ML20137P726

Proposed Work Plan for Development of Davis-Besse Steam Feed Rupture & Control Sys Panel

ML20137P726
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	09/30/1985
From:	ESSEX CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20137P710	List: ML20137P704 ML20137P726
References
PROC-850930, NUDOCS 8512050088
Download: ML20137P726 (27)

Text

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i PROPOSED NORK PLAN FOR DEVELOPMENT DF THE DAVIS-BESSE SFRCS PANEL Prepared For:

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Prepared By:

Essex Corporation 333 North Fairfax Street Alexandria, Virginia 22314 703/548-4500 September 30, 1985 8512050088 851120 PDR ADOCK 05000346 PDR p

PROPOSED WORK PLAN FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE DAVIS-BESSE SFRCS PANEL This document describes a work plan methodology for the design of a new panel to serve functions of the Steam Feed Rupture and Control System (SFRCS). The work plan is composed of nine tasks which include a requirements analysis (Tasks I & 2), the design and evaluation process (Tasks 3-7), and a final review of the completed product and documentation of the panel development (Task 8 & S).

TASK I: ANALYZE DOCUMENTED PROBLEMS -

WITH SFRCS COMPONENTS 9hJtilitt '

o To determine which features of SFRCS related components have documented problems which may need correction.

Eltti

1. Review 'all HEDs concerned with SFRCS and group HEDs according to schedule for correction.

2. Review relevant information resulting from the plant trip on June S, 1985 (e.g., NUREG 1154, Davis-Besse reports....)

and determine which issues need to be addressed for possible SFRCS corrections.

Prggugig_iltsh_11

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o List of issues which should be addressed during any corrections of SFRCS in the mair. control room.

EMtt2El Ntt$t$ ilt* Dttit~Et'Et PSEttnhtiiltthil o Operations and ISC personnel available to provide information regarding the operatrr requirements and hardware requirements of SFRCS.

l o Project management review of identified problems.

1

! TASK 2: IDENTIFICATION OF SFRCS INFORMATION AND

' I CONTROL REQUIREMENTS OkJttlitt o Davis-Besse is in the process of developing a new panel in order to centralize SFRCS functions. The objective of this task is to identify information and control requirements for the SFRCS functions.

E11Es

1. Review Task 1 results for SFRCS instrumentation and control requirements. Determine if any SFRCS related components are recommended for addition, deletion er relocation.

2. Review DCRDR task analysis to identify which information and control requirements are required for SFRCS functions in the emergency procedure.

3. Through interview and joint analysis with system engineers, 1&C and operations, determine which other ISC requirements, if any, should be addressed f.or the proposed pane l to support SFRCS functions. This analysis may review portions of selected normal procedures.

4. Determine criteria regarding installation on control panel considering:

o Seismic.

o . Fire separation.

o Consideration of space required behind panel face and on top of panel (e.g., space f or maintenance,

• for operation,...)

o Availability of new controls and displays from manufacturer.

o Dthe r c rite ria.

Ereducia_ilssh_21 o List of information and control requirements for SFRCS functions. This list should flag requirements for new components vs. relocated components. Requirements for relocated components should identify existing panel location.

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o Availability of Operations, ISC, and/or Systems Engineering for requirements analysis (determination of Tech Spec values, set points, ...)

o Review by proJeet management of component requirement list.

TASK 3: IDENTIFY HARDWARE FOR SFRCS FUNCTIONS OhltElitt o To identify specific components to provide required instrumentation and control f unctions f or the SFRCS function.

ElsE!

3. Determine which existing components will satisfy information and control requirements and other practical requirements such as size. Refer to ralevant HEDs from DCRDR.

2. For new component requirements compare possible components from different manufacturers on the basis of relevant criteria from 0700 and Davis-Besse experience.

Ers#ssis_IIssh_fi o List of displays and controls proposed for new panel.

tunest2.Nssisi irse-Qssis:Ennss Estssonsi ilssh.31 o Availabifity of Operations and ISC pe'rsonnel to provide Davis-Besse experience as input into selection.

o To be determined: Will CRT/SPDS be involved here? Or are only hardwired components to be used? s P.

TASK 4: ASSESS GROUPING OF SFRCS RELATED COMPONENTS Ehj!Slivss o Assess proposed system grouping of SFRCS related components relative to other system groupings to ensure that operator

, ') traffic patterns are effective. This task does not address arrangement of specific components within a group.

e To identify and address any human factors problems which could arise from relocating components (e.g., is it possible that important existing control-display relations will be disturbed? Will component grouping be degraded?

