ML20137M991

Notice of Issuance of Final Director'S Decision Under 10CFR2.206

ML20137M991
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	04/02/1997
From:	Collins S NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137M947	List: ML20137M991
References
2.206, DD-97-08, DD-97-8, NUDOCS 9704080217
Download: ML20137M991 (5)

Text

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7590-01-P

, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION .

DOCKET No. 50-219 LICENSE NO. DPR-16 DYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ,

l ISSUANCE OF FINAL DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor  :

Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), has granted in part and ,

denied in part Petitions, dated September 19, 1994, and supplemented by a ,

letter dated December 13, 1994, submitted by Messrs. Paul Gunter and William ]

decamp, Jr. (Petitioners) on behalf of Oyster Creek Nuclear Watch, Reactor Watchdog Project, and Nuclear Information and Resource Service. Petitioners requested that the NRC take immediate action with regard to Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) operated by GPU Nuclear Corporation (GPU or licensee). By letter dated December 13, 1994, Petitioners supplemented the l Petition dated September 19, 1994.

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Specifically, the Petition of September 19, 1994, requested that the NRC

(1) immediately suspend the OCNGS operating license until the licensee

inspects and repairs or replaces all safety-class reactor internal component j parts subject to embrittlement and cracking, (2) immediately suspend the OCNGS

. operating license until the licensee submits an analysis regarding the

synergistic effects of through-wall cracking cf multiple safety-class components, (3) immediately suspend the OCNGS operating license until the

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licensee has analyzed and mitigated any areas of noncompliance with regard to

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irradiated fuel pool cooling as a single-unit boiling water reactor (BWR), and (4) issue a generic letter requiring other licensees of single-unit BWRs to  ;

submit information regarding fuel pool boiling in order to verify compliance l l

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I with regulatory requirements, and to promptly take appropriate sitigative j action if the unit is not in compliar.ce.

The supplemental Petition, in addition to providing more infomation on the original request, requested that the NRC (1) suspend the DCNGS operating i

license until the Petitioners' concerns regarding cracking are addressed, including inspection of all reactor vessel internal components and other safety-related systems susceptible to intergranular stress-corrosion cracking and completion of any and all necessary repairs and modification; (2) explain the discrepancies between the response of the NRC staff dated October 27, 1994, to the Petition of September 19, 1994, and time-to-boil calculations for the FitzPatrick plant; (3) require GPU to produce documents for evaluation of the time-to-boil calculation for the OCNGS 1rradiated fuel pool; (4) identify redundant components that may be powered from onsite power supplies to be used for spent fuel pool cooling as qualified Class IE systems; (5) hold a public

meeting in Tom River, New Jersey, to permit presentation of additional

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l information related to the Petition; and (6) treat the Petitioners' letter of I i

p December 13, 1994, as a formal appeal of the denial of their request of

Septeceer 19, 1994, to immediately suspend the OCNGS operating license.

I j The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has granted L

requests (3), with the exception of suspending OCNGS operating license which was previously denied, and in part (4) of the Petition of September 19, 1994, and requests (2), (3), and (4) of the supplemental Petition of December 13, 1

1994. The reasons for these decisions are explained in the " Final Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206: (00 08 ), the complete text of which follows f

this notice. The decision and the documents cited in the decision are available for public inspection and copying at the Commission's -Public I

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6 Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at Ocean County Library, Reference

! Department, 101 Washington Street, Toms Rivers, NJ 08753.

l A copy of this Final Director's Decision will be filed with the Secretary l of the' Commission for review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c). As provided in that regulation, the decision will contribute the final action of the ,

i Commission 25 days after the date of its issuance, unless the Commission, sn

its own motio'n, institutes a review of the decision within that time.

l FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION I

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NeTKCollins, Director 1

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l Dated at Rockville, Naryland,

this 2nd day of April 1997 8

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Attachment:

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ACTM EDO Principal correspondence Control EDO CONTROL: 0010473 FROMs DUE: 10/14/94 DOC DT 09/19/94 FINAL REPLY: .

