ML20138B110
| ML20138B110 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/06/1985 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T-1474, NUDOCS 8512120212 | |
| Download: ML20138B110 (68) | |
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ORIGINAL m UNITED STATES U NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF: DOCKET NO:
ADVISORY COIGIITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 308TH GENERAL MEETING LOCATION: WASHINGTON, D. C. PAGES: 1- 49 DATE: FRIDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1985 ACRSOFFICECOPY
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() PUBLIC NOTICE BY THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONERS' ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS FRIDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1985 The contents of this stenographic transcript.of the a . .
proceedings of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), as reported herein, is an uncorrected record of the discussions recorded at the meeting held on the above date.
No member of the ACRS Staff and no participant at this meeting accepts any responsibility for errors or inaccuracies of statement or data contained in this transcript.
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\_ 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 4 308TH GENERAL MEETING 5
Nuclear Regulatory Commission '
Room 1046 6 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
7 8 Friday, December 6, 1985 9
The 308th General Meeting reconvened at 2:45 p.m.,
10 Mr. David A. Ward, Chairman, presiding.
11 ACRS MEMBERS PRESENT:
1 12 MR. DAVID A. WARD MR. JESSE C. EBERSOLE
({} j3 DR. ROBERT C. AXTMANN 14 DR. MAX W. CARBON 1 15 DR. WILLIAM KERR :
16 i DR. HAROLD W. LEWIS i I7 DR. CARSON MARK 18 MR. HAROLD ETHERINGTON f i
19 MR. CARLYLE MICHELSON '
20 DR. DADE W. MOELLER DR. DAVID OKRENT i 21
, i MR. GLENN A. REED 22 DR. FORREST J.-REMICK-DR. PAUL G. SHEWMON
( ,,, ,24 u ,1) , DR. CHESTER P. SIESS MR. CHARLES J. WYLIE
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3220'01 01 2 1....s OMT/bc 1 PROCEEDINGS (m
2 (2:45 p.m.)
3 MR. WARD: The next topic is topic 10, which is 4 really the report of the Decay Heat Removal System 5 Subcommittee. There are two topics we'll be covering. The 6 first is the beginning of the subcommittee review of aux 7 feedwater system reliability. I'll give that; it's just a 8 brief oral report.
9 Following that, we'll have a status report from 10 the staff on the status of Task Action Plan A-45. This will 11 just be a brief status report. We'll have time for a few 12 questions, but it's just intended to remind you of that 13
(]) activity and bring you reasonably up to date.
14 But we won't be attempting to provide comments or 15 to write a letter on that particular topic at this meeting.
16 So, before going to the staff for that, let me spend a few 17 minutes talking about what the subcommittee learned on the 18 issue of aux feedwater system reliability.
19 The committee has expressed considerable interest 20 in this topic of late, inspired primarily by a number of 21 important operating events at several different plants.
22 So the decay heat removal system subcommittee was 23 assigned to begin to try to develop an understanding of the 24 issues on behalf of the committee.
() 25 -So we had a report from several different people ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1 3220 01 02 3 OMT/bc 1 on the staff. The first report was from the AEOD. Our 2 interest there was to find out what data, what information 3 the AEOD had on actual aux feedwater system reliability 4 operating performance.
S We were disappointed in the quality of the data 6 available. It.seems there are some data which suggest that 7 the average pressurized water reactor sees an aux feedwater 8 demand rate of between one to three a year. But this 9 depends on the vendor design. It depends on how the 10 aux feedwater system is used in combination with the demand 11 feedwater system.
12 We really weren't able to get a very clear
(,)s 13 picture on that. I think the committee members would agree 14 we were in fact disappointed with the amount of good, solid 15 information that seems to be available.
16 DR. KERR: Excuse me. Was this information on 17 how the systems were designed to be used, or how they are 18 actually being used in plants? It isn't clear to me which 19 area would provide the uncertainty. Or, is that going to 20 come out later on?
i 21 MR. WARD: Probably, not later on today. We had 22 some data on challenge rates, but we weren't able to get 23 much sort of systems information on how the plants, the 24 various vendors and the various architect-engineers are 25 designed to perform.
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/~gOMT/bc 1 DR. KERR: I see what you mean, I think.
V 2 MR. WARD: Whether the aux feedwater system was 3 most of the time with every plant trip, or whether the main 4 feedwater function would ramp down and that sort of thing.
5 We were unable to get solid information.
6 The next issue was the oft quoted reliability of 7 10 to the minus 4, or 10 to the minus 5 reliability 8 criterion, which is really an unavailability, a target 9 unavailability for the aux feed system upon demand.
10 And I think we need to review to understand what 11 this means. We need to review the history of aux feedwater 12 system requirements. Prior to 1975, as we understood it,
() 13 aux feedwater systems were built just to conform with good 14 engineering practice.
15 There were no specific NRC, or at the time, AEC ;
16 requirements for the aux feed systems. After 1975, 17 requirements came into play which required that new aux 18 feedwater systems had to be safety grade, or at least safety 19 grade to the extent of meeting seismic criteria, having QA 20 programs and being single-failure-proof.
21 After July 1981, the NTOL plant, in addition to 22 having to show those characteristics for their aux feedwater 23 systems, NTOL's were asked to demonstrate that their aux 2:4 feedwater systems met this unavailability requirement of
() 25 less than 10 to the minus 4 to 10 to the minus 5th. And ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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3220 01 04 5 OMT/bc 1 although this was at the OL point rather than the CP point, 2 our understanding was that if they didn't meet that 3 criteria, they were required in fact to make their backfits ,
4 before the OL was granted.
5 DR. SHEWMON: Sometime, when you get down to 6 whether or not what we have now is dedicated to the safety 7 grade or independence, so I can understand what it is, how 8 maybe that's too much of a deviation. I always thought we 9 had a fairly reliable system not. But, apparently, it's not 10 all of these good things.
11 MR. WARD: No. Prior to 1975, it wasn't a safety 12 grade system.
() 13 DR. SHEWMON: But, now, apparently, we're 14 recommending we don't have yet.
15 l MR. WARD: I don't know what you're reading.
16 DR. KERR: This is a more general system.
17 DR. SHEWMON: The title of the topic is Decay 18 Heat Removal.
19 DR. KERR: But he is not talking about all decay 20 heat removal, he's talking about the aux feed system.
21 DR. SHEWMON: Pardon me. I misread the title.
22 MR. WARD: So there are about 20 units that have 23 been licensed since 1981 and which in fact demonstrated to 24 the staff's satisfaction that they meet this unavailability
() 25 criterion of 10 to the minus 4. That means there are 70 or ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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3220 01 05 6 OMT/bc 1 more older units which may or may not meet that criterion.
2 So I think what's at issue is the program that 3 the staff has to go back and look at all those in a 4 systematic way, and determine if they're adequate.
5 The defini' tion of " adequate" perhaps isn't 6 final. But the definition for these later plants has been, 7 well, the standard review plan was an unavailability of 10 8 to the minus 4th. I think we came away from the meeting 9 with a concern that the staff does not seem to have a very 10 well-focused, hart-hitting program to complete this 11 evaluation.
12 In fact, we had some indication that there may O 12 aeve aeea eo eeaico 1o e ia the reoroeatzeeic# or saa- rae 14 responsibility of this program is moving from one group to 15 another group; different personnel are involved. And there 16 as apparently some concern in that transition that the real 17 positive thrust of the program has been lost.
18 MR. EBERSOLE: Dave, may I make a comment?
19 I'd like to impress you by the fact that I don't 20 know of a single plant that's been really shut down because 21 of inadequacy of auxilliary feedwater designs; yet, on the 22 other hand, we shut down, I think it was North Ana, because 23 they didn't have braces on the suction piping structure that 24 would defend against its being upset geometrically should it 25 burst.
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1 3220 01 06 7 l OMT/bc 1 We readily shut down the plant for that 2 consideration, which is virtually impossible to occur. But 3 it strikes me as a little odd that we shouldn't be shutting 4 down the worst of the plants in the context of the least 5 reliable aux feedwater system. And we in fact waited for 6 Davis-Besse to get in trouble.