Elses I. Prepare traffic patterns for preposed grouping of '

components. The traffic patterns should be based on procedures which use the new SFRCS components and relocated SFRCS components.

2. Compare the traffic patterns for the proposed arrangements to those developed for the DCRDR. The primary c r i~t e r i a

! used in this comparison will include:

Distance walked.

Number of shifts between system groupings.

Number of shifts between different panels (console, vertical panel, back panels).

Interference among operators.

t _ - - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ ._ -

These comparisons will focus on the SFRCS function and other functions which use components proposed for relecation to the SFRCS panel.

3. Verify problem components with operator (s).

4. Resolve locations of problem components.

Eredssis_II!!k dk o List cf problems identified in traffic pattern analysis.

These cisms would identif y which components, if any, were not in an appropriate system grouping, or those components which are strongly associated with more than one system grouping.

o Final list of components to b,e placed,on new panel.

EEEEgrj_Nggggf_{rge_Dggis-Bgssg_Esrsgggg1_iltsh_fl o Projec t manageme nt review of components in goor locations.

TASK 5: PRELIMINARY SFRCS COMPONENT ARRANGEMENT Davis-Besse has developed preliminary diagrams showing different alternatives for a mimicked component arrangement. Davis-Besse has also developed a f ull-scale sock-up of the new panel based on one of the preliminary diagrams.

9 kits $122 o Complete a preliminary component arrangement in sufficient detail to allow an evaluation,of component arrangement.

l E1221 .

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! 1. Compare the list of components and component requirements developed in this work plan to the set of components used for the mock-up.

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2. Review criteria for component layout. These criteria include practical considerations such as panel structural limitations and fire separation; and NUREG-0700 criteria i (e.g., panel layout, location sids, ...).

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3. Revise the preliminary scheme to accommodate changes in list of requirements.

4. Consider alternative mimic arrangement, if useful.

Eredusin LInsk k1 o Description of list of criteria.

l _ _

i e Revised mock-up and/or drawing to reflect incorporation of l updated c riteria and requirements. This scheme to include sufficient labeling for component location and identification during evaluation.

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o ISC personnel to provide information regarding panel structure and component area constraints.

o Review of revised layout by Project Manager.

TASK 6: EVALUATION OF PRELIMINARY COMPONENT ARRANGEMENT QkitSiitt .

o Determine to what extent the preliminary component arrangement satisfies operational needs defined by (1) a walkthrough on the mock-up and (2) review of rolevant SFRCS HEDs from DCRDR.

Ei!En I. Develop scenarios for SFRCS operation for emergency procedure walkthroughs.

2. Ensure that all relevant portions of sock-up are prepared for a walkthrough to evaluate only component grrgggemsni (relationships among individual components within a grouping) and labeling.

3. Observe operators as they walkthrough the prepared scenarios to identify possible human factors concerns with the panel layout. .

4. Interview operators participating in walkthrough for comments, criticisms, and suggestions.

i

5. Assess operator comments.

6. Review the HEDs which are relevant to the component arrangement and determine if the layout corrects the problems.

Ersdusis_ilash_fl .

o Scenarios and procedural steps used in the evaluation.

o Record of walkthrough comments by observers and operators.

o Record of assessment of comments.

o Record evaluation of HED correction.

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I I o Operators to assist in development of scenarios. i l '

o Operator to ensure relevant portions of mock-up are prepared for walkthough.

o Operators to participate in walkthrough and interview.

o Operators and Systems Engineer to assist in evaluating SFRCS HED correction.

l TASK 7: REFINE AND FINALIZE DESIGN Okisslixt -

o To complete the design process and prepare final documents suitable for panel construction.

Elses

1. Incorporate comments on preliminary design into drawing of new panel. (This process may be somewhat iterative due to evaluations of new changes and trade-off analyses).

2. Evaluate modified design as required. Examine all HEDs identified in Task 1.

3. Prepare final drawing and necessary notes for panel manufacture. The final design drawing should include proposed label content.

Eredssis_ilssh_Z1

-o Record results of HED correction assessment.

o See No. 3 above.

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o Operations and Project Management to review changes and final document.

TASK 8: REVIEW MANUFACTURED PRODUCT -

Ohlssiirs o To determine if manufactured panel satisfies specifications.

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l Els25 (This item could change depending on who manufactures the panel and the number of participants in the process.)

1. Check physic 67 layout features of panel such as dimensions, color, applicati'bn of mimic lines, and components characteristics against the requirements established in earlier tasks.

