ML20138A836
| ML20138A836 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 03/12/1986 |
| From: | Williams J TOLEDO EDISON CO. |
| To: | Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 1238, TAC-57033, TAC-60569, NUDOCS 8603200132 | |
| Download: ML20138A836 (25) | |
Text
,
HREDO Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 JOE WLLIAMS.,JR s m. vc %_
(419)249 2300 I'' # "#'
Serial No. 1238 March 12, 1986 Mr. John F. Stolz, Director PWR Project Directorate No. 6 Division of PWR Licensing - B United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Stolz:
On July 26, 1984 (Log No. 1561) the NRC Staff requested additional informa-tion regarding isolation devices between the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and the safety eysteme for the Devic-Becce Nucicar Pc er Station Unit No. 1.
This information was requested to confirm that the SPDS could be isolated from electrical and electronic interference with equipment and sensors used in safety systems. On September 24, 1984 (Serial No. 1086) Toledo Edison provided the additional information.
Subsequently, the NRC Staff has verbally requested test information for the SPDS isolation devices.
Accordingly, the following test reports for each of the two types of isolation devices for which the NRC Staff has requested test data are attached:
a.
Fisher and Porter 50 EK 1000 Converter b.
Bailey 880 System (Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Plant Protection System)
Very trulv yours, OH-
- CAB:lah ttachrent cc: DB-1 NRC Resident Inspector
,icl o
4?o2*122e60 ara y
p ADOCK 05000346 I
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s THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY EDISON PLAZA 300 MADISON AVENUE TOLEDO. OHIO 43652
Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3' Serial No. 1238 March 12, 1986 Attachment I r
sPDRIER 20 February 1985 Mr. Paul Goel Bechtel Power Corporation 15740 Shady Grove Road Gaithersburg, Maryland 10877
Dear Paul:
This m>morandum is in response to your recent request to furnish specifi-cation- !or the F&rP 50EK1000 Converter. Be advised that this product was wathdrawn from sale in January 1979 (replaced by the 50EK2000).
Based on limited test data documented as long ago as 1974 (but never published since it represented a sample of one), the following data should be regarded as approximations at best.
As you know, the 50EK1000 uses a mag-amp and does not contain a 24 V power supply, so the specifications are going to be somewhat different than the 50EK2000.
SPECIFICATIONS - ISOIA TION 1.
A common-mode voltage between Input and Output up to 550 V AC or 550 V DC will cause less than (approximately) 150 pA or 50 pA charge, respectively, in the input current.
2.
A normal mode voltage on the output greater than 60 V peak AC can cause failure. NOTE: External fusing is recommended.
Use 1/16 A fuse.
3.
Insulation resistance > 1 M megohm.
continued...
1 FISCHER & PORTER COMPANY W ARMtNSTER, PA USA 18974 12153 s74 6000 C ABLE; FISMPORT 4 TELEX; e45 215
Mr. Paul Goel 20 February 1985 Bechtel Power Corporation Page Two O
I trust this information will provide you with a better understanding of the isolation specifications of the 50EK1000.
f Sincerely, cL
^
ohn Dwyer roduct Manager - Control Products s
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D. Spany 20 June 1972 TABLE I COMON HODE TESTS 84?TERY !mEr'
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Common Mode E2 9" f '
Millivolts, Millivolts, u Amps, u Amps, gg e ggjofg,r (Meast$ red)
(Measured)
(Measured) 0 0.7*
2.82* & 4.2 0.36 1.5 & 2.4*
50 2.2*
& 10.6 14.3* & 15.5 1.11* &
10.2 &
9.44 &
3.8* &
5.3 13.2*
45.5*
5.1 120 6.0*
& 10.6 38.2* & 38.9 3.0* & 5. 3 33.6 &
22.6 &
3.4* &
35.2*
40.0*
3.6 250 12.4* & 28.3 84.9 6.2*&
70.7 &
17.6 &
3.2* &
14.2 78.7*
40.4*
3.5 500 22.6*
& 56.5 152.0* &
11.3*&
121.7 &
17.7 &
3.6* &
159.0 28.3 140.7*
44.2*
4.2 550 24.0* & 56.5 159.0* &
12.0* E 121.7 &
19.4 &
3.7* &
159.0 28.3 147.0*
43.8*
4.5 Unpowered I/I
D Docket NO. 5G-346 License No. EPF-3 Serial No. 1238 March 12, 1985 Attachment II BABCOCK & WILCOX NUCLEAR PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM ISOLATION DEVICE CIRCUITS BAILEY 880 SYSTEM
.eg.
o -,o 1.0 Scope The scope of this docunent is tgscribe the isolation device circuits utilized in Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Plant Protection Systems.
