ML20137M937

Forwards Site Responses to RAI Re Emergency Action Level Rev to NUMARC/NESP-007 Methodology

ML20137M937
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	04/01/1997
From:	Barron H DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
TAC-M94491, TAC-M94492, NUDOCS 9704080203
Download: ML20137M937 (211)

Text

I" i th&kw Compety H R Bwm l Wluire hudear Gmeration ikixutment ' ' WePresident '

y . , ' 17adtlagers ferry Rrxid pfGUlb7') ' '(704)8754M10 V_

- lianterstiDe, NC28078M10 (M)S54809Far f

e-- April 1, 1997

.U. S'.. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention': Document Control Desk Washington, DCJ 20555

Subject:

-McGuire Nuclear' Station Docket Nos. 50-369, 50-370 License Nos. NPF-9,iNPF-171 (NRC TAC M94491 and M94492)

'Ref.:

1) Emergency Plan Change Submittal dated December 27, 1995..

2) Request for Additional Information Regarding Emergency Action Level Revision to NUMARC/NESP-007 Methodology dated January 15, 1997 Attached are McGuire Nuclear Site's responses to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's issues.in Reference 2. Please contact

.Becky Hasty at (704) 875-4662 or Kay Crane at (704) 875-4306 if there are any questions on this information.

Yours truly, ,

-H. B. Barron HBB/EMK(s:\EMK7353\EAL\MNS RAI 1. doc) l l

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080037 Ay5 9704000203 970401 PDR ADOCK 05000369: .

F PDR ,,3 15p5555555.55 c ::::::=r c .'a l..

- U.S. NRC -i April 1, 1997  ;

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- L, A. Re/es, Regional Administrator l USNRC, Region II (2 copies)  !

V. Nerses, Project Manager -)

USNRC, ONRR ,

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S. M. Shaeffer, Senior Resident Inspector  ;

McGuire Nuclear Station i

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I List of Attachments

1. Responses to Issues 1-18 from January 15, 1997, letter

2. Revised Disposition of NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2 Initiating Conditions and Emergency Action Levels in the McGuire EAL i Submittal

3. Revised McGuire Emergency Plan Section D pages with Revision f Marks

4. Revised McGuire Emergency Plan Section D pages without  :

Revision Marks

5. Revised McGuire Procedure RP/0/A/5700/00 t

6. Selected Pages from Critical Safety Function Status Trees  ;

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Attachment 1.

1 Deletion of EAL 4.1.N.4 l i

During our review of the NUMARC EAL package following the Request for-Additional Information, a problem was discovered with EAL 4.1.N.4. This EAL is being deleted for the following-reasons. 1 The' containment process radiation monitors (EMF-38, -39, and -40) I serve to provide early indication of reactor coolant (NC) leaks l in containment to ensure compliance with Technical Specifications  !

and Selected Licensee Commitments. These monitors alarm on small J NC leaks in and below the Unusual Event (IC 4.2.U.4) range. ]

Also, these monitors automatically isolate on a safety injection. i For these reasons, it is not appropriate to use these monitors as I an indication of a. loss of the reactor coolant system barrier.

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The reactor building monitors (EMF-51A and -51B) used for the I; Fuel Clad EAL 4.1.F.3 are not able to indicate clearly the lower levels of activity in containment resulting from a leak of reactor coolant with normal activity levels. Thus, this EAL will  ;

be omitted and other indication will be used to determine a i potential loss or. loss of the Reactor Coolant System Barrier.

Issue 1 At the time of the Emergency Action Level (EAL) submittal, the l Emergency Plan for McGuire Nuclear Site did not require on-shift l dose assessment. Duke Power, in a letter dated January 15, 1997,  ;

has committed to augmenting the capability for on-shift dose j assessment using effluent release information and real-time  ;

meteorology by August 1, 1997. Procedure HP/0/B/1009/29 will l provide guidance for on-shift offsite dose assessment. Duke Power will not implement NUMARC/NESP-007 EALs prior to this date. l McGuire EALs 4.3.U.1-1, 4.3.U.1-2, 4.3.U.1-3, 4.3.A.1-1, and i 4.3.A.1-2 have been revised to match the NUMARC/NESP-007 ,

guidance. {

The Unusual Event and Alert EALs have been revised to indicate l the event should be declared as soon as it is determined that the f t

release duration has or will likely exceed 60 minutes (Unusual I

Event) or 15 minutes (Alert). ,

Issue 2 McGuire EAL 4.3.A.2-2 actually corresponds to NUMARC'EAL AA2.2. l The McGuire EAL which corresponds to NUMARC EAL AA.2.4 is I 4.3.A.2-3. The cross reference document in the original  :

submittal was incorrect. t i

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t Due to concerns for ALARA and personnel safety, Duke Power did i not wish for personnel to remain in the area to observe that j irradiated fuel was uncovered. Personnel should exit the area as  ;

quickly as possible and report the occurrence to the Control Room. This statement has been added to the basis for EAL i i

4.3.A.2-2.

Also, EAL 4.3.A.2-2 has been reworded to clarify that it applies to any irradiated fuel. j Issue 3 I McGuire EAL 4.3.A.3-1 has been revised to read:  !

4.3.A.3-1 Valid reading on EMF-12 greater than 15 mR/hr in the Control Room.

4.3.A.3-2 Valid indication of radiation levels greater than 15 mR/hr in the Central Alarm Station. l (CAS) or Secondary Alarm Station (SAS). '

The previous EAL 4.3.A.3-2 has been renumbered to EAL 4.3.A.3-3. 1 I

The phrase " valid indication" is used instead of a radiation  :

monitor reading for the CAS and SAS because these areas have no  !

area monitors. The CAS and the SAS have replaced the PAP. The CAS and SAS are the security alarm stations which are '

continuously occupied. The following sentence has been added to the basis for this EAL.

"The Control Room, CAS, and SAS are areas that require continuous occupancy. The value of 15mR/hr is derived from the GDC 19~value of 5 Rem in 30 days with adjustment for expected occupancy times."

Issue 4 It was decided to eliminate the 5 R/hr value and use normal occupational exposure limits of 5 Rem per year TEDE for EAL 4.3.A.3-2. This decision was made after research of the basis for EAL 4.3.A.3-2 and discussions with Radiation Protection Personnel.

McGuire EAL 4.3.A.3-2 has been renumbered to 4.3.A.3-3 and revised to read as follows:

EAL 4.3.A.3-3 Radiation Levels in areas requiring infrequent access are such that tasks needed to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown 2

cannot be performed within normal l occupational exposure limits of 5 Rem  !

per year TEDE.

t The basis for this as follows: f t

" Radiation levels in the facility such that tasks cannot be  :

performed without exceeding 5 Rem per year TEDE will impede i access due to the need for a Planned Special Exposure or Planned Emergency Exposure. This situation is indicative of a significant radiological problem that warrants additional resources to assess and mitigate."  ;

Issue 5  !

l The following is the derivation for the monitor. thresholds for EAL 4.3.S.1-1 and EAL 4.3.G.1-1 .

The NUMARC EAL document, NUMARC/NESP-007, gives several l methods for initiating a particular Emergency Action Level.

These methods include using Radiation Monitor (EMF) trigger  ;

values and using site boundary dose rate values that have  ;

either been calculated or actually measured. The Raddose-V model uses the site boundary dose method for identifying the l EAL based on effluent releases and real-time meteorology.

1 The gaseous effluent Selected Licensee Commitment and ,

Technical Specification are based on limiting gaseous activity release rates to a site boundary total body dose rate of 500 mrem / year (= 0.05 mrem / hour).

The 0.05 mrem /hr Tech Spec site boundary dose rate forms the basis of the NUMARC EALs for gas releases, since each of the four EALs are initiated from multiples of that dose rate, i.e.:

Unusual Event: 2

• 0.05 = 0.10 mrem /hr (2 60 minutes)

Alert: 200

• 0.05 = 10 mrem /hr (2 15 minutes)

Site Area Emergency: 100 mrem /hr whole body (2000

• 0.05) 500 mrem /hr thyroid *

(2 15 minutes)

General Emergency: 1000 mrem /hr whole body (20000

• 0.05) 5000 mrem /hr thyroid *

(2 15 minutes)

• Used in the site boundary dose method only, i

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9 Therefore, the first step in coming up with the EAL EMF trigger values is to calculate the Tech Spec release rate and then prorate multiples of that release rate to get the

- monitor readings for each EAL. [

I. Csiculate the Tech Spec Release Rate (pCi/sec Xe-133 eq.) f From page B-6 of the ODCM the release rate limit equation for noble gases is as follows:  ;

K

• X/Q

• Q < 500 mrem /yr i

where: ,

K = the total body dose factor due to gamma emissions, 3

= 2.06E2 mrem /yr per pCi/m for Xe-133 X/Q = the highest calculated annual average relative j concentration for any area at or beyond the l unrestricted area boundary for ground level releases i

= 7.611E-05 sec/m 3 l

0 = pCi/sec Xe-133 eq. release rate Substituting the values into the setpoint equation gives a release rate of 3.189E+04 pCi/sec Xe-133 equivalent.

II. Calculate the EAL EMF Trigger values l

} Reference data from HP/0/B/1003/08: j i Monitor Range Correlation Factor (cpm /pci/ml Xe-133eq.)

7 EMF 36(L) 10 1 -

10 2.66E+07 EMF 36(H) 101 - 10 6 5.0E+03 Average Unit Vent Flow Rate: 1.2E+05 cfm Factor to convert pCi/sec to cpm:

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1. ( Ci-/sec)

• CF(cpm /pCi/ml)

• 60 sec/m

• 3.531E-05 cf/ml + j 1.2E+05 cfm = # (pci/sec)

• CF(cpm /pCi/ml)

• 1.7655E-08 j Unusual Event ,

EMF 36(L) = 2

• 3.189E+04 Ci/sec

• 2.66E+07 cpm /pCi/ml

• l 1.7655E-08 = 3.00E+04 cpm Alert i

EMF 36(L) = 200

• 3.189E+04 pCi/sec

• 2.66E+07 cpm /pCi/ml

• 1.7655E-08 = 3.00E+06 cpm j r

site Area Emergency l

l EMF 36(H) = 2000

• 3.189E+04 pCi/sec

• 5.0E+03 cpm / Ci/ml

• 5.63E+03 cpm  !

1.7655E-08 =

I General Emergency l

EMF 36(H) = 20000

• 3.189E+04 pCi/sec

• 5.0E+03 cpm /pci/ml *  !

1.7655E-08 = 5.63E+04 cpm The EALs and notes have been revised to indicate that the EMF readings are sustained for greater than or equal to 15 minutes, like the Alert, rather than being based upon a 60 minute release duration. The EMF readings are based on dose rates, as described 3 above. )

Issue 6 Initiating condition 4.6.U.1 has been reworded to say

" Fire Within the Protected Area Boundary Not Extinguished Within 15 Minutes of Detection OR Explosion Within the Protected Area Boundary" The Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) has been added to the list of areas for EALs 4.6.U.1-1 and 4.6.A.1-1.

McGuire has added the Equipment Staging Building to the list for EAL 4.6.U.1-1. This structure has been added to the site since the original package was submitted.

Issue 7 McGuire has added a definition of Vital Area to their classification procedure.

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EAL 4.7. A.1-2 has been re*;ised to include a list of areas similar to EAL 4.7.A.1-3.

The Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) has been added to the list of areas for both EALs 4.7.A.1-2 and 4.7.A.1-3.

Issue 8 The ultimate heat sink for McGuire is the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond and Lake Norman. The ultimate heat sink (Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond Dam and Dikes and Cowan's Ford Dam and Associated Dikes) has been added to the list of structures for EAL 4.7.A.1-3.

Issue 9 EAL 4.7.A.1-1 has been revised to read as follows:

Valid "OBE Exceeded" Alarm on 1AD-13.E7 This identifies the instrumentation used to determine if OBE is exceeded.

Issue 10 Defueled is not a defined operating mode per Technical Specifications. The unit is considered to be in "No Mode" when the core is defueled. Duke Power has reviewed the Operating Mode applicability of the NUMARC EALs and has made changes as follows:

1) EAL 4.2.U.3-1 applies in Modes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 only, as the Technical Specification only applies in these modes.

EAL 4.5.U.1-1 has been split into two EALs. In Modes 1-4, 2) both diesel generators must start and load for the unit to be in an Unusual Event. In Modes 5, 6, and No Mode (Defueled), only one diesel generator is required. These events would escalate to an Alert if a diesci failed via EAL 4.5.A.2-1 in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4, and EAL 4.5.A.1-1 in Modes 5, 6, and No Mode (Defueled).

3) EALs 4.6.A.1-1 and 4.6.A.2-1 have been recombined into EAL 4.6.A.1-1. This revised EAL 4.6.A.1-1 applies in Modes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, except that doghouses are an area of interest only in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. A new EAL 4.6.A.2-1 has been written specifically for No Mode (Defueled). This EAL focuses on o' nt Fuel Pool cooling and supporting systems.

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Issue 11 *

EAL 4.7.A.3-1 has been. revised to read:

-Control Room evacuation has been initiated per AP/1(2)/A/5500/17 I EAL 4.7.S.1-1 part a has been revised to read: Li i

a. Control Room evacuation has been initiated per i

AP/1(2)/A/5500/17  ;

Issue 12  ;

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The~ Operating Mode Applicability information for Initiating i j Condition 4.2.U.4 has been revised to include Mode 1 (Power l

. Operation). This was inadvertently omitted from the Basis .

' document.

i i Issue 13 EAL 4.4.A.1-1 part a, 4.4.S.1-1 part a and 4.4.G.1-1 part a .,

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have been revised to read: j l

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a. Valid reactor trip signal received or  !

required and automatic reactor trip was not I a successful Issue 14

EAL 4.4.A.2-1 has been revised to read: l 4.4.A.2-1 Total loss of Residual Heat Removal (ND) and/or Nuclear Service Water (RN) and/or Component l Cooling (KC)  ;

AND i

One of the following:

I i e Inability to maintain reactor coolant temperature below 200'F l

• Uncontrolled reactor coolant temperature rise to

>18 0*F i  !

Issue 15 EAL 4.5.S.2-1 part a has been revised to delete the term

" Unplanned",

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. I The order of EALs 4.4.S.2-1 through 4.4.S.2-3 has been revised to put them in the same priority as the. critical l safety function status-trees (subcriticality, core cooling, -

and heat sink).  ;

Duke Power disagrees with the NRC's interpretation of the j NUMARC guidance. 'The basis in NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2-(IC SS4) indicates that "This EAL addresses complete loss of .

functions _ required for hot shutdown"-and that "there is an 4 actual major failure of a system intended for protection of i

the.public." The critical Safety Function red paths (see Attachment 6) indicate a loss of function needed to protect ,

a Fission Product Barrier, not necessarily the loss.of the l Fission Product Barrier itself. The NUMARC document does i not explain this EAL as being a precursor to Fission Product

. Barrier challenges.

This EAL is applicable in Modes 1-4. The heat sink in these j modes is steam generator cooling. The Heat Sink CSF-Red +

adequately addresses ultimate heat sink concerns. s l

Issue 17 EAL 4.2.S.1-1 part a has been revised to 'cead:

Loss of most (>50%) annunciators associated.with safety {

systems.  ;

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Also, part d has been revised for clarity to read:

i Inability to provide manual monitoring of any of the i following Critical Safety Functions: l

• subcriticality

• core cooling

• heat sink ,

e containment Issue 18 <

EAL 4.5.G.1-1 part b has been revised to provide specific SSF success criteria and now reads  !

Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) fails to supply NC pump f seal injection OR CA supply to Steam Generators

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The first. sentence in the second paragraph of the Basis for i this EAL has been revised to read The SSF is capable of providing the necessary functions (reactor coolant pump seal injection and auxiliary 1 feedwater supply to the steam generators) to maintain a  ;

hot shutdown condition for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

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ATTACHMENT 2 Revised .

Disposition of NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2 +

Initiating Conditions and Emergency Action Levels in the McGuire EAL Submittal e

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McGuire Nuclear Site Disposition of NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2 IC/EAL in McGuire EAL Submittal NUMARC IC/EAL McGuire EAL Recognition Category and EAL Number Recognition Category A AUl/l Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.U.1-1 and -2 AU1/2 Abnormr] Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.U.1-3 and -4 AUl/3 Deleted -- McGuire does not have perimeter monitors AUl/4 Deleted -- McGuire does not have real time dose assessment AU2/1 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.U.2-1 AU2/2 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.U.2-2 AU2/3 Deleted -- McGuire does not have dry fuel storage AU2/4 Abnonnal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.U.2-3 AAl/l Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.1-1 and -2 AA1/2 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.1-3 and -4 AA1/3 Deleted -- McGuire does not have perimeter monitors AAl/4 Deleted -- McGuire does not have real time dose assessment AA2/1 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.2-1 AA2/2 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.2 2 AA2/3 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.2-3 AA2/4 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.2-21 AA3/1 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.3-1 and -2 AA3/2 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.3-23 ASl/l Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.S.1-1 AS!/2 Deleted -- McGuire does not have perimeter monitors ASI/3 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.S.1-2 ASI/4 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.S.1-3 AGl/l Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.G.1-1 AGl/2 Deleted -- McGuire does not have perimeter monitors AGl/3 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.G.1-2 AGl/4 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.G.1-3 l .L

r McGuire Nuclear Site j i

Disposition of NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2 IC/EAL in McGuire EAL Submittal i

NUMARC IC/EAL McGuire EAL Recognition Category and EAL Number Recognition Category F FPB Fuel /l Fission Product Barrier 4.1.F.1 FPB Fuel /2' Fission Product Barrier 4.1.F.2 FPB Fuel /3 Deleted -- Core exit thermocouples are monitored as part of Critical Safety Function (CSF) status. If the OAC is not ' i available, manual monitoring is done per EP/l or 2/A/5000/10 .

and will be used to classify.

FPB Fuel /4 Deleted -- Reactor Vessel level is monitored as part of CSF  ;

status. If the OAC is not available, manual monitoring is done per EP/l or 2/A/5000/10 and will be used to classify.

FPB Fuel /5 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.F.3 FPB Fuel /6 Deleted -- McGuire does not believe additional indications are needed to determine Fuel Clad Barrier status. Air sampling  ;

(PAGS) results are not used, as containment monitors can be used to determine Fuel Clad status.  :

FPB Fueln Fission Product Barrier 4.1.F.4 FPB RCS/l Fission Product Barrier 4.1.N.1 [

FPB RCS/2 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.N.2 '

FPB RCS/3 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.N.3 Note: The classification .

a procedure does not provide site specific criteria that a steam generator is ruptured. Duke Power's philosophy is that diagnostic information of this type belongs in the Emergency ,

Operating Procedures. Once the Emergency Coordinator / EOF l Director determines that a steam generator is ruptured, the

! classification procedure can be used to determine the cone : l classification.

FPB RCS/4 Fi&. P:cic: B=ict i ! N.1 Deleted - Containment process I monitors alarm at too low a leak rate for NCS barrier loss and auto-isolate on safety iniection. Reactor Buildine monitors cannot indicate clearly activity levels from loss of coolant with normal activity.

FPB RCS/5 Deleted -- McGuire does not believe additional indications are needed to determine Reactor Coolant System Barrier status. Air i sampling (PAGS) results are not used, as containment monitors can be used to determine Reactor Coolant System Barrier status.

FPB RCS/6 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.N.5 FPB Containment /l Fission Product Barrier 4.1.C.1 FPB Containment /2 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.C.2 FPB Containment /3 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.C.3 FPB Containment /4 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.C.4 FPB Containment /5 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.C.5

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l ll McGuire Nuclear Site Disposition of NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2 IC/EAL in McGuire EAL Submittal FPB Containment /6 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.C.6 Core exit thermocouples are {

monitored as part of CSF status. If the OAC is not available, j manual monitoring is done per EP/l or 2/A/5000/10 and will be used to classify.  ;

, FPB Containmentn Deleted -- no additional indications needed FPB Containment /8 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.C.7 i i

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McGuire Nuclear Site Disposition of NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2 IC/EAL in McGuire EAL Submittal

- NUMARC IC/EAL McGuire EAL Recognition Category and EAL Number )

Recognition Category H HUl/l Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.U.1-1 and -2  ;

HU1/2 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.U.1-3 l HU1/3 Deleted -- McGuire considers this redundant to Emergency Director Judgement 4

HU1/4 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.U.1 4  ;

HU1/5 Fire and Security 4.6.U.1-2 HU1/6 Natural Disasters, IIazards, etc. 4.7.U.1-5  ;

IIUln Deleted -- McGuire believes no additional items are needed  !

based on currently approved EALs i HU2/1 Fire and Security 4.6.U.1-1 {

HU3/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.U.2-1  :

11U3/2 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.U.2-2 Fire and Security 4.6.U.2-1

11U4/1 HU4/2 Fire and Security 4.6.U.1-2 and -3 HUS/l Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.U.3-1 HA1/1 Natural Disaster', Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.1-1 l HAl/2 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.1-2 ,

l HA1/3 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.1-3 '

HA1/4 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.1-3 HA1/5 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.1-3 l

HA1/6 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.1-3 HAin Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7. A.1-3  !

HA2/1 Fire and Security 4.6.A.1-1 and 4.6.A.2-1 l l HA3/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.2-1 1 I

HA3/2 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.2-2 HA4/1 Fire and Security 4.6.A.Q-1 l liA4/2 Deleted -- McGuire believes no others necessary based on currently approved EALs HA5/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.3-1 HA6/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.4-1 HSl/l Fire and Security 4.6.S.1-1 11S 1/2 Fire and Security 4.6.S.1-2 and -3 HS2/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.S.1-1 HS3/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.S.2-1 HG1/1 Fire and Security 4.6.G.1-1 11G1/2 Eire and Security 4.6.G.1-2 HG2/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.G.1-1 a I

McGuire Nuclear Site Disposition of NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 21C/EAL in McGuire EAL Submittal NUMARC IC/EAL McGuire EAL Recognition Category and EAL Number j Recognition Category S SUl/l Loss of Power 4.5.U.1-1 SU2/1 System Malfunction 4.2.U.1-1 j i

SU3/1 System Malfunction 4.2.U.2-1 SU4/1 Deleted -- McGuire has no failed fuel monitor. Reactor coolant sampling is used to determine fuel clad degradation. i l

SU4/2 System Malfunction 4.2.U.3 Aonlies in Modes 1-5 only because the Technical Snecificatioq colies only in these modes. ,

SU5/l System Malfunction 4.2.U.4-1, -2, and -3 ,

SU6/1- System Malfunction 4.2.U.5-1 and -2  !

SU7/1 Loss of Power 4.5.U.2-1 sal /l Loss of Power 4.5.A.1-1  !

SA2/1 Loss of Shutdown Function 4.4.A.1-1 l SA3/1 Loss of Shutdown Function 4.4.A.2-1-and-2 SA4/1 System Malfunction 4.2.A.1-1 SAS/l Loss of Power 4.5.A.2-1 SSl/l Loss of Power 4.5.S.1-1 .

SS2/1 Loss of Shutdown Function 4.4.S.1-1 l SS3/1 Loss of Power 4.5.S.2-1 I

SS4/1 Loss of Shutdown Function 4.4.S.2-1, -2, and -3 SS5/1 Loss of Shutdown Function 4.4.S.3-1,-2, and -3 l SS6/1 System Malfunction 4.2.S.1-1 SGl/l Loss of Power 4.5.G.1-1 SG2/1 and 2 Loss of Shutdown Function 4.4.G.1-1 s

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ATTACHMENT 3 Revised 1 i

McGuire Emergency Plan Section D Pages l with Revision Marks l

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1 McGuire Nuclear Site i D. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM-Ragulatory Guide 1.101, Rev. 3, August 1992, approved the guidance provided by NUMARC/NESP-007, Revision 2, as an alternative methodology for the i development of Emergency Action Levels. McGuire Nuclear Site will use the  !

i NUMARC guidance for the development ofinitiating conditions and emergeny l

action levels.

The emergency classification system utilizes four categories for classification of emergency events.