Ersissi_II!=h_e2 o Statement of any problems identified in above evaluation.

Isansri_Ussisd_ free _Daris:Basss_Esrssonsi_IIssh_82 o Review by Project Manager, Operations, and Inc.

TASK 9: DOCUMENTATION OF DESIGN PROCESS ,

Qkiss$ist o To provide description of important steps in the design process, to record the level of preparation for the design process and the rationale for key decisions in the process.

Elsgs

1. Prepare summary of each task in the design process and combine into a final report.

Eredesi_IIssh_al l o Final report f or SFRCS pane r design.

Eueestt_Nssdsd_ free _Qstis:Essss_Esrssonsi_11ssk_31 o Review of report by Project Manager.

9 0

P METHOD FOR UPDATING SFTA AND I&C REQUIREMENTS VERIFICATION l l

The following additional function and task analysis will be performed to document and further verify required instrumentation and control requirements as recommended in the NRC's DCRDR audit report of July 2, 1985: .

I. Complete function and task analysis of radioactivity release response (not previously analyzed)

2. Reanalysis of operator actions for steam generator tube rupture to ensure comprehensive identification of information and control needs ( p a r a m e t e'r s and control action capabilities)

3. Analysis and documentation of required characteristics of instrumentation and centrols to meet information and control needs for als emergency operator tasks. -

4. Verification of ISC availability and suitability by comparison of requirements data from steps I - 3 above to existing instrumentation and controls.

ANALYSIS TEAM The analysis team will consist of a human f actors specialist with oxporience in DCRDR task analysis and a nuclear operations specialist (SRO liconse), and a systems / ISC engineer.

INPg,STOTHEANALYSIS o Abnormal Transient Operating Guidelines (ATOG) l o Safety sequence diagrams developed in analysis

leading to ATOG o System Function Review Tables developed in previous function and task analysis for the Davis-Besse DCRDR o Documentation of system changee recommended by Davis-Besse's System Review Group.

ANALYSIS APPROACH The analysis approach is divided into four parts, corresponding to tho four needs identified in the DCRDR audit report.

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a. Review system documentation and technical specifications pertinent to radioactivity release detection and control system.

b. Review administrative procedures concerning personnel responsibilities for radioactivity release control.

c. Prepare safety sequence diagrams identifying system and operator f unctions f or radioactivity release response.

! d. List tasks required to accomplish. operator functions.

,e. Analyze each task and specify task action requirements, and the necessary instrumentation and controls and their

- characteristics, based on what the operator is expected

, to accomplish and plant system characteris' tics and operating and safety limits.

f. Synthesize instrument and control requirements specified for each component and parameter, by system. ,

Z:__sisse_9sestsier_Iuht_Buelurs_ensirsis

a. Compare existing Task Data Forms to applicable portions of the ATOG and safety sequence diagrams. Add any operator acilons and associated information and control needs that may have been omitted from Task Data Forms.

'b4 Compare Task Data Forms as amended in step (a) to

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applicable parts of the symptom-based E0P and technical specifications to identify any additional action, information, and control needs that may be called for by those documents.

c. Anulyze all information and control needs on updated Task Data Forms to specify implications for ISC characteristics as in step 1(e) above.

d. Synthesize I&C requirements as in step 1(f) above.

at__e enir s in_ ne d _D e s ues ci n11se _sf _B ssWit sd_I& G_G h a ra sit ris 11s s Isr_ ell _Bsemicies_EetrS19sr_9str!!icS_S!9919sts This will be done as described for steps 1(e) and 1(f).

I d2___Ytrifiss11sD_sf_ers11sk1111r_nDd_Gharnsistin11ss_st Eli11109_1011rWe101ElisD_IDd_GsDirsil The synthesized set of requirements for each emergency response oequence will be compared to existing components in a walk-through emercise involving one to two operators to assist the analysis team. This will be done in the mockup. Before tre e s e emercises the mockup will be verified and

. spdated as necessary to ensure that it is f ully accurate with respect to tho current control room.

DAVIS-BESSE HED REASSESSMENT METHODOLGY:

DETERMINATION OF CUMMULATIVE AND INTERACTIVE EFFECTS The procedure employed to determine cummulative and interactive effects between HEDs initially requires the identification of all HEDs related to a specific component.

This will be done using the on-line tracking system which can cross-reference HEDs using specific component ID numbers.