P;ul Gunter, Nuclear Information and '

RJource Service William decamp, Jr., Oyster Creek Nuclear COtch 4 TOs James Taylor FIR SIGNATURE OF : ** GRN ** CR

• 94-0936 DESC ROUTING: j 2.206 PETITION TO SUSPEND OYSTER CREEK'S LICENSE Taylor Milhoan Thompson Blaha Russell, NRR TTMartin, RI DATE: 09/20/94 Lieberman, OE ASSIGNED TO: CONTACT:

OGC Cyr SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

NRR RECEIVED: SEPTEMBER 29, 1994 --

ACTION NRR ACTION: DRPE:VARGA-NRR ROUTING: RUSSELL E TO NRR DIRECTOR'S OFF MIRAGLIA /. 7

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ZIMMERMAN THADANI OY _ [T [y/

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i OFFICE @F THE-SECRETARY [

CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET -

l PAPER NUMBER:~ CRC-94-0936 LOGGING DATE: Sep 19 94 i

ACTION' OFFICE:- EDO l l

AUTHOR:' P. GUNHER & W. DECAMP AFFILIATION: DC (DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA)

ADDRESSEE: JAMES TAYLOR LETTER DATE:' Sep 19 94 FILE CODE: IDR-5 OYSTER CREEK

SUBJECT:

PETITION FOR RENERGENCY ENFORCEMENT ACTION UNDER PROVISIONS OF 10 CFR 2.206 WITH RE TO OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACTION: Appropriate DISTRIBUTION: RF, DSB SPECIAL HANDLING: NONE CONSTITUENT:

NOTVGs DATE DUE:

DATE SIGNED:

SIGNATURE: .

AFFILIATION:

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September 19,1994.

Mr. James Taylor .

Executive Director ofOperations 1

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission W==hin tan, DC 20555 4 PETITION FOR EMERGENCY ENFORCEMENT ACTION UNDER PROVISIONS OF 10 CFR 2.206 WITH REGARD TO OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR POWER STATION INTRODUCTION .

NucIcar laformation and Resource Service and Oyster Creek Nuclear Watch (hereinafter

.refemd to as the petitioners) hereby petition the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission - .

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'(NRC or staff) to immaAiately an=nand On* ht's li== until carractive metinne are taken on the nart of the llanne and the NRC with renard to the fn11nwina anan lamat While the petitioners have combined the following issues and requested actions under one petition, it is their contention that either one of the open items is sufficient to warrant the

- immediate suspension of the license.

BACKGROUND AND REQUESTED ACTIONS

1) Age-Related Deterioration of Safety-Class ReactorInternal Components NRC has identiSed that a number of safety-class reactor internal component parts in .

l General Electric Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) are becoming increasingly vulnerable to age related deterlotation. NRC has inued the report " Boiling Water Reactor Internals Aging l

l Degradation Study" Phase 1 (September,1993) analyzing the issues and NRC Generic Letter l

94-03 (GL 94-03) "Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking of Core Shrouds in Boiling Water i Reactors" Uuly 23,1994) which stipulates that alllicensees ofBWRs "!) inspect the core shrouds no later than the next scheduled refueling outage, and perform an appropriate evaluation and/or repair based on the results of the != Mon; and 2) perform a safety analysis supporting

. continuu! operation of the facility until inspections are conducted."'

NRC has defined " safety-class items",' as internal components that are parts of the core suppnet nyntem, used for reactor coolant flow control, and core beat transfer enhancement in

' NRC Ceneric utter 944h "Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking of Core Shrouds la Boiling water Ranctors." July 15,1994, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comadssion.

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accordance with the rules end regulations of Section III of the American Society of Mechanical

, Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel (ASME B&PV) Code.

As a result of inspections for Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IOSSC) of the core abroud component part, licensees for 12 domestic and overseas BWRs have discovered extensive cracking on welds of the core shroud,includmg one unit where it was discovered to have a crack in a weld fully circumfercutial and 1.S$ inches deep on a 2 inch wall The i;urc shroud is a safety-class component part that provides 1) lateral restraint to %e reactor core j

(nuclear fuel, control rods, etc.),2) support structure for maintaining the proper spacing of the upper ends of the fuct anemblies, and 3) support and guidance for contml md guide tubes.