In addition, analysis and test data is presented to support the suitability of the isolation device circuits.
In the context of this document, Nuclear Plant Protection Systems are limited to the Nuclear Instmmentation/ Reactor Protection System (NI/RPS), and Emergency Core Cooling Actuation Systen (ECCAS).
2.0 Introduction Plant Protection System designs are characterized by the use of redundancy to promote reliability, systen testing, and plae =ilability.
Redundant portions (channels) of the protection systems, in order to ensure true redundancy, are:
A.
housed in individual seismically qualified cabinet assemblies.
B.
powered by independent electrical power resources.
C.
qualified to operate through the expected range of environmental and seismic conditions.
To fully exploit the attributes of redundancy, coincidence logic networks are employed to make protective action decisions based on redundant inputs. 'Ihe use of coincidence logic networks requires the interchange of information between redundant channels. These are referred to as interchannel signals _.
Protection Systems are also designed to provide the operator with timely infonnation relative to their status. This involves the consnunication of infonnation from the protection systen (class IE) to non-protection systems (non-IE). These are referred to as non-IE signals.
2 For redundant channels to be truly redundaitt, adequate electrical isolation must be provided in interchannel and non-IE signal paths.
The electrical isolation circuits are housed in, qualified with, and considered a part of the protection system.
3.0 Philosophy The philosophy stated in this section are based on the following
~
definitions:
Electrical Faults - the transmission line connected to the output of an isolation device circuit may be open circuited, short circuited, grounded, or subjected to credible fault voltages.
Maximum Credible Voltage - is considered to be 400 VDC and 400 V peak AC for analog signals and 480 VAC RMS for digital signals.
Unacceptable Effects - non-performance of protective action when required of perfonnance or protective action when not required.
3.1 Interchannel Signal Paths hhen interchannel signal paths are provided with adequate electrical isolation, electrical faults in one channel of the protection system will not produce unacceptable effects in any other redundant channel of the protection system.
3.2 Non-IE Signals hhen non-IE signal paths are provided with adequate electrical
+
isolation, electrical faults affecting the transmission lines in the non-IE environment will not produce unacceptable affects in any channel of the protection system.
4.0 Analysis Two types of signal paths (analog and digital) which require electrical isolation are involved in protection systen designs.
Electrical
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a isolation of analog signals is accomplishe'd by isolation amplifier circuits while electrical isolation of digital signals is accomplished by relay circuits. This section addresses connecting circuits, and isolation devices (isolation amplifiers and relays) separately.
4.1 Connecting Circuits Thie components utilized to connect, field wiring to the isolation devices (relays and amplifiers) combine to form the isolation circuit.
The connecting circuits must possess dielectric strengths equal to or greater than the maximum credible voltages indicated in section 3.0 in order to maintain electrical isolation. Components involved in connecting circuits are listed in Table 4-1.
Table 4-1, in addition, provides working voltage ratings and material data relative to connecting circuits. The component ratings exceed the maxirum credible fault voltage in section 3.0.
Also, it should be noted that breakdown voltage values are considerably greater than working voltage ratings.
For example, the wiring rating is established at twice rated voltage plus one thousand volts.
4.2 Relays Interchannel and non-IE signal paths are provided with electrical isolation by means of relays. The inherent electrical separation between relay contacts and coils and between individual contacts is' utilized to isolate digital signals.
In relays, the main variable determining isolation capability is dielectric strength. The relays, employed in the protection systans for electrical isolation purposes, have a minimum dielectric strength of 1,000 VRMS coil to contact and contact to contact.