A team of human factors specialists and operations personnel will evaluate the specific relationships between HEDs to determine those which will interact to increase the error potential and/or decrease the potential for recovery. Because the consequence of the error is a constant, and only the potential for that effort is impacted by interaction effects, the consequence of error will remain as determined during normal assessment.

The factors to be considered by the evaluation team are as follow:

I. Potential for Error A. Situational factors

1. Time criticality for task completion

2. Frequency of use of component B. Specific factors

1. Operator function / involvement

a. Maintained control of dynamic system parameter

b. Discrete control of plant systems

c. Monitoring systems / responding to alarm information

2. Human engineering considerations

a. Determination of generallocation of component in control room

b. Identification of specific location of component in control room

c. Usability of component II. Potential for Recovery A. Detectability of error-contingent on verfication of control action (feed-back)

1. Nature of verification information (direct vs. Inferred)

2. Accessibility of verification information l B. Restoration of error dependent on dynamics of system (s) involved

9 1

DAVIS-BESSE COMPUTERIZED HED TRACKING SYSTEM (Prototype)

Sample HED Data and Sample HED Status Summary e

O 4

DAVIS-EESSE PAGE NO: 1 HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY (HED) PEPOPT TITLE: Accidental activation of Pushb HED NO: P.4.1.3 utton Controls CATEGORY: III STATUS: COMP ITEMS INVOLVED: CORR CODE: N/A FANEL ID: C-15 COMPNT ID: HIS-E227 HIS-623E HIS-6037 HIS-E240 HIS-6242 HIS-E243 HIS-E244 HIS-6246 HIS-E248 HIS-EOSO HIS-E251 HIS-E254 HIS-EE2E PROBLEM DESCRIPTION:

Pushbuttons enounted low on the Electrical Distribution Panel are subje et to accidental activation by personnel leaning or buriiping against th e rn .

0700 PARA: 6.4.1.2g DATA SOURCE: 01.3 CPECIFIC ERROP:

Inadvertent activat* ion of controls BACI

FIT:

Change the pushbuttons to rotary switches to prevent inadvertent activ ation DI SPOSITI ON:

Changing the controls would violate the current shape coding conventio ns in the control r oorii. -

A foot guard extends 4.5 inches f rorii the base -

of the panel to prevent operators fror leaning or buriping the panel.

SCHEDULE: N/A l OFif8914ATOR D.Deith DATE: 07/19/03 APPROVED: DATE:

-- . . - - - - - - - - - - - , , - , - . - - - - - - - ,, - - ~ - , - ~ wr - - - -o

DAVIS-BESSE PAGE NO: 1 HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY (HED) PEPORT TITLE: Indicator Lights are Dirie HED NO: P.S.1.1 CATEGORY: IIC STATUS: COMP ITEMS INVOLVED: CORR CODE: CL5 PANEL ID: C-22 COMPNT ID: SI-60098 PANEL ID: C-6 COMPNT ID: 21-3000 PANEL ID: C-7 COMPNT ID: TI-RCT 4

PROBLEM DESCRIPTION:

Lights on the above panels are di f ficult to read clearly and have litt 1e contrast i n ar.ibi ent lighting. Oper ators triust shield the light s wit h their hands to read the displays clearly.

0700 PARA: 6.5.3.1b ,

DATA SOURCE: S.5.1.B3(4),S.5.1.BG(1),04.3 SPECIFIC ERROR:

Misinterpretation of equipriient status BACl: FIT:

Ing rease brightness of LED lights.

DISPOSITION:

Add a hood to all LED displays to eliriiinate glare and increase the bri ghtness contrast.

SCHEDULE: Cth Pefuel ORIG 1tJATOR: D.Beith DATE: 07/06/83 APPROVED: DATE:

DAVIS-BESSE PAGE NO: 1 HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY (HED) REPORT TITLE: Label Cleanliness HED NO: P.6.1.2

, CATEGORY: III STATUS: COMP ITEMS INVOLVED: CORR CODE: CL5 PANEL ID: ALL COMPNT ID: ALL 1

PROBLEM DESCRIPTION:

No procedure exists for the periodic cleaning of control panel labels.

Labels are not cleaned on a regular. basis 0700 PARA: 6.6.2.4d

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l DATA SOURCE: S6.1. B6 ( 9) , S6.1. B4 (1 ) ,06.7 l

SPECIFIC ERROR: '

Misreading cornponent labels l .

BACITIT:

• Establish a ruaintenance or adrainistrative procedure for periodic clean ing of labels.

1

, DISPOSITION:

Sarne as above. In addition labels will be standardi::ed blaci: on white to reduce re ading pr obl erns.