7 MR. WARD: So I'm going to be proposing later in 8 the meeting that we write a very brief letter urging that a 9 higher priority and a better sense of direction and more 10 authority be given to the program of establishing the 11 reliability of the older plants, of the aux feedwater system 12 reliability of the older plants.
() 13 MR. MICHELSON: What does that letter look like?
14 MR. WARD: I don't really have it. I've just got 15 a very rough draft. I'll get around to it. It will be 16 simple though. I feel we've just sort of begun our 17 investigation of the issue.
18 The committee may or may not feel that it's 19 appropriate to comment at this time.
20 MR. MICHELSON: I'd like to make a comnent if I 21 may.
22 MR. WARD: Yes, I'd like to invite the rest of 23 the subcommittee to do so.
24 MR. MICHELSON: One thing I wondered about,
() 25 didn't get, I don't think, a very good answer, and that is l
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3220 01 07 8 LwOMT/bc 1 that the presentation, as you pointed out, from AEOD on A
2 their knowledge of the reliability of auxilliary feedwater 3 left something to be desired.
4 So I was trying to pursue both with AEOD and the 5 staff as to whether is there any move afoot to somehow do 6 better. In terms of the information isn't available, are 7 steps being taken to get the information?
8 Or, if the analysis techniques haven't been 9 developed, are they developing? Where's the problem? The 10 problem apparently is in the availability of the information 11 because of its reportability. Yet, I could find no move q 12 afoot to improve or rectify the rep,ortability aspects, or
() 13 somehow get better information with which to decide when the 14 systems have reached an acceptable level of availability.
15 DR. KERR: Carl, if you aren't going to get the 16 data to get an unavailability of 10 to the minus 4 per 17 demand from the reports...
18 MR. MICHELSON: That's not right. I didn't 19 expect to get that. I expected to get the number of 20 challenges to the systems and the types of system, component 21 failure, from such a place as NPRDS. NPRDS, as it turns 22 out, doesn' t have what you need because it doesn' t report 23 the number of challenges. It just reports failures.
24 So, apparently, we're making no effort to get y
s_) 25 somehow the denominator to the number of challenges.
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3220 01 08 9 OMT/bc 1 DR. LEWIS: Is the reliability as high as 10 to 2 the minus 47 3 DR. KERR: This is the goal.
4 DR. LEWIS: Thank you.
5 MR. MICHELSON: We don't know how reliable it 6 is. They have no way to calculate it yet.
i 7' MR. WARD: Except for about 20 plants, the staff 8 accepted the licensees'...
9 DR. KERR: Calculated rate.
.0 MR. WARD: Right.
11 MR. MICHELSON: The question is, is this good 12 enough or should it be better? I couldn't tell if it's good
() 13 enough really. I haven't reached that conclusion yet. What 14 I was trying to find out, is there an effort being made to 15 do a better calculation or a better date-gathering job?
16 The answer apparently is: not beyond what 17 they're presently doing.
16 DR. LEWIS: I'm a little mixed up. Just from 19 raw-remembering failures, isn't the actual reliability about 20 two orders of magnitude worse than that? Or am I missing 21 something in the calculation?
22 MR. WARD: What raw failures?
6 23 DR. LEWIS: Maybe we're not talking about the 24 same thing.
() 25 MR. MICHELSON: These things are 1 in 100.
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3220 01 09 10 "xOMT/bc 1 MR. WARD: What sort of failures are you talking 2 about?
3 DR. LEWIS: I thought we were talking about aux 4 feedwater.
5 MR. WARD: We are.
6 DR. LEWIS: Okay. I thought you said the 7 challenges were on the order of a couple per plant per 8 year. You said that.
9 MR. WARD: Yes.
10 DR. LEWIS: A couple per plant per year, a 11 hundred plants, means that at 10 to the minus 4, there 12 should be one failure every 100 years. Now, clearly, there
() 13 have been severa1 failures in the last year.
14 DR. SHEWMON: This is failures per demand.
15 DR. LEWIS: But demands were of the order of 1 tc ;
16 2 per year.
17 MR. MICHELSON: That's the point. There are many 18 more demands, I think, than that. They didn't know the 19 number of demands, really.
20 MR. WARD: No, they didn't have very good data on 21 demands. But if they had to make an estimate, it was this 22 one to three demands per year.
23 DR. LEWIS: And that's two orders of magnitude.
24 DR. KERR: But, Hal, you're assuming that all
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3220 01 10 11 OMT/bc 1 DR. LEWIS: No, I would never do that.
2 2 DR. KERR: You are if you do the kind of 4
3 arithmetic you're doing.
4 DR. LEWIS: You're absolutely right. I'm making 5 a numerator and a denominator. I'm thinking a mean.
6 MR. WARD: A couple of more important points.
7 The first one directly addresses this. In demonstrating 8 that a plant aux feedwater system meets the 10 to the minus 9 4 unavailability, a licensee is permitted to credit recovery 10 actions here. These recovery actions are kind of plant-11 specific.
12 It depends on, you know, the inertia of the
() 13 system, the steam generator, how much time, you know, is 14 available per plant. But that's an important part of the 15 picture.
16 DR. KERR: If you have a once-through steam 17 generator, you have about 30 minutes.
18 MR. WARD: So it's very important. That's part 19 of it. I guess there was one other point I wanted to make 20 out of this part of the meeting. We have a presentation 21 from an analyst from Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, who talked 22 about his methodology that he has developed for estimating 23 the effects of common cause failures.
24 Apparently, this is a methodology that has been
() 25 used really in kind of the latest major PRA's, but not in ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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3220 01 11 12 OMT/bc 1 earlier ones. He thinks this methodology is particular apt 2 in evaluating the aux feedwater systems.
3 In general, he claims that if you look at the 4 possibility for common cause failures, even the three-5 train systems, you have difficulty with coming up with 6 numbers as good as 10 to the minus 4.
7 In some of the examples by his method, the 8 unavailability would be a factor of 10 higher than that.
9 DR. LEWIS: There's no succinct way to describe 10 his new method?
11 MR. WARD: There probably is, but I don't have 12 it.
() 13 DR. KERR: It's called the gamma method.
14 MR. MICHELSON: It does involve the beta and the 15 gamma.
16 MR. WARD: As a matter of fact, it's a little 17 more elaborate than just guessing at beta factors.
18 MR. WARD: But he comes to the conclusion with 19 his method that merely adding trains, even diverse trains in 20 a system doesn't necessarily give you all the improvements 21 in availability that other methods of analysis will give 22 you.
23 DR. KERR: You say "even diverse trains," even ;
i 24 diverse trains is just going to make things worse.
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,,/ 25 MR. WARD: I thought you might say that.
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2 MR. WARD: Okay. Do other subcommittee members 3 have something they would like to say about this on the aux 4 feedwater system topic?
5 MR. REED: I wasn't at the halfday meeting on aux 6 feedwater system. It always bothers me as an only principle 7 of heat removal, because it depends upon condensate systems 8 in part, service water system in part, the emergency 9 electrical system in part, the auxilliary feedwater system 10 itself, the steam supply system, natural circulation in the 11 primary, the steam discharge system by atmospheric dump.
12 Safety valves are dumped to the condenser. And then perhaps
() 13 the circulating water system in the control system involves 14 a lot of things about the hydraulics and dynamics of steam 15 binding and water hammer.
16 So you get my feeling about reliability.
17 MR. EBERSOLE: You're working your way into the 18 boiler there, Glenn.
19 (Laughter.)
20 MR. WARD: Ron, did you want to make some 21 comments?
22 MR. HERNAN: Yes, Ron Hernan.
I 23 AEOD stated the other day that the average of 24 three events per year was based on only on events that would
() 25 be reportable in an LER. And they stated there would be l
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- xDAVbur 1 MR. WARD: Yes. But the testing argument doesn't 2 sway me too much because the failures we are talking about 3 have not been the testing.