D.I.a UNUSUAL EVENT 5

Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite '

response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

The purpose of this class is to provide notification of the emergency to the station .

staff, State and Local Government representatives, and the NRC.

Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D4.

D.l.b ALERT Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential

- substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

The purpose of this class is to assure that emergency personnel are readdy l available to:

1. Activate the onsite response centers

2. Respond if the situation becomes more serious or to perform confirmatory radiation monitoring if required

3. Provide offsite authorities current status information Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D4.

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D.I.c. SITE AREA EMERGENCY Events are in process or have occurred which involee actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public. Any releases are not }

expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except near the site boundary.

The purpose of the Site Area Emergency is to: ,

1. Activate the offsite response centers

2. Assure that monitoring teams are mobilized ,

3. Assure that personnel required for taking protective actions of near site areas are at duty stations should the situation become more serious. ,

4. Provide current information to the public and be available for consultation with offsite authorities Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D4.

D.I.d. GENERAL EMERGENCY Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

The purpose of the General Emergency is to: i

1. Initiate predetermined protective actions for the public i

2. Provide continuous assessment ofinformation from onsite and offsite measurements

3. Initiate additional measures as indicated by event releases or potential releases ,

4. Provide current information to the public and be available for consultation with offsite authorities Specific initiating condi t ions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D4.

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i D.2. INITIATING CONDITIONS 1

The initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency actions levels are contained in the BASIS document beginning on page D4. A classification procedure (RP/0/A/5700/00) will be used to classify events as they occur. Specific response procedures are in place which delineate the required response during the appropriate classification. l P

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Enclosure 4,1 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX McGuire Nuclear Sito Use EALs to determine Fission Product Barner status (Intact, Potential Loss, or Loss). Add points for all 3 bamers. Classify according to the table below Note 1: This table is only applicabic in Modes 1-4.

Note 2: Also, an event (or multiple events) could occur which results in the conclusion that exceeding the Loss or Potential Loss thresholds is IMMINENT (i.e., within 1-3 hours). In this IMMINENT LOSS situation, use judgement and classify as if the thresholds are exceeded Unueuel Event (1 - 3 Pomts) Alert 14 - 6 Po6nts) site Area Emergency (7 - 10 Points) General Emernency (11 - 13 Po6nts) e Arty Potenbal Loss of Containment e Any Potenbal Loss or Loss of the e Loss of both NCS and Fuel Clad e Loss of allthree bamers l NCS e Any Loss of Contamrnent

• Any Potential Loss or Loss of Fuel e Potenbal Loss of both NCS and Fuel e Loss of any two t>arnert and the Clad Clad Potent:al Loss of the tfurd barner e Potential Loss of ether the NCS or i Fuel Clad and Loss of any additonal barner CONTAINMENT BARRIER NCS BARRIER FUEL CLAD BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS- LOSS-(3 Point (s)) POTENTIAL LOSS- LOSS-(5 Point (s)) POTENTIAL LOSS- LOSS-(5 Point (s))

(1 Point (s)) (4 Point (s)) (4 Point (s))

y L Crecalsmug F uncame Slaha 1. Cracal Salsty Funchon Staha L Crecad Sdaty Funcann Staba e CantanmortRED e hot apptcarse e NCS tresyty&d e pet apphcatie o Care CocdrgOrange e Core CWRed e Heat Sr*4ed e Heat Sne&d ie,w w r e i NCS Leak Rae 1 Pnman, rw Actnne, tavat

• Contament Pressure > 15 e Rapd unexplaned decrease m o L!nnotatteleak exceedrig tie e GREATER THAN avslatte e Nat aghcatie e Coctant Ac9vey GREATER PSIG contanmert pressure tAnnne capacey of one chayng pump makets capeWy as recated THAN 300 pCmz n runal scease a tie normd charyng rnase by alo6s d NCS =% Equivalent lodrie(DEQ H31 e H2 concentahon > 9% we tetkum solaned.

• Contienment pressure or surnp

• Contanment presswa yeater level e not consstent Stan 3 psig we less etas one we LOCA condeons.

W Wan d NS and a VX4 ARF operaeng i

ENCLOSURE 4.1 IWcGuire Nuclear Site FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX CONTAINMENT BARRIER NCS BARRIER FUEL CLAD BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(3 Point (s)) POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(5 Point (s)) POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(5 Point (s))

(1 Potnt(s)) (4 Point (s)) (4 Point (s))

2 Comannum mesman vahes Siam Aan Canamnnem lantmann h 1 SG Tda Rupass 1 Cmemaman Retaban tendanne

. =& . Com nm.t ms:en. . Pnmeywsaxnery w ran . viscason w a sG. . me . Cmamrom ran== =aer incomplete ud a release poen sameds to capsary done Ruptsed aus has a teon- 51 A er 518 ressrs >117 R9r ownaremament essa canyg pump a me normd exsstne seconsey nnetaa .

chaynemose eisthun makeni . mecanon w e SGis neared ad a prdorged releae d contmanaamd seconsny coolart a acomme kra me anscied SG m ee swanment i SG Sacnnssy Saba Raimann Wim Pnmary t>Samnday tanhage 4. Conseresnt Rataann idenlunng Judgement

. ~_ . - .e_,., s.,e . . ~~ . -- . - - . ._.r . . - I atmq#we se prenar m W to Emergency Coon $nasorEW Drectr indcates LOSS cr seconday leakage GREATER POTENTIAL LOSS d fue kulclad barfur.

THAN Tecm Spec aAmeable i Sq*. ant Ramonceve kwantry h Contanment O . Contswet Rad Ents . M anrk*= . Any condean, rdudmg sutsty a man.r me teur. 9. m to apnon

@ EMF 51Aor 518 d me Emergency Coonsnaio :EW Drectr recanes LOSS or hann0 @ kme sece POTENTIAL LOSS W me NCS baner.

shuesown

> 4M R.9r @ 0- 0 5 tr 31M R3r @ 0 5 2 hr

> 125 RAr @ 2-4 hr

> 90 RAr 0 4-8 tr

> 53 R9r g > 8 tr u_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ ._ . _ . _ _ _ _ . - _ - . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

ENCLOSURE 4.1 McGuire Nuclear Site FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX CONTAINMENT BARRIER NCS BARRIER FUEL CLAD BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(3 Point (s)) POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(5 Point (s)) POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(5 Point (s))

(1 Point (s)) l (4 Point (s)) (4 Point (s))

t em cmise

. cm coceas-mo pe. . Nc:mecam nacand tr > 15 nst T. Enrammy Centnaar EN Drer2r Adgammar

• Any anaton. erAnnng mateey e nratr me baner. Se in to opnon d to Emsgrey CoonhnaarEG Dructs kuk: ansa LOSS or POTENTIAL LOSS W me canamnrert bamer D

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McGuire Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.1 BASIS INFORMATION FOR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER REFERENCE TABLE CONTAINMENT BARRIER EALs: (1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7)

The Containment Barrier includes the containment building, its connections up to and including the outermost containment isolation valves. This barrier also includes the main steam, feedwater, and blowdown line extensions outside the containment building up to and including the outermost secondary side isolation valve.

Critical Safety Function (CSF) indications are not meant to include transient alarm conditions '

which may appear during the start-up of engineered safeguards equipme - '. A CSF condition is satisfied when the alarmed state is valid and sustained.

4.1.C.1 Critical Safety Function Status  !

Containment - RED indicates containment conditions which may challenge the containment integrity. Therefore, this condition represents a potential loss of the containment barrier.

I There is no " Loss" EAL associated with this item.

4.1.C.2 Containment Conditions Containment pressure above 15 psig (the design pressure) indicates that the containment or its heat removal systems are not functioning as intended. This degradation of containment pressure control represents a potential loss of containment integrity.

A containment hydrogen concentration of 9 volume percent is sufficient to expect that any ignition would result in complete combustion of the hydrogen in containment and a significant pressure rise. At some initial containment pressures, this pressure rise may exceed the capacity of the containment. Therefore, this level of hydrogen in the containment represents a potential loss of containment integrity.

Containment heat removal systems are actuated at the high-high containment pressure setpoint of 3 psig. At least one train of Containment Spray (NS) and one Containment Air (VX) Return Fan (CARF) should be actuated at that time (the CARF  ;

with a 10 minute delay). A failure to actuate the design basis heat removal capability ]

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McGuire Nucl:ar Site or assure proper containment mixing represents a degradation in the control of the i containment conditions. Therefore, this situation represents a potential loss of containment integrity.

Rapid unexplained loss of pressure (i.e., not attributable to containment spray or condensation effects) following an initial pressure increase indicates a loss of containment integrity.

Containment pressure and sump levels should increase as a result of the mass and energy release into containment from a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). Thus, sump level or containment pressure not increasing indicates an interfacing systems LOCA which is a containment bypass and a loss of containment integrity, or some t other containment pressure boundary failure.

4.1.C.3 Containment Isolation Valve Status After Containment Isolation Actuation Failure to isolate those containment pathways which would allow containment atmosphere to be released from containment is a loss of the containment barrier.

Here is no " Potential Loss" EAL associated with this item.

4.1.C.4 Steam Generator (SG) Secondary Side Release With Primary To Secondary i Leakage i l

Secondary side releases to atmosphere include those from the condenser air ejector, SG Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs), atmospheric dump valves, faulted steam i lines, and main steam safety valves. Steam releases, in combination with primary to i secondary leakage, constitute a bypass of the containment and, therefore, a loss of the containment barrier.

The appropriate c:s :sification can be determined in combination with the SG Tube Rupture EAL under the Reactor Coolant System (NCS) barrier.

There is no " Potential Loss" EAL associated with this item.

l 4.1.C.5 Significant Radioactive Inventory in Containment These values indicate significant fuel damage well in excess of the EALs associated with both loss of Fuel Clad and loss of NCS Barriers. NUREG-1228, Source Estimations During Incident Response to Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents, D6 l

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indicates that such conditions do not exist when the amount of clad damage is less than 20%. This amount of activity in containment, if released, could have such severe i consequences that it is prudent to treat this as a potential loss of containment. i By treating the radioactive inventory in containment as a poiential loss, a General  !

Emergency will be declared when the conditions of the fuel clad and NCS barriers are included in the evaluation. This will allow the appropriate protective actions to be  !

recommended. l There is no " Loss" EAL associated with this item.

NOTE: If EMF-51 A and EMF-51B are unavailable, readings can be calculated from procedure HP/0/B/1009/02, " Alternative Method for Determining Dose Rates within the Reactor Building."

4.1.C.6 Core Cooling l 7

Core Cooling - RED for greater than 15 minutes in this potential loss EAL represents imminent core damage that, if not terminated, could lead to reactor vessel failure and an increased potential for containment failure. The potential for containment 4 challenge as a result of events at reactor vessel failure makes it prudent to consider an unmitigated core damage condition as a potential loss of the containment barrier.

Severe accident analyses (e.g., NUREG-1150) have concluded that function restoration procedures can arrest core degradation within the reactor vessel in a significant fraction of the core damage scenarios, and that the likelihood of containment failure is very small in these events. Given this, it is appropriate to provide a reasonable period to allow function restoration procedures to arrest the core i melt sequence. Whether or not the procedures will be effective should be apparent within 15 minutes. The Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director should make the declaration as soon as it is determined that the procedures have been, or will be, t ineffective.

There is no " Loss" EAL associated with this item.

4.1.C.7 Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement This EAL addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director in determining whether the containment barrier is lost or potentially lost. In addition, the inability to monitor the barrier should also be Dl

McGuire Nucleor Site incorporated in this EAL as a factor in Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director judgement that the barrier may be considered lost or potentially h. ,

i REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (NCS) BARRIER EALs: (1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5)

The NCS Barrier includes the NCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary isolation valves.

4.1.N.1 Critical Safety Function Status NCS Integrity - RED indicates NCS pressure and temperature conditions which may challenge the Reactor Vessel integrity. Heat Sink - RED indicates the ultimate heat sink function is under extreme challenge. Either of these conditions indicate a potentialloss of the NCS Barrier.

There is no " Loss" EAL associated with this item.

4.1.N.2 NCS Leak Rate Small leaks may result in the inability to maintain normal liquid inventory within the NCS by operation of the Chemical and Volume Control System, which is considered as one centrifugal charging pump discharging to the charging header with the letdown line isolated. Ifletdown cannot be isolated, and a second charging pump is required, this is still considered a potential loss of the NCS barrier. The need for compensatory action to maintain normal liquid inventory is an indication of a degraded NCS barrier and is considered to be a potential loss of the barrier.

The loss of subcooling is the fundamental indication that the inventory loss from the primary system exceeds the capacity of the inventory control systems. If the loss of subcooling is indicated, the NCS banier is considered lost.

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4.1.N.3 SG Tube Rupture Small Steam Generator tube leaks may result in the inability to maintain normal liquid inventory within the Reactor Coolant System (NCS) by operation of the Chemical and Volume Control System, which is considered as one centrifugal j charging pump discharging to the charging header with the letdown line isolated. If  ;

letdown cannot be isolated, and a second chargmg pump is required, this is still D10

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. considered a potential loss of the NCS barrier. The need for compensatory action to maintain normal liquid inventory is an indication of a degraded NCS barrier and is l considered to be a potential loss of the bamer.

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A tube rupture with an unisolable secondary line fault is generally indicated by a reduction in primary coolant ir.ventory, increased secondary radiation levels, and an uncontrolled or complete depressurization of the ruptured SG. This set of conditions represents a loss of the NCS and containment fission product barriers. It conjunction ,

with containment barrier loss #4, this condition will result in the declaration of a Site l Area Emergency. Escalation to a General Emergency would be indicated by at least a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier.

Secondary radiation increases should be observed via radiation monitoring of  !

Condenser Air Ejector Discharge, SG Blowdown, Main Steam, and/or SG Sampling ,

System. Determination of the " uncontrolled" depressurization of the ruptur:d SG ,

should be based on indication that the pressure decrease in the ruptured steam generator is not a function of operator action. This should prevent declaratim based on a depressurization that results from an EOP induced cooldown of the NCt that does not involve the prolonged release of contaminated secondary coolant froa the affected SG to the environment. This EAL should encompass steam breaks, feed breaks, and stuck open safety or relief valves. These conditions represents a loss of the NCS and containment fission product barriers. ,

I 4.1.N.4 Containment Radiation Monitoring

- An =p!==d =!!d T-!p !! !=, en E"F: 38,35, = 10 ind!=:= S: =!=: ef r '= ccc!=::e S::=:2!==: "i r= din;; ic =: =!!d dS=: : ===p= ding d=== i- NCS : =n:crj rd !=:=:d ch=p =:: :c S: NCS. E: Trip '!

2:pe -: i: =!=td oc == = .p!!== ? S:!= d L!=== C= ::==: 16.! '

6. n: ind!=:M !c= cf ==:e Oce!=: i:id=f E=:!cn ef:!c= cf S: NCS 5=i=

n...:.,___a: -..:n. u i _ .t__.t . _ _ m _; cm. r. .., ci. m a n _ __:__ e..u.~ u ,. m. . . . . . u. . ..

. . . . . . . , - . . . ~ . . . - . . . . . - . , . . . . . . - . . . . - - . . . . . . . . . . . .

EAL _r!d b !nd!= != cf: NCS '9 en!y. If S: =d!::!c- c-!'c- = din;;

=:=:d c +.:: :p=! Ecd by F=! C!-d E=!= EAL "3, f=! d=:;;: =r!d != b ,

nd!=:M.This EAL is beine deleted for the followine reasons. The containment )

process radiation monitors (EMF-38. -39. and -40) serve to orovide early indication I of reactor coolant (NC) leaks in containment to ensure compliance with Technic.a_1 )

Specifications and Selected Licensee Commitments. These monitors alarm on small NC leaks in and below the Unusual Event (IC 4.2.U.4) rance. Also. these monitors automati cally isolate on a safety iniection. For these reasons. it is not aooropriate to l use these monitors as an indication of a loss of the reactor coolant system barrier. I The reactor buildine monitors (EMF-51 A and -51B) used for the Fuel Clad EAL 4.1.F.3 are not able to indicate clearly the lower levels of activity in containment resultine from a leak of reactor coolant with normal activity levels. Thus. this EAL will be omitted and other indication will be used to determine a potential loss or loss  :

1 of the Reactor Coolant System Barrier.

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S.:= !: = "PC'r!!:! L=:" E.^.L r=itM ? $!: ::.7 l

4.1.N.5 Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement This EAL addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency ,

Coordinator / EOF Director in determining whether the NCS barrier is lost or potentially lost. In addition, the inability to monitor the barrier should also be incorporated in this EAL as a factor in Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director judgement that the barrier may be considered lost or potentially lost.

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FUEL CLAD BARRIER EALs:(1 or 2 or 3 or 4)

The Fuel Clad Barrier is the zircalloy tubes that contain the fuel pellets. ,

t 4.1.F.1 Critical Safety Function Status Core Cooling - ORANGE indicates subcooling has been lost and that some clad damage may occur. Heat Sink - RED indicates the ultimate heat sink function is under extreme challenge. Either of these conditions indicate a potential loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

Core Cooling - RED indicates significant reactor coolant superheating and core  !

uncovery. Clad damage under these conditions is likely; therefore, this is indication ofloss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

4.1.F.2 Primary Coolant Activity Level >

The value of 300 Ci/cc 1131 equivalent coolant activity is we!! above that expected for iodine spikes and corresponds to about 2% to 5% fuel clad damage. This amount of clad damage indicates significant clad damage and thus the Fuel Clad Bamer is j considered lost. l There is no equivalent " Potential Loss" EAL for this item.

4.1.F.3 Containment Radiation Monitoring A reading of 117 R/hr on EMF-51 A or B is a value which indicates the release of reactor coolant, with elevated activity indicative of fuel damage, into the containment.

Reactor coolant concentrations of this magnitude are several times larger than the maximum concentrations (including iodine spiking) allowed within technical ,

specifications and are therefore indicative of fuel damage (approximately 5% clad  !

failure depending on core inventory and NCS volume). Ei: c != !: h!;;hr S: . S:: i g=iEd f= NCS 5 dr L = EAL " A 9.=, t.T_his EAL indicates a loss of both the fuel clad barrier and a loss of NCS barrier.

There is no " Potential Loss" EAL associated with this item.

D\1.

- - - - .. . = .- _. . - - . . ...-.- . . . - _ .

McGuire Nuctrar Sit  :

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NOTE: If EMF-51 A and EMF-51B are unavailable, readings can be calculated from procedure HP/0/B/1009/02," Alternative Method for detennining Dose Rates within the Reactor Building."

1 4.1.F.4 ' Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement

This EAL addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency i Coordinator / EOF Director in determining whether the Fuel Clad barrier is lost or potentially lost. In addition, the inability to monitor the barrier should also be

incorporated in this EAL as a factor in Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director judgement that the barrier may be considered lost or potentially lost.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, BASIS 1NFORMA TION FOR TABLE 4 -

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McGuire Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.2.U.I Inability to Reach Required 4.2.A.1 Unplanned Loss of Most or 4.2.S.1 Inability to Monitor a Shutdown Within All Safety System Significant Transient in Technical Specification Annunciation or Indication Progress Limits in Control Room With Either(1) a Significant Transient in Progress, or (2) Compensatory Non-Alarming Indicators Unavailable 4.2.U.2 Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety System g Annunciation or Indication

- in the Control Room for i Greater Than 15 Minutes 4.2.U.3 Fuel Clad Degradation 4.2.U.4 ReactorCoolant(NCS)

System Leakage 4.2.U.5 Unplanned Loss of All Onsite or Offsite Communications

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ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT 4.2.UJ Inability to Reach Required Shutdown Within Technical Specification Limits.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup) i Mode 3 (Hot Standby)  !

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.2.U.1-1 Plant is not brought to required operating mode within Technical Specifications LCO Action Statement Time.  ;

i BASIS:

Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCOs) require the plant to be brought to a required shutdown mode when the Technical Specification required configuration cannot be restored. Depending on -

the circumstances, this may or may not be an emergency or precursor to a more severe condition.

In any case, the initiation of plant shutdown required by the site Technical Specifications requires a one hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b) Non-emergency events. The plant is within its safety envelope when being shut down within the allowable action statement time in the '

Technical Specifications. An immediate Notification of an Unusual Event is required when the ,

plant is not brought to the required operating mode within the allowable action statement time in the Technical Specifications. Declaration of an Unusual Event is based on the time at which  ;

the LCO-specified action statement time period elapses under the site Technical Specifications and is not related to how long a condition may lasve existed. Other required  :

Technical Specification shutdowns that involve precursors to more serious events are addressed by other System Malfunction, Hazards, or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2. 0U92, SU2

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McGuire Nuctrar Site SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT .

4.2.U.2 Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety System Annunciation or Indication in the Control Room for Greater Than 15 Minutes.

4 OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode I (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup) ,

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)  !

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.2.U.2-1 The following conditions exist:  ;

a. Unplanned loss of most (>50%) annunciators associated with safety systems for greater than 15 minutes.

• AND

b. In the opinion of the Operations Shift ManagerEmergency CoordinatorEOF l 4

Director, the loss of the annunciators or indicators requires additional personnel  !

(beyond normal shift compliment) to safely operate the unit.

BASIS:

I This IC and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the difficulty associated with monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment. " Unplanned" loss of annunciators or indicator excludes scheduled maintenance and te:, ting activities. Quantification of"most" is arbitrary; however, this l judgement is supported by the specific opinion of the Operations Shift ManagerEmergency l CoordinatorEOF Director that additional operating personnel will be required to provide increased monitoring of system operation to safely operate the unit. Fifteen minutes was selected ,

as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses. i l

This Unusual Event will be escalated to an Alert if a transient is in progress during the loss of annunciation or indication.

Due to the limited number of safety sys' ems in operation during cold shutdown, refu ling, and defueled modes, no IC is indicated during these modes of operation.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, SU3 D 1 Ce

McGuire Nuclear Sita SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT 4.2.UJ Fuel Clad Degradation.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: AHMode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startun)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.2.U3-1 Dose Equivalent 1-131 greater than the Technical Specification allowable limit.

BASIS:

This IC is included es an Unusual Event because it is considered to be a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant and a potential precursor of more serious problems. The EAL addresses coolant samples exceeding coolant technical specifications for iodine spike. Escalation of this IC to the Alert level is via ue Fission Product Barrier Degradation Monitoring ICs. This EAL aoolies in Modes 1. 2. 3. 4. and 5 only because the Technical Soecification aoolies oniv in these modes.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, 01/92, SU4 D\ ~1

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SYSTEM MALFUNCTION j UNUSUAL EVENT  :

4.2.U.4 Resetor Coolant System (NCS) Leakage.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ModeAPPL!CAS!L!N: *&& 1 (4 tow,,- 1 (Power Operations)  :

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.2.U.4-1 Unidentified leakage 210 gpm I

1 4.2.U.4-2 Pressure boundary leakage 210 gpm l 4.2.U.4-3 Identified leakage 2 25 gpm i BASIS:

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l This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it may be a precursor of more serious conditions and. as a result, is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The 10 gpm value for the unidentified and pressure boundary leakage was selected as it is observable with nonnal control roorn indications. Lesser values must generally be determined through time-consuming surveillance tests (e g.,

mass balances). The EAL for identified leakage is set at a higher value due to the lesser significance of identified leakage in comparison to unidentified or pressure boundary leakage. In either case, escalation of this IC to the Alert level is via Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs or IC, " Inability to Maintain Pl. int in Cold Shutdown."

REFERENCE:

NUAbtRC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, SUS 1

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McGuire Nuclear Site SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT 4.2.U.5 Unplanned Loss of All Onsite or Offsite Communications. ,

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All ,

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.2.U.5-1 Loss of all onsite communications capability (intemal phone system, PA system, onsite radio system) affecting the ability to perform routine operations.

4.2.U.5-2 Loss of all offsite communications capability (Selective Signaling, NRC FTS lines, offsite radio system, commercial phone system) affecting the ability to communicate with offsite authorities.

i BASIS:

The purpose of this IC and its associated EALs is to recognize a loss of communications capability that either defeats the plant operations staff ability to perform routine tasks necessary for plant opuations or the ability to communicate problems with offsite authorities. The loss of offsite communications ability is expected to be significantly more comprehensive than the condition addressed by 10 CFR 50.72.