4.3 Analog Signal Isolators Figure 1 depicts a typical analog signal path where amplifiers A and
.p L
4 B2 Process the protective action signal while amplifier B1 provides the isolated analog output signal. Various faults, at the output of B, are acceptable when signal V2 and hence signal V5 are essentially 1
unaffected.
In this circuit:
A.
the 220 ohm resistors preclude overload of the related amplifier in the event of an inadvertent short at the amplifier output.
B.
the gain of A, B, and B2 is essentially unity.
1 C.
the dynamic signal range is ten volts.
D.
amplifiers A, B, and B2 are capable of supplying up to five 1
milliamperes mininum without limiting.
E.
the normal loading on amplifier A is approximately 0.0001 amperes per each driven amplifier.
- F.
the maximum input current to amplifier B2 is 0.0001 ampere.
G.
the changes in the value of R1 will be reflected as a signal error in the output signal at R. Changes in R1 are, therefore, self L
annunciating.
H.
the protective action signal is conservatively considered as unaffected so long as current I2 does not exceed 0.004 amperes under fault conditions at the B1 output.
IA = 0.005 A max. without limiting Il = 0.0001 A max.
I2 n Imal = I2N = 0.0001 A max.
I2 fault = I2F = 0.004 A max. under fault conditions IA=Il+I2F = 0.0001 + 0.004 = 0.0041 A max, allowable under fault conditions I2F < IA***
4.3.1 Worst Case Analysis From section 4.3, the worst case fault is assumed to be the case where a high voltage is applied at the output of B1 and results in a
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Table 4-1 Connect _..g Circuit Data COMPONEMF RATING MATERIAL REMARKS W.V.= Working Voltage D.S.= Dielectric Strength f
Terminal Blocks 1100 VAC W.V.
Phenolic Interconnects field wiring and cabinet back-plane wiring Backplane Wiring 600 VAC W.V.
Teflon Type G Connects terminal blocks to blue ribbon connectors Blue Ribbon 750 V D.S.
Diathoulate Connects backplane wiring to module internals Connectors Module Internal 600 VAC W.V.
Teflon Type G Connects blue ribbon connector to mother Wiring board internal to modules Connector 600 V D.S.
Lexan Connects printed circuit board carrying the isolation device (relay or isolation amplifier)
Printed Circuit 600 V W.V.
- Glass / Epoxy
- Working voltage between adjacent printed Lanes circuit board conductors per 1/16 inch spacing.
Also applicable to mother board.
a I
s i
t
5 a
short circuit fault between the B input and output.
In this case, y
the impedance between the fault source and the IE output of A is 5
minimum and equal to R1 = 10 ohms. The maximum tolerable fault voltage at the By output is, therefore, E ault " Ifault x R1 = 0.004 x f
105 = 400 volts. Under worst case fault R is required to dissipate y
1.6 watts and not breakdown with 400 v,olts impressed across its tenninals. The characteristics of R1 are consistent with these requironents.
4.3.2 Analysis Results Fault potentials up to and including 400 VDC and 400 volts peak AC have been analyzed to demonstrate that under worst case conditions (amplifier B1 input to output shorted) amplifier A will not be driven into limits. The protection system would, therefore, suffer no unacceptable effects.
- 5. 0 Isolator Tests
'Ihe isolation device circuits utilized in the protection systems were subjected to type tests designed to verify the analysis described in section 4 of this document. The tests and their results are described below.
5.1 Connecting Circuits The connecting circuits are described in section 4.1.
The dielectric strengths and working voltage ratings of these devices are considerably above the nuximisn credible fault voltage levels -- see section 3.0.
Vendors procurement specification and quality assurance procedures ensure electrical isolation ratings of these components is maintained.
5.2 Relays Since relays are standard products and are installed as a unit and since their electrical isolation ability is accepted, the manufacturers
s dielectric rating certifications are utilized as evidence of their suitability. The relay manufacturers certifications verify that the protection system vendor's requirements for 1,000 volt minimtn dielectric strength are met. The ratings of these devices is considerably above the maxinum credible fault voltage level -- section 3.0.