4 The numerator Dr. Lewis has alluded to is in 5 operation.
6 DR. LEWIS: If I can just ask Ron a question.
7 You say many times more demands than are reported 8 on LERs. What kind of event can there be which calls for 9 aux feedwater but doesn't require an LER?
10 MR. HERNON: Surveillance.
11 DR. LEWIS: Only testing?
12 MR. HERNON: Some plants are required to test
() 13 once a month.
14 MR. MICHELSON: One of the interesting subtleties 15 which I didn't realize is that they don't consider it, you 16 know, as an engineered safety feature. There is even a 17 question about whether it is so-called safety related, and 18 so forth.
19 As a result, it doesn't get into the reporting 20 system like you might think it would do.
21 There is an argument about what kind of events 22 are even reportable.
23 MR. WARD: That is right.
24 MR. MICHELSON: For auxiliary feedwater.
() 25 MR. WARD: It wasn't clear to me whether in 1985 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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2 wasn't even called safety grade, and its failure wouldn't 3 elicit an LER.
4 MR. MICHELSON: That is right, and it still 5 doesn't.
6 And remember the arguments about, you know, 7 conflicts about whether or not it is reportable. So it 8 varickfromsitetositeastohowmuchgetsreported.
c 9 It looked to me like you ought to go back and
~10 amend whatever they have to amend to clarify the status of 11 auxiliary feedwater. <
12 Now, they are doing it informally, as I
() 13 understand it, through the resident inspector and regional 14 office, and so forth. So'maybe indirectly they will get 15 better reporting. '
16 MR. EBERSOLE: Our practice, I think, was to 17 routinely shut down a plant if an ECCS system failed in 18 test.
~I 19 MR. WARD: Okay.
'20 l MR. HERNON: One other importa'nt point, 21 Mr. Chairman.
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22 ,1, [ , DR. KERR: I am not getting the impression that 23 the aux feed system is the only way'of removing decay heat
- 24. from a PWR. I don't think that is quite the case, is it?
) .25 MR. EBERSOLE: Oh, yes,-it,is, unless you get t_ I l
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3220 02 03 17
?~%DAVbur 1 bleed-feed in order to get it pressurized down to an RHR.
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2 MR. HERNON: We tried to bring out the point the 3 other day that in addition to the 20 or so NTOLs that have 4 been evaluated for the current SRP that all but a handful of 5 ,
the older plants have also been shown to meet both the 6 liability requirements and diversity requirements.
7 The proposed CRGR package talks about which 8 plants those are, and that is the whole thrust of the 9 staff's current effort, is what do we do about those 10 plants.
11 We have met with each and every one of those 12 utilities during the past month or two. They are coming in
() 13 with proposals on improvements they have made.
14 MR. WARD: Let's go on to the next topic, Task 15 Action Plan A-45.
16 We have had periodic reports on that. We have 17 commented on it several times over the past two or three 18 years. We are now going to hear a report from Andy 19 Marchese, who is the task manager, just to bring us up to 20 date on the progress of the schedule.
21 (Slide.)
22 MR. MARCHESE: Good afternoon, everyone.
23 Mr. Ward asked me to come down and give a very 24 brief status report on the progress of work in Task Action
( 25 Plan A-45. Let me just say a few things about the package ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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3220 02 04 18 DAVbur 1 of slides that has been handed out.
2 I feel that in about 15 minutes I could cover the 3 first six slides. There are some additional backup slides 4 that have some of the specific results that we are starting 5 to see in the program. I don't believe we are going to have 6 time to get into that, but you can look at that at your 7 leisure and perhaps in the future we can have more time to 8 cover this topic when we get into some more specific results 9 of the work to date.
10 Just to get started, let me remind you of the 11 specific objectives of the program. I know you have seen 12 this in the past, but I just want to get us all off on kind 13 of a common footing here.
(])
14 Basically, the specific objectives of the program 15 were to evaluate the adequacy of decay heat removal 16 reliability in existing power plants. In addition, we are 17 performing a value impact evaluation or cost-benefit studies 18 on various alternative measures to improve the overall 19 reliability of decay heat removal, and then based on these 20 value impact results, new requirements for decay heat 21 removal systems may be recommended.
22 (Slide.)
23 In terms of the scope of the program, A-45 is 24 concentrating on those systems whose function is to remove
() 25 decay heat on their transients and small break LOCA ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1 3220 02 05 19 DAVbur 1 conditions.
2 Now, for such systems we will also examine the 3 vulnerability to what we have termed special emergencies; 4 that is, fire, flood, seismic, and sabotage. We are looking 5 at these special emergency events in an integrated sense; 6 that is, what we feel may be helpful for something like fire 7 may also be effective in mitigating some of the other ones.
8 Now, sabotage is also one of the special 9 emergencies that is l'ing considered in A-45, specifically 10 protection against the insider. We are concentrating on 11 system design aspects rather than physical protection 12 measures in A-45. So I want to make that clear because
() 13 there has been some question as to what A-45 is doing in the 14 sabotage area.
15 DR. KERR: Would you repeat that? You are 16 concentrating on what instead of what?
17 MR. MARCHESE: We are concentrating on the 18 insider, and we are concentrating on what you can do in 19 terms of system design modifications to make the system less 20 vulnerable to insider sabotage rather than physical security 21 measures like guards, whistles, and things like that.
22 DR. KERR: Thank you.
23 DR. REMICK: Would system design include 24 embedding it in concrete?
4
() 25 MR. MARCHESE: Yes.
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3220 02 06 20 Fw 1 (Slide.)
k_),DAVbur 2 This slide shows the specific plants that we are 3 concentrating on for the program. There is a total of i
4 seven. There's two PWRs, Quad Cities and Cooper. There are 5 three Westinghouse plants, Point Beach, Turkey Point, and 6 Trojan.
7 Basically, there are three or four old plants, 8 one B&W unit, ANO-1, and one CE unit, St. Lucie.
9 Basically, we are doing a detailed reliability 10 risk assessment, also a cost-benefit study for various 11 alternatives to reduce the vulnerabilities that are being 12 uncovered during the plant analysis.
() 13 We have submitted -- that is, the contractor has 14 submitted two draft reports, one for Quad Cities and one for 15 Point Beach. In fact, we spent all day Tuesday reviewing 16 the results of those studies with the subcommittee.
17 We expect by Christmas to have four plants 18 finished. By March of next year we should have all seven of 19 those complete.
20 Following this, then, a summary document will be 21 put together comparing all seven plants.
22 (Slide.)
23 In terms of the alternatives that we are looking 24 at to improve the decay heat removal system reliability, r
(. 25 they raIge from improved operations, such as improved ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS,'INC.
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3220 02 07 21 DAVbur 1 procedures, training, information display, using existing 2 systems in atypical modes -- for example, invoking the bleed 3 and feed mode of decay heat removal using existing PORVs and 4 existing high pressure injection.
5 We were also looking for some plants that have 6 either no PORVs or marginal capacity, respectively, in 7 adding PORVs.
8 Next is the dedicated bleed and feed system, 9 where we are examining -- this is the proposed system. We 10 are also locking at high pressure RHR, the add-on emergency 11 feedwater system.
12 In the PWRs we are concentrating on a low
() 13 pressure suppression pool cooling systeq and also looking at 14 some of the concepts that have been backfitted in some of 15 the countries in Europe, such as dedicated and bunkered 16 shutdown decay heat removal systems.
17 (Slide.)
I 18 This slide is an attempt to give you a feeling, 19 to give you the kind of generic findings and insights that 20 are starting to come out of the program. This is really 21 based on only two plant studies to date.
22 As we get more plants under our belt, I am sure 23 we are going to be able to refine this and probably find 24 some other things that are not listed here. But basically
() 25 we are finding that failures in support systems, such as ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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3220 02 08 22
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(>)DAVbur 2 contributors to core melt frequency.
3 Emergency electric power availability; that is, 4 AC and DC, is a very key issue in terms of failures of both 5 systems. Core melt frequency, failures in aux feedwater 6 pumps are important.