This EAL is intended to be used only when extraordinary means are being utilized to make communications possible (relaying ofinformation from radio transmissions, individuals being sent to otTsite locations, etc.).

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, OU92, SU6 i

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l McGuire Nuclear Site l

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ALERT 1

l 4.2.A.1 Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety System Annunciation or Indication in i Control Room With Either (1) a Significant Transient in Progress, or (2)

Compensatory Non-Alarming Indicators Unavailable, j l

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.2.A.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Unplanned loss of most (>50%) annunciators associated with safety systems for greater than j 15 minutes.

l AND

b. In the opinion of the Operations Shift ManagerEmergency CoordinatorEOF Director, the loss of the annunciators or indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift compliment) to safely operate the unit.

AND l

c. Either of the following: I e A significant plant transient is in progress.

. Loss of the Operator Aid Computer (OAC).

BASIS:

I This IC and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the difficulty associated with i monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or i indication equipment during a transient. Quantification of"Most" is arbitrary; however, this judgement is supported by the specific opinion of the Operations Shift ManagerEmergency CoordinatorEOF  ;

02.0

McGuire Nuclear Site Director that additional operating personnel will be required to provide increased monitoring of system operation to safely operate the unit. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

"Significant Transient" includes response to automatic or manually initiated functions such as reactor trips, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injections, or thermal power oscillations of 10% or greater.

Significant indication is available from the OAC. Loss of the OAC in conjunction with the loss of other indications would further impair the ability to monitor plant parameters.

Due to the limited number of safety systems in operation during cold shutdown, refueling and defueled modes, no IC is indicated during these modes of operation.

This Alert will be escalated to a Site Area Emergency if the operating crew cannot monitor the transient in progress.

REFERENCE:

NUAL4RC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, SM D2.\

McGuire Nuclear Site SYSTEM MALFUNCTION SITE AREA EMERGENCi 4.2.S.1 Inability to Monitor a Significant Transient in Progress.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL: ,

4.2.S.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Unp!==d ! Loss of most (>50%) annunciators associated with safety systems, fe g: "-

e r 15. :rtr. ,

l AND  ;

I

b. A signific.'nt plant transient is in progress.

AND

c. Loss of the OAC.

AND l

d. Inability to provide manual monitoring, int;=d=: cfi: OAC Cn!=! Saf: y Fu=:!cn St:= T:= p cg:=, of any eneof the following Critical Safety Functions:

e subcriticality

• core cooling

• heat sink

• containment BASIS:

This IC and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the inability of the control room staff to l I

monitor the plant response to a transient. A Site Area Emergency is considered to exist if the control room staff cannot monitor safety functions needed for protection of the public.

D2.1 l

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McGuire Nuclear Site  !

"Significant Transient" includes response to automatic or manually initiated functions such as  !

trips, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injections, or thermal power oscillations of 10% or greater.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SS6 .

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McGuire Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY '

43.U.I Any Unplanned Release of 43.A.I Any Unplanned Release of 43.S.I Boundary Dose Resulting 43.G.I Boundary Dose Resulting Gaseous or Liquid Gaseous or Liquid from an Actual or Imminent from an Actualor Radioactivity to the Radioactivity to the Release of Radioactivity Imminent Release of Environment that Exceeds Environment that Exceeds Exceeds 100 mrem TEDE Radioactivity that Exceeds Two Times the SLC Limits 200 Times the SLC Limits or 500 mrem CDE Adult 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 for 60 Minutes or Longer for 15 Minutes or Longer Thyroid for the Actual mrem CDE Adult Th>Toid or Projected Duration of the for the Actual or Projected Release Duration of the Release 43.U.2 Unexpected increase in 43.A.2 Major Damage to Irradiated Plant Radiation or Airbome Fuelor Loss of Water Concentration Level that lias or Will Result in the Uncovering y ofirradiated Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel 43.A3 Release of Radioactive Material or increases in Radiation Levels Within the Facility That Impedes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown

McGuire Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT 4.3.U.1 Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds Two Thnes the SLC Limits for 60 Minutes or Longer.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All i

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.U.1-1 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-49L, EMF-44L, or EMF-31 (when aligned to RC) of 2 5.45E+06 cpm for 2 60 minutes or will likely continue for >60 minutes which indicates that the release may have exceeded the initiating condition and indicates the need to assess the release with crocedure HP/0/B/1009/10.

HP/0/B/l 009/294. or HP/0/B/1009/20.,

4.3.U.1-2 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36L of t 3.00E+04 cpm for 2 60 minutes or will likely continue for >60 minutes which indicates that the release may have exceeded the initiating condition and indicates the need to assess the release with crocedure HP/0/B/1009/10. HP/0/B/1009/429. or HP/0/B/1009/20.

T 4.3.U.1-3 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-31 (when aligned to WC or WWCB) of 2 9.174E+03 epm for 2 60 minutes or will likely continue for >60 minutes which indicates that the release may have exceeded the initiating condition and indicates the need to assess the release with crocedure HP/0/B/1009/10. HP/0/B/1009/M29. or HP/0/B/1009/20.

4.3.U.1-4 Gaseous effluent being released exceeds two times SLC 16.11-1 for 2 60 minutes as determined by Radiation Protection (RP) procedure.

4.3.U.1-5 Liquid efIluent being released exceeds two times SLC 16.11-6 for 2 60 minutes as determined by RP procedure.

NOTE: If monitor reading is sustained for the time period indicated in the EAL AND the required assessments (procedure calculations) cannot be completed within this l lim _s_ period, declaration must be made based on the valid radiation monitor reading.

HASIS:

D25

b McGuire Nuclear Site The term " Unplanned", as used in this context, includes any release for which a liquid waste release (LWR) or gaseous waste release (GWR) package was not prepared, or a release that exceeds the conditions (e.g., minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm set points, ,

etc.) on the applicable package.

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

Unplanned releases in excess of two times the site Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) that continue for 60 minutes or longer represent an uncontrolled situation and hence, a potential degradation in the level of safety. It is not intended that the release be averaged over 60 minutes. 1 The event should be declared as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will  ;

likely exceed 60 minutes.

The gaseous release rate SLC and Technical Specification (TS) are based on limiting gaseous (

release rates to the SITE BOUNDARY to 500 mr/ year total body.  :

The liquid release rate SLC and TS are based on limiting liquid release rates to the l UNRESTRICTED AREA to 10 times the Effluent Concentration (EC) valves given in l 10CFR20.1001-20.2401, Appendix B, Table 2, Column 2.

Monitor indiations are based on the methodology of the site Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). Annual average meteorology has been used. Radiation Protection will use HP/0/B/1009/10, " Release of Radioactive Effluents Exceeding Selected Licensee Commitments," HP/0/B/1009/32. "O, Sh9 OEd: De= W:!:::!:=29. " Initial Response On-Shift Dose Assessment"#2 or HP/0/B/1009/20. " Manual Procedure for Offsite Dose Projections" to quantify a release.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, A UL i

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McGuire Nuclear Site ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT 4.3.U.2 Unexpected Increase in Plant Radiation or Airborne Concentration.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.U.2-1 Indication of uncontrolled water level decrease of greater than 6 inches in the reactor refueling cavity with all irradiated fuel assemblies remaining covered by water.

4.3.U.2-2 Uncontrolled water level decrease of greater than 6 inches in the spent fuel pool and fuel transfer canal with all irradiated fuel assemblies remaining covered by water.

4.3.U.2-3 Unplanned valid area radiation monitor (EMF) reading increases by a factor of 1000 over normal levels.

l BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

l All of the above events tend to have long lead times relative to potential for radiological l release outside the site boundary; thus, impact to public health and safety is very low.

In light of reactor cavity seal failure incidents, explicit coverage of these types of events via l EALs 1 and 2 is appropriate given their potential for increased doses to plant staff. A threshold value of 6 inches is used to allow time for mitigating actions to successfully terminate the inventory loss. Credit should not be taken for inventory additions to maintain  ;

level above the 6 inch threshold. Classification as an Unusual Event is warranted as a l precursor to a more serious event.

EAL 3 addresses unplanned increases in in-plant radiation levels that represent a degradation in the control of radioactive material, and represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant. This EAL escalates to an Alert if the increases impair safe operation.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-OO7, REV. 2, OU92, AU2 D2~7

McGuire Nuclear Site !

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT 4.3.A.1 Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds 200 Times the SLC limits for 15 Minutes or Longer.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All -

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

I 4.3.A.1-1 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-49H of 21.56E+03 cpm for 215 minutes or will likely continue for >l 5 minutes which indicates that the release may ,

have exceeded the initiatine condition and indicates the need to assess the release with crocedure HP/0/B/1009/10. HP/0/B/1009/429. or HP/0/B/1009/20.

4.3.A.1-2 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36L of t 3.00E+06 cpm for 215 minutes, or will likely continue for >l 5 minutes which indicates that the release may ,

I have exceeded the initiatine condition and indicates the need to assess the release with procedure HP/0/B/1009/10. HP/0/B/1009/M29. or HP/0/B/1009/20.

4.3.A.1-3 Gaseous effluent being released exceeds 200 times the level of SLC 16.11-1 for t 15 minutes as determined by RP procedure.

1 4.3.A.1-4 Liquid effluent being released exceeds 200 times the level of SLC 16.11-6 for 215  !

minutes as determined by RP procedure.

NOTE: If monitor reading is sustained for the time period indicated in the EAL AND the required assessments (procedure calculations) cannot be completed within this period, declaration must be made based on the valid radiation monitor reading.

BASIS:

The term " Unplanned", as used in this context, includes any release for which a liquid waste release (LWR) or gaseous waste release (GWR) package was not prepared, or a release that exceeds the conditions (e.g., ninimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm set points, etc.) on the applicable package.

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

D7. 8 i

g McGuire Nuclear Site This event escalates'from the Unusual Event by escalating the magnitude of the release by a factor of100.

It is not intended that the release be averaged over 15 minutes. The event should be declared as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 15 minutes.

The gaseous release rate SLC and Technical Specification (TS) are based on limiting gaseous release rates to the SITE BOUNDARY to 500 mr/ year total body.

The liquid release rate SLC and TS are based on limiting liquid release rates to the UNRESTRICTED AREA to 10 times the Efiluent Concentration (EC) valves given in 10CFR20.1001-20.2401, Appendix B, Table 2, Column 2.

Monitor indications am based on the methodology of the site Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). Annual average meteorology has been used. Radiation Protection will use HP/0/B/1009/10, " Release of Radioactive Efiluents Exceeding Selected Licensee Commitments," HP/0/B/1009/32. "^ . SF.T OE& D::: P::!: r." 29. " Initial Response On-Shift Dose Assessment." or HP/0/B/1009/20. " Manual Procedure for Offsite Dose Proiections" to quantify a release.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, AAI i

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McGuire Nuclear Site ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT 4.3.A.2 Major Damage to Irradiated Fuel or Loss of Water Level that Has or Will Result in the Uncovering ofIrradiated Tael Outside the Reactor Vessel.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.A.2-1 An unplanned valid trip II alarm on any of the following radiation monitors:

a. Spent Fuel Building Refueling Bridge IEMF-17 2 EMF-4

b. Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation IEMF-42 2 EMF-42

c. Reactor Building Refueling Bridge IEMF-16 2 EMF-3

d. Containment Noble Gas Monitors 1 EMF-39 2 EMF-39 i

4.3.A.2-2 Plant personnel report that water level drop in reactor refueling cavity, spent fuel pool, or fuel transfer canal has or will exceed makeup capacity such that any l .

irradiated fuel will become uncovered.

4.3.A.2-3 NC system wide range level < 358 inches after initiation of NC system make-up AND Any irradiated fuel assembly not capable of being lowered into spent fuel pool or reactor vessel AND KF-122 cannot be closed.

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McGuire Nuclear Site

-i BASIS: .

'Ihis IC applies to spent fuel requiring water coverage. There is time available to take l corrective actions, and there is little potential for substantial fuel damage. Thus, an Alert  !

Classification for this event is appropriate. Escalation,if appropriate, would occur via i Abnormal Rad Level / Radiological Ef11uent or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director  !

. Judgement. l i

EAL 2: Due to concerns for ALARA and nersonnel safety. oersonnel should not remain in .. I the area to observe that irradi='M fuel is uncovered. Personnel should exit the area as auickly j as nossible mad renort the occurrence to the Control Room. t I

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2. OU92, AA2 i 1

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McGuire Nuclear Site ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT 4.3.A.3 Release of Radioactive Material or Increases in Radiation Levels Within the Facility That Impedes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.A.31 Valid r^d!::!c c "c reading on EMF-12 E-d!= tin;; greater than 15 mR/hr in the eControl rRoom er P A.P.

4.3.A.3-2 Valid indication of radiation levels creater than 15 mR/hr in the Central Alarm Stajion (CAS) or Secondary Alarm Station (SAS).

U.A2 2 V:!!d =d!::!cn c-! cr -din;; cf'S Phr 5 2 p!=:"i* ! ::.

4.3.A.3-3 Radiation levels in areas reauirine infreauent access are such that tasks needed to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown cannot be performed within normal occupational exposure limits of 5 Rem ner year TEDE.

BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

This initiating condition (IC) addresses increased radiation levels that impede necessary access to operating stations, or other areas containing equipment that must be operated manually, in order to maintain safe operation or perform a safe shutdown. It is this impaired e.bility to operate the I

plant that results in the actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Radiation levels in the facility such that tasks cannot be performed without exceedinc 5 )

Rem ner year TEDE will impede access due to the need for a Planned Special Exposure or E]anned Emercency Exposure. This situation is indicative of a sienificant radiolocical nroblem that warrants additional resources to assess and miticate.

This IC is not intended to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g., incore

. detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, etc.)

The Control Room. CAS. and S AS are areas that reauire continuous occupancy. The value of 15 mR/hr is derived from the GDC 19 value of 5 Rem in 30 days with adiustment for expected oCeuDanCV times. I f

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REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, Oy92,333 t i

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McGuire Nuclear Site ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT SITE AREA EMERGENCY ,

4.3.S.1 Boundary Dose Resulting from an Actual or Imminent Release of Radioactivity Exceeds 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid i for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.S.1-1 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36H 2: 5.63 E +03 cpm sustained for

>15 minutes.

4.3.S.1-2 Dose assessment team calculations indicate dose consequences greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid at the site boundary.  ;

4.3.S.1-3 Analysis of field survey results or field survey samples indicates dose consequences greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid at the site boundary.

NOTE 1: These EMF readings are calculated based on average annual meteorology, a Sty ::::: ::!:r: d =t! site boundary dose rate. and design unit vent flow rate.

Calculations by the dose assessment team use actual meteorology, release duration, and unit vent flow rate. Therefore, these EMF readings should not be used if dose assessment team calculations are available.

NOTE 2: If dose assessment team calculations cannot be completed in 15 minutes, then valid monitor readings should be used for emergency classification.

HASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

, The 100 mrem integrated dose in this initiating condition is based on 10 CFR 20 annual average population exposure. This value also provides a desirable gradient (one order of magnitude) between the Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency classes. These values are 10% of the EPA Protective Action Guide (PAG) values given in EPA-400-R 001.

REFERENCE:

NUM4RC/NESP-007 REV. 2, OU92, ASI D3 'A

. McGuire Nuclear Site ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ,

GENERAL EMERGENCY 43.G.1 Boundary Dose Resulting from an Actual or Imminent Release of Radioactivity that Exceeds 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

43.G.1-1 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36112: 5.63 E +04 cpm sustained for

>l 5 minutes.

43.G.1-2 Dose assessment team calculations indicate dose consequences greater than 1000 ,

mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid at the site boundary, l 43.G.1-3 Analysis of field survey results or field survey samples indicates dose ,

I consequences greater than 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid at the site boundary.

NOTE 1: These EMF readings are calculated based on average annual meteorologya 6:y ::::: r62: dura:!:nsite boundary dose rate, and design unit vent flow rate.

Calculations by the dose assessment team use actual meteorology, release duration, and unit vent flow rate. Therefore, these EMF readings should not be used if dose assessment team calculations are available.

NOTE 2: If dose assessment team calculations cannot be completed in 15 minutes, then valid monitor readings should be used for emergency classification.

BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

The 1000 mrem TEDE and 5000 mrem CDE thyroid integrated doses are based on the EPA PAG values given in F.PA-400-R-92-001, which indicates that public protective actions are indicated if doses exceed these values. This is consistent with the emergency class description of a general emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007. REV. 2. 01/92. AGI D39

McGuire Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY '

4.4.A.I Failure of Reactor 4.4.S.I Failure of Reactor Protection 4.4.G.I Failure of the Reactor Protection System System Instrumentation to Protection System to Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Complete an Automatic Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Trip Trip and Manual Trip was Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Protection NOT Successful and There Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been is Indication of an Extreme System Setpoint lias Been Exceeded and Manual Trip Challenge to the Ability to Exceeded and Manual Trip Was NOT Successful Cool the Core Was Successful 4.4.A.2 Inability to Maintain Plant 4.4.S.2 Complete Loss of Function in Cold Shutdown Needed to Achieve or hgp Maintain liot Shutdown 4.4.S.3 Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessellhat lias or Will Uncover Fuelin the Reactor Vessel

l McGuire Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.4 LQSS OF SIIUTDOWN FUNCTIONS 4.4,A.1 Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded and Manual Trip Was Successful.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.4.A.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Valid reactor trip signal received or required and automatic reactor trio was not successful.

AND

b. Manual reactor trip from the control room is successful and reactor r--e is j less than 5% and decreasing. I l

l BASIS:

This condition indicates failure of the automatic protection system to trip the reactor. This condition is more than a potential degradation of a safety system in that a front line automatic protection system did not function in response to a plant transient and thus the plant safety has been compromised, and design limits of the fuel may have been exceeded. An Alen is indicated because conditions exist that lead to potential loss of fuel clad or NCS. Reactor protection system setpoint being exceeded (rather than limiting safety system setpoint being exceeded) is specified here because failure of the automatic protection system is the issue. A manual trip is any set of actions by the reactor operator (s) at the reactor control console which causes control rods to be RAPIDLY inserted into the core and brings the reactor suberitical. Operator action to drive rods does NOT constitute a reactor trip, i.e. does not meet the rapid insertion criterion.

Failure of manual trip would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUAbtRC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SA2 1

l D34 l

McGuire Nuclear Site LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS ,

ALERT 4A.A.2 Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown. .

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) ,

Mode 6 (Refueling)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS: ,

4.4.A.2 1 Total loss of Residual licat Removal (ND) and/or Nuclear Service Water (RN) and/or Component Cooling (KC) 4 AND One of the followiDI temperature below 200 F.

• Uncontrolled reactor coolant temocrature rise to >l80 F BASIS:

This EAL addresses loss of functions required for core cooling during cold shutdown and refueling conditions. This IC and associated EALs are based on concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, " Loss of Decay IIcat Removal." A number of phenomena such as pressurization, vortexing, steam generator U-tube draining, NCS level differences when operating at a mid-loop condition, decay heat removal system design, and level instrumentation problems can lead to conditions where decay heat removal is lost and core uncovery can occur. NRC analyses show that sequences that can cause core uncovery in 15 to 20 minutes and severe ccre damage within an hour after decay heat removal is lost.

Escalation to the Site Area Emergency is by, " Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That flas or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel," or by Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SA3 D17

McGuire Nuclear Site i

LOSS OF SilUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.4.S.1 Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded and Manual Trip Was NOT Successful.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.4.S.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Valid reactor trip signal received or required and automatic reactor trio was not successful.

AND 4

b. Manual reactor trip from the control room was not successful in reducing reactor power to less than 5% and decreasing.

BASIS:

Automatic and manual trip are not considered successful if action away from the reactor control console is required to trip the reactor. This EAL is equivalent to the Suberiticality CSF-RED.

Under these conditions, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems are designed. A Site Area Emergency is indicated because conditions exist that lead to imminent loss or potential loss of both fuel clad and NCS. Although this IC l may be viewed as redundant to the Fission Product Barrier Degradation IC, its inclusion is  !

necessary to better assure timely recognition and emergency response. Escalation of this event to a General Emergency would be via Fission Product Barrier Degradation or Emergency I Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement ICs. l l

REFERENCE:

NUMIRC/NESP-007, REV 2, OU92, SS2 l

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McGuire Nuclear Site j LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.4.S.2 Complete Loss of Function Needed to Achieve or Maintain Hot Shutdown. i OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) ,

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.4.S.2-1 Suberiticality CSF-RED 4.4.S.2-24 Core Cooling CSF-RED l 4.4.S.2-33 Heat Sink CSF-RED l 1A.S.2 2 Sd:?&c!hy CSF RED l BASIS:

This EAL addresses complete loss of functions, including ultimate heat sink and reactivity control, required for hot shutdown with the reactor at pressure and temperature. Under these conditions, there is an actual major failure of a system intended for protection of the public.

l Thus, declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted. Escalation to General Emergency would be via Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director )

Judgement, or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUAbtRC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, SS4 I

4 D39 i

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l McGuire Nuclear Site LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS l l

SITE AREA EMERGENCY i

4.4.SJ Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel i l

1 OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) )

Mode 6 (Refueling)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

1 4.4.SJ-1 a. Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown conditions. l l

AND

b. Lower range Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) decreasing after j initiation of NC system makeup. )

4.4.SJ-2 a. Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown conditions. ,

l AND

b. Reactor Coolant (NC) system narrow range level less than 6 inches and decreasing after initiation of NC system makeup.

4.4.SJ-3 a. Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown conditions.

A.ND

b. Either train ultrasonic level indication less than 6 inches and decreasing after initiation of NC system makeup.

BASIS:

Under the conditions specified by this IC, severe core damage may be imminent due to prolonged boiling following loss of decay heat removal.

Thus, declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted under the conditions specified by the IC. Escalation to a General Emergency is via radiological effluent IC. l

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, OU92. SSS l

D90 i

McGuire Nuclear Site LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.4.G.1 Failure of the Reactor Protection System to Complete an Automatic Trip and Manual Trip was NOT Successful and There is Indication of an Extreme Challenge to the Ability to Cool the Core.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.4.G.1-1 The following conditions exist-

a. Valid reactor trip signal received or required and automatic reactor trio was not successful.

AND

b. Manual reactor trip from the control room was not successful in reducing reactor power to less than 5% and decreasing.

AND

c. Either of the following conditions exist:

. Core Cooling CSF-RED e Heat Sink CSF-RED j HASIS Automatic and manual trip are not considered successful if action away from the reactor control I console is required to trip the reactor.

Under the conditions of this IC and its associated EALs, the efforts to bring the reactor suberitical have been unsuccessful and, as a result, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems were designed.

The extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core is intended to mean that the core exit temperatures are at or approaching 1200 F or that the reactor vessel water level is below the top of active fuel. This equates to a Core Cooling-RED condition.

D'M l

i McGuire Nuclear Site i

i i Another consideration is the inability to initially remove heat during the early stages of this  :

i sequence. If emergency feedwater flow is insufficient to remove the amount of heat required by  !

design from at least one steam generator, an extreme challenge should be considered to exist.  !

{ This equates to a Heat Sink-RED condition.

I In the event either of these challenges occurs during or following a time that the reactor has not  !

been brought below the power associated with the safety system design, core damage may be imminent. For this reason, the General Emergency declaration is intended to be anticipatory of  !

