, NRC, to R. J. O'Brien, Jr., DOE. This document is classified and contains third agency information and is not provided.
- 35. Briefing Slides, dated September 4,1985, "NRC Threat Assessment Activities." One classified slide is not provided. (Attachment 27, Question 12).
- 36. Briefing Slides, dated September 11,1985,' " Investigation of the Truck :
Bomb Threat to Nuclear Facilities." Classified slides (41 are not provided. (Attachment 28, Cuestion 12).
1
Question 12. (Continued) 37. Memorandum, dated October 21,1985, " Topics For Discussion At Comission Meeting on Design Basis Threat, November 4,1985," from N. J. Palladino, NRC, to W. J. Dircks, NRC. (Attachment 29, Question 12).
- 38. Briefing text slides, undated, " November 4,1985, Presentation by Robert F. Burnett." Document is classified and is not provided.
- 39. Memorandum for the Record, dated November 8,1985, " Staff Requirements --
Continuation of 7/23 Discussion on Threat level and Physical Security... ."
from S. J. Chilk, NRC, Limited Distribution. (Attachment 30, Question 12).
- 40. Memorandum,' dated December 5,1985, "Comission Meeting on December 9 on Threat level and Physical Security," from J. E. Zerbe, NRC, to the Comission.
Document is classified and is not provided.
- 41. Memnrandum, dated December 6,1985, " Staff Requirements -- Continuation of 9/4 Discussion of Threat Level and Physical Security...." from S. J. Chilk, NRC, to W. J. Dircks, NRC. (Attachment 31, Question 12).
- 42. Note, dated December 19,1985, "Comission Threat Briefing," from D. B. Mausshcrdt, NRC to R. F. Burnett, NRC. (Attachment 32, Cuestion 12).
- 43. Memorandum, da'ed recamber 19,1985, "Sta'f Pequirements -- Discussion of Threat Level and Physical Security... ," ' rom S. J. Chilk, NRC, to W. J. Dircks, NRC. (Attachment 33, Question !?).
4 l
l 1
1 j Ouestion 12. (Continued) l 1
l
- 44. Memorandum, dated January 6, 1986, from J. E. Zerbe, NRC, to , l N. J. Palladino, NRC, titled, " Design Basis Threat Issues Raised by DOE i
Special Team Project Report." Not released as it contains classified l
material.
- 45. Briefing slide, dated January 9, 1986, "NSC Actions." Classified slide l is not provided.
- 46. Outline, dated January 10, 1986, " January 28 Commission Briefing."
l R. F. Burnett, NRC.
(Attachment 34, Ouestion 12). !
4 I
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- 47. Memorandum, dated January 15,1986, " Staff Requirements for Design Basis l
Threat Meeting with Commission, January 28, 1986 " from N. J. Palladino, NRC, l
- to V. Stello, Jr. , NRC. (Attachment 35, Cuestion 12).
, 48. Draft paragraph, dated January 21, 1986, draft 2, E. Ten Eyck/dah. Document is classified and is not provided.
- 49. Memorandum, dated January 22,1986, " Staff Requirements 'or Design Basis j Threat Meeting with Commission, January 28, 1986," from T. M. Roberts, NRC, to N. J. Palladino, '4RC. (Attachment 36, Question 12).
- 50. Memorandum, dated January 22, 1986, from T. M. Roberts, NRC, to N. J. Palladino, NRC, with annotated comment frcn N. J. Palladino, NRC, dated January 24, 1986. (Attachment 37, Cuestion 12).
1
.g .
Ouestion 12_. (Continued) l l
l
- 51. Memorandum, dated January 27, 1986, and draft memorandum, undated, " Staff i
Requirements for Design Basis Threat Meeting with Comission, Japuary 28, t
j 1986," from V. Stello, Jr., NRC, to N. J. Palladino, NRC. Document is j classified and is not provided.
! 52. Briefing slides, oated January 28, 1986 Comission Briefing. One of 11 l
l slides is classified and is not provided. (Attachment 38, Question 12). l i
i
- 53. Briefing text for January 28, 1986 Comission Briefing. Two of 11 pages i
are classified and are.not provided. (Attachment 39, Question 12).
l 54 Memorandum, dated February 7,1986, " Staff Pecuirements -- Discussion on Design Basis Threat.. . ." from S. J. Chilk, NRC, to V. Stello, Jr. , NRC.
