ML20138A999

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 36 & 25 to Licenses NPF-10 & NPF-15,respectively
ML20138A999
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre  
Issue date: 09/30/1985
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20138A997 List:
References
TAC-56002, TAC-57875, TAC-57876, NUDOCS 8510110236
Download: ML20138A999 (4)


Text

.

g9 8LE Gy, o

UNITED STATES E*,m ' ^g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7, 7 l

WASHING TON. D. C. 20555 i

  • x p

u.-

...+

SAFETY EVALUATION AMENDMENT NO. 36 TO NPF-10 AMENDMENT N0. 25 TO NPF-15 SAN ON0FRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 2 & 3 DOCKET NOS. 50-361 AND 50-362 Introduction Southern California Edison Company (SCE), on behalf of itself and the other licensees, San Diego Gas and Electric Company, the City of Riverside, California, and The City of Anaheim, California, has submitted several applications for license amendments for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3.

One such request, Proposed Change Number 163, or PCN-163, dated May 9,1985 involves the San Onofre Unit 3 boric acid storage tank water volume and concentration. Another such request, PCN-193 dated May 30, 1985 and June 21, 1985, involves the operability of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 fuel handling building post-accident cleanup system (FHBPACFS). A description and evaluation of each of these changes is given below.

Description I. PCN-163:

By letter dated May 9, 1985, SCE requested that the NRC staff revise San Onofre Unit 3 Technical Specifications 3.1.2.7, 3.1.2.8, and Bases 3/4.1.2 (PNC-163). Technical Specifications 3.1.2.7 and 3.1.2.8 require borated water source operability and specify volume, temperature and boron concen-tration requirements which assure that sufficient negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. These technical specifications define the minimum boric acid concentration. The amendment increases the boric acid storage tank volume / concentration and the minimum refueling water storage tank water volume specified by Technical Specification 3.1.2.7, consistent with the revised safety analysis associated with plant refueling and cycle 2 operation. In addition, the amendment decreases the boric acid storage tank water volume / concentration specified in Technical Specification 3.1.2.8, but nevertheless maintains the reactivity control required for cycle 2 cperation, as is demonstrated by the cycle 2 safety analysis.

II. PCN-193:

By letters dated May 30, 1985 and June 21, 1985, SCE requested that the NRC staff revise San Onofre 2 and 3 Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.9.12 " Fuel Handling Building Post-Accident Cleanup Filter System." TS 3/4.9.12 requires the operability of two independent fuel handling building post-accident cleanup filter system (FHBPACFS) trains. The purpose of the FHBPACFS is 0510110236 050930 PDR ADOCK 05000361 p

PDR

J i j to ensure that radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly after a fuel handling accident will be filtered through the HEPA filter and j

charcoal adsorbers. The action required by TS 3/4.9.12 if one of the two j

filter systems becoms inoperable is to restore the inoperable system to operable status within seven days or suspend operation involving movement of fuel within the storage pool or operation of the fuel handling machine over i

the storage pool. The proposed change would revise the action in the event l

of one of the two filter systems becoming inoperable to require that the 4

remaining filter system be placed in operation and be discharging through at least one train in HEPA filters and charcoal absorbers. The proposed

[

change would allow fuel handling operations to continue indefinitely while complying with these action requirements.

Evaluation 4

PNC-163:

The borated water source required by these technical specifications is part i

of the boron injection system which assures that nenative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation, This system is required to satisfy 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 26, " Reactivity l

Control System Redundancy and Capability." GDC-26 states that a nuclear power plant must contain two independent reactivity control systems, one of which is

{

capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under shutdown conditions.

Core performance analyses of the cycle 2 reactor fuel managment design show j

that the baron concentration required to (1) mair(tain the required shutdown margin after xenon decay and cooldown to 200'F, and (2) satisfy GDC-26, has increased due to the differences in core design and core performance charac-teristics from cycle 1.

As a consequence, the minimum borated water volume in the refueling water storage tanks and the minimum boric acid makeup tank water volume must be revised for cycle 2 operation in order to meet the limiting conditions for operation on shutdown margin. The minimum water volume required in the boric acid makeup tank and refueling water storage tank i

in Modes 5 and 6 has been increased due to the increased Mode 5 shutdown

]

margin required for cycle 2 operation.

In addition, the Modes 1 through 4 boric acid makup tank water volume requirement has been decreased in order j

to facilitate plant operation while nevertheless providing the required shut-down margin. For cycle 1 operation, borated water from the boric acid storage I

tank was used during plant shutdown to provide makeup for reactor coolant I

system (RCS) shrinkage. Makeup for RCS shrinkage during cycle 2 will be i

provided from the refueling water storage tank.

Therefore, the proposed Technical Specifications 3.1.2.8 and B3/4.1.2 would specify the boric acid storage tank water volume / concentration and the refuelina water storage tank volume required for negative reactivity control i

to be consistent with the requirements of cycle 2 operation. On this basis, the NRC staff finds the proposed change to be acceptable.

i l

l r

a Y----

L

. II. PCN-193:

The current technical specification requires suspension of operations involving movement of fuel within the storage pool or operation of the fuel handling machine over the storage pool if one of the two filter systems becomes inoperable, and operability is not restored within 7 days. This technical specification is more restrictive than the Combustion Engineering (CE)

Standard Technical Specifications (STS) in this regard, and the proposed change would alter the technical specification to make it consistent with that of the CE STS. The proposed change would allow movement of fuel within the storage pool or operations of the fuel handling machine over the storace pool beyond seven days (if one systen is inoperable) as long as the redundant system is in operation and discharging through charcoal adsorbers.

SRP Section 9.4.2 defines acceptance criteria for spent fuel building area ventilation systems. The criteria state that a single active failure should not result in loss of system functional perfornance capability. The criteria are satisfied at San Onofre 2 and 3 by two independent FHBPACFS trains, both of which are required by the technical specifications to be operable whenever spent fuel is in the fuel storage pool. As stated in Section 16 of the SRP, the technical specifications will be considered to be acceptable if they are consistent with the regulatory guidance contained in the CE Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-0212). Because +he proposed change would make the San Onofre 2 and 3 technical specifications consistent with the CE STS, the staff concludes that the change is, therefore, acceptable.

Contact With State Official The NRC staff has ' advised the Chief of the Radiological Health Branch, State Department of Health Services, State of California, of the proposed determina-tions of no significant hazards consideration. No comments were received.

Environmental Consideration These amendments involve changes in the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupation radiation exposure. The Comission has previously issued proposed findings that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public coment on such findings. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteriaforcategoricalexclusionsetforthin10CFRSec.51.22(c)(9).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environ-mental assessment need to prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

E 3

I J l 1

i Conclusion j

~

Based upon our evaluation of the proposed changes to the San Onofre Units ?

and 3 Technical Specifications, we have concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered i

by operation in the proposed manner, and such activities will be conducted j

in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of the i

amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. We, therefore, conclude that the proposed changes are acceptable, and they are hereby incorporated into the, San Onofre J

2 and 3 Technical Specifications.

f Dated: September 30, 1985 4

1 1

)

i 1

i 0

1 i

i i

f

)

i I

I f

i j

i I

i

_ _ _ ~ - -. _ _ _,, - - _.

_-