SCHEDULE: 7t'h Refuel ORI GINATOR: D. Death DATE: 07/05/83 APPROVED: DATE:

l l

l v-, .-. . . . , . . - . . - -

DAVIS-BESSE PAGE NO: 1 HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY (HED) REPORT TITLE: Cornput er Display Titles are Un HED NO: P.7.1.1 clear in Describing Display Co CATEGORY: III STATUS: COMP ITEMS INVOLVED: CORR CODE: ENH PANEL ID: CRT'S COMPNT ID: DISPLAYS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION:

Titles used for individual CRT displays do not accurately describe the actual contents of the display .

0700 PARA: 6.7.1.2a(2)

DATA SOURCE: S7.1.B2(6),B3(7),B3(83)

SPECIFIC ERROR:

Delay in obtaining appropriate data.

l l BACKFIT:

Modi fy display titles to give a clearer indication of display contents using standard acronyrus and abbreviations developed for control r ocru labels.

DISPOSITION:

Sarne as above.

CCHEDULE: 7th Refuel OR IGINATOR: D.Beith DATE: 12/14/83 APPROVED: DATE:

1

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• 1 I

DAVIS-BESSE PAGE NO: 1 '

HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY (HED) REPORT TITLE: Inconsistent Use of Color in t HED NO: P.B.1.1 he Control Poorn CATEGORY: III STATUS: OPEN ITEMS INVOLVED: CORR CODE:

PANEL ID: ALL COMPNT ID: ALL PROBLEM DESCRIPTION:

There is no consistent sneaning assigned to the colors used for coropone nt and roirnic coding across the control roorn.

0700 PARA: 6.5.1.1d(1) 6.5.1.6d(2) 6.5.3.2a(2) 6.4.2.2f(1)

DATA SOURCE: SG.1.B7(1,7,8,9)

CPECIFIC ERROR:

Delay in locating /identi fying controls and display.

BACl: FIT:

Developrnent and i rnp l enien t a standard systero of color coding to the con trel r oorn.

DISPOSITION:

To be r< viewed further under the labeling study.

CCHEDULE:

ORIGI NAT OR: D.Beith DATE: 01/17/84 APPROVED: DATE:

DAVIS-BESSE HED STATUS

SUMMARY

HED NO. TITLE PNL CMPNT 0700 CAT STAT COR SCHED P4.1.3 Accidental Control C15 HIS6227 6412g III Comp N/A N/A Activation HIS6242 HIS6248 HIS6626 HIS6236 HIS6243 HIS6250 HIS6237 HIS6244 HIS6251 HIS6240 HIS6246 HIS6254 P5.1.1 Die Indicator C06 ZI3000 6531b IIC Comp CLS Ref-6 Lights C07 TI-RCT C22 S!600SB P6.1.2 Label Cleanliness ALL ALL 6624d I!! Camp CLS Ref-7 Pl.1.1 CRT Display Title CRT ALL 6712a III Comp ENH Ref-7

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Clarity P8.1.1 Inconsistent Color ALL ALL 6411f1 III Open - -

l Codes 6511d1 6516d2 6532a2 O

e

HU;;AN CTE ATOR LICENSEE ENGINEERING EXPERIENCE

, EVENT REPO3TS DISCIEPANCIES REPOOTSt (LE Rs)

(NEDs) INTERVIEWS NUCLEAR POWER TRANSIENT MAINTENANCE FACILITY

'IY WO ORDERS CHANGE REQUESTS L

DATA YST PROGRAM R ORTS (NPRDS) (TApt) h I' h I P h '

I h i r SYSTEMS REVIEW r GROUP 1 EVALUATION t

DOCUMENTED EOulPMENT PROBLEMI SACKFITS

• V 1r N

HUMAN FACTORS -

. REVIEW ir DEVELOP / MODIFY NO TES REVIEW BY SOLUTION

- RE ME DED  : ~

ACCEPTABLE PR ESS REV EW T

GROUP (IPRG)

I t FCR DEVELOPMENT _YES SOLUTION NO IMPLEME NTATION; -

ACCEPTALSE SCHEDULING 7 h

w.

PRE EMISTING - HUMAN FACTORS FCRs REVIEW OF FCRs 4

2 VERIFICATION AND FINAL .

VALIDATION 1

DOCUMENTATION l AND REPORTING l

l l

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DAVIS-BESSE SYSir.HS REVIEW GROUP DISCREPAN.Y INDEX HED NO. TITLE CATEG SRG NO.