5.3 Analog Isolators The analog isolation device, illustrated in figure 1,.was subjected to eight tests. The tests are illustrated in figures 2 through 9 where the reference conditions and effects of the sinulated electrical fault on the protective action signal are enumerated in a tabic at the bottom of each figure. Three types of tests were conducted:
1.
Passive - illustrated in figures 2 and 3, 2.
Credible Fault Voltages - illustrated in figures 4, 5, 6, and 7, and 3.
High Fault Voltages - illustrated in figures 8 and 9.
5.3.1 Passive Tests Faults such as shorted and open isolator outputs are passive faults which do not introduce foreign sources of voltage into isolator output circuits. These tests are illustrated in figures 2 and 3.
In these cases, protective action signals V2 and V5 were not affected to an unacceptable degree.
5.3.2 Credible Fault Voltages Credible fault voltage tests are tests where the output of the isolator is subjected to foreign voltages which are credible due to exposure of the transmission line and load. The tests are illustrated and the results enumerated in figures 4 through 7.
Tests 3 and 4 (figures 4 and 5) were designed to verify the adequacy of isolation at the low f
end of the credible fault range. Tests 5 and 6 (figures 6 and 7) were designed to verify the adequacy of isolation in the center and i
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upper portion of the credible fault voltage range for both AC and -
DC potentials.
4 In these cases (tests 3, 4, 5 and 6) protective action signals V2 and V5 were not affected to an unacceptable degree.
5.3.3 liigh Fault Voltages liigh fault voltage tests are where the output of the isolator is subjected to foreign voltages in the upper region of the credible fault voltage range and beyond for both AC and DC potentials. These tests are illustrated and the results enumerated in figures 8 and 9.
In these cases (tests 7 and 8) protective action signals V2 and V3 were not affected to an unacceptable degree.
5.4 Test Conclusions The results of the analog isolator tests are sumarized in figure 10.
The tests were conducted in the fault voltage range 0 to 608 volts peak 60 H AC and 0 to 475 VDC. The extremely low percentage of error and low values of ripple induced in the protective action signal indicates the suitability of the analog isolator c'.esign.
V2 and V5 No wreceptable effects were noted in any of the tests.
6.0 NI/RPS to Actuated Device Interface A discussion of the NI/RPS should include the electrical interface between the NI/RPS and the control rod drive control systan.
A typical interface is shown in simplified fonn in figure 11. Since the NI/RPS is cmprised of four redundant channels, the arrangement shown is repeated four times (once in each division of plant redundancy).
There are four control rod drive breaker cabinets where each cabinet 1
8 a
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contains a channel of trip equipment. The cabinet and trip equipnent are seismically and enviromentally qualified.
The NI/RPS channel controls the vital power source that maintains the under voltage coil (tN) and relay K2 in a statically energized state. To convey a trip, the NI/RPS intermpts vital power to de-energize the tN coil.' The IN coil can also be de-energized by means of a momentary manual trip switch. When the IN coil de-energizes, the associated contacts intermpt primary power to the CRD system. The breakers are arranged to produce a trip of the control rods in a one-out-of-two taken twice coincidence of the four breakers.
Relay K2 produces a secondary trip into the motor return cabinets while relay K1
{
transmits a signal to the NI/RPS for breaker trip confinnation.
All wiring between each NI/RPS channel and the respective control rod drive breaker cabinet is classified as class IE and required to be maintained within its division of redundancy.
All class IE and non-class IE wiring within the control rod drive breaker cabinets have minimum voltage ratings of 600 VRMS. All components (tenninal blocks, connectors, etc.) within these connecting paths posssess dielectric strengths in excess of 600 VME.
Relays K1 and K3 have a dielectric strength rating of 1,250 VRtS i
coil to contact.
The maximum credible failure mode voltage within the control rod drive breaker cabinet is 480 VRtS. The maximtzn credible failure voltage is well below the minimum relay dielectric strength of the control rod drive trip channel equipnent.
Failures to maximum credible voltage, within a given control rod drive breaker cabinet will not
_ produce unacceptable effects within the NI/RPS.
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