(Attachment 40, Question 12).
1
- 55. Memorandum, dated February 10, 1986, from G. McCorkle, NRC, to R. F. Burnett, NRC, titled " Semi-Annual Threat Environment Review 8 " ,
- 56. Memorandum, dated February 12, 1986, from F. M. Bernthal, NRC, to V. Stello, Jr., NRC, titled " Design Basis Threat." (Attachment 42, Question 12).
- 57. SECY 86-101, dated v .h 31, 1986, Design Basis Threat-0ptions for Consideration. (At'.achment 43, 0uestion 12).
. ._ _ .- . -. . . - - . = .- . . . __ .. . . - ~ ~
j .
t Question 12. (Continued) i :
J i
- 58. Note, dated April 9,1986, from G. McCorkle, NRC, to R. F. Burnett, NRC, 4 4 titled "EDO Concerns Regarding Security Response Planning." (Attachment 4a, l 4
Question 12). J j
- 59. SECY 86-101A, dated June 12, 1986, Design Basis Threats - Options for Consideration. This document is classified Secret National Security Information and it is not included in the submittal. It also contains information classified by a third agency.
! 60. Memorandum, dated July 18, 1986, from S. J. Chilk, NRC, to V..Stello, Jr., NRC, SECY 86-101/101A - Design Pasis Threat -Options For j Consideration. (Attachment 45, Question 12).
i i
- 61. Memorandum, dated August 22, 1986, from G. McCorkle, NRC, to i R. F. Burnett, NRC, titled " Semi-Annual Threat Envirortrent Review 9."
(Attachment 46, Question 12).
l l
- 62. Memorandum from H. R. Denton to J. G. Davis, dated December 18, 1986, NRC/ DOE Comparability Review Team Findings of Safeguards Programs at
- Fuel Facilities. (Attachment 47, Question 12).
l
- 63. Memorandum, dated February 21, 1987, from G. McCorkle to R. F. Burnett.
titled " Semi-Annual '~ eat Environment Review 810". Not released as contains information c'essified by other government agencies and is subject to the third agency rule (Executive Order 12356, Part 3).
l
. .- - _ _ _ _- . .- . _ . = - - _ - . . - - . - _ _ _ . . _ . . . _ -
l Question 12. (Continued) l
- 64. Memorandum dated April 7,1987, from H. L. Thompson, Jr. to V. Stello, Jr., titled " Truck Bombs National Level Threat Perspective". Document is classified and is not provided.
- 65. Summary of SG on Comparability Meeting, dated June 15, 1987.
- (Attachment 48, Question 12).
- 66. Memorandum from H. L. Thompson to E. S. Beckjord, dated June 18, 1987, j Request for Rule Development. (Attachment 49, Question 12).
I
- 67. Memorandum from R. F. Burnett to E. W. Brach dated June 25, 1987, )
Implementation of SECY 87-28, Phase II, Rulemaking.
(Attachment 50, Question 12). i l
l 1
- 68. Memorandum, dated July 30, 1987, from H. L. Thompson, Jr., NRC to V. Stello, Jr., titled " Status of NRC Initiative with the National Security Council (NSC)". Document is classified and is not provided.
- 69. Oraft Proposed Rule dated October 2, 1987, Proposed Rule for Safeguards Requirements for Fuel Facilities Possessing Formula Ouantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material. (Attachment 51, Question 12).
- 70. Draft memorandum, undted, " Staff Requirements - Discussion on Threat Level and Physical Security, 2:30 p.m., Tuesday, July 23, 1985...,"
from S. J. Chilk, NRC to W. J. Dircks, NRC. Document is classified and is not provided.
l
.0uestion 12. (Continued) 71. Dutline, undated, titled, " Middle Ground Options".
(Attachment 52, Question 12). ,
- 72. Question and answer, undated, regarding Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS).
The document is classified and is not provided.
- 73. Questions and Answers, undated, titled, "In Anticipation of Ing;iries I Regarding Notice on Potential Threat".