Pl.7.10 LAMP TEST / DUAL BULB IA CAPABILITY P1.7.11 INDICATOR BULBS SHORT OUT IA l DURING REPLACEMENT ]

P3.1.37 ANNUNCIATORS WITH MULTI- IIA PARAMETER INPUTS P4.1.4 CONTROLS CO-LOCATED EXCESSIVELY IA MU & P-NRR-22 CLOSE TOGETHER P5.1.2 UNLIT INDICATOR LIGHTS PROVIDE IIA MU & P-NRR-26 SYSTEM STATUS P5.1.6 SCALE RANGE INSUFFICIENT FOR IIA MU & P-RR-03 '

MAXIMUM SYSTEM VALUE IMS-NRR-03 P5.1.7 METERS DO NOT HAVE AN OBVIOUS  !!8 FAILURE MODE (OFF-SCALE LOW)

P5.1.3 MULTISCALE METERS DIFFICULT TO IIA READ P5.1.2S METER 3 SUFFER PARALLAX PROBLEMS IIA IMS-NRR-03 P6.1.12 L ABELS NOT LOCATED ABOVE THE  !!A ARTS-NRR-02 ELEMENTS DESCRIBED P6.1.15 TEMPORARY LABELS OBSCURE LABELS  !!A AND COMPONENTS PS.2.1 SFRCS DISPLAY ARRANGEMENT IIA -SFRCS FCR-INCORRECT PS.2.4 RELATED CONTROLS / DISPLAYS NOT  !!B PROPERLY GROUPED PS.2.5 ICS PANEL ARRANGEMENT MISLEADING IIB l PS.2.6 CONTROL VIOLATES OPERAD R IIA SFAS-NRR-04 EXPECTANCY -

PS.2.7 AFW DISPLAY ACCURACY INSUFFICIENT  !!A AF-NRR-06 PS.2.18 SFRCS INFORMATION AVAILABILITY  !!A SG-NRR-01 INCONSISTENT

\

PS.2.20 SFAS ISOLATION GROUPS UNCLEAR  !!A SFAS-NRR-05 MU & P-NRR-0S

.m._ .,. _

PS.2.28 FEEDWATER FLOW INDICATION IIB MISLEADING PS.2.30 CRITICAL DISPLAYS NOT VISIBLE IIA PS.2.33 AFW SYSTEM LACKS APPROPRIATE IIA MIMICS PS.2.42 STEAM GENERATOR LOGIC INPUTS VARY IIA (ICS AND SFRCS) SG-NRR-02 MFW-RR-04 PS.2.43 SFRCS BLOCK CONTROL NOT LOCATED IIA -SFRCS FCR-IN CONTROL ROOM PS.2.47 DECAY HEAT MIMIC RELATIONSHIPS l

UNCLEAR

!!A HPI-RR-II

! PS.2.54 CONTROLS NOT ARRANGED TO SUPPORT

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IIA -SFRCS FCR-OPERATIONS (SFRCS) .

PS.2.65 MAIN TURBINE INFORMATION IIB INADAQUATE-PS.2.83 ICS TRACK N00E INFORMATION

! IIB INADAQUATE PS.2.84 DEAERATOR LEVEL CONTROL VALVE IIB INFORMATION INADAQUATE PS.8.7' INACCURATE DISPLAYS

' (PAM) IIA / RCS-RR-04 (CR) IIC i

I O

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DAVIS-BESSE HED/ SYSTEMS REVIEW GROUP PROBLEM ID CROSS-INDEX PROBLEM PROBLEM RELATED

10. NO. DESCRIPTION HED NO.

ARTS-NRR-02 CONTROLS TOO CLOSE TOGETHER - P6.1.12 ACTUAL PROBLEM IS LABELING AS THE ARTS OUTPUT TRIP AND LAMP TEST CONTROLS ARE LABELED "CH 1, 2, 3, 4" AND "BKR A, B, C, D" WHILE THE ACTUAL RELATIONSHIP IS 1 TO B, 2 TO A, 3 TO D, AND 4 TO C.

SIA-NRR-03 STATION AIR COMPRESSOR CANNOT BE STARTED

, FROM THE CONTROL ROOM -

NO CONTROL SWITCH SIA-NRR-14 NO INSTRUMENT AIR FLOW METER IN THE CONTROL ROOM AF-NRR-06 NO FLOW INDICATION EXISTS ON THE AFW PUMP PS.2.7 MINIMUM FLOW LINE CCW-NRR-03 NO CCW LETDOWN FLOW METER IN THE CONTROL ROOM EVS-RR-01 CONTROLLERS NOT PROTECTED AGAINST ACCIDENTAL ACTIVATION (PDC 5000, PDC 5014 )

CS-NRR-03 NO CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVEL INDICATION - ONLY i .