7 We have looked'at -- with respect to bleed and 8 feed, we have analyzed that with and without bleed and feed 9 and calculated the delta reduction in core melt frequency, 10 and we are seeing a significant, what we feel is a 11 significant reduction in core melt frequency when one has 12 bleed and feed capability.
() 13 With respect to some of the special emergency 14 sites in terms of seia.nic events, we are finding that 15 anchorage is very important, particularly for battery racks, 16 switchgear, and tanks.
17 Fires in certain areas can also be important, 18 particularly in the switchgear room, the cable spreading and 19 the AF, auxiliary feedwater, pump.
4 20 Internal floods can be important in certain 21 areas, particularly those that could be initiated by human 22 errors.
23 Insider sabotage vulnerabilities exist, mainly 24 because of the existing layout of equipment.
n
(_) 25 I can't give you any more detail on this. If ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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3220 02 09 23 DAVbur 1 you want to get into this in any detail, we would have to 2 have a closed meeting.
3 DR. MARK: You have given us the expression, 4 "significant contributors."
5 What was your base core melt probability, 10 to 6 the minus 7?
7 MR. MARCHESE: We are seeing numbers of the order 8 of 4 times 10 to the minus 4 for the system failures that we 9 have looked at; that is, those systems that respond to small 10 break LOCAs and transients. We are seeing numbers on the 11 order of 4 times 10 to the minus 4.
12 DR. MARK: When do you say a contributor is
, () 13 significant?
14 MR. MARCHESE: If it is on the order of 10 to the 15 minus 5.
16 DR. MARK: That sounds pretty nice and small.
17 MR. MARCHESE: When you add those all up, you 18 know, you will get a number like 4 times 10 to the minus 4.
19 So if you have like 10 vulnerabilities and each one is on 20 the order of 10 to the minus 5, you know, they add up to 21 something like 10 to the minus 4.
22 DR. KERR: What is the uncertainty in the 10 to 23 the minus 57 24 MR. MARCHESE: We have an uncertainty analysis, I
() 25 think we are estimating, on the order of about plus or ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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3220 02 10 24 DAVbur 1 minus a factor of 7.
2 DR. KERR: So all of the 10 to the minus 5's 3 could be 10 to the minus 6's?
4 MR. EBERSOLE: Could it be said, Andy, that 5 really the essence of all this is the extensive 6 interdependencies on complicated, multi-purpose systems?
7 MR. MARCHESE: Yes.
8 MR. EBERSOLE: They are just spread all over the 9 place?
10 MR. MARCHESE: Within the trains of equipment, 11 all in the same area, they are interconnected and 12 vulnerable, particularly for these special emergency
() 13 events. As far as the insider --
14 MR. REED: You have got up there generic 15 findings, and I thought I almost heard a generic finding in 16 the meeting earlier this week that PORVs -- and I am trying 17 to remember the words -- PORVs as a minimum will be 18 required.
19 MR. MARCHESE: The staf f position on the CE PORV 20 issue was that as a minimum we are going to go forward with 21 the CRGR, that PORVs were required on those Combustion 22 Engineering plants that didn't have them. However, it was 23 decided to hold back on that until the completion of A-45 24 because there is a possibility that A-45 would come up with
() 25 something more comprehensive than just adding PORVs.
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3220 02 11 25 DAVbur 1 However, it is NRR management's position that if 2 A-45 does not come up with something more comprehensive as a 3 minimum for those Combustion Engineering plants that do not 4 have PORVs, PORVs would be recommended to CRGR.
5 MR. REED: That is almost a generic thing.
6 (Slide.)
7 DR. KERR: Those are the kind of PORVs that are 8 now in use?
9 MR. MARCHESE: Not necessarily. There has 10 been --
11 DR. KERR: When you say PORV, that means a 12 pilot-operated --
() 13 MR. REED: Power-operated --
14 DR. KERR: So what you are saying is that some 15 sort of valve --
16 MR. MARCHESE: Some sort of relief valve. I 17 think there is enough work to date that suggests that there 18 might be other more reliable relief valves.
19 DR. KERR: We have done enough work to recognize 20 that the existing ones are not very reliable, but I haven't 21 seen the work that suggested or that demonstrated that the 22 pilots are more reliable. They probably are.
23 MR. REED: You are correct that internal 24 pilot-operated relief valves, some lash-ups, may not be
() 25 reliable. But when you term the term " power-operated,"
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3220 02 12 26
' [3DAVbur 1 which is what PORV means --
%)
2 DR. SHEWMON: This month it meant 3 pilot-operated. Last year --
4 MR. REED: No, it didn't.
5 MR. EBERSOLE: I think that connotes an automatic 6 relief function, and you don't want to do that. So it is a 7 valve.
8 MR. MARCHESE: It is a relief valve.
1 9 MR. EBERSOLE: It is a valve of some kind, not 10 necessarily one with automatic relief capacity. You are 11 going to do it probably by hand.
12 MR. ETHERINGTON: I think the closest it means is
() 13 a depressurization.
14 MR. MARCHESE: Right.
15' Okay, the schedule. The major milestones are 16 shown here.
17 The first one is a summary report on all seven 18 plant analyses. This is kind of what we need to see what 19 sort of plant specific findings are coming out. We need 20 this in order to develop a regulatory analysis and technical 21 findings report, which are the two main documents we need to 22 go forward with the CRGR.
23 The next item shows basically the internal review 24 cycle that we have to go through to get this out into the
) 25 public comment arena. The reports will be issued for staf f ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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l 3220 02 13 27 I fgDAVbur 1 comments before they go to the Director of NRR; that is, V
2 each division director basically has to confirm the package 3 in one way or another.
4 We are expecting this to be complete by about the late 5 summer or early fall, and we are going to the CRGR in about 6 October of '86. CRGR will do their review. We will have to 7 resolve their comments, and we are estimating that we will 8 be ready to go out for public comment in about February of 9 '87, and depending on what the resolution package says, the 10 public comment pnase could be approximately six to nine 11 days.
i 12 MR. WARD: Dr. Kerr.
() 13 DR. KERR: I would like to explore a little bit 14 more these contributions to core melt probability that you 15 discovered.
16 Are these contributions ones that have been 1 17- recognized before?
18 MR. MARCHESE: Some have on other studies on 19 other plants, and some are new.
20 DR. KERR: I am trying to understand whether --
21 let's say, if we had a plant that had a core melt 22 probability of 10 to the minus 4, that 10 to the minus 4 23 didn't include most of these vulnerabilities. You have in 24 effect sort of doubled the core melt's likelihood by O)
(_ 25 exploring decay heat removal capabilities in detail.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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'3220 02 14 28 DAVbur 1 Is that the point I am hearing?
2 i ,
. 3 4
5 i
6
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7 i.
i 8
9 1
10 j 11 12 i
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- 14
! 15 16
) 17 2
18 i
19 ,
20 21 22 i
.23 24 lO 25 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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3220 03 01 29 DAVbw 1 MR. WARD: I don't think so.
2 Let me see if I can characterize it. I think the 3 numbers Andy's showing are the core melt probability, where 4 the analysis is affected by the capability of the decay heat 5 removal systems. So for a typical plant, it might be half 6 of the total. It doesn't include ATWS large-break LOCA and 7 Event B.
8 DR. KERR: But what I'm hearing is that these 9 systems that he's looked at constitute virtually all of the 10 core melt likelihood, and if one could eliminate that, one l
11 could get down to maybe 10 to the minus 6.
12 MR. WARD: No. You'd still be stuck with a
() 13 number due to ATWS large-break LOCA.
14 DR. KERR: ATWS doesn't contribute much to PWRs.
15 It contributes more to BWR.
16 MR. MARCHESE: We've had some support in that
, 17 area which suggests that the systems which work were 18 probably covering about 75 percent of the full core melt 19 contribution. That's a rough estimate and it does vary 20 plant to plant, but I think you're right.