L the fission product barrier matrix declaration to permit maximum offsite intervention time. l i i

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, OH92, SG2 a  ;

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McGuire Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY '

4.5.U.I Loss of All Offsite Power to 4.5.A.1 Loss of All Offsite Power 4.5.S.I Loss of All Offsite Power 4.5.G.I Prolm3ed Loss of All Essential Busses for Greater and Loss of All Onsite AC and Loss of All Onsite AC (Offsite and Onsite) AC Than 15 Minutes Power to Essential Busses Power to Essential Busses Power During Cold ShutdowT Or Refueling Mode 4.5.U.2 Unplanned Loss of Required 4.5.A.2 AC power to essential 4.5.S.2 Loss of All Vital DC Pown DC Power During Cold busses reduced to a single Shutdown or Refueling power source for greater C Mode for Greater than 15 than 15 minutes such that 4 Minutes an additional single failure M could result in station blackout

- - _ _ _ _ . - -- . - _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ __ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ = _ - _ - _ - . _ - _ _ . - -

i McGuire Nuclear Site i

ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER UNUSUAL EVENT 4.5.U.1 Loss of All Offsite Power to Essential Busses for Greater Than 15 Minutes.

OPEP ^.T!NC ODE ^.PPL!C.^ S!L!TY: .^.!! l EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.U.1-1 OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startun)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

The followirig conditions exist:

a. Loss of offsite power to essential buses ETA and ETB for greater than 15 minutes.

AND 4

b. Bp_thEseh emergency diesel generators isgg supplying power to theirke respective essential busse _s.

4.5.U.1-2 OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueline)

No Mode (Defueled)

The followinn conditions exist:

a. Loss of offsite power to essential buses ETA and ETB for creater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. One emergency diesel cenerator is supolving power to its respective essential bus.

D49 4

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. i McGuire Nuclear Site '

I  :

BASIS: _;

Prolonged loss of AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level'of safety of the plant by rendering the plant more vulnerable to a complete Loss of AC Power (Station Blackout). When in cold shutdown. refuelina. or defueled mode the event can be 3 classified as an Unusual Event. because of the sinnificantly reduced decav heat. lower i t temperature and oresswe. incra=ino the time to restore one of the ascential busces_ relative to l

that soecified for the Alert EAL The event will escalate to an Alert in these modes if both ' i essential busses are lost. -Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or  :

momentary power losses.' l

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY, 2, OU92, SUI j

. 5 i

i f

4 4  !

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- ,w McGuire Nuclear Site LOSS OF POWER UNUSUAL EVENT 4.5.U.2 Unplanned Loss of Required DC Power During Cold Shutdown or Refueling Mode for Greater than 15 Minutes.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode $ (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueling)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.U.2-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Unplanned loss of both unit related EVDA and EVDD busses as indicated by bus voltage less than 110 VDC.

AND

b. Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes from the time ofloss.

BASIS:

The purpose of this IC and its associated EALs is to recognize a loss of DC power compromising the ability to monitor and control the removal of decay heat during Cold Shutdown or Refueling operations. This EAL is intended to be anticipatory in as much as the operating crew may not have necessary indication and control of equiprnent needed to respond to the loss.

" Unplanned" is included in this IC and EAL to preclude the declaration of an emergency as a result of planned maintenance activities.

If this loss results in the inability to maintain cold shutdown, the escalation to an Alert is via

" Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown."

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, SU7 D45

4 McGuire Nuclear Site LOSS OF POWER ALERT 4.5.A.1 Loss of All Offsite Power and Len of Ail Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses During Cold Shutdown Or Refueling Mode.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueling)

No Mode (Defueled)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL: t 4.5.A.1-1 Loss of all offsite and onsite AC power as indicated by:

a. Loss of power on essential buses ETA and ETB.

AND l l

b. Failure to restore power to at least one essential bus within 15 minutes.

BASIS:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including Residual Heat Removal (R11R), Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS), Containment Heat Removal, Spent Fuel Heat Removal and the Ultimate 11 eat Sink. When in cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode the event can be classified as an Alert, because of the significantly reduced decay heat, lower temperature and pressure, increasing the time to restore one of the essential busses, relative to that specified for the Site Area Emergency EAL. Escalating to Site Area Emergency, if appropriate, is by Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement ICs. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, sal l

b4(.

McGuire Nuclear Site LOSS OF POWER I ALERT 4.5.A.2 AC power to essential busses reduced to a single power source for greater than 15 minutes such that an additional single failure could result in station blackout.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.A.2-1 The following condition exists:

AC power capability has been degraded to one essential bus powered from a single power source for > 15 min. due to the loss of all but one of:

SATA SATB ATC ATD D/G A D/G B BASIS:

This IC and the associated EAL is intended to provide an escalation from IC, " Loss of All Offsite ,

Power To Essential Busses for Greater Than 15 Minutes." The condition indicated by this IC is the degradation of the offsite and onsite power systems such that an additional single failure could result in a station blackout. This condition could occur due to a loss of offsite power with a concurrent failure of one emergency generator to supply power to its essential busses. Another related condition could be the loss of all offsite power and loss of onsite emergency diesels with ,

only one train of essential busses being back fed from the unit main generator, or the loss of onsite emergency diesels with only one train of essential busses being back fed from offsite power. The subsequent loss of this single power source would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency in accordance with IC, " Loss of All Offsite and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to ,

Essential Busses."  ;

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY 2, 01/92, SA5 DC

i McGuire Nuclear Site ,

LOSS OF POWER j SITE AREA EMERGENCY j 4.5.S.1 Loss of All Offsite Power and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

, Mode 4 (Het Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.S.1-1 Loss of all offsite and onsite AC power as indicated by:

a. Loss of power on essential buses ETA and ETB. ,

AND

b. Failure to restore power to at least one essential bus within 15 minutes.

BASIS:

i Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. Prolonged loss of all AC power will cause core uncovering and loss of containment integrity; thus, this event can escalate to a General Emergency.

Escalation to General Emergency is via Fission Product Barrier Degradation or IC, " Prolonged Loss of All Offsite Power and Prolonged Loss of All Onsite AC Power."

REFERENCE:

NUhuRC/NESP-007, REV 2, OU92, SSI i

DH8

McGuire Nuclear Site LOSS OF POWER SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.5.S.2 Loss of All Vital DC Power.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) ,

l EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.S.2-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Unp!=:d ! Loss of both unit related EVDA and EVDD busses as indicated l i by bus voltage less than 110 VDC.

AND I

b. Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes  !

from the time ofloss.

BASIS:

I Loss of all DC power compromises ability to monitor and control plant safety functions.

Prolonged loss of all DC power will cause core uncovci;ng ud ;.. cf cweinment integrity when there is significant decay heat and sensible heat in the reactor system. Escalation to General Emergency would occur by Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement ICs. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses. ,

REFERENCE:

NUMtRC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 0H92, SS3 be

McGuire Nuclear Site .

LOSS OF POWER GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.5.G.! Prolonged Loss of All(Offsite and Onsite) AC Power.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup) l Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) l l

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.G.1-1 Prolonged loss of all offsite and onsite AC power as indicated by:

a. Loss of power on essential buses ETA and ETB for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) fails to sucolv'c =dn'd: het c'.:-eyEC oumo seal iniection OR CA sunoly to steam cenerators AND

c. At least one of the following conditions exist:

• Restoration of at least one essential bus within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is NOTlikely. -

• Indication of continuing degradation of core cooling based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring. j BASIS:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sirl. Prolonged loss of all those functions necessary to maintain hot shutdown will lead to loss of fuel clad, NCS, and containment.

The SSF is capable of providing the necessary functions (reactor coolant numo seal iniection and auxiliary feedwater sunoly to the steam cenerators) to maintain a hot shutdown condition for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. No fission product barrier degradation would be expected if the SSF is functioning 1

as intended.

D50

McGuire Nuclear Site Analysis in support of the station blackout coping study indicates that tne plant can cope with a station blackout for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> without core damage.

The likelihood of restoring at least one essential bus should be based on a realistic appraisal of the situation since a delay in an upgrade decision based on only a chance of mitigating the event could result in a loss of valuable time in preparing and implementing public protective actions.

l in addition, under these conditions, fission product barrier monitoring capability may be degraded. Although it may be difficult to predict when power can be restored, it is necessary to ,

give the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director a reasonable idea of how quickly (s)he may need l to declare a General Emergency based on two major considerations:

l. Are there any present indications that core cooling is already degraded to the point that Loss l

or Potential Loss of Fission Product Barriers is IMMINENT 7

2. If there are no present indications of such core cooling degradation, how likely is it that  ;

power can be restored in time to assure that a loss of two barriers with a potential loss of the )

l third barrier can be prevented?

Thus, indication of continuing core cooling degradation must be based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring with particular emphasis on Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director judgement as it relates to IMMINENT Loss or Potential Loss of fission product barriers and degraded ability to monitor fission product barriers.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007. REV. 2, OU92, SGI D5\

McGuire Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE / EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY l 4.6.U.I Fire = Eg'n!= Within 4.6.A.I Fire or Explosion AITecting 4.6.S.1 Security Event in a Plant 4.6.G.I Security Event Resulting in Protected Area Boundary the Operability of Plant Vital Area Loss Of Ability to Reach-Not Extinguished Within 15 Safety Systems Required to and Maintain Cold Minutes of - Establish or Maintain Safe ShuMown Detection or Explosion Shutdown Within the Protected Area Boundary 4.6.U.2 Confirmed Security Event 4.6.A.2 Fire or Explosion Affecting Which Indicates a Potential the Operability of Plant Degradation in the Level of Safety Systems Required to Safety of the Plant Establish or Maintain Safe O Shutdown Ul 4.6.A.3 Security Event in a Plant Protected Area

McGuire Nucl ar Site ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE / EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT 4.6.U.1 Fire = E:;!:i: Within Protected Area Boundary Not Extinguished Within 15 Minutes of Detection or Explosion Wwithin the Protected Area Boundary.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.6.U.1-1 Fire in any of the following areas not extinguished within 15 minutes of control room notification or verification of a control room fire alarm.

- Reactor Building

- Auxiliary Building Diesel Generator Rooms

- Control Room )

- Safe Shutdown Facility (SSF) .

l Central Alarm Station (CAS)

- Secondary Alann Station (SAS)

Doghouses

• Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST)

- Turbine Building 1

- Service Building

- Interim Radwaste Building

- Eauipment Stanine Buildine I

4.6.U.1-2 Report by plant personnel of an unanticipated explosion within protected area boundary resulting in visible damage to permanent structure or equipment.

BASIS:

EAL 1: The purpose of this EAL is to address the magnitude and extent of fires that may be potentially significant precursors to damage to safety systems. Fire is combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required if i

large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. This excludes such items as fires within administration buildings outside the protected area. Waste-basket fires, and other small fires of no safety consequence should easily be extinguished within 15 minutes of detection. This IC applies to buildings and areas contiguous to plant vital areas or other significant buildmgs or l

D63

McGuire Nuclear Site areas. Nerification of the alarm in this context means those actions taken in the control room to determine that the r ontrol room alarm is 'not spurious. ,

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._ _.4 ..._ _ _ _ , . . . _ . - , . _ , . , . _ . . _ . . ~ . . _ _ . _ . , . _ . _ . _ . . . . _ _ . .. . . . _ . , . . , _ _ .

McGuire Nuclear Site EAL 2: Only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment within the protected area should be considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. No attempt is made in this EAL to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The occurrence of the explosion with reports of evidence of damage (e.g., deformation, scorching) is sufficient for declaration. The Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director also needs to consider any security aspects of the explosion, if applicable.

l Escalation to a higher emergency class is by, " Fire or Explosion Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown".

REFERENCE:

NUAfARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, HU2 l

l l

DS9

McGuire Nuclear Site FIRE / EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT 4.6.U.2 Confirmed Security Event Which Indicates a Potential Degradation in the Level of Safety of the Plant.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.6.U.2-1 Security confirmed bomb device discovered within plant Protected Area and outside Vital Areas.

4.6.U.2-2 Hostage situation / extortion 4.6.U.2-3 A violent civil disturbance within the owner controlled area.

BASIS:

The above situations represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant.

A civil disturbance is to be considered violent when force has been used in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage plant property.

REFERENCE:

NUAL4RC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, HU4 D55

McGuire Nuclear Site FIRF/ EXPLOSION AND SECIIRITY EVENTS ALERT 4.6.A.1 Fire or Explosion Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICAHILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueling)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.6.A.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Fire or explosion in any of the following areas:

• Reactor Building

- Auxiliary Building

• Diesel Generator Rooms

. Control Room

- SSF i

. CAS l I

. SAS Doghcu r

. FWST

• Dochouses ( Applies in Mode 1. 2. 3. 4 only) l AND

b. One of the following:

• Affected safety system parameter indications show degraded performance

• Plant personnel report visible damage to permanent structures or equipment within the specified area. i Note: Only one train of a system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy this condition.  !

l D54 I

McGuire Nuclear Site BASIS:

With regard to explosions, only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment required for safe operation within the identified plant area should be considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. Fire is combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of >

smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires.

Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required iflarge quantities of smoke and heat are observed. The inclusion of a " report of visible damage" should not be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification.

The key to classifying fires / explosions as an Alert is the damage as a result of the incident. The fact that safety-related equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit has been affected or damaged as a result of the fire / explosion is the driving force for declaring the Alert. It is ,

important to note that this EAL addresses a fire / explosion and not just the degradation of a safety system. The reference to damage of the systems is used to identify the magnitude of the fire / explosion and to discriminate against minor fires / explosions.

Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Efiluent, or l Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, HA2 l

D57

1 l

l

! McGuire Nuclear Site FIRF/ EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT 4.6.A.2 Fire or Explosion Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: No Mode (DefueledWed: 5 (C:!d Sh::d=- :)

• hd: 6 (R:ft:!!:;;)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.6.A.2-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Fire or explosion in any of the following areas:

l

. P :::::B !!dingSnent Fuel Pool

- Auxiliary Building DI:::! C:::::::: Rec =

Cc-:: ' Re m SSF CAS

, CAC F"!ST AND

b. One of the following:

• AT::::d :f::y re,::= p =::::::dientic:: Snent Fue) Pool 1evel and/or temperature show degraded performance, e Plant personnel report visible damage to permanent structures or equipment suonortine Spent Fuel Pool coolinee !'- th: :p::!E:d 2:::.

d l

Note: Only one train of a system needs to be afTected or damaged in order to satisfy this condition.

BASIS:

In a Defueled condition. the niant safety systems ofinterest are those that suonort Spent Fuel Pool inventory and cooline.

D56

McGuire Nuclear Site With regard to explosions, only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment required for safe operation within the identified plant area should be considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. Fire is combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. - l l

l b58 o-

McGuire Nuclear Site  ;

Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required iflarge quantities of smoke and heat are observed. The inclusion of a " report of visible damage" should not be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification.

The key to classifying fires / explosions as an Alert is the damage as a result of the incident. The fact that safety-related equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit has been affected or damaged as a result of the fire / explosion is the driving force for declaring the Alert. It is important to note that this EAL addresses a fire / explosion and not just the degradation of a safety system. The reference to damage of the systems is used to identify the magnitude of the fire / explosion and to discriminate against minor fires / explosions.

Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement ICs. ,

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OH92, HA2 l

l 1

D5%

McGuire Nuclear Site

- FIRE / EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT 4.6.A.3 Security Event in a Plant Protected Area.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL: .

4.6.A.3-1 Intrusion into plant protected area by a hostile force.

BASIS:

Tleis class of security events represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in the Lnusual Event. A civil disturbance which penetrates the protected area boundary can be considered a hostile force. Intrusion into a vital area by a hostile force will escalate this event to  ;

a Site Area Emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, OU92, HA4 ,

T 6

D40 ,

McGuire Nuclear Site FIRE / EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.6.S.1 Security Event in a Plant Vital Area.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.6.S.1-1 Intrusion into any of the following plant areas by a hostile force:

• Reactor Building

• Auxiliary Building

• Diesel Generator Rooms

- Control Room

- SSF

- Doghouses ,

• CAS SAS 4.6.S.1-2 Security confirmed bomb discovered / exploded in a vital area.

]

l 4.6.S.1-3 Security confirmed sabotage in a plant vital area. j BASIS:

This class of security events represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in the Alert IC in that a hostile force has progressed from the Protected Area to the Vital Area.

REFERENCE:

NUAfARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, HSI j

l D (o I

McGuire Nuclear Site 9

FIRE / EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.6.G.1 Security Event Resulting in Loss Of Ability to Reach and Maintain Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY:- All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.6.G.1-1 Loss of physical control of the control room due to security event.

4.6.G.1-2 Loss of physical control of the SSF and Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (ASP) due to security event. .

BASIS: ,

This IC encompasses conditions under which a hostile force has taken physical control of vital area required to reach and maintain safe shutdown.  :

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 0U92, HG1 i i

O G '2.

McGuire Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.7.U.I Natural and Destructive 4.7.A.1 Natural and Destructive 4.7.S.I Control Room Evacuation 4.7.G.1 Other Conditions Existing Phenomena Affecting the Phenomena Affecting the Has Been Initiated and Which in the Judgement of Protected Area Plant Vital Area Plant Control Cannot Be the Emergency Established Coordinator / EOF Director Warrant Declaration of General Emergency 4.7.U.2 Release of Toxic or 4.7.A.2 Release of Toxic or 4.7.S.2 Other Cc,ditions Existing Flammable Gases Deemed Flammable Gases Within a Which in the Judgement of Detrimental to Safe Facility Structure Which the En rgency Operation of the Plant Jeopardizes Operation of Coordinator / EOF Director C Systems Required to  % ammt Declaration of Site O Maintain Safe Operations Area Emergency W or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown 4.7.U.3 Other Conditions Existing 4.7.A.3 Control Room Evacuation Which in the Judgement of IIas Been Initiated the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Unusual Event 4.7.A.4 Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Alert

McGuire Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT 4.7.U.1 Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Protected Area.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.7.U.1-1 Tremor felt and valid alarm on the " strong motion accelerograph".

4.7.U.1-2 Tremor felt and valid alarm on the " Peak shock annunciator".

4.7.U.1-3 Report by plant personnel of tornado striking within protected area boundary.

4.7.U.1-4 Vehicle crash into plant structures or systems within protected area boundary.

4.7.U.1-5 Report of turbine failure resulting in casing penetration or damage to turbine or generator seals.

BASIS:

The protected area boundary is typically that part within the security isolation zone and is defined in the site security plan.

EALs 1&2: Damage may be caused to some portions of the site, but should not affect ability of safety functions to operate. Method of detection can be based on instrumentation, validated by a reliable source, or operator assessment. As defined in the EPRI-sponsored " Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake", dated October 1989, a " felt earthquake" is:

An earthquake of sufficient intensity such that: (a) the vibratory ground motion is felt at the nuclear plant site and recognized as an earthquake based on a consensus of control room operators, and (b) valid alarm on seismic instrumentation occurs.

EAL 3: A tornado striking (touching down) within the protected boundary may have potentially damaged plant structures containing functions or systems required for safe shutdown of the plant.

If such damage is confirmed visually or by other in-plant indications, the event may be escalated to Alert.

DA

h McGuire Nuclear Site EAL 4: Addresses such items as a car, truck, plane, helicopter, or train crash that may potentially damage plant structures containing functions and systems required for safe shutdown of the plant. If the crash is confirmed to affect a plant vital area, the event may be escalated to Alert.  !

EAL 5: Addresses main turbine rotating component failures of sufficient magnitude to cause  ;

observable damage to the turbine casing or to the seals of the turbine generator. Of major concern is the potential for leakage of combustible fluids (lubricating oils) and gases (hydrogen cooling) to the plant environs. Actual fires and flammable gas build up are appropriately classified via other EALs. This EAL is consistent with the definition of an Unusual Event while maintaining the anticipatory nature desired and recognizing the risk > non-safety related equipment. Escalation of the emergency classification is based on potential damage done by the i

missiles generated by the failure or by the radiological releases in conjunction with a steam generator tube mpture. These latter events would be classified by the Radiological ICs or Fission Product Barrier ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUAfARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, OU92, HU1 NOTE: NUAfARC EAL #5 moved to Fire / Security Recognition Category I

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McGuire Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT 4.7.U.2 Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Deemed Detrimental to Safe Operation of the Plant. .

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.7.U.2-1 Report or detection of toxic or flammable gases that could enter within the site area boundary in amounts that can affect safe operation of the plant.

4.7.U.2-2 Report by Local, County or State Officials for potential evacuation of site personnel based on offsite event.

BASIS:

This IC is based on releases in concentrations within the site boundary that will affect the health of plant personnel or the safe operation of the plant with the plant being within the evacuation area of an offsite event (i.e., tanker truck accident releasing toxic gases, etc.).

Gases within the owner con: rolled area that are below life threatening or flammable concentrations do not meet this EAL.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, HU3 D6G

McGuire Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. IIAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT 4.7.UJ Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Unusual Event.

. OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.UJ-I Other conditions exist which in the judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

HASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Einergency Coordinator / EOF Director to fall under the Unusual Event emergency class.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, OU92, HUS l

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P McGuire Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT 4.7.A.1 Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Plant Vital Area.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.7.A.1-1 Valid "OBE Exceeded" Alarm on 1 AD-13.E7 V:!M :ir!: r:6=!:= g:rt i= i: ep:=:!n;; 5=!: ::-hq"-5 (OSE):

0.08 ;; h=!=n' .'

OR 0.053 g :: & 2!.

4.7.A.1-2 Tornado or high winds:  ;

Tornado striking plant structures within the vital area  !

- Reactor Building 1

- Auxiliary Buildinn  !

- Refueling Water Storane Tank (FWST)

- Diesel Generator Rooms

- Control Room

- Safe Shutdown Facility (SSF)

- Dochouses

- Central Alarm Station (CAS)

. Secondary Alarm Station (SAS)

I OR l sustained winds > 60 mph for > 15 minutes.

4.7.A.1-3 Turbine failure generated missiles, vehicle crashes or other catastrophic events causing visible structural damage on any of the following plant structures:

• Reactor Building

• Auxiliary Building

- Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST)

Diesel Generator Rooms j

- Control Room

- Safe Shutdown Facility (5SF)

Doghouses ,

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McGuire Nuclear Site Central Alarm Station (CAS)

. Secondary Alarm Station (SAS)

.- Ultimate Heat Sink (Standby Nuclear Services Wwater Pond Dara and -

Dikes and Cowan's Ford Dam and Associated Dikes)

BASIS:  ;

L EAL 1: Based on fhe FSAR design basis. Seismic events of this magnitude (> OBE) can cause damage to safety functions.

EAL 2: Based on the available instrumentation and the FSAR design basis. Wind loads of this magnitude can cause damage to safety functions.  ;

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- . , . . . - ~ _ _ _ - - _ _ . . - . . . = . . . - . . . - . . . _ - - - . . - -. ... .-

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l McGuire Nuclear Site EAL 3: This EAL is intended to address the threat to safety related structures or equipment from  !

uncontrollable and possibly catastrophic events. This list of areas includes areas containing safety-related equipment, their controls, and their power supplies. This EAL is, therefore, consistent with the definition of an ALERT in that if events have damaged areas containing safety-related equipment the potential exists for substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

REFERENCE:

NUhuRC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, IM1  ;

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I McGuire Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS i AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY l

, ALERT 4.7.A.2 Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Within a Facility Structure Which  ;

Jeopardizes Operation cf Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.7.A.2-1 Report or detection of toxic gases within a Facility Structure in concentrations that

, will be life threatening to plant personnel.

4.7.A.2-2 Report or detection of flammable gases within a Facility Structure in concentrations that will affect the safe operation of the plant.

Structures for above EALs:

• Reactor Building

. Auxiliary Building

. Diesel Generator Rooms

. Control Room

. SSF ,

. Doghouses

. CAS

. . SAS BASIS:

This IC is based on gases that have entered a plant structure affecting the safe operation of the plant. Safe operations are affected when the area can not be accessed by plant personnel to ensure continued operability or availability of safety systems / components. This IC applies to buildings and areas contiguous to plant Vital Areas or other significant buildings or areas. The intent of this IC is not to include buildings (i.e., warehouses) or other areas that are not contiguous or immediately adjacent to plant Vital Areas. It is appropriate that increased ,

monitoring be done to ascertain whether consequential damage has occurred. Escalation to a i higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product I

Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels / Radioactive Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement ICs.