TWO INDICATOR LIGHTS THAT OPERATORS ARE UNSURE OF TO INDICATE LOW LEVEL l CS-NRR-04 NO PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE INDICATION IN THE CONTROL ROOM FOR MONITORING CAVITATION WHEN IN THE RECIRC. MODE

• CRD-NRR-04 DIAMOND CONTROL PANEL LIGHTS ARE NOT COLOR CODED TO MATCH THOSE USED ON THE SIMULATOR CRD-NRR-03 CRD MOTOR POWER ANNUNCIATOR IS A NUISANCE ALARM OF-NRR-02 CORE FLOOD TANK LEVEL INDICATION READS IN l CUBIC FEET, TECH. SPECS. READ IN GALLONS 13.8KV-NRR-02 MIMIC BUSSES ARE CONFUSING TO FOLLOW

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13.8KV-NRR-03 METERS 01 ELECTRICAL PANEL ARE DIFFICULT TO READ CLEARLY (PI-RR-11 HPI AND DECAY HEAT PUMP CONTROL SWITCHES ARE NOT CLEARLY GROUPED -

PS.2.47

MS-NRR-03 INCORE TEMPERATURE METER RANGE ON PAM PANEL P5.1.6 l

IS NOT LARGE ENOUGH FOR SYSTEM CAPABILITIES P5.1.29 l

IMS-NRR-04 TWO BACKUP INCORE MULTIPOINT DETECTORS ARE AVAILABLE - ONLY NEED ONE ICS-NRR-03 NO ALARM TO INDICATE SATURATION OF Tave INTEGRAL ICS-NRR-07 NON-NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM SELECTOR SWITCHES CAN BE POSITIONED BETWEEN DETENTS -

THIS COULD CAUSE AN ICS TRANSIENT ICS-NRR-08 THE SYSTEMS REVIEW GROUP FEELS A CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW IS NEEDED ,

MFW-RR-04 ELIMINATE UN-NECESSARY INTERLOCKS IN THE MFW PS.2.28 SYSTEM TO ELIMINATE VARYING INDICATIONS OF PS.2.43 MFW LEVEL AND THE UN-NECESSARY LEVEL CONTROLS PS.2.85 MFW-NRR-05 'HI PRESSURE FEEDWATER HEATER SIGHTGLASS LEVEL INDICATIONS ARE UNRELIABLE /0UT OF SERVICE -

REPLACE THEM WITH BETTER COMPONENTS MFW-NRR-OS MFW STARTUP CONTROL VALVE POSITION INDICATION INDICATES THE DEMAND PLACED ON THE VALVE, NOT THE ACTUAL STATUS RCS-RR-03 BENTLEY-NEVADA PROXIMITY PROBES USED TO DETECT RC PUMP VIBRATION ARE CONFUSING TO READ - OPS PERSONNEL RELY ON THE ANNUNCIATOR AS SOLE l

' INDICATION OF HIGH VIBRATION. NEW METERS ARE BEING ADDED TO THE CONTROL ROOM

! RCS-RR-04 INCORE TEMP. INDICATIONS ARE AVAILABLE ON THE

! PS.8.7 PAM PANEL BUT THREE OPERATORS ARE REQUIRED IN ORDER TO READ THEM. SPDS DOES PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION RCS-NRR-09 INOPERATIVE DISPLAYS - RC Tave DIGITAL DISPLAY IS BROKEN RCS-NRR-16 CCW SYSTEM WATER LOSS LEADS TO AN RCP TRIP AFTER A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF TIME. NO DEVICES IN THE CR TO MEASURE ELAPSED TIME AND DETERMINE WHEN A MANUAL TRIP SHOULD OCCUR - A TIME DEL AY IS BEING ADDED TO THE CCW ANNUNCIATORS

! CPS-NRR-04 RPS CHANNELS ARE LABELED 1,2,3,4 - TRIP 8KRS.

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• P6.1.12 ARE RELATED B.A D.C NOT A.B.C.D AS WOULD 8E EXPECTED. SEE ARTS-NRR-02 AS WELL SFAS-NRR-01 SFAS ACTUATES MSIV'S LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAIN-MENT - THESE VALVES ARE UNNECESSARY AND ARE j

BEING REMOVED (SFRCS ACTUATES THE SAME VALVES)

SFAS-NRR-04 SFAS MANUAL TRIPS ARE NOT GROUPED WITH THE PS.2.6 ASSOCIATED RESET CONTROLS, AND RESET INVOLVES TWO ACTIONS - PRESS "0FF" ON THE TRIP CONTROL AND THEN PRESS RESET

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.SFAS-NRR-05 RCP SEAL INJECTION ISOLATION VALVES AND RCP PS.2.20 SEAL RETURN VALVE CONTROL SWITCHES ARE GROUPED UNDER LEVEL TWO ACTUATION WHEN THEY SHOULD BE UNDER LEVEL THREE SW-RR-02 EMERGENCY CONDENSER OUTLET VALVES HAVE NO AUTO-INITIATION FEFATURE - THE SYSTEM TEMP. <

INDICATION IS INACCURATE AS WELL SW-NRR-02 Sk FLOW INDICATOR INACCURATE - CHANGE SENSOR LOCATION SW-NRR-08 NO TEMP. INDICATOR FOR THE SWING CCW HEAT EXCHANGER - AN FCR IS IN PLACE TO ADD ONE SW-NRR-OS NO ALARM IN THE CONTROL ROOM TO INDICATE A LOSS OF TPCCW FROM SERVICE WATER.

SG-NRR-01 NO SFRCS LEVEL INDICATION IN THE CONTROL ROOM PS.2.18 AN FCR IS IN PLACE TO ADD ONE (SEE SG-NRR-02) P S . 2. 4 2 SG-NRR-02 STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL INDICATION IS INACCURATE PS.2.18 1

AND UNRELIABLE - DOESN'T ALWAYS MATCH ACTUAL PS.2.42 SFRCS LEVEL - INSTALL SFRCS LEVEL INDICATION MU & P-RR-03 FLOW INDICATOR RANGE IS INSUFFICIENT FOR THE P5.1.6 POTENTIAL LIMIT OF THE SYSTEM (FI MU31)

MU & P-NRR-09 LEVEL THREE ACTUATION COMPONENTS LOCATED IN PS.2.20 THE LEVEL TWO ACTUATION GROUP (SEE SFAS-NRR-05)

MU & P-NRR-11 LOCATION OF G4377A AND G4978A MAKE IT DIF-FICULT TO OPERATE THE SYSTEM TO SUPPLY HYDROGEN TO THE MAKEUP TANK MU & P-NRR-16 RCP SEAL LEAKAGE INDICATORS ARE INACCURATE AND UNRELIABLE (FI-4137A,4237A,4337A,4437A)

MU & P-NRR-22 CONTROL SWITCHES MU-54 AND MU-3971 ARE LOCATED P 4 .1. 4 EXCESSIVELY CLOSE TOGETHER, HAVE SIMIL AP L ABELS, AND LOOK THE SAME - THIS COULD CAUSE CONFUSION DURING OPERATIONS MU 4 P-NRR-26 BORATION PERMIT INDICATOR LIGHT IS UNLli TO P5.1.2 INDICATE SYSTEM NORMAL STATUS - NO OBYIOUS FAILURE MODE. -

EDG-NRR-23 EDG FUEL DIL STORAGE AND DAY TANKS.HAVE NO LEVEL INDICATORS ON THEM - OVERFILL 2NG Or THE TANKS OFTEN RESULTS AND CAUSES SPURIOUS HIGH LEVEL ALARMS IN THE CONTROL ROOM i

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TASK $1ME-PHASESCHEDULE l TASK Mwras Po* "' *'r

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Upgrade HED i Dossmentation Rooiew SFRCS Modifications I .

j Dooolep SFTA

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Approach l Dovolep/Cenduct Spoeial Studies j

i Dooolop Method for Re-Assessment NRC Meeting __

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! Vorification l

Ro-Assess HEDs 1 Coodset Noise j Ssrvoy i

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SPECIAL STUDY TIME-PHASE SCHEDULE .

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SFRCS Labels and Location Aids Annunciators Displays Controls Process Computer .

Nelse Illumination Engineering Dperations Documentation and Reporting ----

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o MEETING

SUMMARY

DISTRIBUTION Licensee: Toledo Edison Company

• Copies also sent to those people on service (cc) list for subject plant (s).

Docket File NRC PDR L PDR ORBf4 Rdq Project Manager - ADe Agazio JStolz BGrimes (Emerg Preparedness only)

OELD EJordan, IE ACRS-10 RRamirez NRC Meeting

Participants:

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