ML20138C067
| ML20138C067 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000025 |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1967 |
| From: | Cooley W US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Roeder J US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138C048 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-85-514 NUDOCS 8510220175 | |
| Download: ML20138C067 (2) | |
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To J. R. Roeder, Chief, Materials Inspection and DATE:
November 6, 1967 Enforcement Branch, Division of Compliance, HQ Frost W. J. Cooley, Fuel Facilities Inspector Region V, Division of Compliance
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o wagcT: ATOMICS INTERNATIONAL, DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION:
CANOGA PARK, CALIFORNIA; LICENSE NO SNM-21; DOCKET NO. 70-25; INVESTIGATION OF EXPOSURES TO AIRBORNE URANIUM COMPOUNDS CO:V:WJC Attached is a report of an investigation conducted at Atomics International.
The following cop:ments are offered for your consideration.
We believe the licensee was confident that any toxicity problem with the enriched uranium-aluminum compound he was using was of low-order magnitude.
He continued the use of the material for more than a year and a half under two monitoring criteria which now have proved to be incorrect and non-conservative. These criteria were (1) the assumption that the soluble uranium airborne concentration limit of 10 CFR 20 applied to his air monitoring program and (2) that he could determine 'ractional uranium body-burden accumulations quantitatively by urinalysis.
It was not until erratic elimination rates were discovered by urinalysis that the insolu-bility of the material was detected. When subsequent whole-body counting confirmed lung depositions, the licensee then recognized the problem.
E It also appears that Radiation Safety Unit supervision did not analyze survey data provided and probably did not review that data in enough y,
detail to determine that the health physicists were performing adequately.
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It :.ppears to us that the licensee intended to follow his procedures as
'l presented in his application of June 29, 1965 for renewal of license SNM-21, J
as well as the Radiation Safety Unit procedures in Annex E of this report.
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The investigation disclosed that certain of these procedures actually had not been followed and these matters were specifically noted during the closing meeting with management as possible violations. Our further consideration of such, however, has not revealed any specific requirement for these procedures as a condition of license SNM-21. For this reason we are not recommending any citations for the licensen's failure to place f
all dry uranium machining operations in glove boxes, to enforce decontami-nation' procedures, and to adequately monitor ventilation. The citations that are listed in the attached report (i.e., exposure to airborne concentrations and failure to make a timely report of exposure) are indicative of lack of health physics supervisory surveillance.
8510220175 851015 l
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f J. R. Roeder November 6,1967 We cannot say that surveys were not made nor that the licensee was unwilling or incapable of evaluating a radiological problem. When the health physics supervisor recognized that a problem existed, he initiated a thorough and technical investigation, along with a strong effort to bring the airborne proble= under control. Moreover, he has been and is receiving his manage-ment's support in bringing about complete correction.
Corrective action taken to the time of this investigation, although of a temporary nature, has.~resulted in reducing breathing zone concentrations to within 10 CFR 20 limits for insoluble material. Long range, permanent corrective action, which is planned for completion by the second week in January 1968, includes the complete redesign of the powder production facilities and should result in further reduction of the airborne con-centrations. The licensee's goal is 0.1 of the MPCa.
We learned during this investigation that five licensee personnel, in 4
addition to those listed in the licensee's August 15, 1967 report and listed in this investigation report, have been exposed to uranium airborne concentration in excess of the insoluble 10 CFR 20 limit. In this case the maximum weekly average airborne concentration was 3.3 x 10-10,uc/cc and the insoluble limit was met or exceeded during six different weeks in November and December 1966 and in. January 1967. These five exposures differed from those covered by this investigation in that they occurred in a different restricted area under another reactor core production effort (Japanese Atomic Energy Research Institute - Fas t Assembly).
That production has been completed; however, the problem (poor venti-lation during the deburring operation) was discovered and corrected before completion. One of the five individuals involved has terminated.
The licensee has arranged for a whole-body count on the remaining four.
One whole-body count received at the time of this investigation indicated approximately 1% body burden (lung). The licensee is preparing a further report of these overexposures for submission to the AEC.
Region V will continue to follow the licensee's contamination control efforts in his powder production work through and beyond the installation of his redesigned production line. We vill also follow the exposures through the licensee's whole-body counting and urinalysis data collected for exposed individuals.
Enclosure:
Investigation Report
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