21 In general, we're covering the majority, I 22 think.
23 DR. KERR: Is it your view that you can get 24 together decay heat removal systems that contribute
() 25 virtually nothing to core melt risk?
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1 MR. MARCHESE: I think we're seeing, for the J3DAVbw V
2 range of alternatives that we're looking at, we feel that 1
3 the best we can do is maybe reduce that by a factor of at 4 least 10 for the dedicated system option, which is the 5 single train add-on, completely separate and independent and 6 self-sufficient. It's in its own separate building.
7 DR. KERR: How does one make certain that this 8 thing is so independent from all these other systems that 4 1 9 have been put in? Apparently these are interdependencies 10 that nobody thought of, and somehow one is going to come up 11 with one that is completely independent of everything.
i 12 That strikes me as being --
() 13 MR. MARCHESE: Independently means it has its own 14 water supply, both for primary and secondary makeup.
4 15 DR. KERR: But you see, we have been talking 16 about independent systems for a long time. Mr. Ward just I
17 told me that someone that come up with a new method of 1
18 analysis that said that almost any multitrained system has a 4
19 limited reliability.
20 Now you don't make a system independent, just by 21 saying it's independent. Indeed, if it's part of a total 4
22 system, then it's a multitrain system. If it's one train,
. 23 it's a diverse train.
24 MR. MARCHESE: But one of the biggest
() 25 contributors to the core melt frequency that we've seen is ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646
I, 3220 03 03 31 DAVbw 1 when you put another train in, and you put it side by side 2 in the existing systems. There's just a limit. It's still 3 vulnerable to floods.
4 DR. KERR: But this new one is going to be side 5 by side with something, and how is it going to get to the 6 core, if it isn't?
7 MR. MARCHESE: It's going to have to be connected 8 to either the primary or secondary system.
O CR. Kv99- naca yno connect it, you have it side 10 by side with other connected systems.
11 MR. MARCHESE: You have a piping connection. You 12 don't have pumps and valves and heat exchangers and tanks
(~1 13 and all the support systems side by side.
14 MR. WARD: I agree in the limit. It's just 15 adding another train. But for example, one of the German 16 plants they have a separate dedicated system, and it has its 17 own river water pump house, which is three quarters of a 18 mile upstream.
19 DR. KERR: I'm just a little skeptical about 20 systems that are independent by definition, because 21 experience has indicated to us that systems that were 22 thought to be independent frequently turn out to have 23 dependencies.
24 When I'm told that by adding a single train
,m
(_f 25 system, I can reduce the failure probability by a factor of ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
3220 03 04 32 7^sDAVbw 1 10, that strikes me as being an amazing system, which I b 2 ought to go for immediately.
3 DR. SHEWMAN: But you're so old and skeptical, 4 you wonder?
5 DR. KERR: That's a real accomplishment. If I 6 can cut the core melt probability by a factor of 10 by 7 adding a single train system.
8 DR. LEWIS: You know, Bill, if you have any 9 system of whatever redundancy, if you add another 10 independent system that is even 10 percent reliability, 11 you've accomplished that, even 10 percent reliability.
L 12 DR. KERR: But that "if" is a big "if."
() 13 DR. LEWIS: I said if it's independent and .
14 redundant, absolutely. So it's a piece of cake.
15 MR. EBERSOLE : You can't deny that a little thing i 16 outside with a gauge glass is an independent system.
17 DR. KERR: I wouldn't deny that for a minute, 18 because I don't know enough about it.
l 19 DR. LEWIS: I'd go a step further. If you have 20 three train systems, in which reliability is not as good as 21 10 to the minus 4, that means that either they're not 22 independent of they each have 10 percent reliability, which 23 is outrageous. So you should never have three train 24 systems.
() 25 MR. WARD: I think you maybe sort of pushed Andy ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. l 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 4646
f 3220 03 d5 33 l
DAVbw 1 into saying that he's invented a new system which will 2 reduce core melt probability by a factor of 10. He's trying 7 4
3 to say this is the general approach they're taking. !
4 I don't think he's in a position to make claims. j l 5 DR. KERR: I apologize if I did that.
6 (Laughter.)
7 MR. MARCHESE: That's all I had, in terms of 8 planned remarks.
l 9 MR. WARD: Okay. I dona't know if there are any ;
j 10 more questions.
I think we don't have time to really go
- 11 into the additional slides, but there are some preliminary, 12 I guess, quantified numerical results, which are interesting I
j
() 13 to look at and think about. But we may be able to do that
[
j 14 at your leisure. I a
{ 15 Any other questions for Mr. Marchese?
, l
! 16 MR. REED: I think I would-like to point out in i
! 17 these other slides that, for instance, the high pressure RHR 1
. 18 system alternative is a very limited alternative and perhaps !
! l 19 would not function to do the things that Dr. Kerr is talking l li I l
20 about -- pressure above saturation and the other function !
l I 21 problems. '
l 22 So some of the alternatives that the A-45 people
! 23 are looking at, one or two of them have some lack of 1
l 24 diversity. I think we ought to work some more -- is that i
() '
25 right, Andy -- on these alternatives?
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3220 03 06 34 T3 DAVbw 1 MR. MARCHESE: Yes.
2 MR. WARD: Okay. Thank you very much, Andy.
3 Our next topic is what was originally Agenda Item 4 8 on the prioritization of new generic issues.
l 5 Dr. Siess.
6 DR. SIESS: Gentleman, in your black notebooks, 7 Tab 8, together with what Mr. Duraiswamy is handling out, 8 should be all that you need.
9 This is the third round, as I understand, of r
10 concurrence or lack thereof, on the prioritization of 11 generic items. We have a total of 33 items. 16 of them are 12 listed as sub items. We have received comments from all the j
() 13 subcommittee chairmen to whom these were assigned.
14 I don't know whether their opinions as 15 subcommittee chairmen or whether they've con: sited the
! 16 subcommittee. They will explain that when we take them up.
17 There are 18 items, the prioritization of which 18 they agree with.
19 There are 13 with which they agree, but would 20 like to suggest comments, and there are two with which 21 disagreement has been expressed.
22 You have got in handout 15, together with 23 material that's in the folder, the actual comments that have 24 been received from the subcommittee chairmen in a reasonably 4
() 25 consistent format. I am going to ask each subcommittee ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3*00 Nationwide Coversee 800 33H645 :
3220 03 07 35 DAVbw 1 chairman to refine his list and call it to your attention, 2 so that you can find it, and then to present, as briefly as 3 he can, what the issue is, what the priority is, and whether 4 he agrees or recommends that we agree or not.
5 I'm going to start arbitrarily with Moeller, 6 because he has an item for which the Staff has come down to 7 respond to, and as a courtesy, we ought to let them go home 8 a little early.
9 So Dade, would you provide your list.
10 DR. MOELLER: Yes.
11 It's page 14 in the notebook is the memo that I 12 wrote to Chet on it. In the first item, 67.5.1, it's the
([ ) 13 reassessment of the radiological consequences.
14 DR. SIESS: Will you start with 97, please.
15 l DR. MOELLER: 97 is the PWR reactor cavity 16 uncontrolled exposures. The committee will recall that this 17 was discussed with the Staff perhaps a year ago and the 18 Staff at that time proposed to us that they add layers, and 19 I hope I'm paraphrasing this properly, that they add layers 20 of administrative controls. You know, more people have to 21 approve and sign off before you could enter the PWR reactor 22 cavity.
23 What the problem is, is if the in-core probes are 24 withdrawn and you enter that cavity, the dose rates can be
( > 25 up to 1000 R per hour, and it's a rather serious sitttation. l l
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l 3220 03 08 36 1 Now the Staff said that their proposed priority
[-)DAVbw
\/
2 ranking was that this was resolved, and I talked to some 3 people on the Staff. They were pointed out to me that if a 4 person entered the reactor cavity with the in-core probe 5 withdrawn -- and let's say that it's a very crowded area.
6 It's dark. There's usually water on the floor. And if they 7 slipped and broke their leg or something, I was told that by 8 the time you could send someone in to get them out, they 9 might be dead, due to the radiation exposure.
10 So, in fact, some of the Staff members I talked 11 to on an informal basis pointed out that this may be the 12 source of the first radiation fatality in the operation of
() 13 our nuclear power plants. They viewed it as serious.
14 So I then asked, well, is there a signal in the 15 control room that says the in-core probes have been 16 withdrawn, and they said, yes, there is.
17 So I said, well, had anyone thought of just 18 having a red light at the entrance to the cavity, and if the 19 in-core probes are out, then the red light is on, and you 20 know not to enter.
21 They said, initially, and I am delighted that the 22 Staff is here, because they probably can correct some of the 23 . things that I am going to say, but then I call.d the Staff, 24 and I said, I was given a name of a person to contact on
) 25 this item. And I said, had you thought of that, a red light ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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3220 03 09 37 DAVbw 1 at the door to warn the person not to enter, that the 2 in-core probe was out?
3 They said, no, we had not thought of that. Then 4 later, though, in talking to other members of the Staff, I 5 found that, indeed, they had talked about interlocks on the 6 door. So if the in-core probe was out, you could open it 7 and things like that.
8 What I finally came down to, the bottom line, 9 again, not with all the fact, but I finally came down that 10 -- I came down to the bottom line, that what they had 11 considered were very complicated expensive procedures, such 12 as door interlocks. A simple thing, such as a light may
() 13 possibly not have been considered, although some members of 14 the staff said we looked at everything from A to Z, and we 15 ruled them out.
16 My thinking was that a simple red light would be 17 fair better than another several layers of administrative l 18 sign-off. And I simply then said, well, this item is not 19 resolved. I think we should hear more about it, before we 20 agree that it is resolved.
21 Yes, Glenn?
22 MR. REED: I'd like to make a comment as one who 23 entered a PWR cavity under the reactor vessel with the 24 in-core probes withdrawn, and perhaps the first person ever
/O (j 25 to do so, along with another person, and of course, being ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverase 800 336-6646
3220 03 10 38 DAVbw 1 very fast afoot, I did not get overexposed, but the other 2 person did.
3 You don't go down in those cavities, just because 4 you are trying to have fun. You go down with a purpose, and 5 the purpose, of course, was to evaluate leakage during a 6 refueling event, to see if you could proceed with the 7 event.
8 It was not necessary. We sort of pioneered this 9 thing. We found out after that that the procedures from 10 Westinghouse did not have to be written that way. You did 11 not have to withdraw the probes prior to starting to try to 12 flood the cavity.
()' 13 So the procedures have been reversed, and should 14 have been in all the facilities, but I noted just one 15 facility got in trouble, just in the last year or so.
16 In addition to changing the procedure because of 17 the nature of this particular cavity, and it's a grating 18 entrance, it's very much of a dungeon. A grating entranc,e 19 was put on this cavity, and just always locked. Unless you 20 have to go down there to make an inspection.
21 I agree with you, there shouldn't be any 22 sign-offs by people who don't want to go in there in the 23 first place.
24 At the plant I was at, a red light was installed O
(/ 25 for the withdrawn position or even the operating position ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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3220 03 11 39 !
/m 1 of the in-core instrumentation at-the time.
(_)DAVbw 2 In addition to looking the access into that area 3 by a grating, you can't put in locked doors and all that 4 fancy stuff.
5 DR. MOELLER: Did you do the light on your own?
6 Was the NRC happy?
7 MR. REED: I believe we did it because the NRC 8 was unhappy with the overexposure, and we had to file 9 corrective actions. So we filed corrective action.
10 DR. SIESS: Glenn, Dade recommended agreement or 11 disagreement -- disagree; right?
12 DR. MOELLER: Yes.
() 13 DR. SIESS: The comment that they ought to have a 14 red light.
15 Do you agree with Dade nor not?
16 MR. REED: I'm agreeing that -- Dade, that you 17 don't want fancy interlocked doors. That you can go with 18 the red light. And I would lose some grating lock.
19 DR. MOELLER: Should we give the Staff a chance 20 to say something? Maybe they can show we're all off base.
21 22 23 24
() 25 4
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r 3220 04 01 40 l P NDAVbur 1 MR. PATTERSON: My name is Rod Patterson. I am i (_/
l 2 part of the staff in I&E and have been involved with this 3 issue for a few years.
4 First, I would like to correct a few things that 5 Dr. Moeller said.
6 The radiological source that has turned out to be 7 more of a problem than the in-core probe itself is the 1
8 thimble tubes that the in-core probe traverses. The probe 9 can be in a stored position and not a redlight problem at 10 all, but when the thimble tubes are pulled down out of the 11 core during the refueling phase a portion of the tubes are 12 actually hanging down, the guide tubes underneath the l
() 13 vessel.
l 14 DR. SIESS: It is still 1000 rem an hour?
l 15 MR. PATTERSON: That is correct. '
16 DR. SIESS: Let's get on with the redlight.
1 17 MR. PATTERSON: It is my understanding that there 18 is a position indication for the storing of the guide tube 19 itself. The movement of the thimble tubes is a mechanical 20 operation, where when an operator goes up and loosens some 21 lock type fittings at the seal table and physically pulls 22 the tube out of the guide tube -- I am not sure what kind of i 23 a redlight you would want unless it is just a light that l
24 somebody flips a switch to turn on.
() 25 DR. SIESS: The proposal is that a redlight be l
l l ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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'3220 04 02 41 DAVbur 1 installed at the entrance to this cavity and that that light 2 be on whenever the radiation in the cavity is high?
3 MR. PATTERSON: What the staff proposed was that 4 the lock to that access point be a unique lock, not common 5 with the other locks that lock high radiation areas in the 6 plant and that the keys to that lock would be under the 7 administrative control of both the plant management and the 8 health physics supervision for the RPM.
9 From looking at it, we felt that the problem was j 10 that the radiological protection management wasn't involved 11 in these evolutions. Shift supervisors were grabbing an HP 12 technician.
([) 13 DR. SIESS: And if they inadvertently give the 14 key to somebody where the radiation is high and they go in 15 there and break a leg and end up dead, we will know whose 16 fault it is.
1 17 DR. MOELLER: And I think so -- we disagree at i 18 the moments it is clear that we do not disagree.
19 MR. REED: I don't want to disagree very otrongly 20 as long as it is not a complicated interlocking situation 21 and as long as the key is available and must be available to 22 the shift supervisor as well as health physics control.
23 DR. KERR: Glenn, would you comment on whether i 24 the procedure that he is describing would have prevented
() 25 your colleague from becoming overexposed?
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3220 04 03 ,
7 42 DAVbur, 1 MR. REED: No, it would not have because the 2 mission was established.
3 You had -- let me tell you. We established this 4 s mission.
5 DR. KERR: I don't mean to be critical.
6 s MR. REED: Nos,.what you are going into is a
.ms -
s7 sidu^ation that if you move one inch forward the radiation 8 levels gE'up very quickly.
9 DR. KERR I understand. Maybe it wasn't your 10 place where they got fined because they went in there and 11 they thought it was an emergency, and so they acted in a 12 hurry,,and the staff concluded, because they hadn't followed O "
is rute , th t eher should oet fined, and ther did.
14 -
DR. SIESS: The issue is the staff believes that li administrative controls -- somebodr-has i to make a decision 16 other than the per$on whone life is going to be in danger --
, 17 are adequate, and Dr. Mbeller thinks that it would be better 18 -
if the person that was going in there physically knew that 19 the radk'ation was high, and if he stil.1 went in it is his 20 own damn tault. I guess he could still get killed either
, 21 way. ,
Glenn -- is Git $nn, happy with administrative 22 Now, 23 controls?
24 -
MR. REED: I think I am closer to what the 25 gentleman just said here. Thoro has to be known that the
. . Act. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. I e *
._. . _ _Y3#'3" , _ _ . . ##H"? . _ ?f"_ _ _ . _ _ .