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REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, HA3 D1Os

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McGuire Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS

• AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ,

ALERT 4.7.AJ Control Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated. i OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

":^- ^r 4.7.A3-1 Control Room evacuation has been initiated oer AP/l(2)/A/5500/17. r i: :or:: ! :: r. =d :=:::: !:, : i: i- 1: p::::= cf bein;;, :=5!!d:d f:cr i: '

^ =i!!- j E5:Mc - Px::(ASP) :i: SEF BASIS: 7 1

With the control room evacuated, additional support, monitoring and direction through the Technical Support Center and/or Emergency Operations Facility is necessary. Inability to establish plant control from outside the control room, as evidenced by the inability to maintain NCS or SG inventories, will escalate this event to a Site Area Emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 0092, HAS l

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l McGuire Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT S AFETY ALERT 4.7.A.4 Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Alert.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.A.4-1 Other conditions exist which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director indicate that plant safety systems may be degraded and that increased ,

monitoring of plant functions is warranted.

BASIS: ,

l This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but l that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the 1 Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director to fall under the Alert emergency class.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, HA6 I

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McGuire Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.7.S.1 Control Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated and Plant Control Cannot Be Established.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.S.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Control room evacuation has been initiated oer AP/l(2VA/5500/17. l 4

AND ,

b. Control of the plant cannot be established from the ASP or the SSF within 15 minutes.

BASIS:

The timely transfer of control to alternate control areas has not been accomplished. This failure to transfer control would be evidenced by deteriorating reactor coolant system or steam generator parameters. For purposes of classification, the 15 minutes begins at the time that the ,

determination to staff the alternate location is made. For most conditions, Reactor Coolant Pump i seal LOCAs or steam generator dryout would be indications of failure to accomplish the transfer in the necessary tim:e.

Escalation of this event, if appropriate, would be by Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Efiluent, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director ,

Judgement ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, HS2 D73  ;

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McGuire Nuclear Site 1 NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS  ;

AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY  !

SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.7.S.2 Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Warrant Declaration of Site Area Emergency.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.S.2-1 Otbr conditions exist which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Direc.;3r indicate actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protectic/, of the public.

BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director to fall under the emergancy class description for Site Area Emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV, 2, OU92, HS3 i

McGuire Nucleu Site ,

NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS '

AFFECTING PLANT 3AFETY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.7.G.1 Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgement of the Emergency ,

Coordinator / EOF Director Warrant Declaration of General Emergency. j OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.G.1-1 Other conditions exist which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director indicate: (1) actual or imminent substantial core degradation with potential for loss of containment, or (2) potential for uncontrolled radionuclide releases. These releases can reasonably be expected to exceed Environmental Protection Agency Protective Action Guideline levels outside the site boundary.

i BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director to fall under the General Emergency class.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2. OU92. HG2 D7 5

1 ATTACHMENT 4 Revised McGuire Emergency Plan-Section D pages f without Revision Marks i

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McGuire Nuclear Sita l

D. EMFRGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM j Regulatory Guide 1.101, Rev. 3, August 1992, approved the guidance provided by NUMARC/NESP-007, Revision 2, as an alternative methodology for the development of Emergency Action Levels. McGuire Nuclear Site will use the NUMARC guidance for the development ofinitiating conditions and emergeny action levels.

The emergency classification system utilizes four categories for classification of  ;

emergency events. j D.I.a UNUSUAL EVENT 1

l Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs. i 1

The purpose of this class is to provide notification of the emergency to the station .

]

staff, State and Local Government representatives, and the NRC.

Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are ,

provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D4. l l

D.I.b ALERT l Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential ,

4 substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are  !

expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline  !

exposure levels. ,

! The purpose of this class is to assure that emergency personnel are readily

available to:

1. Activate the onsite response centers

2. Respond if the situation becomes more serious or to perform confirmatory '

radiation monitoring if required

3. Provide offsite authorities current status information Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D4.

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_.___ _y McGuire Nuclear Site l D.I.c. SITE AREA EMERGENCY  :

,i Events ar'e in process or have occurred which invol"e actual or likely major failures l ofplant functions needed for protection of the public. Any releases are not i expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action I

Guideline exposure levels except near the site boundary.

~ The purpose of the Site Area Emergency is to: j

1. Activate the offsite response centets i

2. Assure that monitoring teams are mobilized  ;

3. Assure that personnel required M taking protective actions of near site areas are at duty stations should the situation become more serious. 3

4. Provide current information to the public and be available for consultation 1 with offsite authorities Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D4. ..

D.I.d. GENERAL EMERGENCY Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

The purpose of the General Emergency is to:

1. Initiate predetermined protective actions for the public

2. Provide continuous assessment ofinformation from onsite and offsite '

measurements

3. Initiate additional measures as indicated by event releases or potential releases

4. Provide current information to the public and be available for consultation with offsite authorities Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D4.

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McGuira Nuclear Site D.2. INITIATING CONDITIONS The initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency actions levels are contained in the BASIS document beginning on page D4. A classification procedure (RP/0/A/5700/00) will be used to classify events as they occur. Specific response procedures are in place which delineate the required response during the appropriate classif; cation.

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Enclosure 4.1 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX McGuire Nuclear Sito Use EALs to determine Fission Product Barner status (Intact, Potential Loss, or Loss). Add points for all 3 barriers. Classify according to the table below Note 1: This table is only apphcable in Modes 1-4.

Note 2: Also, an event (or multiple events) could occur which results in tha conclusion that exceeding the Loss or Potential Loss thresholds is IMMINENT (i e., within 1-3 hours). In this IMMINENT LOSS situation, use judgement and classify as if the thresholds are exceeded unusual Event (1 - 3 Pointal Alert (4 - 6 Points) Site Area Emonsoncy (7 - 10 Pakits) General Emergency (11 - 13 Pointsi

. Any Potential Loss of Containment . Any Potential Loss or Loss of the . Loss of both NCS and Fuel Ctad . Loss of all tfwee bemers NCS

. Any Loss of Contarvnent . Any Potent:a6 Loss or Loss of Fuel . Potential Loss of both NCS and Fuel . Loss of any two bamers and the Ciad Clad Potential Loss of the thwd bamer

. Potential Loss of either the NCS or Fuel Clad and Loss of any additenal bamer CONTAINMENT BARRIER NCS BARRIER FUEL CLAD BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS- LOSS-(3 Point (s)) POTENTIAL LOSS- LOSS -(5 Point (s)) POTENTIAL LOSS- LOSS-(5 Point (s))

(1 Point (s)) (4 Point (s)) (4 Point (s))

.c tCmca same r.maan s= t Cram se r=ic== se t Cnacs se r ncien stan-

. cm.,=,. mo . Na wense . Ncsin vvy= . me . core c.*ngo.ge . cm c *ngr.d

. nea s,*ad . nea s =

2. Contanment Condsons 1 NCS Laak Rme 2. Pnmanr Codad Ac2vey Level

. Contanrrent Presswa > 15 . Rapd wegumf decrease m . Urusdatte leak emmedmg to . GREATER DMN avalable . Not argicaNo . Codant Activty GREATER PSC, contanment presswa Noumg capacey W one chagng pwg makeS capauty a6 r@cated DMN 300 pCar Oose rutd acrease in1he normd chargeg erode ty aloss d NCS subcochng Eqmvasnt toene(DEI)k131

. H2 concentahon > 9% weletioun adated

. cont.no -or sw,

. Contamert presswe greaser neve response atconsstent the 3 psg + tess tie one we toCA conetons U tan d Ns and a VX4 ARF operalmg

ENCLOSURE 4.1 McGuire Nuclear Site FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRlX CONTAINMENT BARR!ER NCS BARRIER FUEL CLAD BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS- LOSS-(3 Point (s)) POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS-(5 Point (s)) POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(5 Point (s))

(1 Point (s)) (4 Point (s)) (4 Point (s))

1 Caetaanse halene Yahes Stanas Aihr rmannsamt hniaann kauann 1 SG Tds Nphre I 1 Omdammme Radatna tinnamag

• Nat appmete e Cateveert emarm e e PnmrybSaxnsry tem rm o htcanon tus a SG s e its apphcatse o Contsrurt reakm maner euxmstate se a resesse pam eoseds t.capasty of one RLqased sul has a h 51 A or $19 reseng $117 Rk kom m est esas cftsyng pur'yatonumal luulehde seamdury his hit dwyng nude se been=n acaded e inscaban sia a SG s su;swed amt a grtscryped release d cananmant seamery coatze e acewmgimrn me aflected SG t to enwonment 4 SG Seamdary Sea Ralmaus We Pnmary bSacander iaskans 4 Canemnnmut Rahem hkrutanna LLms;gulafagidsakuTT Drecer Judgems:1 e W mger e e Reinsse d secundary asse e e Not apphcatWe o Nat appicatie

• Any W mcludsig matdny b enmah me bamer. Dat a to corum almosphere me pretary e af to Emagmcy ConninskrEW Drucer indcases LOSS er secondary leakage GREATER POTENTIAL LOSS d me nas dat tuer.

THAN Tech Spec aAmestde 5 Sardcard Radmar.sva invenenriIn Contanmord i Emergency CounnapartM Dreckr Jwigernant O . C m me,. Rad r e W caue . An,am o, m ww.yt m arton es mt. -

Y EW51 A or 518 et to Enurgerry Coordnatr EN Dem*r tecans LOSS or W G tme asus POTENTM LOSS d me NCS temer.

se

> 470R3r 0 o 0 5 tr

> 170 RAr 0 05 2 tr

> 125 RMr @ 2 4 hr

> 90 Rhr @ 4 4 tr

> 53 R,hr g a $ hr

_ . . _ . - . _ - .2.______-_____-__ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _____2_.r + 2___ __

ENCLOSURE O.1 McGuire Nuclear Site FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX CONTAINMENT BARRIER NCS BARRIER FUEL CLAD BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(3 Point (s)) POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS-(5 Point (s)) POTENTIAL LOSS- LOSS-(5 Point (s))

(1 Point (s)) (4 Point (s)) (4 Point (s))

t roe cosmo

. ca.cmAne -REo pam . . nm asecaen edcsand tr > 15 mrt

7. Ememancy Coodnaar FEN Dramr Jdpumard

. Ary canetan. rdudme mawy a noner me be=r. te e se aprum of to Emrgency CardnatrEW Dncts edesans LOSS or ,

POTENTIAL LOSS af to contanment baner. +

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McGuire Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.1 BASIS INFORMATION FOR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER REFERENCE TABLE CONTAINMENT HARRIER EALs: (1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7)

The Containment Barrier includes the containment building, its connections up to and including the outermost containment isolation valves. This barrier also includes the main steam, feedwater, and blowdown line extensions outside the containment building up to and including the outermost secondary side isolation valve.

Critical Safety Function (CSF) indications are not meant to include transient alarm conditions which may appear during the start-up of engineered safeguards equipment. A CSF condition is satisfied when the alarmed state is valid and sustained.

4.1.C.1 Critical Safety Function Status Containment - RED indicates containment conditions which may challenge the containment integrity. Therefore, this condition represents a potential loss of the containment barrier.

There is no " Loss" EAL associated with this item.

4.1.C.2 Containment Conditions Containment pressure above 15 psig (the design pressure) indicates that the containment or its heat removal systema are not functioning as intended. This degradation of containment pressure control represents a potential loss of containment integrity.

A containment hydrogen concentration of 9 volume percent is sufficient to expect that any ignition would result in complete combustion of the hydrogen in containment and a significant pressure rise. At some initial containment pressures, this pressure rise may exceed the capacity of the containment. Therefore, this level of hydrogen in the containment represents a potential loss of containment integrity.

Containment heat removal systems are actuated at the high-high containment pressure setpoint of 3 psig. At least one train of Containment Spray (NS) and one Containment Air (VX) Retum Fan (CARF) should be actuated at that time (the CARF with a 10 minute delay). A failure to actuate the design basis heat removal capability D1

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or assure proper containment mixing represents a degradation in the control of the l containment conditions. Therefore, this situation represents a potential loss of I containment integrity. l I

Rapid unexplained loss of pressure (i.e., not attributable to containment spray or l condensation effects) following an initial pressure increase indicates a loss of )

containment integrity. j i

Containment pressure and sump levels should increase as a result of the mass and energy release into containment from a L-oss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). Thus, sump level or containment pressure not increasing indicates an interfacing systems LOCA which is a containment bypass and a loss of containment integrity, or some other containment pressure boundary failure.

4.1.C.3 Containment Isolation Valve Status After Containment Isolation Actuation

' Failure to isolate those containment pathways which would allow containment i atmosphere to be released from containment is a loss of the containment barrier. .

There is no " Potential Loss" EAL associated with this item.

4.1.C.4 Steam Generator (SG) Secondary Side Release With Primary To Secondary Leakage Secondary side releases to atmosphere include those from the condenser air ejector, SG Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs), atmospheric dump valves, faulted steam lines, and main steam safety valves. Steam releases, in combination with primary to secondary leakage, constitute a bypass of the containment and, therefore, a loss oi the

containment barrier.

The appropriate classification can be determined in combination with the SG Tube Rupture EAL under the Reactor Coolant System (NCS) barrier.

There is no " Potential Loss" EAL associated with this item.

4.1.C.5 Significant Radioactive Inventory in Containment These values indicate significant fuel damage well in excess of the EALs associated with both loss of Fuel Clad and loss of NCS Barriers. NUREG-1228, Source Estimations During incident Response to Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents, o8

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indicates that such conditions do not exist when the amount of clad damage is less 1 3

than 20%. This amount of activity in containment, if released, could have such severe consequences that it is prudent to treat this as a potential loss of containment.

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By treating the radioactive inventory in containment as a potential loss, a General Emergency will be declared when the conditions of the fuel clad and NCS barriers are ]

t included in the evaluation. This will allow the appropriate protective actions to be i

recommended. -)

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There is no " Loss" EAL ' associated with this item. l l

NOTE: If EMF-51 A and EMF-51B are unavailable, readings can be calculated from ,

procedure HP/0/B/1009/02, " Alternative Method for Determining Dose Rates within ]

the Reactor Building." ]

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4.1.C.6 Core Cooling

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Core Cooling - RED for greater than 15 minutes in this potential loss EAL represents

imminent core damage that, if not terminated, could lead to reactor vessel failure and

. an increased potential for containment failure. The potential for containment challenge as a result of events at reactor vessel failure makes it prudent to consider an ,

l unmitigated core damage condition as a potential loss of the containment barrier.  !

Severe accident analyses (e.g., NUREG-1150) have concluded that function 1' restoration procedures can arrest core degradation within the reactor vessel in a j significant fraction of the core damage scenarios, and that the likelihood of

containment failure is very small in these events. Given this, it is appropriate to provide a reasonable period to allow function restoration procedures to arrest the core  ;

melt sequence. Whether or not the procedures will be effective should be apparent within 15 minutes. The Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director should make the 1

declaration as soon as it is determined that the procedures have been, or will h

ineffective.

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. There is no " Loss" EAL associated with this item.

4.1.C.7 Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement This EAL addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director in determining whether the containment barrier is lost or potentially lost. In addition, the inability to monitor the barrier should also be D'i L i l

McGuire Nuclear Site incorporated in this EAL as a factor in Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director judgement that the barrier may be considered lost or potentially lost. i REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (NCS) BARRIER EALs: (1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5)

The NCS Barrier includes the NCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary isolation valves.

4.1.N.1 Critical Safety Function Status NCS Integrity - RED indicates NCS pressure and temperature conditions which may challenge the Reactor Vessel integrity. Heat Sink - RED indicates the ultimate heat ,

sink function is under extreme challenge. Either of these conditions indicate a potential loss of the NCS Barrier.

There is no " Loss" EAL associated with this item.

4.1.N.2 NCS Leak Rate Small leaks may result in the inability to maintain normal liquid inventory within the NCS by operation of the Chemical and Volume Control System, which is considered as one centrifugal charging pump discharging to the charging header with the letdown line isolated. Ifletdown cannot be isolated, and a second charging pump is required, this is still considered a potential loss of the NCS barrier. The need for compensatory action to maintain normal liquid inventory is an indication of a degraded NCS barrier and is considered to be a potential loss of the barrier.

The loss of subcooling is the fundamental indication that the inventory loss from the primary system exceeds the capacity of the inventory control systems. If the loss of subcooling is indicated, the NCS barrier is considered lost.

4.1.N.3 SG Tube Rupture Sma!! Steam Generator tube leaks may result in the inability to maintain normal liquid inventory within the Reactor Coolt.nt System (NCS) by operation of the Chemical and Volume Control System, which is considered as one centrifugal charging pump discharging to the charging header with the letdown line isolated. If letdown cannot be isolated, and a second charging pump is required, this is still DtO

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McGuire Nuclear Site considered a potential loss of the NCS barrier. The need for compensatory action to I maintain normal liquid inventory is an indication of a degraded NCS barrier and is .l' considered to be a potential loss of the barrier.

A tube rupture with' an unisolable secondary line fault is generally indicated by a reduction in primary coolant inventory, increased secondary radiation levels, and an

- uncontrolled or cumplete depressurization of the ruptured SG. This set of conditions ,

repasents a loss of the NCS and containment fission product barriers. In conjunction j with containment barrier loss #4, this condition will result in the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. Escalation to a General Emergency would be indicated by at least a  ;

potential loss of the fuel clad barrier.  ;

Secondary radiation increases should be observed via radiation monitoring of Condenser Air Ejector Discharge, SG Blowdown, Main Steam, and/or SG Sampimg r System. Determination of the " uncontrolled" depressurization of the ruptured SG ,

should be based on indication that the pressure decrease in the ruptured steam i generator is not a function of operator action. This should prevent declaration based on a depressurization that results from an EOP induced cooldown of the NCS that  :

does not involve the prolonged release of contaminated secondary coolant from the l affected SG to the environment. This EAL should encompass steam breaks, feed .,

breaks, and stuck open safety or relief valves. These conditions represents a loss of  ;

the NCS and containment fission product barners.

1 4.1.N.4 Containment Radiation Monitoring l

This EAL is being deleted for the following reasons. The containment process 1 radiation monitors (EMF-38, -39, and -40) serve to provide early indication of l reactor coolant (NC) leaks in containment to ensure compliance with Technical l Specifications and Selected Licensee Commitments. These monitors alarm on small l NC leaks in and below the Unusual Event (IC 4.2.U.4) range. Also, these monitors l automatically isolate on a safety injection. For these reasons, it is not appropriate to l use these monitors as an indication of a loss of the reactor coolant system barrier. l The reactor building monitors (EMF-51 A and -51B) used for the Fuel Clad EAL 4.1.F.3 are not able to indicate clearly the lower levels of activity in containment resulting from a leak of reactor coolant with normal activity levels. Thus, this EAL will be omitted and other indication will be used to determine a potential loss or loss of the Reactor Coolant System Barrier.

4.1.N.S Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement i-This EAL addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director in determining whether the NCS barrier is lost or D\\

McGuire Nuclear Site potentially lost. In addition, the inability to monitor the barrier should also be incorporated in this EAL as a factor in Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director judgement that the burier may be considered lost or potentially lost.

FUEL CLAD BARRIER EALs: (1 or 2 or 3 or 4)

The Fuel Clad Barrier is the zircalloy tubes that contain the fuel pellets.

4.1.F.1 Critical Safety Function Status Core Cooling - ORANGE indicates subcooling has been lost and that some clad damage may occur. Heat Sink - RED indicates the ultimate heat sink function is under extreme challenge. Either of these conditions indicate a potential loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier. l Core Cooling - RED indicates significant reactor coolant superheating and core .

uncovery. Clad damage under these conditions is likely; therefore, this is indication l ofloss of the Fuel Clad Barrier. l 4.1.F.2 Primary Coolant Activity Level The value of 300 pCi/cc 1:31 equivalent coolant activity is well above that expected for iodine spikes and corre ~mnds to about 2% to 5% fuel clad damage. This amount of clad damage indicates sig uficant clad damage and thus the Fuel Clad Barrier is considered lost.

There is no equivalent " Potential Loss" EAL for this item.

4.1.F.3 Containment Radiation Monitoring l

A reading of 117 R/hr on EMF-51 A or B is a value which indicates the release of reactor coolant, with elevated activity indicative of fuel damage, into the containment.

Reactor coolant concentrations of this magnitude are several times larger than the j maximum concentrations (including iodine spiking) allowed within technical specifications and are therefore indicative of fuel damage (approximately 5% clad failure depending on core inventory and NCS volume). This EAL indicates a loss of both the fuel clad barrier and a loss of NCS barrier.

There is no " Potential Lost" EAL associated with this item.

i

l McGuire Nuclear Site NOTE: If EMF-51 A and EMF-51B are unavailable, readings can be calculated from procedure HP/0/B/1009/02," Alternative Method for determining Dose Rates within j the Reactor Building."

4.1.F.4 Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement i

This EAL addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency  ;

Coordinator / EOF Director in determining whether the Fuel Clad barrier is lost or potentially lost. In addition, the inability to monitor the barrier should also be incorporated in this EAL as a factor in Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director l 4 judgement that the barrier may be considered lost or potentially lost.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, BASIS INFORMA TION FOR TABLE 4  :

1 I

e D13

McGuire Nuclear Site ENCLOSUR24.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNESPAL EVENT ALERT .

SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.2.U.1 Inabilit 'to Reach Required 42.A.1 Unplanned Loss of Most or 4.2.S.1 Inability to Monitor a ShutdovJi Within All Safety System Significant Transient in Tecimir,,al Specification Annunchtion or Indication Progress Limits in Contro! 'wm With Either(1)a oignificant Transient in Progress, or (2) Compensatory Non-Alarming Indicators Unavailable 4.2.U.2 Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety System

~

U Annunciation or Indication

.f. in the Control Room for Greater'than 15 Minutes 4.2.U.3 Fuel Clad Degradation 4.2.U. t Reactor Coolant (NCS)

System Leakage 4.2.U.5 Unplanned Loss of All Onsite or OITsite Communications l

i t

E___________------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - --

McGuire Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT 4.2.U.1 Inability to Reach Required Shutdown Within Technical Specification Limits.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.2.U.1-1 Plant is not brought to required operating mode within Technical Specifications LCO Action Statement Time.

BASIS:

Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCOs) require the plant to be brought to a required shutdown mode when the Technical Specification required configuration cannot be restored. Depending on the circumstances, this may or may not be an emergency or precursor to a more severe condition.

In any case, the initiation of plant shutdown required by the site Technical Specifications

~

requires a one hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b) Non-emergency events. The plant is within its safety envelope when being shut down within the allowable action statement time in the Technical Specifications. An immediate Notification of an Unusual Event is required when the plant is not brought to the required operating mode within the allowable action statemenuime in the Technical Specifications. Declaration of an Unusual Event is based on the time at which the LCO-specified action statement time period elapses under the site Technical Specifications and is not related to how long a condition may have existed. Other required Technical Specification shutdowns that involve precursors to more serious events :ac duressed by other System Malfunction, Hazards, or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs.

REFERENCE:

NU%tRC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OH92, SU2 D\S

McGuire Nuclear Site SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT 4.2.U.2 Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety System Annunciation or Indication in the Control Room for Greater Than 15 Minutes.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.2.U.2-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Unplanned loss of most (>50%) annunciators associated wit safety systems for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. In the opinion of the Operations Shift ManagerEmergency CoordinatorEOF Director, the loss of the annunciators or indicators requires additional personnel I (beyond normal shift compliment) to safely operate the unit.

BASIS:

l This IC and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the difficulty associated with monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment. " Unplanned" loss of annunciators or indicator excludes scheduled maintenance and testing activities. Quantification of"most" is arbitrary; however, this judgement is supported by the specific opinion of the Operations Shift ManagerEmergency CoordinatorEOF Director that additional operating personnel will be required to provide increased monitoring of system operation to safely operate the unit. Fifteen minutes was selected I as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

This Unusual Event will be escalated to an Alert if a transient is in progress during the loss of annunciation or indication.

Due to the limited number of safety systems in operation during cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled modes, no IC is indicated during ths.se modes of operation.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92. SU3 Di(P

McGuire Nuclear Site SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT 4.2.U.3 Fuel Clad Degradation.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.-2.U.3-1 Dose Equivalent I-131 greater than the Technical Specification allowable limit.

BASIS:

This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it is considered to be a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant and a potential precursor of more serious problems. He EAL addresses coolant samples exceeding coolant technical specifications for iodine spike. Escalation of this IC to the Alert level is via the Fission Product Barrier Degradation Monitoring ICs. This EAL applies in Modes 1,2,3,4, and 5 only bec~ause the Technical Specification applies only in l these modes.  ;

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, SU4  ;

l l

D \ ~1

i McGuire Nuclear Site SYSTEM MAL. FUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT  ;

i 4.2.U.4 Reactor Coolant System (NCS) Leakage.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operations)  :

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)  ;

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.2.U.4-I Unidentified leakage 210 gpm 4.2.U.4-2 Pressure boundary leakage 210 gpm l

4.2.U.4-3 Identified leakage 2 25 gpm BASIS:  !

This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it may be a precursor of more serious conditions and as a  !

result, is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The 10 gpm value tiv l the unidentified and pressure boundary leakage was selected as it is observable with normal control room j indications. Lesser values must generally be determined through time-consuming surveillance tests te g . i mass balances). The EAL for identified leakage is set at a higher value due to the lesser significance of identified leakage in comparison to unidentified or pressure boundary leakage. In either case, escalathm of this IC to the Alert level is via Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs or IC, " Inability to Maintain Plant ;

in Cold Shutdown."

REFERENCE:

NUhbtRC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, SUS 4

i DL8

I McGuire Nuclear Site SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT 1

4.2.U.5 Unplanned Loss of All Onsite or Offsite Communications.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:  :

4.2.U.5-1 Loss of all onsite communications capability (internal phone system, PA system, onsite radio system) affecting the ability to perform routine operations.

4.2.U.5-2 Loss of all offsite communications capability (Selective Signaling, NRC FTS lines, offsite radio system, commercial phone system) affecting the ability to communicate with offsite authorities.

BASIS:

The purpose of this IC and its associated EALs is to recognize a loss of communications i capability that either defeats the plant operations staff ability to perform routine tasks necessary for plant operations or the ability to communicate problems with offsite authorities. The loss of offsite communications ability is expected to be significantly more comprehensive than the condition addressed by 10 CFR 50.72.

This EAL is intended to be used only when extraordinary means are being utilized to make communications possible (relaying ofinformation from radio transmissions, individuals being sent to offsite locations, etc.).

REFERENCE:

NUAL4RC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, SU6 ,

I l

l Dt%

McGuire Nuclear Site SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ALERT 4.2.A.1 Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety System Annunciation or Indication in Control Room With Either (1) a Significant Transient in Progress, or (2)

Compensatory Non-Alarming Indicators Unavailable.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.2.A.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Unplanned loss of most (>50%) annunciators associated with safety systems for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. In the opinion of the Operations Shift ManagerEmergency CoordinatorEOF Director, the loss of the annunciators or indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift compliment) to safely operate the unit.

AND

c. Either of the following:

• A significant plant transient is in progress.

• Loss of the Operator Aid Computer (OAC).

HASIS:

This IC and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the difficulty associated with monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment during a transient. Quantification of"Most" is arbitrary; however, this judgement is supported by the specific opinion of the Operations Shift ManagerEmergency CoordinatorEOF DLO

- - _ . . __ _ . . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ - _ . . . _ _ _ _ ~ . . _ _ _ . _

McGuire Nuclear Site Director that additional operating personnel will be required to provide increased monitoring of '

system operation to safely operate the unit. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.  ;

i "Significant Transient" includes response to automatic or manually initiated functions such as reactor trips, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injections, or  !

thermal power oscillations of 10% or greater.

Significant indication is available from the OAC. Loss of the OAC in conjunction with the loss of other indications would further impair the ability to monitor plant parameters.

Due to the limited number of safety systems in operation during cold shutdown, refueling and defueled modes, no IC is indicated during these modes of operation.

This Alert will be escalated to a Site Area Emergency if the operating crew cannot monitor the  ;

transient in progress.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV, 2, OU92, SA4 i l

l l

l l

D2.\

1 McGuire Nuclear Site SYSTEM MALFUNCTION SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.2.S.1 Inability to Monitor a Significant Transient in Progress.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) i EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.2.S.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Loss of most (>50%) annunciators associated with safety systems.

AND

b. A significant plant transient is in progress.

AND

c. Loss of the OAC.

AND

d. Inability to provide manual monitoring of any of the following Critical Safety Functions:

e suberiticality e core cooling

• heat sink e containment BASIS:

This IC and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the inability of the control room staff to monitor the plant response to a transient. A Site Area Emergency is considered to exist if the control room staff cannot monitor safety functions needed for protection of the public.

D2.2.

McGuire Nucl:ar site "Significant Transient" includes response to automatic or manually initiated functions such as trips, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injections, or thermal power oscillations of 10% or greater.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, OU92, SS6 D7 3

McGuire Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.3.U.I Any Unplanned Release of 43.A.1 Any Unplanned Release of 43.S.1 Boundary Dose Resulting 43.G.I Boundary Dose Resulting Gaseous or Liquid Gaseous or Liquid from an Actual or Imminent from an Actualor Radioactivity to the Radioactivity to the Release of Radioactivity Imminent Release of Environment that Exceeds Environment that Exceeds Exceeds 100 mrem TEDE Radioactivity that Exceeds Two Times the SLC Limits 200 Times the SLC Limits or 500 mrem CDE Adult 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 for 60 Minutes or Longer for 15 Minutes or Longer Thyroid for the Actual mrem CDE Adult Thyroid or Projected Duration of the for the Actual or Projected Release Duration of the Release 43.U.2 Unexpected increase in 43.A.2 Major Damage to Irradiated Plant Radiation or Airborne Fuel or Loss of Water O Concentration Level that Has or Will Result in the Uncovering ofIrradiated Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel 43.A3 Release of Radioactive Material or increases in Radiation Levels Within the Facility That Impedes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown

McGuire Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT 4.3.U.1 Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds Two Times the SLC Limits for 60 Minutes or Longer.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: A11 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.U.1-1 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-49L, EMF 44L, or EMF-31 (when aligned to RC) of 2 5.45E+06 cpm for 2 60 minutes or will likely continue for 260 minutes which indicates that the release may have exceeded the initiating condition and indicates the need to assess the release with procedure HP/0/B/1009/10, ,

IIP /0/B/1009/29, or HP/0/B/1009/20.

4.3.U.1-2 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36L of 2 3.00E+04 cpm for 2 60 minutes or will likely continue for 260 minutes which indicates that the release may have exceeded the initiating condition and indicates the need to assess the release l with procedure HP/0/B/1009/10, HP/0/B/1009/29, or HP/0/B/1009/20. l 4.3.U.1-3 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-31 (when aligned to WC or WWCB) of j 2 9.174E+03 cpm for 2 60 minutes or will likely continue for 260 minutes which l indicates that the release may have exceeded the initiating condition and indicates the  !

need to assess the release with procedure HP/0/B/1009/10, HP/0/B/1009/29, or I HP/0/B/1009/20. i 1

4.3.U.1-4 Gaseous effluent being released exceeds two times SLC 16.11-1 for 2 60 minutes as determined by Radiation Protection (RP) procedure.

4.3.U.1-5 Liquid effluent being released exceeds two times SLC 16.11-6 for z 60 minutes as determined by RP procedure.

NOTE: If monitor reading is sustained for the time period indicated in the EAL AND the required assessments (procedure calculations) cannot be completed within this time period, declaration must be made based on the valid radiation monitor reading.

BASIS:

T)7.5 1

McGuire Nuclear Site The term " Unplanned", as used in this context, includes any release for which a liquid waste release (LWR) or gaseous waste release (GWR) package was not prepared, or a release that j exceeds the conditions (e.g., minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm set points, i etc.) on the applicable package.

]

l Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct. )

Unplanned releases in excess of two times the site Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) that I continue for 60 minutes or longer represent an uncontrolled situation and hence, a potential degradation in the level of safety. It is not intended that the release be averaged over 60 minutes.

The event should be declared as soon as it is detennined that the release duration has or will j likely exceed 60 minutes. j The gaseous release rate SLC and Technical Specification (TS) are based on limiting gaseous -

release rates to the SITE BOUNDARY to 500 mr/ year total body.  :

i The liquid release rate SLC and TS are based on limiting liquid release rates to the l UNRESTRICTED AREA to 10 times the Efiluent Concentration (EC) valves given in l 10CFR20.1001-20.2401, Appendix B, Table 2, Column 2.

Monitor indications are based on the methodology of the site Offsite Dose Calculation Manual l (ODCM). Annual average meteorology has been used. Radiation Protection will use 3 lip /0/B/1009/10. " Release of Radioactive Effluents Exceeding Selected Licensee ]

Commitments," 11P/0/B/1009/29," Initial Response On-Shift Dose Assessment" or '

j llP/0/B/1009/20," Manual Procedure for Offsite Dose Projections" to quantify a release.

i

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, 01/92, AUL l a

i i

i D2/e '

McGuire Nuclear Site ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT j I

i 4.3.U.2 Unexpected Increase in Plant Radiation or Airborne Concentration.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All j l

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.U.2-1 Indication of uncontrolled water level decrease of greater than 6 inches in the reactor refueling cavity with all irradiated fuel assemblies remaining covered by water.

4.3.U.2-2 Uncontrolled water level decrease of greater than 6 inches in the spent fuel pool and fuel transfer canal with all irradiated fuel assemblies remaining covered by water.

4.3.U.2-3 Unplanned valid area radiation monitor (EMF) reading increases by a factor of 1000 over normal levels.

BASIS:

Valid means that a radietion monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

All of the above events tend to have long lead times relative to potential for radiological release outside the site boundary; thus, impact to public health and safety is very low.

In light of reactor cavity seal failure incidents, explicit coverage of these types of events via EALs I and 2 is appropriate given their potential for increased doses to plant staff. A threshold value of 6 inches is used to allow time for mitigating actions to successfully terminate the inventory loss. Credit should not be taken for inventory addition to maintain level above the 6 inch threshold. Classification as an Unusual Event is warranted as a precursor to a more serious event.

EAL 3 addresses unplanned increases in in-plant radiation levels that represent a degradation in the control of radioactive material, and represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant. This EAL escalates to an Alert if the increases impair safe operation.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007. REV. 2, 0H92. A U2 027

McGuire Nuclear Site ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT 4.3.A.1 Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds 200 Times the SLC limits for 15 Minutes or Longer.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.A.1-1 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-49H of 21.56E+03 cpm for 215 minutes or will likely continue for 215 minutes which indicates that the release may have exceeded the initiating condition and indicates the need to assess the release with procedure HP/0/B/1009/10, HP/0/B/1009/29, or HP/0/B/1009/20.

4.3.A.1-2 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36L of t 3.00E+06 cpm for 215 minutes or will likely continue for 215 minutes which indicates that the release may have exceeded the initiating condition and indicates the need to assess the release with procedure HP/0/B/1009/10, HP/0/B/1009/29, or HP/0/B/1009/20.

4.3.A.1-3 Gaseous effluent being released exceeds 200 times the level of SLC 16.11-1 for 215 minutes as determined by RP procedure.

4.3.A.1-4 Liquid effluent being released exceeds 200 times the level of SLC 16.11-6 for 215 minutes as determined by RP procedure.

NOTE: If monitor reading is sustained for the time period indicated in the EAL AND the required assessments (procedure calculations) cannot be completed within this period, declaration must be made based on the valid radiation monitor reading.

BASIS:

The term " Unplanned", as used in this context, includes any release for which a liquid waste release (LWR) or gaseous waste release (GWR) package was not prepared, or a release that exceeds the conditions (e.g., minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm set points, etc.) on the applicable package.

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

l D28

{

McGuire Nuclear Site This event escalates.from the Unusual Event by escalating the magnitude of the release by a

. factor of 100.

It is not intended that the release be averaged over 15 minutes. The event should be declared as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 15 minutes.

The gaseous release rate SLC and Technical Specification (TS) are based on limiting gaseous release rates to the SITE BOUNDARY to 500 mr/ year total body.

The liquid release rate SLC and TS are based on limiting liquid release rates to the UNRESTRICTED AREA to 10 times the Effluent Concentration (EC) valves given in 10CFR20.1001-20.2401, Appendix B, Table 2, Column 2. 1 Monitor indications are based on the methodology of the site Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). Annual average meteorology has been used. Radiation Protection will use IIP /0/B/1009/10, " Release of Radioactive Effluents Exceeding Selected Licensee l Commitments," HP/0/B/1009/29, " Initial Response On-Shift Dose Assessment," or lip /0/B/1009/20, " Manual Procedure for Offsite Dose Projections" to quantify a release.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, OU92, AA1 i

)

l D29

McGuire Nuclear Site ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT 4.3.A.2 Major Damage to Irradiated Fuel or Loss of Water Level that Has or Will Result in the Uncovering ofIrradiated Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.A.2-1 An unplanned valid trip II alarm on any of the following radiation monitors:

a. Spent Fuel Building Refueling Bridge 1 EMF-17 2 EMF-4

b. Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation IEMF-42 2 EMF-42

c. Reactor Building Refueling Bridge 1 EMF-16 2 EMF 3

d. Containment Noble Gas Monitors IEMF-39 2 EMF-39 4.3.A.2-2 Plant personnel report that water level drop in reactor refueling cavity, spent fuel pool, or fuel transfer canal has or will exceed makeup capacity such that any irradiated fuel will become uncovered.

4.3.A.2-3 NC system wide range leve! < 358 inches after initiation of NC system make-up AND Any irradiated fuel assembly not capable of being lowered into spent fuel pool or reactor vessel AND KF-122 camiot be closed.

D'ho <

l l

l McGuire Nuclear Site BASIS:

This IC applies to spent fuel requiring water coverage. There is time available to take corrective actions, and there is little potential for substantial fuel damage. Thus, an Alert Classification for this event is appropriate. Esct.ation, if appropriate, would occur via Abnormal Rad Level / Radiological Effluent or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement.

EAL 2: Due to concerns for ALARA and personnel safety, personnel should not remain in the area to observe that irradiated fuel is uncovered. Personnel should exit the area as quickly as possible and report the occurrence to the Control Room.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 0H92, AA2 D'M

l McGu>e Nuclear Site i ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT i

ALERT I 4.3.AJ Release of Radioactive Material or Increases in Radiation Levels Within the  !

Facility That Impedes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe l Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.A3-1 Valid reading on EMF-12 greater than 15 mR/hr in the Control Room.

4.3.AJ-2 Valid indication of radiation levels greater than 15 mR/hr in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) or Secondary Alarm Station (SAS).

43.A3-3 Radiation levels in areas requiring infrequent access are such that tasks needed to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown cannot be performed within normal occupational exposure limits of 5 Rem per year TEDE.

BASIS: i l

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

i This initiating condition (IC) addresses increased radiation levels that impede necessary access to l operating stations, or other areas containing equipment that must be operated manually, in order j to maintain safe operation or perform a safe shutdown. It is this impaired ability to operate the l plant that results in the actual or pot en~ial substantial degradation of the level of safety of the l plant. Radiation levels in the facility such that tasks cannot be performed without exceeding 5 Rem per year TEDE will impede access dec to the need for a Planned Special Exposure or l 1

Planned Emergency Exposure. This situation is indicative of a significant radiological problem that warrants additional resources to assess and mitigate.

This IC is not intended to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g., incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, etc.)

The Control Room, CAS, and SAS are areas that require continuous occupancy. The value of 15 mR/hr is derived from the GDC 19 value of 5 Rem in 30 days with adjustment for expected occupancy times.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92. AA3 D 37-l l

McGuire Nuclear Sn2 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.3.S.1 Boundary Dose Resulting from an Actual or Imminent Release of Radioactivity Exceeds 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.S.1-1 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36H 2 5.63 E +03 cpm sustained for

>l5 minutes.

4.3.S.1-2 Dose assessment team calculations indicate dose consequences greater than 100 ,

mrem TEDE or 500 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid at the site boundary.

4.3.S.1-3 Analysis of field survey results or field survey samples indicates dose consequences greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid at  ;

the site boundary.

l NOTE 1: These EMF readings are calculated based on average annual meteorology, l site boundary dose rate, and design unit vent flow rate. Calculations by the dose assessment team use actual meteorology, release duration, and unit vent flow rate.

Therefore, these EMF readings should not be used if dose assessment team calculations are available.

NOTE 2: If dose assessment team calculations cannot be completed in 15 minutes, then valid monitor readings should be used for emergency classification.

l BASIS: l Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

The 100 mrem integrated dose in this initiating condition is based on 10 CFR 20 annual average population exposure. This value also provides a desirable gradient (one order of magnitude) between the Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency classes. These values are 10% of the EPA Protective Action Guide (PAG) values given in EPA-400-R 001.  !

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2. 01/92. ASI D33

l l

McGuire Nuclear Site ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.3.G.1 Boundary Dose Resulting from an Actual or Imminent Release of Radioactivity that Exceeds 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.G.1-1 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36H 2 5.63 E +04 cpm sustained for

>15 minutes.

4.3.G.1-2 Dose assessment team calculations indicate dose consequences greater than 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid at the site boundary.

4.3.G.1-3 Analysis of field survey results or field survey samples indicates dose consequences greater than 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid at the site boundary.

NOTE 1: These EMF readings are calculated based on average annual meteorology, site boundary dose rate, and design unit vent flow rate. Calculations by the dose assessment team use actual meteorology, release duration, and unit vent flow rate.

Therefore, these EMF readings should not be used if dose assessment team calculations are available.

NOTE 2: If dose assessment team calculations cannot be completed in 15 minutes, then valid monitor readings should be used for emergency classification.

BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

The 1000 mrem TEDE and 5000 mrem CDE thyroid integrated doses are based on the EPA PAG values given in EPA-400-R-92-001, which indicates that public protective actions are indicated if doses exceed these values. This is consistent with the emergency class description of a general emergency.

l

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2. 01/92. AGI l 1

D39

McGuire Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY ~

4.4.A.1 Failu e of Reactor 4.4.S.1 Failure of Reactor Protection 4.4.G.1 Failure of the Reactor Protection System System Instrumentation to Protection System to Instrumentation to Complete or initiate an Complete an Automatic Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Trip Trip and Manual Trip was Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Protection NOT Successful and There Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been is Indication of an Extreme System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded and Manual Trip Challenge to the Ability to Exceeded and ManualTrip Was NOTSuccessful Cool the Core Was Successful 4.4.A.2 Inability to Maintain Plant 4.4.S.2 Complete Loss of Function C in Cold Shutdown Needed to Achieve or 19 Maintain Hot Shutdown G

4.4.S.3 Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That lias or Will Uncover Fuelin the Reactor Vessel i

e I

McGuire Nuclear Site i

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS 4.4.A.1 Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded and Manual Trip Was Successful.

OPERATING MODE A PPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.4.A.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Valid reactor trip signal received or required and automatic reactor trip was not successful.

AND

b. Manual reactor trip from the control room is successful and reactor power is less than 5% and decreasing. )

i BASIS: 1 This condition indicates failure of the automatic protection system to trip the reactor. This condition is more than a potential degradation of a safety system in that a front line automatic protection system did not function in response to a plant transient and thus the plant safety has been compromised, and design limits of the fuel may have been exceeded. An Alert is indicated because conditions exist that lead to potential loss of fuel clad or NCS. Reactor protection system setpoint being exceeded (rather than limiting safety system setpoint being exceeded) is I specified here because failure of the automatic protection system is the issue. A manual trip is  !

any set of actions by the reactor operator (s) at the reactor control console which causes control rods to be RAPIDLY inserted into the core and brings the reactor subcritical. Operator action to drive rods does NOT constitute a reactor trip, i.e. does not meet the rapid insertion criterion.

Failure of manual trip would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency.

l

REFERENCE:

NUM4RC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, SA2 0%

McGuire Nuclear Site LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS ALERT 4.4.A.2 Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueling)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.4.A.2-1 Total loss of Residual Heat Removal (ND) and/or Nuclear Service Water (RN) and/or Component Cooling (KC)

AND One of the following:

• Inability to maintain reactor coolant temperature below 200 F.

• Uncontrolled reactor coolant temperature rise to >l80 F BASIS:

This EAL addresses loss of functions required for core cooling during cold shutdown and refueling conditions. This IC and associated EALs are based on concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, " Loss of Decay Heat Removal." A number of phenomena such as pressurization, vortexing, steam generator U-tube draining, NCS level differences when operating at a mid-loop condition, decay heat removal system design, and level instrumentation problems can lead to conditions where decay heat removal is lost and core uncovery can occur. NRC analyses show that sequences that can cause core uncovery in 15 to 20 minutes and severe core damage within an hour after decay heat removal is lost.

Escalation to the Site Area Emergency is by, " Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel." or by Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 0182 SA3 0YI

McGuire Nuclear Site l

LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS S.TE AREA EMERGENCY 4.J.S.1 Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded and Manual Trip Was NOT Successful.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.4.S.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Valid reactor trip signal received or required and automatic reactor trip was  ;

not successful.

AND

b. Manual reactor trip from the control room was not successful in reducing reactor power to less than 5% and decreasing.

BASIS:

Automatic and manual trip are not considered successful if action away from the reactor control console is required to trip the reactor. This EAL is equivalent to the Subcriticality CSF-RED. ,

Under these conditions, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems are designed. A Site Area Emergency is indicated because conditions exist that lead to imminent loss or potential loss of both fuel clad and NCS. Although this IC may be viewed as redundant to the Fission Product Barrier Degradation IC, its inclusion is necessary to better assure timely recognition and emergency response. Escalation of this event to a General Emergency would be via Fission Product Barrier Degradation or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judge *.nent ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUAL4RC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, SS2 D30

McGuire Nuclear Site j LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.4.S.2 Complete Loss of Function Needed to Achieve or Maintain Hot Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.4.S.2-1 Subcriticality CSF-RED 4.4.S.2-2 Core Cooling CSF-RED 4.4.S.2-3 Heat Sink CSF-RED i BASIS:

This EAL addresses complete loss of functions, including ultimate heat sink and reactivity control, required for hot shutdown with the reactor at pressure and temperature. Under these conditions, there is an actual major failure of a system intended for protection of the public.

Thut declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted. Escalation to General Emergency woulo be via Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent, Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement, or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2. OU92, SS4 D39

McGuire Nuclear Site LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY B

4.4.S3 Loss of Water Levelin the Reactor Vessel That Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) l Mode 6 (Refueling)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.4.S3-1 a. Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown conditions.

AND

b. Lower range Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) decreasing after initiation of NC system makeup.

4.4.S3-2 a. Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown conditions.

AND j

b. Reactor Coolant (NC) system narrow range level less than 6 inches and decreasing after initiation of NC system makeup.

4.4.S.3-3 a. Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown conditions.

AND

b. Either train ultrasonic level indication less than 6 inches sad decreasing after initiation of NC system makeup.

BASIS:

Under the conditions specified by this IC, severe core damage may be imminent due to prolonged boiling following loss of decay heat removal.

Thus, declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted under the conditions specified by the IC, Escalation to a General Emergency is via radiological effluent IC.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, 01/92, SS5 D40

McGuire Nuclear Site LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.4.G.1 Failure of the Reactor Protection System to Complete an Automatic Trip and Manual Trip was NOT Successful and There is Indication of an Extreme Challenge to the Ability to Cool the Core.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.4.G.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Valid reactor trip signal received or required and automatic reactor trip was not successful.

AND

b. Manual reactor trip from the control room was not successful in reducing reactor power to less than 5% and decreasing.

AND

c. Either of the following conditions exist:

I e Core Cooling CSF-RED  :

. Heat Sink CSF-RED BASIS I Automatic and manual trip are not considered successful if action away from the reactor control console is required to trip the reactor.

l Under the conditions of this IC and its associated EALs, the efforts to bnng the reactor  ;

subcritical have been unsuccessful and, as a result, the reactor is producing more heat than the j maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems were designed.  ;

1 The extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core is intended to mean that the core exit I temperatures are at or approaching 1200 F or that the reactor vessel water level is below the top  !

of active fuel. This equates to a Core Cooling-RED condition. l i

DM i

a

i i

f McGuire Nuclear Site Another consideration is the inability to initially remove heat during the early stages of this  ;

I sequence. If emergency feedwater flow is insufficient to remove the amount of heat required by i

design from at least one steam generator, an extreme challenge should be considered to exist.

This equates to a Heat Sink-RED condition.

In the event either of these challenges occurs during or following a time that the reactor has not -

been brought below the power associated with the safety system design, core damage may be ,

- imminent. For this reason, the General Emergency declaration is intended to be anticipatory of the fission product barrier matrix declaration to permit maximum offsite intervention time.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, OH92, SG2 i

McGuire Nuc' ear Site ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY ~

4.5.U.I Loss of All Offsite Power to 4.5.A.I Loss of All Offsite Power 4.5.S.I Loss of All Offsite Power 4.5.G.I Prolonged Loss of All Essential Busses for Greater and Loss of All Onsite AC and Loss of All Onsite AC (Offsite and Onsite) AC Than 15 Minutes Power to Essential Busses Power to Essential Busses Power During Cold Shutdown Or Refueling Mode 4.5.U.2 Unplanned Loss of Required 4.5.A.2 AC power to essential 4.5.S.2 Loss of All Vital DC Power DC Power During Cold busses reduced to a single Shutdown or Refueling power source for greater Mode for Greater than 15 than 15 minutes such that Minutes an additional single failure g could result in station y blackout V

,,m.-

McGuire Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER UNUSUAL EVENT 4.5.U.1 Loss of All Offsite Power to Essential Busses for Greater Than 15 Minutes.

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.U.I-1 OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Modr 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

The following conditions exist: .

a. Loss of offsite power to essential buses ETA and ETB for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. Both emergency diesel generators are supplying power to their respective essential busses. t 4.5.U.I-2 OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Siode 6 (Refueling)

No Mode (Defueled)

The following conditions exist:

a. Loss of offsite power to essential buses ETA and ETB for greater thr.n 15 minutes.

AND

b. One emergency diesel generator is supplying power to its respective essential bus.

I D

I

._ . . -..- - _ . - . . _ . - . . . . . . . - _- =- .. . -

(

1 McGuire Nuclear Site i

1 BASIS:  ;

Prolonged loss of AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of

. safety of the plant by rendering the plant more vulnerable to a complete Loss of AC Power  ;

(Station Blackout). When in cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode the event can be  !

classified as an Unusual Event, because of the significantly reduced decay heat, lower i temperature and pressure, increasing the time to restore one of the essential busses, relative to ,

that specified for the Alert EAL .he event will escalate to an Alert in these modes if both ]

essential busses are lost. Fifeun minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or l momentary power losses. .

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, SUI r i

i l

I Dh

l McGuire Nuclear Site LOSS OF POWER 1

UNUSUAL EVENT l l

4.5.U.2 Unplanned Loss of Required DC Power During Cold Shutdown or Refueling Mode for Greater than 15 Minutes.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueling)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.U.2-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Unplanned loss of both unit related SVDA and EVDD busses as indicated by bus voltage less than 110 VDC. l AND

b. Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes from the time ofloss.

1 l

i BASIS:

The purpose of this IC and its associated EALs is to recognize a loss of DC power compromising the ability to monitor and control the removal of decay heat during Cold Shutdown or Refueling operations. This EAL is intended to be anticipatory in as much as the operating crew may not have necessary indication and control of equipment needed to respond to the loss.

" Unplanned" is included in this IC and EAL to preclude the declaration of an emergency as a result of planned maintenance activities.

If this loss results in the inability to maintain cold shutdown, the escalation to an Alert is via l

" Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown."

REFERENCE:

NUAbtRC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, SU7 l t)14 5

McGuire Nuclear Site LOSS OF POWER ALERT 4.5.A.1 - Loss of All Offsite Power and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses During Cold Shutdown Or Refueling Mode.

l OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueling)

No Mode (Defueled) .

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.A.1-1 Loss of all offsite and onsite AC power as indicated by:

a. Loss of power on essential buses ETA and ETB.

AND

b. Failure to restore power to at least one essential bus within 15 minutes.

BASIS:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including Residual Heat Removal (RHR), Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS), Containment Heat Removal, Spent Fuel Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. When in cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode the event can be classified as an Alert, because of the significantly reduced decay heat, lower temperature and pressure, increasing the time to restore one of the essential busses, relative to that specified for the Site Area Emergency EAL. Escalating to Site Area Emergency, if appropriate, is by Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Efiluent, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement ICs. Fifleen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, OU92, SA1 D%

McGuire Nuclear Site LOSS OF POWER ALERT 4.5.A.2 AC power to essential busses reduced to a single power source for greater than 15 minutes such that an additional single failure could result in station blackout.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.A.2-1 The following condition exists:

I AC power capability has been degraded to one essential bus powered from a single l power source for > 15 min. due to the loss of all but one of:  ;

i SATA SATB ATC ,

ATD D/G A D/G B BASIS:

This IC and the associated EAL is intended to provide an escalation from IC, " Loss of All Offsite Power To Essential Busses for Greater Than 15 Minutes." The condition indicated by this IC is the degradation of the offsite and onsite power systems such that an additional single failure could result in a station blackout. This condition could occur due to a loss of offsite power with a concurrent failure of one emergency generator to supply power to its essential busse::. Another related condition could be the loss of all offsite power and loss of onsite emergency diesels with l only one train of essential busses being back fed from the unit main generator, or the loss of onsite emergency diesels with only one train of essential busses being back fed from offsite power. The subsequent loss of this single power source would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency in accordance with IC, " Loss of All Offsite and Loss of All Onsite AC' Power to Essential Busses."

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92. SAS DM

7 .

1 I

McGuire Nuclear Site LOSS OF POWER SITE AREA EMERGENCY i

4.5.S.1 Loss of All Offsite Power and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.S.1-1 Loss of all offsite and onsite AC power as indicated by:

a. Loss of power on essential buses ETA and ETB.

AND

b. Failure to restore power to at least one essential bus within 15 minutes.

BASIS:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including R11R, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. Prolonged loss of all AC power will cause core uncovering and loss of containment integrity; thus, this event can escalate to a General Emergency.

Escalation to General Emergency is via Fission Product Barrier Degradation or IC, " Prolonged Loss of All OfTsite Power and Prolonged Loss of All Onsite AC Power."

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, 0U92, SSI D48

d McGuire Nuclear Site 4

LOSS OF POWER SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.5.S.2 Loss of All Vital DC Power.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby) 7 Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.S.2-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Loss of both unit related EVDA and EVDD busses as indicated by bus voltage less than 110 VDC. ,

AND

b. Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes from the time ofloss.

BASIS:

Loss of all DC power compromises ability to monitor and control plant safety functions.

Prolonged loss of all DC power will cause core uncovering and loss of containment integrity )

when there is significant decay heat and sensible heat in the reactor system. Escalation to a l General Emergency would occur by Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent, Fission Prci et Barrier Degradation, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement ICs. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2. OU92, SS3 l

l b43

McGuire Nuclear Site LOSS OF POWER GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.5.G.1 Prolonged Loss of All(Offsite and Onsite) AC Power.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation) ,

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.G.1-1 Prolonged loss of all offsite and onsite AC power as indicated by:

a. Loss of power on essential buses ETA and ETB for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) fails to supply NC pump seal injection OR CA supply to steam generators l AND

c. At least one of the following conditions exist:

• Restoration of at least one essential bus within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is NOT likely.

• Indication of continuing degradation of core cooling based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring.

l BASIS:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including l RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. Prolonged loss of all l those functions necessary to maintain hot shutdown will lead to loss of fuel clad, NCS, and  !

containment. l The SSF is capable of providing the necessary functions (reactor coolant pump seal injection and auxiliary feedwater supply to the steam generators) to maintain a hot shutdown condition for up '

to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. No fission product barrier degradation would be expected if the SSF is functioning as intended.

b50 >

McGuire Nuclear Site Analysis in support of the station blackout coping study indicates that the plant can cope with a

station blackout for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> without core damage.

The likelihood of restoring at least one essential bus should be based on a realistic appraisal of -

the situation since a delay in an upgrade decision based on only a chance of mitigating the event could result in a loss of valuable time in preparing and implementing public protective actions. l 1

In addition, under these conditions, fission product barrier monitoring capability may be i degraded. Although it may be difficult to predict when power can be restored, it is necessary to '

l give the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director a reasonable idea of how quickly (s)he may need to declare a General Emergency based on two major considerations:

i

1. Are there any present indications that core cooling is already degraded to the point that Loss -

or Potential Loss of Fission Product Barriers is IMMINENT 7  !

2. If there are no present indications of such core cooling degradation, how likely is it that power can be restored in time to assure that a loss of two barriers with a potential loss of the l third barrier can be prevented?

i Thus, indica' ion of continuing core cooling degradation must be based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring with particular emphasis on Emergency Coordinator / EOF Directorjudgement ,

as it relates to IMMINENT Loss or Potential Loss of fission product barriers and degraded ability to monitor fission product barriers. l 1

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, SG1 i

1 i

l l

1 1

i DSi i

McGuire Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE / EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.6.U.1 Fire Within Protected Area 4.6.A.I Fire or Explosion Affecting 4.6.S.1 Security Event in a Plant 4.6.G.I Security Event Resulting in Boundary Not Extinguished the Operability of Plant Vital Area Loss Of Ability to Reach Within 15 Minutes of Safety Systems Required to and Maintain Cold Detection or Explosion Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown Within the Protected Area Shutdown Boundary 4.6.U.2 Confinned Security Event 4.6.A.2 Fire or Explosion Affecting Which Indicates a Potential the Operability of Plant Degradation in the Level of Safety Systems Required to Safety of the Plant Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown 4.6.A.3 Security Event in a Plant p Protected Area

McGuire Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE / EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT 6.U.1 Fire Within Protected Area Boundary Not Extinguished Within 15 Minutes of Detection or Explosion Within the Protected Area Boundary.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.6.U.1-1 Fire in any of the following areas not extinguished within 15 minutes of control room notification or verification of a control room fire alarm.

• Rcactor Building

• Auxiliary Building Diesel Generator Rooms Control Room

- Safe Shutdown Facility (SSF) i Central Alarm Station (CAS)

. Secondary Alarm Station (SAS)

Doghouses ,

- Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) 1

- Turbine Building

• Service Building

• Interim Radwaste Building

. Equipment Staging Building 4.6.U.1-2 Report by plant personnel of an unanticipated explosion within protected area boundary resulting in visible damage to permanent structure or equipment.

BASIS:

EAL 1: The purpose of this EAL is to address the magnitude and extent of fires that may be potentially significant precursors to damage to safety systems. Fire is combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. This excludes such items as fires within l administration buildings outside the protected area. Waste-basket fires, and other small fires of no safety consequence should easily be extinguished within 15 minutes of detection. This IC applies to buildings and areas contiguous to plant vital areas or other significant buildings or D53

McGuire Nuclear Site areas. Verification of the alarm in this context means those actions taken in the control room to determine that the control room alarm is not spurious.

EAL 2: Only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment within the protected area should be considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of presstuized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. No attempt is made in this EAL to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The occurrence of the explosion with reports of evidence of damage (e.g., deformation, scorching) is sufficient for declaration. The Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director also needs to consider any security aspects of the explosion, if applicable.

Escalation to a higher emergency class is by, " Fire or Explosion Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown".

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, HU2 1

l l

I D54

I l

1 McGuire Nuclear Site ;

i i

FIRE / EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS l l

UNUSUAL EVENT 4.6.U.2 Confirmed Security Event Which Indicates a Potential Degradation in the Level j of Safety of the Plant.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.6.U.2-1 Security confirmed bomb device discovered within plant Protected Area and outside Vital Areas.

4.6.U.2-2 Hostage situation / extortion 4.6.U.2-3 A violent civil disturbance within the owner controlled area.

BASIS:

The above situations represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant.

A civil disturbance is to be considered violent when force has been used in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage plant property.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, OU92, HU4 D55

McGuire Nuclear Site FIRF/ EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT f

4.6.A.I Fire or Explosion Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

+ Mode 6 (Refueling)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.6.A.I-I The following conditions exist:

a. Fire or explosion in any of the following areas:

• Reactor Building

• Auxiliary Building

= Diesel Generator Rooms

. Control Room

- SSF

- CAS

. SAS

• FWST a Doghouses (Applies in Mode 1,2,3,4 only)

AND

b. One of the following: j

• Affected safety system parameter indications show degraded performance

• Plant personnel report visible damage to permanent structures or equipment within the specified area.

Note: Only one train of a system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy this condition.

D5G

McGuire Nuclear Site BASIS:

With regard to explosions, only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment required for safe operation within the identified plant area should be considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. Fire is combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of '

smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires.

Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. The inclusion of a " report of visible damage" should not be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification.

The key to classifying fires / explosions as an Alert is the damage as a result of the incident. The fact that safety-related equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit has been affected or damaged as a result of the fire / explosion is the driving force for declaring the Alert. It is important to note that this EAL addresses a fire / explosion and not just the degradation of a safety sp an. The reference to damage of the systems is used to identify the magnitude of the fire / explosion and to discriminate against minor fires / explosions.

Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, OH92 HA2 1 j 4

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McGuire Nuclear Site l

FIRE / EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT i

4.6.A.2 Fire or Explosion Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: No Mode (Defueled)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.6.A.2-1 The following conditions exist: l l

a. Fire or explosion in any of the following areas:

• Spent Fuel Pool

. Auxiliary Building AND 1

b. One of the following: )

e Spent Fuel Pool level and/or temperature show degraded per#ormance.

. Plant personnel report visible damage to pennanent structures or equipment supporting Spent Fuel Pool cooling.

Note: Only one train of a system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy this condition.

BASIS:

In a Defueled condition, the plant safety systems ofinterest are those that support Spent Fuel Poolinventory and cooling.

With regard to explosions, only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment required for safe operation within the identified plant area should be considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. Fire is combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires.

Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required iflarge quantities of smoke and heat are b5B

McGuire Nuclear Site j s

I observed. The inclusion of a " report of visible damage" should not be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification.  !

The key to classifying fires / explosions as an Alert is the damage as a result of the incident. The fact that safety-related equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit has been affected or damaged as a result of the fire / explosion is the driving force for declaring the Alert. It is important to note that this EAL addresses a fire / explosion and not just the degradation of a safety system. The reference to damage of the systems is used to identify the magnitude of l

the fire / explosion and to discriminate against minor fires / explosions, Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement ICs.

1

REFERENCE:

NUAMRC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, IM2 l

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McGuire Nuclear Site FII(E/ EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT 4.6.A.3 Security Event in a Plant Protected Area.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL: ,

4.6.A.3-1 Intrusion into plant protected area by a hostile force.

BASIS:

This class of security events represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in the Unusual Event. A civil disturbance which penetrates the protected area boundary can be j considered a hostile force. Intrusion into a vital area by a hostile force will escalate this event to a Site Area Emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HA4  ;

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• FIRE / EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.6.S.1 Security Event in a Plant Vital Area.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.6.S.1-1 Intrusion into any of the following plant areas by a hostile force:

- Reactor Building

• Auxiliary Building

• Diesel Generator Rooms

• Control Room

. SSF

• Doghouses

• CAS i

. SAS i

4.6.S.1-2 Security confirmed bomb discovered / exploded in a vital area.

4.6.S.1-3 Security conf.. . . led sabotage in a plant vital area.

BASIS:

This class of security events represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in j the Alert IC in that a hostile force has progressed from the Protected Area to the Vital Area. I

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, HS) l

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McGuire Nuclear Site FIRE / EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.6.G.1 Security Event Resulting in Loss Of Ability to Reach and Maintain Cold 3 Shutdown. l OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.6.G.1-1 Loss of physical contal of the control room due to security event.

4.6.G.1-2 Loss of physical control of the SSF and Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (ASP) due to security event.

BASIS:

This IC encompasses conditions under which a hostile force has taken physical control of vital area required to reach and maintain safe shutdown.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, OU92, HGI l

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McGuire Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.7.U.I Natural and Destructive 4.7.A.1 Natural and Destructive 4.7.S.1 Control Room Evacuation 4.7.G.1 Other Conditions Existing Phenomena Affecting the Phenomena Affecting the Has Been Initiated and Which in the Judgement of Protected Area Plant Vital Area Plant Control Cannot Be the Emergency Established CoordinatorEOF Director Warrant Declaration of General Emergency 4.7.U.2 Release of Toxic or 4.7.A.2 Release of Toxic or 4.7.S.2 Other Conditions Existing Flammable Gases Deemed Flammable Gases Within a Which in the Judgement of Detrimental to Safe Facility Structure Which the Emergency Operation of the Plant Jeopardizes Operation of CoordinatorEOF Director U Systems Required to Warrant Declaration of Site I Maintain Safe Operations Area Emergency W

or to Establish or Maintnn Cold Shutdown 4.7.UJ Other Conditions Existing 4.7.AJ Control Room Evacuation Which in the Judgement of flas Been Initiated the Emergency CoordinatorEOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Unusual Event' 4.7.A.4 Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgement of the Emergency CoordinatorEOF Director l Warrant Declaration of an Alert l

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.cGuire Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS i AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT 4.7.U.1 Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Protected Area.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.7.U.1-1 Tremor felt and valid alarm on the " strong motion accelerograph".

4.7.U.1-2 Tremor felt and valid alarm on the " Peak shock annunciator".

4.7.U.1-3 Report by plant personnel of tomado striking within protected area boundary.

4.7.U.1-4 Vehicle crash into plant structures or systems within protected area boundary.

4.7.U.1-3 Report of turbine failure resulting in casing penetration or damage to turbine or generator seals.  ;

BASIS:

The protected area boundary is typically that part within the security isolation zone and is defined in the site security plan.

EALs 1&2: Damage may be caused to some portions of the site, but should not affect ability of safety functions to operate. Method of detection can be based on instrumentation, validated by a reliable source, or operator assessment. As defined in the EPRI-sponsored " Guidelines for l Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake", dated October 1989, a " felt earthquake" is:

An earthquake of sufficient intensity such that: (a) the vibratory ground motion is felt at the nuclear plant site and recognized as an earthquake based on a consensus of control room operators, and (b) valid alarm on seismic instrumentation occurs.

EAL 3: A tomado striking (touching down) within the protected boundary may have potentially damaged plant structures containing functions or systems required for safe shutdown of the plant.

If such damage is confirmed visually or by other in-plant indications, the event may be escalated to Alert.  !

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McGuire Nuclear Site EAL 4: AJdresses such items as a car, truck, plane, helicopter, or train crash that may potentially damage plant structures containing functions and systems required for safe shutdown of the plant. If the crash is confirmed to affect a plant vital area, the event may be escalated to .

Alett.

EAL 5: Addresses main turbine rotating component failures of sufficient magnitude to cause observable damage to the turbine casing or to the seals of the turbine generator. Of major concern is the potential for leakage of combustible fluids (lubricating oils) and gases (hydrogen -

cooling) to the plant environs. Actual fires and flammable gas build up are appropriately classified via other EALs. This EAL is consistent with the definition of an Unusual Event while maintaining the anticipatory natum desired and recognizing the risk to non-safety related equipment. Escalation of the emergency classification is based on potential damage done by the missiles generated by the failure or by the radiological releases in conjunction with a steam generator tube rupture. These latter events would be classified by the Radiological ICs or Fission l Product Ba: Tier ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, 01/92, HUI NOTE: NUMARC EAL H5 moved to Fire / Security Recognition Category J

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McGuire Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS >

AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT 4.7.U.2 Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Deemed Detrimental to Safe Operation of the Plant.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.7.U.2-1 Report or detection of toxic or flammable gases that could enter within the site area boundary in amounts that can affect safe operation of the plant.

4.7.U.2-2 Report by Local, County or State Officials for potential evacuation of site personnel based on offsite event.

HASIS:

This IC is based on releases in concentrations within the site boundary that will affect the health of plant personnel or the safe operation of the plant with the plant being within the evacuation  ;

area of an offsite event (i.e., tanker truck accident releasing toxic gases, etc.).

Gases within the owner controlled area that are below life threatening or flanunable concentrations do not meet this EAL.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, OU92. HU3 1

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McGuire Nuclear Site j NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS l AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ]

UNUSUAL EVENT l

4.7.U3 Other Cecd!tiens Exht!=g Which i= the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Unusual Event.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All J

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL: l 4.7.UJ-I Other conditions exist which in thejudgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

BASIS:

1 This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director to fall under the Unusual Event emergency class.

REFE'RENCE: NUAMRC/NESP-007, REY. 2, 01/92, HUS I

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McGuire Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT I 4.7.A.1 Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Plant Vital Area.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.7.A.1-1 Valid "OBE Exceeded" Alarm on I AD-13.E7 4.7.A.1-2 Tornado or high winds:

Tornado striking plant structures within the vital area

- Reactor Building

. Auxiliary Building

- Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST)

• Diesel Generator Rooms

. Control Room

- Safe Shutdown Facility (SSF)

- Doghouses Central Alarm Station (CAS) l

. Secondary Alarm Station (SAS)

OR sustained winds > 60 mph for > 15 minutes.

4.7.A.1-3 Turbine failure generated missiles, vehicle crashes or other catastrophic events causing visible structural damage on any of the following plant structures:  ;

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• Reactor Building l

• Auxiliary Building 1

- Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) l I

. Diesel Generator Rooms

= Control Room

. Safe Shutdown Facility (SSF) l

• Doghouses Central Alarm Station (CAS)

. Secondary Alarm Station (SAS)

. Ultimate Heat Sink (Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond Dam and Dikes and Cowan's Ford Dam and Associated Dikes)

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i BASIS:

EAL 1: Based on the FSAR design basis. Seismic events of this magnitude (> OBE) can cause l damage to safety functions.

l EAL 2: Based on the available instrumentation and the FSAR derign basis. Wind loads of this f' magnitude can cause damage to safety functions.

i EAL 3: This EAL is intended to address the threat to safety related structures or equipment from

. uncontrollable and possibly catastrophic events. This list of areas includes areas containing safety-related equipment, their controls, and their power supplies. This EAL is, therefore, i consistent with the definition of an ALERT in that if events have damaged areas containing safety-related equipment the potential exists for substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.  !

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REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, OU92, HAl f

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McGuire Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT 4.7.A.2 Release of Toxic or Flammable Gzses Within a Facility Structure Which Jeopardizes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.7.A.2-1 Report or detection of toxic gases within a Facility Structure in concentrations that will be life threatening to plant personnel.

4.7.A.2-2 Report or detection of flammable gases within a Facility Structure in concentrations that will affect the safe operation of the p! ant.

Structures for above EALs:

• Reactor Building

- Auxiliary Building

• Diesel Generator Rooms a Control Room

- SSF

=

Doghouses

. CAS

. SAS BASIS:

This IC is based on gases that have entered a plant structure affecting the safe operation of the plant. Safe operations are affected when the area can not be accessed by plant personnel to ensure continued operability or availability of safety systems / components. This IC applies to buildings and areas contiguous to plant Vital Areas or other significant buildings or areas. The intent of this IC is not to include buildings (i.e., warehouses) or other areas that are not contiguous or immediately adjacent to plant Vital Areas. It is appropriate that increased monitoring be done to ascertain whether consequential damage has occurred. Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels / Radioactive Effluent, or Emergency l Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement ICs. j i

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REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OH92. HA3 D70 i

3 McGuire Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS  :

AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT ,

4.7.A.3 Control Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated.  ;

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All ,

l EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.A.3-1 Control Room evacuation has been initiated per AP/l(2)/A/5500/17.

BASIS:

With the control room evacuated, additional support, monitoring and direction through the Technical Support Center and/or Emergency Operations Facility is necessary. Inability to establish plant control from outside the control room, as evidenced by the inability to maintain ,

NCS or SO inventories, will escalate this event to a Site Area Emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, OU92, HA5 D7I i

McGuire Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT 4.7.A.4 Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Alert.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.A.4-1 Other conditions exist which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director indicate that plant safety systems may be degraded and that increased monitoring of plant functions is warranted.

BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director to fall under the Alert emergency class.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, llA6 l

]

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McGuire Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AfFECTING PLANT SAFETY SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.7.S.1 Control Room Evacuat;on Has Been Initiated and Plant Control Cannot Be Established.  :

OPERATING MODE AF'LICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.S.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Control room evacuation has been initiated per AP/l(2)/A/5500/17.

AND

b. Control of the plant cannot be established from the ASP ,or the SSF within  ;

15 minutes. i BASIS: l The timely transfer of control to alternate control areas has not been accomplished. This failure to transfer control would be evidenced by deteriorating reactor coolant system or steam generator parameters. For purposes of classification, the 15 minutes begins at the time that the determination to staff the alternate location is made. For most conditions, Reactor Coolant Pump seal LOCAs or steam generator dryout would be indications of failure to accomplish the transfer in the necessary time.

Escalation of this event, if appropriate, would be by Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REY. 2, OU92, HS2 I

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McGuire Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.7.S.2 Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Warrant Declaration of Site Area Emergency.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All '

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.S.2-1 Other conditions exist which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director indicate actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public.

BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but

hat warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director to fall under the emergency class description for Site Area j Emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUhfARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, HS3 ,

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McGuire Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY GENERAL EMERGENCY ,

t 4.7.G.1 Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Warrant Declaration of General Emergency. }

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.G.1-1 Other conditions exist which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director indicate: (1) actual or imminent substantial core degradation with potential for loss of containment, or (2) potential for uncontrolled radionuclide releases. These releases can reasonably be expected to exceed Environmental Protection Agency Protect Action Guideline levels outside the site boundary.

BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director to fall under the General Emergency class.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 0U92. HG2 l l

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ATTACHMENT 5 Revised McGuire Procedure RP/0/A/5700/00 i

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RP/0/A/5700/00 Page1 of2  ;

DUKE POWER COMPANY MCGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE "

CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY  !

1.0 SYMPTOMS .

1 1.1 Notification of Unusual Event 1.1.1 Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

1.1.2 No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or j monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety  ;

systems occurs.

l 1.2 Alen l 1.2.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

1.2.2 Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

I 1.3 Site Area Emergency 1.3.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public.

1.3.2 Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except near the site boundary.

I 1.4 General Emergency 1.4.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity.

l 1.4.2 Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective .

l Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

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RP/0/A/5700/00 Page 2 of 2 '!

- 2.0 - IMMEDIATE ACTION $

l 2.1 Determine operating mode that existed at the time the event occurred prior -l 5

to any protection system or operator action initiated in response of the )

event. .;

i 2.2 If the plant was in Mode 1-4 and a valid condition affects fission product l barriers, then proceed to Enclosure 4.1.-  ;

2  !

2.3 If the condition does not affect fission product barriers, then review the l i listing of enclosures to determine if the event is applicable to one of the '

categories shown.

i i 2.4 Compare actual plant conditions to the Emergency Action Levels listed, l

then declare the appropriate Emergency Class as indicated.

2.5 Implement the applicable Emergency Response Procedure (RP) for that  !

classification and continue with subsequent steps of this procedure..  !

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- Notification of Unusual Event RP/0/A/5700/01 Alert RP/0/A/5700/02 Site Area Emergency RP/0/A/5700/03 General Emergency RP/0/A/5700/04 i

3.0 SUBSEOUENT ACTIONS 3.1 To escalate, de-escalate, or terminate the Emergency, compare plant conditions to the Initiating Conditions of Enclosures 4.1 through 4.7, i 3.2 Refer to enclosure 4.9, Emergency Declaration Guidelines, as needed.

4.0 ENCLOSURES 1

4.1 Fission Product Barrier Matrix 4.2 Systems Malfunctions 4.3 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Efiluent 4.4 Loss of Shutdown Functions 4.5 Loss of Power

. 4.6 Fires / Explosions and Security Events 4.7 Natural Disasters, Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety 4.8 Definitions / Acronyms 4.9 Emergency Declaration Guidelines

RP/0/Af5700100 Enclosure 4.1 Page 1 of 3 MCGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Use EALs to determine Fission Product Barrier status (Intact, Potential Loss, or Loss). Add points for all 3 barriers. Classify accofding to the table below.

Note 1: This table is only applicable in Modes 1-4.

Note 2: Afso, an event (or multiple events) could occur which results in the conclusion that exceeding the Loss or Potential Loss thresholds is IMMINENT (i.e., within 1-3 hours). In this IMMINENT Loss Situation, use judgement and classify as if the thresholds are exceeded.

Unusual Event (1 - 3 Poinjts Alert (4 - 5 Points) Site Area Emersoncy (7 - 10 Points) General Emeroency (11 - 13 Points 1'-~

e Any Potenbal Loss of Cw4. mm4 o Any Potental Loss or Loss of the o Loss of both NCS and Fuel Ctad e Loss of a8 three bamers NCS e Any Loss of Containment

• Any Potential Loss or Loss of Fuel . Potenbal Loss of both NCS and Fuel e Loss of any two bamers and the Clad Ctad Potentsal Loss of the third bamer o Potental Loss of ether the NCS or Fuel Clad and Loss of any addional bamer CONTAINMENT BARRIER NCS BARRIER FUEL CLAD BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS-(1 LOSS -(3 Points) POTENTIAL LOSS-(4 LOSS-(5 Points) POTENTIAL LOSS-(4 LOSS-(5 Points)

Point) Potnts) Points) 1 CrecA Saaste Facton Stama 1. Cracal Safury Functon Staks 1. Cnhcal Safety Fincton Stama e ContanredED e P6)t g4 cath e NCS trangityM e Not mwm o Core CoahngOa9ge e Core Coc4ngM e Heat SrsJted e Heat SusM

2. Contament Condanns 232Laak Raan 2 Pnmanr Coolar:t Actv!!v level e Contanment Pressure > 15

• Rapd unexplaned decease e o tkusataseleeenceedrg to e GREATER THAN avalaoie e Ptat apphcath e Caolant Actmty GREATER contant'ent pressors tomoung capioty of one charipng purry meets capinly a edcsled THAN 300 pOAr Dose PsaG runal mcrease e te normd cfwgqimade by a tus of NCS =*meng Eemaient todme(dei)I131 o H200ncentraban > 9% unimist2mm salated e Contarnrmmt pressure or surry e Contarv,ent pressure gnaatar levelresconse not consstert te 3 psq ee less man one we LOCA condmons M tran of NS suf a RCARF opptog

i RP10/A15700/00 Enclosure 4.1 Page 2 of 3 MCGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX CONTAINMENT BARRIER NCS BARRIER FUEL CLAD BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(3 Points) POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(5 Points) POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(5 Points)

(1 Point) (4 Points) (4 Points)

• Comannen isoimon vaivas sina Ana Comannwe hdanon m i sc Tabs PashFe 1 Contanment Rahaben Monkreg e setappuas e Cortamert solaeon a e Pnnwy e4ecatry leak ram

• kecmon mala SG s e Not agicable e Contanrut raiston mantr suxyrpete arut a nuease pam e to capa:Wy d one Ruptwed arut has a Non- 51 A or 518 rearg >117 R9r torn oordanmert easts earyng pwg a ma normal hdable seconday knelault cfurpng mode we letbum molded e Indemon M a SGis Ruptured and a proenged nnease dcontrunated escandarycontat a occumng hrn the anecied SG e to envranment

4. SG Secnndary Sde Raisass W tt Pnmary t> Socardary Laakage 4. Contanment Ra6aban ahnsonng 4. Emergercy Counkakr! EOF Drectr Jw e see =W *=

• RWease d seconday sase e e NotapphcatWe e Not arke e Any cordton eclueng mabMy e nuvlJr he baW, $2 m to opnen d armaphore with pnmay b to Emergency CoordmatriOF Ovecer secanes LOSS or POTENTIAL samndary Isaage GREATER LOSS d to FuelQad bamer THAN Tech Spec anomale DD i Sagn6 cant Rahaa:kve invenson, in Con:anment 5 Emergency CoordmakrTOF Dreckr Jumpamard e Contament Rai nbner o Not appiche Any mndson, mciudmg mabMy m maner me bamer. Ihm in te opnen d te EIAF51 A or 51B Ernergency CoortnatrEOF Drector irdcams LOSS or POTENTIAL LOSS d Raatng @ eme smcs te NCS bamer.

shueso=n

>470 R#r 0 0 0 5 hr DD

>170 Rmr @ 0 5 2 hr

>125RAr @ 2 4 hr

> 90 Rmr 0 4 8 hr

> 53 RAr @ > 8 hr

RP/0/A/5700/00 Enclosure 4.1 Page 3 of 3 MCGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX CONTAINMENT BARRIER NCS BARRIER FUEL CLAD BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(3 Points) POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS - (5 Points) POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(S Points)

(1 Point) _

(4 Points) (4 Points)

E n m osens e Owe czoeng RED pam e o Na spphte rocaind kr > 15 em L E=rnorre Coireemer lEOF DrearJaisemara e any acroom resong % e aeror to tevr. em vi ee wren d me Emerprey OxrchnstrEOF Dructs rocaen a LOSS cr POTENTIAL LOSS d be Qinhmport barner DO NOTE: Take hghest points for each barrier and add together in chart below. Do not take more than one number for each barrier. "Not applicables* are included in this table as place holders only, and no points are assigned.

Containment TOTAL POINTS NCS 1-3 Unusual Event 4-6 Alert Fuel Clad 7-10 Site Area Emergency 11-13 General Emergency Total Points

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE RPMWA/5700f00 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.2 '

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION Page 1 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EIAERGENCY ggNJEAL EIEWIGENCY END

1. Insbety to Reech Required Shutdown 1. C. , _ f Loos of RBoot or AM Safety 1. Instmity to IBonitor a SignsRcent VUlthin Technical SpeelReason Limits. System Annunciamon or indicamon in Treno6ert in Progrees.

Control Room VWith Either(1) a OPERATING ISODE. 1,2,3.4 Signmcant Transient in Progrees, or (2) OPERATING RIODE: 1, 2, 3. ',

Compensatory Non-Alarmmg

• Plant is not brought to requwed operahng Indicators UneveMatne e The fotowog controons r.zat rnode within Techrucal Specdicabons LCO Achon Staterne st Time - OPERATING MDOE. 1.2,3,4 Loss of tr9st (>50%) annunciators see' with safety systems.

2. Unplanned Loos of Recot or All Safety . The fonounng conddens east System Annunciation or indication in AND the Control Room for Groeter Then Unplanned loss of most (>50%)

15 Itinutes. annuncators assooeted with safety A significant plant transient is in systems for greater than 15 rrunutes. progress.

OPERATING ISODE. 1.2,3,4 AND AND e The fonoweg condeons emet.

In the opwuon cf the Operatens Shdt Loss of the OAC.

Unplanned loss of most (>50%) Manager / Emergency annunostors assocated wth safety Coordnator/ EOF Drector, the loss of AND systems for greater than 15 mmutes. the annunostors or indecators requees addebonal personnel triabihty to provide manual montonng AND (beyond normal shrft -vb 4) to of any of the followeg Cribcal Safety safely operate the unit. F unciens in the opruon of the Operatens Shrft e subenbcahty Manager / Emergency AND e core coohng CoordmatorIEOF Drector, the loss of e heat sink the annunostors or indicators EITHER of the following e contamment requires adddional personnel (beyond normat shdt comphment) to e A significant plant transient is safety operate the unit. in progress. E!$

3. Fuel Clod D., *^_ . Loss of the OAC-OPERATING R$ ODE 1,2,3,4,5 E!E o t- t w e m ree.e. w me 4 e- . w Aas.eom.eate=me

_ _ _ - _ . - - - - - _ - _ - _ - - _ _ . - - - - - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ . - _ - - _ _ - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ - - - _ - _ _ _ . _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ . - _ - . _ - _ _ _ - - - _ - - _ _ _ .- __ ~ . - - - - - - - _ - _ _ - - _ - _ _ - - -

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE RP/0/Al5700f00 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION Page 2 of 2 UNUSUAL EVEffT ALZRT SITE AREA EtERGBeCY GUWtAL ERWIGEldCY

4. neector consens syseem incs) Leekage.

OPERATueG heOOE: 1.2.3.4 e UnderMuod leakage 310 gpm ,

e Pressure bourdery leakage a to gom e identmed leakage a 25 spm S. E.. .._2 Loss of AE Onsite or Offsete Canununications.

OPERATING M.: ALL e Loss of at onsAe commumcations rapahehty (reernal phone system, PA system, onste taeo system) affectng the atzkty to perform ,

rouhne operabons.

e loss of aB offsde commurucafe.ar @hty (Selechve Segnahng, NRC FTS anes, offsde radio system, commercial phone system) affechng the stukty to communcate wth offsee authorees EE

___________________m____._m.__._._________._.________._________._________.__m_____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _m_ _ _ --_+_ _-- _ __ . - . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ -- -

RICGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE RPNWAl5700f00 ERERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.3 ABNORRAAL RAD LEVELSNtADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT Page 1 of 4 unusual Event neRT s Ts AREA sueRoenCv oEneRAL eMeRoenCv

1. Any unpsenned maissee of c-- or 1. Any unpeanned Reisene of 1. soundary pee. Reeunnie srom an 1. soundary pose Raousilne srom an Uguhl M to the e-= or Liquid M to Actual or Inuninent Roteams of Actual orInuninent Roteese el environneont that Exceeds Two Times the Environment that Exceeds 200 W Eoceeds 100 mRene Rrdloecthrity that Eaceeds 1800 Wie SLC Limits for SS Minutos or Times sie SLC Ilmets for 15 TEDE or Ost nanom COE Adult neRom TEDE er 3000 mRom COE Langer. Minutse or Longer. Thyroid for the Actual or Projected Adult Thyveld for sie Actual or i Duromon of Wee Reisees. Projected Duretten of Wie Relosos.

i OPERATING MODE. ALL OPERATING IBODE: ALL OPERATWIG IBODE: ALL OPERATWIG ISODE. ALL e : A weild indcation on redishon monitor . A valid innte=hnn on redishon monitor EMF- 49L. EMF-44L or EMF-31 (when EMF-49H of 21. 56 E + 03 com for 315 . A valid indcohon on redishon e A valid indeshon on reenhon shgned to RC) of 2 5.45E+06 com for160 mmunes or wil hkely conhnue for 215 monitor EMF-36H of 3 5.63 E + 03 montor EMF-36H of 3 5.63 E + 04 -

mmutes or we hkely conbnue for 2 63 rrunutes which indicates that the release (pm sustomed for 215 mmutes cpm ==*==ied fort 15 minutes minutes which indicates that the release may have eur== dad the enlushng may have exceeded the initietmg conditure and indicates the need to e Dose assessment team calculebons e Dose assessment team calculebons condsten and indentes the need to assess the release with promdure indicate dose consequences greater mdcate dose consequenms greater assess the release wth procedure HP/OS/1009/10. HP/0/B/1009/29.or than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mRom Ben 1000 rnRom TEDE or 5000 HP106/1009/10, HP/OS/1009/29. or HP/0/B/1009/20 CDE Adult Thyroid at the site mrem CDE Adult Thyroid at the site HP/OSI1000/20 boundary boundary

. A vanid indcahon on radiabon rnondor e A valid mdcahon on radiaton mondor EMF- 36L of 2 3 00E+06 cpm for115 . Analysis of field survey results or . Analysis of field survey results or EMF- 36L of 2 3 00E+04 com for 3 60 mmutes or we likely continue for 215 field survey samples indcates dose field survey samples mdestos dose mmutes or we likely conhnue for 2 60 rrunutes which indecotes that the release consequences greater than 100 consequences grooter than 1000 rnmules whch indicates that the release may have errmatted the inihahng mRom TEDE or 500 mRom CDE mRom TEDE or 5000 mRom CDE may have exceeded the iruhahng condihon and indicates the need to Adut Thyroid at the site boundary Adult Thyroid at the site 1 - 2,.

conditen and indicates the need to assess the release with procedure assess the release with procedure HP/OS/1009/10, HP/0/B/1009/29, or Note 1: These EMF readege are calculated Note 1: These EMF readings are calculated HP/0/B/1009/10, HP/OS/1009/29, or HP/OS/1009'20 bened on average annual meteorology, site based on average annual meteorology, site HP/0/B/1009/20 boundary dose rate, and design unit vent flow boundary does rate, and design unit vont flow

= Gaseous emuent bemg released exceeds rate. Calcuishons by the does assessment rate. Calcutshons by the does assessment e A valid indicaten on radiaton monitor 200 times the level of SLC 16.11-1 for 3 team use actuel ., ___ ;e y,v veloose durabon. team use actual meteorology, release durabon.

EMF-31 (when abgned to WC or WWCB) 15 rrunutes as determmed by RP and urnt vent flow rate. Therefore, these EMF and unit vent flow rete. Therefore, these EMF of 2 9.174 E+03 com for 2 60 m %s or procedure readings should not be used if dose readmgs should not be used if dose wd hkely contmue for 2 60 minutes wty? assessment toom calcuishons are available. assessment team calculohons are available.

andcates that the release rnay have e Liquid effluent being released exceeds ear ==re=d the wuhatang condsen and 200 times the level of SLC 1611-6 for 3 s*=smo see nood to aseees the setenee 15 mnutes as decomuned by RP

.* -%,. wom ioom io tir-e ee- 9 en. 9 Es ie w HP 4 & NUwlb

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE RP10/A/5700/00 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosufe 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT Page 2 of 4 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AfIEA EMERGENCY GE9ERAL ERERGENCY e Geseous emuert berg reiseeed escueds Note: Note 2 Note 2 two tones SLC 1611 1 for 180 moutes as if the mormor reedog a sustomed foe the tune if dose messeemert team +% cannot if done aseeeemort teem +h cannot determmed by Redskr=1 PrW (RP) penod indcated in the EAL NQ the requred be composted ki 15 mmutes, then valid montar be completed ti15 mW then vehd monRot procedure Ws (procedureem=* ions) cannot be reeeng should be used for emergency feedng should be used for emergency completed unthm thes tune penod, declarahon closeWicoten. class 2cahon e Lique emuert bang reeeemed - two must be made bened on me vasid romahan bmes SLC 16.11-6 for180 mruAss as maritor reedmg E!G M determmed by RP prar=6 e

2. Ma6er Demoge to Irradiated Fuel or Note: Loss of Water Level that Has cr Will Result in the Uncevering of if the rnonator readog is sustained for the bme treadiated Fue4 Outside the Reactor penod indcated m the EAL MQ the requred Vessel assessr. wets (procedure calculatens) cannot be completed vnthm this bme penod. Wen OPERATING MODE: ALL must be made booed on the valed radetion enonsor reedsng e An unplanned valid inp 11 alarm on any of the folkwng redation mordors:

2. Une spected increase in Plant Radiaten or Aarborne Concentration. Spent Fuel Bud &ng Refueling Bndge 1 EMF-17 2 EMF-4 OPERATING MODE. ALL Spent Fuel Pool Ventdeten e Indcaten of uncontrolled water level 1 EMF-42 decrease of greater than 6 inches in the 2 EMF-42 reactor refueling cavity unth a5 irradated fuel assembhes remanwng covered by water. Reactor Buildog Refuehng Bndge 1 EMF-16 e L5contromed water level decrease of 2 EMF-3 greater than 6 inches in the spent fuel pool and fuel transfer canal vnth aE irradeled fuel Contanment Noble Gas Monitor assembhes remainmg covered by water. 1 EMF-39 2 EMF-39 e Unptenned value eres EMF reeeng n reseen sur a estaar or 1000 ower nurmas

=

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE RPfefAl578tf00 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclostste 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT Page 3 of 4 UNWSIML EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EIERGENCY GEBetAL EtEREM30CY 4

. Plant personnd report that waner love drop in rescsor remshng cmey, apart fuel pool, or u transser canal has or -

unE exceed mamup r7 y8 such that anyirraduled euelunE become uncovered.

. NC system wate range level <358 inches ener inhoton of NC syneem W

AND Any irredeled fuel seesmtdy not cepetde of being W irto spent fuel pool or reactor weseel ABC KF-122 cannot be closed.

3. Release of Radsoccteve Material or increenes in Radiation Levels Withen the Facihty Ttat impedes Operation of Systems Requered to assintain see Operations or to Estatshsh or Masntaen Coed Shutdown.

OpERATWsG MODE. ALL

. Vatid reseng on EMF-12 yet*w then 15 mRMr in the Control Room.

. Valid irwerahnn of reeshon levels greater then 15 mRMr in the Central Alarm Stahon (CAS) or Seconcey l Alarm Stahan (SAS) l l

i

_ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . . . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . . _ -. . . . . . . ., ~_=, _. .__ _.,._-. - _- _ . , , - _ _ . . . _ _ _ , . . . , -

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE RP/0/N570040 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosum 4.3 ,

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELSIRADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT Page 4 of 4 UNU$UAL EVENT ALERT NTE AftEAERENGENCY

. Radahnry lggglg in grggg ggquygg infrequert arr=== are such that tasks needed to mortem safe operebens or

• to 6 or mesitam cold shutdoom cannot be performed vnthm normal arn f=8-=ml P-e irnes of 5 Rem per year TEDE.

EEEl t

i t

i I

i 5

i 4

_ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ __ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ __m ____ _____m______ __

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE RP/0/A/570000 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS Page 1 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT STE AREA EMERGENQY GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. Failure of Reactor Protection System 1. Failure of Reactor Protection System 1. Failure of the Reector Protection Instrumentation to Complete or initiate instrumentation to Complete or initiate System to Cornplete an Automatic Trip an Automatic Reactor Trip Once a en Automatic Reactor Trip Once a and Manual Trip was NOT Successful Reactor Protection System Setpoint Reactor Protection System Setpo8nt and There is indication of an Extreme Has Been Exceeded and Manual Trip Has Been Exceeded and Manual Trip Challenge to the Atety to Cool the Was Successful Was NOT Successful Core.

OPERATING MODE. 1,2,3 OPERATING MODE. 1 OPERATING MODE: 1

. The followog cordbons exist . The fotowing conditions exist . The foRowing conditions exist Valid reactor trip signal recewed or Valid reactor trip signal recetved or Valid reactor trip segnal received or required and automatic ree&r mp required and at.4omate reactor trip required and automatic reactor trip was not successful. was not successful. was not successful.

AND AND AND Manual reactor inp from the control Manual reactor inp from the control Manual reactor tnp from the control room is successful and reactor room was not successfulin reducing room was not successfulin reducing power is less than 5% and reactor power to less than 5% and reactor power to less than 5% and decreasing- decreasing. decreasing.

2. Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold 2. Complete Loss of Function Needed to AND Shutdown. Achieve or Maintain Hot Shutdown.

EITHER of the tollovnng conditions OPERATING MODE: 5, 6 OPERATING MODE. 1,2,3,4

. Core Cookng CSF-RED

. Totalloss of NO and/or RN and/or KC . Subcriticality CSF-RED

. Heat Sink CSF-RED AND . Core Cooling CSF-RED END One of the following: . Heat Sink CSF-RED e inabihty to maintain reactor coolant o

temperature below 200 F.

. Uncontro: led reactor coolant temperature o

rise to >180 F.

EtiD

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE RPMA/5700N10 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.4 -

LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS . Page 2 of 2 '

UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GDERAL EBERGENCY

3. Loos of Water Levet in the Reactor Vessel That Has or WHI Uncover Fuel in the Reector Vessel OPERATING MODE: 5,6

• Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdoum cond6 tons.

APD Lower range Reactor Vessel Level Irdcanon System (RVLIS) decreasing after inmaton of NC system makeup.

. Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown condrbons.

Afe Beactor Coolant (NC) system nanow range levelless than 6 inches and decreasing after initiaton of NC system makeup.

. Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold stwtdown condrbons.

AND Either train ultrasonic leve i indication less than 6 inches and'Acreasing after initation of NC system makeup.

E!E

• _ _ _ _ _ _ .__m.____ . _ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ . __