ML20137Z695
| ML20137Z695 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07002947 |
| Issue date: | 11/27/1985 |
| From: | Crow W, Ketzlach N NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137Z684 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8512110376 | |
| Download: ML20137Z695 (3) | |
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NOV 2 719C DOCKET N0: 70-2947 APPLICANTS: Illinois Power Company Soyland Power Cooperative, Inc.
Western Illinois Power Cooperative, Inc.
FACILITY: Clinton Power Station, Unit 1
SUBJECT:
REVIEW OF LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST DATED NOVEMBER 11, 1985 BACKGROUND Illinois Power Company, on behalf of itself, Soyland Power Cooperative, Inc.,
and Western Illinois Power Cooperative, Inc., by application dated November 11, 1985, requested Materials License No. SNM-1886 be amended authorizing an exemption from the provisions of 10 CFR 70.24. At the present time, when fuel is being handled or stored, area radiation monitors are required to monitor for potential criticality accidents (although the potential for criticality at the Clinton Station is practically impossible) in the Fuel Building and the Contain-ment Building. These radiation monitors are to be designed according to the NRC Regulatory Guide 8.12 and 10 CFR 70.24(a)(1). The fuel assemblies are Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Assemblies.
DISCUSSION A. Nuclear Criticality and Radiation Safety The following are the inherent features associated with the storage and inspection of unirradiated fuel containing uranium enriched to less than 5 percent in the U-235 isotope when no fuel processing activities are to be performed:
- 1. Fuel asser.blies are handled as discrete items. Only one fuel assembly is handled at one time and only three assemblies can be out of approved storage at one time. The NRC staff has shown that three isolated BWR fuel assemblies cannot be made critical independent of the spacing between them and of the degree of water moderation and/c reflection.
- 2. Normally the new fuel assemblies are stored dry. Under these condi-tions, an infinite number of assemblies containing uranium enriched to less than 5 percent in the U-235 isotope cannot be made critical, independent of the spacing between them.
- 3. There are engineered controls for the spacing between fuel assemblies in the fuel storage racks in the Upper Containment, Spent Fuel Storage Pools, and in the new fuel vault. In the spent fuel storage racks in the Spent Fuel Storage Pool, racks are designed so that the array of fuel assemblies cannot be made critical independent of the degree of 8512110376 851127 PDR ADOCK 07002947 C PDR k
NOV g7;ggg Illinois Power Company 2 for an infinite array is watermoderationbetweenthem(maximumk@storedintheracksinthe 0.84010.004). The new fuel assemblies a Upper Containment Fuel Storage Pool only under water (License Condition 20). Under these conditions, the k of the array is 0.82. Adminis-trativecontrolsforthestorageof*k[wfuelassembliesintheNew Fuel Storage Vault (License Conditions 17 and 18) assure nuclear criticality safety. The number of fuel assemblies that can be un-covered at one time is limited and all fire hoses servicing the New Fuel Storage Vault area are equipped with solid stream nozzles.
These conditions preclude the possibility of moderating an entire open section of the fuel array and from generating mist over the entire exposed array to assure nuclear criticality safety in the vault.
- 4. Fuel assemblies are packaged in plastic wrappers open at both ends so that water would drain freely from the assemblies in the event of flooding and subsequent draining of the fuel storage area. This administrative control removes the possibility of criticality under these postulated accident conditions.
The liuited quantity of uranium enriched in the U-235 isotope contained in incore neutron detectors and plutonium for calibration of alpha and neutron detectors are insignificant compared to the maximum quantities required to form a critical mass independent of container geometry, the degree of water modera-tion, and the degree of water reflection.
Based on the above, the staff hereby detennines that granting the requested exemption will not endanger life or property, or the common defense and -
security, and is otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, it is recom-mended Condition 24 be added to the license to read as follows:
Condition 24: The licensee is hereby exempted from the provisions of 10 CFR 70.24 insofar as this section applies to materials held under this license.
sThere is no requested change to the materials to be handled or the radiation protection program (other than the criticality alarm requirements); therefore, the radiation protection program for the Clinton Power Station is adequate.
B .. Environmental Protection There is no requested change to the environmental protection requirements of the facility. The requested change is administrative and in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(11), neither an Environmental Assessment nor an Environmental Impact Statement is necessary for this proposed action.
GENERAL The application dated November 11, 1985, was discussed with Mr. T. P. Gwynn, Senior Resident Inspector, Clinton Power Station, on November 21, 1985, and
Illinois Power Company- 3 Mr. L. R. Greger, Region III, Chief Facility Radiation Protection Section, on November 25, 1985. Neither foresaw a safety or environmental problem with the requested authorization.
wiginal SisnedB7A N. Ketzlach Norman Ketzlach Uranium Process Licensing Section Uranium Fuel Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety, NMSS Approved by: /m, ,
. T. Crow, Settfor Lead M
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0FC: FCUP :FCUF :FCUF y: : : :
NAME:NKe z ac /kd/as:VLT arpe : : : : :
DATE:11/r7/85 :11/29785 :11/JP/85 : : : :
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