3220 04 04 43 l DAVbur 1 thimble tubes have the highly radioactive withdrawal tubes 2 in them. It has to be known. There ought to be quite a 3 little bit to the approval procedure; namely, the shift 4 supervisor and health physics, in order to go in in that .
, t 5 high risk situation.
6 MR. PATTERSON: The most recent events, we felt 7 one of the common problems in the events was that the plant 8 management, the shift supervisor was taking it upon himself 9 to go down there and look for leaks without contacting the 10 health physics management, without discussing the :
11 radiological consequences and the radiological hazard down 12 there.
O 13 MR. REED: But he did kn'ow what it was, j 14 MR. PATTERSON: He should have known, but if he 1
j 15 did, he wasn't indicating it at the time.
i 16 MR. REED: I hate to make another statement on 17 this because you are in a hurry, but I think you and the l
18 staff should have established by now that for almost all 19 PWRs, unless they are unique, the withdrawal should be 20 proceduralized to take place after floor leakage work has 21 been done.
22 I hope you have done that.
23 DR. SIESS: The committee has heard this.
24 Dr. Moeller has not changed his mind.
O V 25 DR. REMICK: Could I ask Dade this question?
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3220 04 05 44 1 Dade, is it your view that in addition to the
[v) DAVbur 2 administrative controls that have been discussed that j there 3 should be a light?
4 DR. MOELLER: I really don't know. I firmly 5 believe there should a light.
, 6 DR. REMICK: If I understood what he said,
,7 somebody would have to throw the switch on the light.
8 DR. MOELLER: He said that. So what we need to 9 ask is -- they told me that if the in-core detectors are 10 withdrawn, .that is automatically recorded.
11 DR. REMICK: That I understand.
12 DR. MOELLER: When the thimble-tubes are down or 13 out or whatever, is that not indicated?
14 DR. KERR: You have got to h'a're the thimble tubes '
15 out or the in-core detectors out in order to withdraw the 16 thimble tubes.
17 DR. MOELLER: Then you do have an indication in 18 the! control room. ,
19 DR. SIESS: But I think the point is that if 20 somebody -- if the light is not actuated by radiation 21 somebody has to turn the light on, and you still now have an 22 administrative --
23 DR. KERR: You have got the same sticks that will j i
24 , turn the light on in the control room.
(O_/ 25 ' DR. SIESS: Is there a light in the control room?
i !
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3220 04 06 45 DAVbur 1 DR. MOELLER: Oh, yes, and it can turn this light 2 on.
3 DR. SIESS: It is as positive as electrical 4 systems get?
5 DR. MOELLER: Yes.
6 Am I correct?
7 MR. PATTERSON: To my understanding, there is an 8 indication of the storage location for the in-core probe.
9 Whether the thimble tubes are withdrawn or in the core, the 10 indication I know of --
11 DR. KERR: You can't withdraw those tubes without 12 having the detectors withdrawn first?
() 13 MR. PATTERSON: True, but the tubes can be in the 14 core with the detector in the storage position.
15 DR. KERR: The redlight could be on with those 16 tubes inside, but the tubes couldn't be outside without the 17 redlight being on.
18 MR. PATTERSON: That is correct, to my knowlege.
19 I understand there is a status board in the control room 20 that most licensees keep track of whether the tubes are in 21 or out.
22 DR. MOELLER: If we voted disagreement, you would 23 then reassess or look, and if we are wrong, fine. If we are 24 right -- oh, you already know we are wrong?
r~')s
(_ 25 (Laughter.)
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3220 04 07 46 DAVbur 1 MR. PATTERSON: Actually, the I&E staff agrees i 2 with you. We still feel there should be something 3 additional done. We don't feel that we are sitting back and 4 not doing anything on this.
5 DR. SIESS: Do other members of the committee 6 have any other questions? Would you Ah to agree with 7 Mr. Moeller?
8 (No response.)
9 DR. SIESS: I hear nothing to the contrary.
10 Okay, Dade, let's proceed with the next item.
11 DR. MOELLER: The other two, the first one is 12 straightforward. We agree on both, but I want Jesse or
() 13 someone to help me with the second one.
14 The first one, 67.5.1 is reassessment of the 15 radiological consequences following a postulated steam 16 generator tube rupture event.
17 They simply recommend that the steam generator 18 ' tube rupture accident should be reassessed by the staff to 19 determine the effects of the releases made for periods 20 substantially via other re16sse points than those previously 21 analyzed.
22 It is a licensing issue, we agree. We simply 23 couldn't see -- you know, we agree, period.
24 Any question or comment?
() 25 (No response.)
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l 3220 04 08 47 1 DR. MOELLER: The next one, 67.5.3, as I say, 73DAVbur LJ 2 maybe Jesse or someone can help. I will tell you what it 3 is.
4 Many PWRs do not have these valves. Let me just 5 see what they are.
6 67.5.3, the recommendation is that the NRC staff 7 should reevaluate the provisions for isolating the steam 8 generators in conjunction with Item 67.3.1 and 67.5.1. The 9 evaluations should consider whether the current provisions 10 for isolating this main steam and feedwater lines are 11 adequate, with particular emphasis on isolation of the steam 12 generator with the RCS loop isolation valves.
() 13 Then they point out that many PWRs do not have 14 these valves for use in an SGTR steam generator tube rupture 15 accident. For those plants that have the loop isolation 16 valves, modifications would likely be required.
17 Based on the above discussions, however, the 18 valves do not appear to be necessary. In each of the events 19 which has occurred the operator took corrective action, and 20 in none of the events did incorrect action result in any 21 significant adverse effect to the public.
22 They recommend dropping it as an issue, and we 23 saw no reason not to agree.
24 But as I say, Jesse and others would be far more (n_) 25 knowledgeable than I.
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3220 04 09 48 DAVbur 1 MR. EBERSOLE: These are valves that isolate the 2 steam generator?
3 DR. MOELLER: Isolation of the steam generator 4 using the RCS isolation loop valves.
5 MR. EBERSOLE: How did you get that?
6 DR. MOELLER: I don't know how I got it.
7 MR. REED: I guess what you are talking about is 8 primary loop isolation valves, which only a few plants haver 9 namely, Haddam, Yankee Rowe, and I guess Surrey. There are 10 not many loop isolation valves.
11 DR. MOELLER: That is correct.
12 MR. REED: It is a mammoth modification, almost
() 13 an impossible modification, and I don't see any real thing 14 that it does. I wouldn't even consider it.
15 DR. MOELLER: Fine. We agree then. ;
16 Okay, Mr. Chairman, we agree on those two, and 17 that completes it.
18 DR. SIESS: I am going to go back to the head of 19 the list now. Sam says we should go consecutively with the 20 pages, which means we will go next to 15, and that is 21 Shewmon.
22 DR. SHEWMON: The first item I have has to do --
23 Sam, can I get another copy of what you sent me-three weeks 24 ago?. !
' 25 - MR. WARD: Let's see, I think it is agreed, !
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3220 04 10 49 DAVbur 1 Dr. Siess, that we don't need a transcript for this portion 2 of this meeting.
3 In fact, I don't think we will need it for the 4 remainder of the meeting.
5 (Whereupon, at 4:00 o' clock p.m., the meeting was 6 recessed, to go into unrecorded session.)
7 8
9 10 11 12 O t3 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 O 25 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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d CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER O
This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the matter of:
NAME OF PROCEEDING: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS _
308TH GENERAL MEETING 1
DOCKET NO.:
PLACE: WASHINGTON, D. C.
DATE: FRIDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1985 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United' States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
(sigt) .
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DAVID L. HOFFMAN Official Reporter ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
Reporter's Affiliation O
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NRR STAFF PRESENTATJON TO THE l ACRS i
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SUBJECT:
STATUS 0F USI A-45 RESOLUTION EFFORTS ON
" SHUTDOWN DECAY HEAT REMOVAL REQUIREMENTS" DATE: DECEMBER 6, 1985 i G l
[ .i PRESENTER: A. R. MARCHESE 1
r PRESENTER'S TITLE / BRANCH /DIV: TASK MANAGER / REACTOR SAFETY ISSUES BRANCH / DIVISION OF> SAFETY REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT PRESENTER'S NRC TEL. NO.: (301) 492-4712 .
i SUBCOMMITTEE: FULL COMMITTEE MEElING O
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T T A A E E H R H S E D Y
. W Y O A O A H C P C T E E E D G D M N R .