NRC issued GL 94-03 identifying the technical issues and safety significance of10 SCC ori the core shroud and states that "NRC has an overall concern with cracking of BWR internals and -

encourages licensees to work closely with the BWR Owners Group on coordination of inspections, evaluations, and repair options for internals cracking.d Additionally,NRC has informed BWR Ownen Ozoup of concems with regard to the lack of analysis of the " synergistic effects" of multiple internal component cracking.' These concarns are based in part on the Oak l

Ridge National Laboratory's " Boiling Water Reactor Intamals Aging Degradation Study" published in 1993 which states that:

' "In summary,19 of the '25 selected BWR intemals are susceptible to SCC (stress corrosion crackmg), including IASCC (irradiation mlvted stress corrosion cracking).

Specifically,6 out of the 19 are susceptible to IASCC."8 Oyster Creek station is the oldest operating General Electric Mark I BWR with its initial criticality commencing in May,1969 and the third oldest operating reactor in the United States.

It is the contention of the petitioners that among the BWRs, Oyster Creek has been subjected to the longest period of operational conditions that cause safWry-ctm reactor latemal components to embrittle and crack. These conditions include the thermal and mechanical loniing associated with start-up, reactor operation, and shutdown, hydrodynamic induced

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2 " Bolling Water Reactor laternals Aging Degradados btedy," MtJREG/C1t-5754,t'hsk RMue National Laboratory, Scytember,1993, p. 3.

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' USNRC and Bolling Water Reactor Owner Group Management Mwting, Septesoer u, Iw4, 4 Rockville, MD

1. NIIRF.G/CM-5754. p.26.

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vibrations, fatigue, contact with thermally hot and corrosive coolant water, long-term exposure to intense radioactive bombardment, and additionally, conditions promoting cracking arising out of specific methods used for fabricating components'(welding and cold-working). Intemals made e

of cast austenitic stainless steel (Type 304) have an extensive history of susceptib'ility to embrittlement after prolonged operations and are prone to cracking.

The core shroud is but one safety-class component part hsted as m@ble to IOSCC ,

and irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC). The BWR Owners Group *as stated ,

i that cracking of the core shroud is a warning signal that additional safety-class teactor intamals

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are inacasingly more susceptible to the same age-eelated deterioration.' It is the contention of J

the petitioners that cracking of any single part or multiple components endangers the respective safety-class functions and jeopardizes the safe operation of the nuclear station.

A representative list of reactor internals fabricated of Type 304 stainless steel and their l

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safety-class function includes:

I) core sprav sparger injeeb emergency cooling water into core in the evem of a LOCA; 4 2) core spmv internal pipino supplies cooling water to the reactor fuel assemblies in the event of a LOCA;

3) c^re ninte perforations provides lateral support and guidance to control rods;  ;

4) top auide provides lateral support and maintains proper spacing of the upper ends of

, the fuct assemblies; -l

5) control rod drive hon <ino provides access into the reactor pressure vessel for the

control rods and supports the control rods;

6) fuel supnort --ambly provides supporting stmeture for the reactor core.

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7) enntrol rod enide tubes provides lateral guidance to control rods and fuel assemblies, e

The Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group has identified additional safety-class vessel 1

internals to include the in-core housing, SRM/IRM dry tube, access hole cover, the LPCI coupling, and vesselID brackets.

Prior to the currese refueling outage (R15), Oyster Creek had not inspected for core shroud cracking.' This findmg is again canW in the licensee's raponse (August 24,1994) to

' " Core Shroud mod Vessel Internals Concerns," Necker Regulatory Commission / Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group (BWROG) Meeting, Jane 28,1994, Bandout of Viewgraphs.

7 NRC/BWROG Meeting June 28,1994, Owner Group Shroad Data Sheet

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Generic Letter 94-03. The petitioners contend that 1) additional safety-class rvmetm internals

have not been adequately inspected to d6% if cracking has occurred to those safety-class reactor parts and,2) a safety analysis has.not been p fois.cd on the potential synergistic effects of multipic component cracking that supports a continuation of operation without a full inspection and repair of all safety-class reactor internals at Oyster Creek .

A review of NRC documents has t=-1-3?+i that a large number safety-class hac ual components are vulnerable to IGSCC and IASCC as !A-a+ifimi in the NRC report BWR Internals Aging Degradation Study." Only 10 of 36 U.S. BWRs have b:r+3+1 their core shrouds to date and 7 of those reactors were found to have cracks greater than 30 inches long and 2 reactors with cracks fully circumferential on the shroud. These inspections have been performed on reactors with significantly less exposure time to IGSCC and IASCC than Oyster Creek. Therefore, as it specifically relates to safety-class reactor ia**m=1= at Oyster Creek, it is.

the contention of the petitioners that the NRC's role as regulator of the nuclear industry is to .

pursue a more aggressive action plan than mercly "cacourage licenscos to work closely with BWR Owners Group on coordination ofinspections, evaluations, and repair options for internals cracking."'

The petitioners acknowledge that the licensee is planning to fulfill the requirement of GL 94-03 with regard to the inspection of th'e core shroud and that the licensee is planning additional inspections to the vessel intamais. However, because of the number ainfety class components vulacrable to age-rea deterioration, the significant percentage and extensive degree of cracking already documented at BWRs with less exposure time than Oyster Creek, and the immediacy of the current outage at Oyster bk,it in the expressed concern of the petitio that the licensee's current inspection program include a focus on all safety-class reactor internals.

It is the requested action of the petitioners that; A) NRC immediately e'gend the Oyster Creek operating license until'the licensee inspects and repairs or replaces all ==fatv-c1m== raar*ar inumal en=nonent pans subject to embriulomaat and cracking; * .

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B) NRC WMately suspend the Oyster Creek operating liceme until the licenace provides an analysis on the synergistic effects of through wall cracking of multiple safety-class

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, components;

2) Fast Pool Cooling Design DeSciencies on Single Unit GE BWRs As It Pertains to Oyster Creek For the past two years NRC has been aware of serious design deficiencies in BWRs regarding " Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling" as the result of an Engineering Discrepancy Rep (April,1992) and the 10 CFR 21 Roport of Substantial Safety Hazard (November 27,1992 by Messrs. David Lochbaum and Donald Prevatte on contract for Pennsyhania Power and Light's (PP&L) Susquehanna Steam Electric Station. Messrs. Lochbaum and Prevatte have identified design de6ciencies for the h=adline ofloss of fuel pool cooling events associated with Design Basis Loss of Coolant Accidents (DBA LOCAs) at the two PP&L BWR units. Central the Lochbaum and Prevatte findings "Is the inability to removo docay hast from the spent fuel pools for the various design events which mechanistically incapacitate the normal fuci pool cooling system and the resultant effects from loss of normal cooling on the safety-related systems and components in the reactnr building."' As a msult of these defects, there is the potential for a meltdovm ofirradiated fuel outside primary containment, the failure of all safety-related systems .

in the reactor building, failure of contamment systems, and the catastrophic off-alte release of radiation. The engineers additionally identiSed that other BWRs with the same basic design deficiencies were vulnerable to the fuel pool boiling accident.

Lochbaan and Prevatte have thoroughly documented numerous technical concems and l

violations including; '

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A) Seismically and environmentally unqualified instrumentation on the BWR fuel storage pooli l

j B) Fuel pool instrumentation is on non-1E power system and not considered safety-related; l '

C) Emergency procedures inthe event of a LOCA do not address the fuel pool oooling issue an will cause fuel pool cooling failure by de-energizing non-1E power systems:

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' 10CFR21 Report of Substantial Safety Bazard, November 27,1992. Docket No.30-387, David ,

Lochbaum and Demaid Prevette. i l

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D) Reactor building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) has not been analyzod and qualified for the effects of heavy coM*adon and %m increases resulting from a fuel pool boil event:

E) Standby Gan Treatment System (SOTS) is environmentally unqualified for boiling fuel poo conditions; F) The cunently calculated radiation levels resulting from a DBA at the fuel pool Emergency Service Water valves, which must be manipulated by hand to make up feedwater to a boiling fbel pool, would be in the range of thousands of Rarns per hour.

These deficiencies represent violations of NRC regulatory requirements including 10CFR50.49,10CFR50 App. A GDC 63,10CFR50 ApWiv B, Criterion HI, Design Control and Reg. Guides 1.13,1.89, and 1.97.