(Attachment 53, Question 12) i I
74 NMSS Task. Sumary Sheet, undated, titled " Protection of Nuclear Facilities from Possible Vehicle Bomb Attacks". (Attachment 54, j Question 12)
- 75. Draft Comission Paper, undated, (U) NRC/ DOE Comparability Review Team Findings of Safeguards Programs at Fuel Facilities and Staff Analysis of Power Reactor Safeguards Issues. This document is classified Secret National Security Information and is not included in the submittal. It 1
also contains information classified by a third agency.
- 76. Flow chart, " Power Reactor Protection Alternatives," undated.
(Attachment 55. Question !?).
- 77. Draft briefing slides, undated, for December 9,1985 Comission Meeting, Three classified or Third Agency slides are not provided.
(Attachment 56, Question 12).
Question 12. (Continued) ! 78. Briefing slides, undated, " Synopsis of Commission Threat Oriefings, e
I June-December 1985". (Attachment 57, Question 12).
- 79. Outline Enclosure 2, undated, " Discussion Outline -- November 4, Commission Meeting". Document is classified and is not provided.
- 80. A Discussion Outline, November 4 Commission Meeting. Document is classified and is not provided.
4
- 81. Draft Briefing Slides, undated, "NRC/ DOE Comparability". Slides are classified and are not provided.
- 82. Transcript of Commissinn Appearance before Conoressman Markey, pp. 28-68.
Document is classified and is not provided. Prepared Testimony for N. J. Palladino, NRC, Sunnary of Prepared Testimony for J. G. Davis, NRC and 29 Ouestions and Answers. (Attachnent 58, Question 12)
- 83. Chart, undated, "Mid-East Bombing". (Attachment 59, Ouestion 12).
- 84. Draft briefing slides / text, undated, " Threat Briefing - June 19, 1985".
1 Classified slides / text are not provided. (Attachment 60, Question 12).
- 85. Chart, undated, " Vehicle Bomb Threats Alternative Courses of Action-Backup". (Attachment 61, Question 12).
I l .
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Ouestion 12. (Continued) l
- 86. See response to Question 13, #1.
- 87. SECY-87-28 Classified not provided.
Question 12 Part B ,
The following documents are not available to the public. We are providing copies with the understanding that their confidentiality should be maintained.
i
- 1. SECY-87-222, dated September 2, 1987 " Implementation of SECY-87-28, Use of Deadiy Force in the Protection of Special Nuclear Material" SRMs and l Commission Vote Sheets attached. l l
1 QUESTION 13 " Analysis of Truck Bomb Threat for Nuclear Facilities,"
1.ean D. Chapman and David E. Bennett, Sandia National Laboratory, March 1984; and any and all NRC analyses and documents relating to this study.
ANSWER.
- 1. Memorandum, dated December 12, 1983, from J. G. Davis, NRC, to R. B. Minogue, titled, " Request for Initiation of RES Project for NMSS/SG". (Attachment 1, 0uestion 13)
'2. Memorandum, dated December 23, 1983, from J. G. Davis, NRC, to '
H. R. Denton, NRC, titled, " Request for NRR Assistance in RES Project RE: " Truck Bombs Threat". (Attachment 2. Question 13)
- 3. Memorandum, dated December 30, 1983, from R. F. Burnett, NRC, to G. W. McCorkle, titled " Consequences Study of Sabotage at Reactor Sites". (Attachment 3, Question 13)
- 4. Letter, dated January 10, 1984, from W.C. Floyd, NRC, to C. Reed, Comonwealth Edison, (Attachment 4, Cuestion 13).
- 5. Memorandum, dated January 13, 1984, from H.R. Denton, NRC, to J.G. Davis, NRC titled " Request for NRR Assistance in RES Project RE: Truck Bomb Threat." (Attachment 5. Question 13).
~. _ _ _ __ . _ - - _ _ . ._ . _
i Pastion 13. (Continued) .
- 6. Memorandum, dated February 2, 1984, from K. R. Goller NRC to l l
J. G. Keppler, NRC, titled " Site Visit to Quad Cities Station for a 1 RES Contract: Truck Bomb Threat Analysis." (Attachment 6, Question 13).
a
- 7. Memorandum, dated Febuary 13, 1984, from W. Floyd, NRC, to R. Burnett et al., NRC, titled " Analysis of Truck Bomb Threats at Nuclear Facilities; Sandia Contractor Briefing." (Attachment 7, Question 13).
l l
- 8. Memorandum, dated February 16, 1984, from R. F. Burnett, NRC, to K. R. Goller, NRC, titled " Request for Modification of RES Project."