I G E O T N V F S I I I V T S X O A T E N R R N N W P H R E N O M D E M I D I T E T O L R L U R T A I A H O U V S F D G Q O E N E M D S T I R E L D A S S
R O O C I G E C H I M N V T T D O I I A D E E R S T E N M D P N H A E C E S T C O E J
B O
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_ F V S N O A E A I E F S I E D U H F U L N
_ E C L A A H A E C V L T H N P E
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- USI A-45 PROGRAM CONCENTRATING ON THOSE SYSTEMS WHOSE FUNCTION IS TO !
TRANSIENTS AND SMALL-BREAK LOCAs -
- ALSO, A-45 IS EVALUATING THE VULNERABILITY OF SUCH SYSTEMS TO SPECIAL EMERGENCIES (E.G., FIRE, FLOOD, SEISMIC, SAB0TAGE)
- SABOTAGE BY AN INSIDER IS ONE OF THE SPECIAL EMERGENCY EVENTS CONSID PROGRAM :
- USI A-45 PROGRAM CONCENTRATES ON SYSTEMS DESIGN ASPECTS TO REDUCE INSIDER, RATHER THAN PHYSICAL SECURITY METHODS 9
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() PLANTANALYS$lIhTATUS .
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QUAD CITIES ANALYSIS COMPLETED DRAFT REPORT RESUBMITTED - NOVEMBER 1
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- POINT BEACH ANALYSIS COMPLETED
, DRAFT REPORT TO BE RESUBMITTED - NOVEMBER 15 COOPER ANALYSIS NEAR COMPLETION DRAFT REPORT IN PREPARATION t
DRAFT REPORT SUBMITTAL DUE - NOVEMBER 29
- l. TURKEY POINT FAULT TREES BEING EDITED / CHECKED INTERNAL SEQUENCES IDENTIFIED SPECIAL EMERGENCY ANALYSIS WELL ALONG DRAFT REPORT SUBMITTAL DUE - DECEMBER 13 l
TORJAN FAULT TREES BEING EDITED / CHECKED 1 INTERNAL SEQUENCES AND SPECIAL EMERGENCY .
ANALYSIS IN PROCESS DRAFT REPORT SUBMITTAL DUE - JANUARY 15 i i
ANO-1 FAULT TREES BEING EDITED / CHECKED INTERNAL SEQUENCES AND SPECIAL EMERGENCY ANALYSIS IN PROCESS EXCEPT VULNERABILITIES NOT IDENTIFIED AE PLANS PLANT VISIT IN DECEMBER DRAFT REPORT SUBMITTAL DUE - FEBRUARY 15 ST. LUCIE ANALYSIS TO START JANUARY 10 AE PLANS PLANT VISIT IN MID-JANUARY DRAFT REPORT SUBMITTAL DUE - MARCH 17
.. .........._.........1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . .
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'. . ALTERNATIVE MEASURES ..
'I, PROVED, OPERATIONS (E.G., PROC $DURES, TRAINING,INFdRMATIONDISPLAY)
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- USE EXISTING SYSTEMS IN ATYPICAL.. MODES . .
- ADD PORYS ONLY ,
- DEDICATED FEED AND, BLEED SYSTEM' ,
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- HIGH PRESSURE RHR SYSTEM -
- ADD-0N EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM
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- BUNKERED AND DEDICATED SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM ,
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O O O
_g-IMPORTANT GENERIC FINDINGS / INSIGHTS FROM USI A-45 PROGRAM FAILURES IN SUPPORT SYSTEMS (CCW & SW) ARE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTORS EMERGENCY ELECTRIC' POWER AVAILABILITY (AC AND DC) IS A KEY ISSUE AFW SYSTEM PUMP FAILURES ARE IMPORTANT
- FEED AND BLEED CAPABILITY DOES PRODUCE APPRECIABLE BENEFITS
- ADEQUATE ANCHORAGE IS IMPORTANT FOR SEISMIC EVENTS (BATTERY RACKS, SWITCHGEAR, TANKS)
- INTERNAL FLOODS INITIATED BY HUMAN ERRORS COULD BE IMPORTANT
- INSIDER SABOTAGE VULNERABILITIES EXIST DUE TO EXISTING PLANT LAYOUT OF EQ
- TWO UNIT CORE MELTS ARE POSSIBLE to I
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.{ MAJOR SCHEDULE MILESTONES FOR USI A-45 i
CONTRACTOR FINAL
SUMMARY
REPORT ON SEVEN PLANTS MAY 1986 DST DRAFT REGULATORY ANALYSIS AND TECHNICAL FINDINGS JULY 1986 j
REPORT ISSUED FOR STAFF COMMENTS STAFF COMMENTS TO DST AUGUST 1986
{
COMPLETED PACKAGE TO DIRECTOR, NRR SEPTEMBER 1986 i
! PACKAGE TO CRGR OCTOBER 1986 .
CRGR REVIEW COMPLETE DECEMBER 1986
- j ISSUED FOR PUBLIC COMMENT FEBRUARY 1987 1
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h CM (INTERNAL) 9.6 E-05 1.8 E-04 hCM(SPECIALEMERGENCY) 3.4 E-05 9.8 E-05 dCM(TOTAL) 1.3 E-04 2.8 E-04 6hCM(CHANGE)
ALTERNATIVE 1 6.1E-05 1.1E-04 ALTERNATIVE 5 6.3E-05 1.7E-04 AVERTED OFF-SITE DOSE * (P-REM) ,
ALTERNATIVE 1** 2098 3053 -
o ALTERNATIVE 5 2499 4705 iO
- AVERTED OFF-SITE COST AT $1000 PER P-REM ($X10 )
6 ALTERNATIVE 1 . 1.134 1.827 ALTERNATIVE 5 1.351 2.815 POSITIVE IMPACTS ($X10 6
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ALTERNATIVE 1 16.5 16.5 ALTERNATIVE 5 89.3 89.3 IMPACT /hALUE($PERP-REM)
ALTERNATIVE 1 6647 4174 i ALTERNATIVE 5 63355 22816 i
BASED ON 0.3 x RSS SOURCE TERM
- ALTERNATIVE 1 = ADD A DG; ALTERNATIVE 5 = ADD A DEDICATED l
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- P SITIVE IMPACTS = INSTALLATI N, ENGINEERING, OPERATION AND iO i MAINTENANCE COSTS.
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ALTERNATIVE 1 1.8 E-04 2.1 E-04 ALTERNATIVE 4 2.5 E-04 3.3 E-04 AVERTED OFF-SITE DOSE * (P-REM)
ALTERNATIVE 1 2803 3183 ALTERNATIVE 4 3947 4786 o
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- AVERTED OFF-SITE COST AT $1000 PER P-REM ($X10 )
6 ALTERNATIVE 1 1.552 1.868
_ ALTERNATIVE 4 2.186 2.809 POSITIVE IMPACTS ($X10 6 )..
ALTERNATIVE 1 4.4 7.6 ALTERNATIVE 4 64.5 64.5 NET IMPACT /VALL'i'. ($ PER P-REM)
ALTERNATIVE 1 52 833
, ALTERNATIVE 4 15437 12104 j .-
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c h O O O DIERCT COST COMPARISON
($ in Thousands) i l.
BASE WITH PRIMARY HICH PRESSURE BASE RRR BLOWDOWN RHR 7,966 9,203 8,898 8,595 Structures .
5,784 7,425 6,967 6,300 Equipment 7,150 11,800 21,035 18,970 Piping 1,060 1,196 1,277 1,057 Instrumentation 1,212 3,359 1,811 1,499 Conduit and Cable .
23,172 32,983 39,988 36,421 l TOTAL i
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