As a result of two years of meticulous documentation and persistent interactics with NRC and the licensee on the part of Messrs. Lochbaum and Prsvatte, the NRC now acknowledges that design defects in the BWR fuel pool cooling systern do in fact pose a significant increase in ris to the public safety at the Susquehanna units and additional reactors. Similarly,'PP&L announced in writing to the NRC on June 1.1994 that it was committing to actions which will preverit spent fuel pool boiling."" ' Essentially, PP&L has decided to cross-tic Unit I and U irradiated fuel storage pools by removing the fbel puul to cask storage pit gates during normal operations. As well, PP&L cornmitted to make additional modifications to the plant includin i irradiated fuel pool instrumentation and numerous procedural changes. These modifications

! have brought the Susquehanna units closer to heing in compliance with the regulatory i

requirements.

However, the resolution as put forward by PPAL is not applicable to any of the sinsic unit BWRs. In fact, Susquehanna, a much newer power station built to more stringent regulations, was unable to show how a single unit alone could cool its irrai=fM fuel pool following a seismic cvent which disabled the fuel pon) conting system.

Oyster Creek is a single unit facility with no a(jacent units to rely on. To the best of the petitioners knowledge, Oyster Creek has not docketed any material with avgasd to the DWR l

. design deficiencies as identified by Messrs. Lochbaum and Prevette. Consequently, it is the .

" "Susquebsana stenin Doctric Session Response to Roguest for Idditions!Infor Less or Spent Fuel Cantina laitisted by the Desige Basis Seismic E, vent," FP&I., June 1,1994, i'

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contention of the pentioners that Oyster Creek nuclear Wation, as well as the licensees of other single unit BWRs with non-safety related fuel pool cooling systems, cunently may be in violation of NRC regulatory requirements. It is the contention of the petitioners that it is

impossible to'know if the plant is in regulatory. compliance until Oyster Creek has docketed an analysis regarding their vulnerability to a DBA LOCA resuhing in a boiling fuel pool as s

documented by the Lochbaum and Prevatte submittals. ,

It is the petitioners' requested action that; l.

- A) the NRC immediately suspend the license of Oyster Creek nuclear power station until the liccasco has analyzed and mitigated any areas ofnoncompliance with regard to the irradiated fuel

! pool cooling issue as a single unit BWR; B) the NRC issue a Generic Letter requinng other licensees of sirgie unit BWRs to provide information on the fuel pool boiling issue as it pertains to their specific units to 1) verify J

compliance with the regulatory requimments and, 2) take prompt and appropriate action to 4

udugate the issue if the units arc found to be out of compliance.

DESCRIPTION OF THE PETITIONERS Nucient infonnatinn and R*=nurce Service (NIRS)is a nonprofit organization whose work is related to nuclear power, adioactive waste, and renewable energy. Members include l

New Jersey residents whose health and safety are put at direct risk by the unsafe opemtion of the Oyster Creek nuclear power station. With an of5cc in WaMagma. DC, NIRS has been a participant in nuclear regulatory affairs, including rulennWgs, enforcement ac'tions, and adjudications involving individual nuclear power stations since 1978.

Ovcer Cra+k Nuclear Watch (OCNW) is a grassroots organization formed in' June of 1994 by citizens concerned about the safety of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. ~

OCNW is curnntly in the process ofincorporating as a Ni w Jersey not for-profit. Most of OCNW. supporters are residents of Ocean County, New Jersey. Their health and safety therefore depends upon the safe operation of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. The supporters of OCNW are disturbed by newspaper accounts and indications by experts that the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station may have reactor intemal component cracking and /or flaws in the

' irradiated fuel storage system. As a local citizens group lacking expertise in the technical issues

v SEP-19-199 3 12:53' FROr1 NIR$-MSHINGTON.DC TO 13015041672-22 P.09

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C-related to nuclear power, ocNW relies upon the teclutical kiwwledge of its co-petitioner, the l Nuclear Information and Resource Service, in the technical aspects of the document.

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William decamp, Jr.

Paul Gunter. Director Reactor Watchdog Project Founding Trustee '

Oyster CreekNuclear Watch Oyster CreekNuclear Watch '

Nuclear Information and Resource Service PO Box 243 142416th Streed, NW, Suite 601 ,

IslandHeights,NJ 08732 Washington,DC 20036 .

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