(Attachment 8, Question 13).
I i l 3
- 9. Briefing Charts, dated February 21, 1984, titled " Analysis of Truck Bomb Threat for Nuclear Facilities." (Attachment 9, Question 13).
1
- 10. Pemorandum, dated April 4,1984, from W. Floyd, NRC, to R. Burnett i j et al., NRC, titled "' Analysis of Truck Romb Threats at Nuclear Facili-ties'; Sandia Contractor Briefing ." (Attachment 10, Ouestion 13). l
- 11. Interagency Agreement No. RES-84-004, Entitled " Review of Truck Bomb Analysis Report," April 10, 1984. (Attachment 11, Ouestion 13).
4
- 12. " Weekly Information Report - Week Ending April 20, 1984." (Attachment 12, Question 13).
J i
i Ouestion 13. (Continued) 13. Note, dated May 4, 1984, from O. Smith, NRC, to P. Owyer, NRC.
(Attachment 13, Question 13).
I
- 14. Letter, dated June 13, 1984, from J.F. Proctor, Department of Navy, to I I
R.M. Bernero, NRC, contains clastified third agency (Department of Navy) !
information (Executive Order 12356, Part 3), and is not provided.
i
- 15. Letter, dated August 10, 1984, from L.D. Chapman, Sandia National Labs, to P. Ting, NRC. (Attachment 14, Question 13).
- 16. Memorandum, dated August 14, 1984, from R.F. Burnett to J. Davis,
Subject:
" Truck Bomb Threat." (Attachment 15, Question 13).
- 17. Letter, dated September 10, 1984, from L.D. Chapman to P. Ting, NRC.
(Attachment 16, Question 13).
- 18. " Investigation of the Truck Bomb Threat to Nuclear Facilities."
SAND 84-1621 by David E. Bennett and Donald R. Gallup, dated November 1984, is classified and is not provided.
- 19. SECY 85-24, dated January 23,1985, " Consideration of Modification of NRC Design Basis Threat Statement," is classified and is not provided. ]
I i
- 20. Copies of Briefing s' ides for July 23, 1985 Commission meeting. Three l I
of 14 slides are classified and are not provided. (Attachment 17, l Question 13).
l
- Question 13. (Continued) i
- 21. Briefing text,14 pages, for July 23, 1985 Conmission meeting. Four of 14 pages are classified and are not provided. (Attachment 18, Question 13.)
1 1
- 22. Transcript of NRC briefing for the Subcommittee on Energ.v Conservation ano Power, U.S. House of Representatives, dated September 11, 1985.
i Classified and not provided. l l
4
- 23. Copies of briefing slides for NRC briefing for the Subcommittee on !
i Energy Conservation and Power, U.S. House of Representatives, dated September 11, 1985. Four of 15 slides are classified and not provided.
(Attachment 19, Question ~13).
Pa. Copies of briefing slides, dated March 27, 1987, " Investigation of the i
Truck Bomb Threat to Nuclear Facilities." Three of la slides are cl'assi-fied and are not provided. (Attachment 20, Question 13).
I l
l w r
QUESTION 14 Transcripts of all NRC Commission meetings after January 1, 1983, at which the threat of sabotage and terrorism to NRC-licensed facilities was discussed, and all vote sheets after January 1, 1983 concerning any issue relating to !
l
, terrorism and/or sabotage.
ANSWER. I e
Documents responsive to this request are provided in Parts A and 8, which follows. Note that the documents in Part B are not in the Commission's Public Document Room and are therefore not available to the public. Since these documents' have not been publicly disclosed, we request that you preserve their confidentiality by restricting access and use to the Members and staff of the Subcommittee.
s e l
Question 14 Part A
- 1. Audio tape recordings were made of Commission meetings at which the threat to licensed facilities was considered. Recordings exist for meetings held on July 23, 1985, September 4, 1985, November 4, 1985, December 9, 1985, and January 28, 1986. (Transcripts were not made from these recordings.) These recordings are classified and are not provided. Some contain third agency infcrmation (Executive Order 12356, Part 3). .
I
- 2. An audio tape' recording and transcript of the briefing by the Executive Branch on June 19, 1985 contains third agency information (Executive Order 12356, Part 3) and classified information. They are not .
l provided.
4
- 3. Vote sheets relating to SECY's 85-24,86-101, and 86-101A. (Attachment 1, 2 and 3, Question 14).
,l.
Question 14 Part B f
l l
- l The folivwing documents are not available to the public. We are providing copies with the understanding that their confidentiality should be maintained.
- 1. SECY-87-26, dated February 3, 1987 " Review of International Physical Security Standards" SRMs and Commission Vote Sheets attached.
- 2. SECY-87-75, dated March 20, 1987 " Annual Report to the President on Domestic Safeguards" SRMs and Commission Vote Sheets attached.
e
I QUESTION 15. Any and all correspondence after January 1,1983, between the NRC and any other federal agency, including but not limited to, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Council, the Naval Ordnance Laboratory concerning the threat of sabotage ,
and terrorism to NRC-licensed facilities.
ANSWER.
- 1. Letter, dated January 13, 1984, from W. C. Floyd, NRC, to K. L. Cauldwell, Florida Power and Light. (Attachment 1, Ouestion 15).
- 2. Interagency Agreement No. RES-84-004, entitled " Review of Truck Bomb Analysis Report," April 10, 1984. (SeeAttachment2. Question 15).
- 3. Letter, dated June 13, 1984, from J. F. Proctor, Department of the Navy, to R. M. Bernero, NRC, contains classified third agency information (Executive Order 12356, Part 3). Not provided.
- 4. Letter, dated July 10, 1984, from R. F. Burnett to R. Caudle, DOE (Attachment 3, Question 15).
- 5. Letter, dated July 10, 1984, from R. F. Burnett to D. L. Ness, Department of State. (Attachment 4, Ouestion 15).
l
0 *f ad Question 15. (Continued) %
- 6. Letter, dated July 31, 1985, from N. J. Palladino, NRC, to R. C. McFarlane, NSC, classified. Not provided.
- 7. Letter, dated August 11, 1985, from R. C. McFarlane, NSC, to N. J.
Palladino, NRC, classified third agency information (Executive Order 12356, Part 3). Not provided.
- 8. Letter, dated August 20, 1985, from R. F. Burnett, NRC, to Chief, Counter Terrorism Group, CIA. (Attachment 5, Question 15).
- 9. Letter, dated August 24, 1985, from R. F. Burnett, NRC, to R. Robinson, Department of State. (Attachment 6, Ouestion 15).
- 10. Letter, dated August 27, 1985, from R. F. Burnett, NRC, to J. Shiman, F8I. Attachment to letter contains classified third agency infonnation and is not provided. (NOTE: A classified audio tape recording of the meeting was reviewed rather than a transcript). (Attachment 7, Question 15).
1
- 11. Letter, dated December 19, 1985, from N. J. Palladino, NRC, to J.M. Poindexter, NSC. Two attachments that contain classified infor-mation are not provided. (Attachment 8, Question 15).
e 4
Question 15. (Continued) I
- 12. Memorandum, dated July 11, 1986, from R. 8. McDaniel, NSC, to Col. J. F. Lemon, 000, S. Chilk, NRC, and J. Geer, DOE, titled, " Domestic Reactor Safeguards " classified third agency (NSC) information (Executive
~
Order 12356, Part 3). Not provided.
- 13. Connission Paper, dated July 29, 1986, NMSS 86002. This document is classified and is not provided.
e -
14.
Letter, dated August 7,1986, from T. M. Roberts, NRC, to R. 8. McDaniel, NSC classified. Not provided. I 15.
Letter, dated August 8,1986, from W. H. Webster, FBI, to L. W. Zech, Jr. ,
NRC, classified third agency information (Executive Order 12356, Part3). Not provided.
- 16. Letter, dated November 24, 1986, Document No. SECY-86-8, is classified third agency material and is not provided.
- 17. Letter, dated April 8, 1987, from R. F. Burnett, NRC to W. Barker, 00E.
One classified attachment is not provided. (Attachment 9, Question 15).
- 18. Numerous items of daily intelligence message traffic and general studies have not been included.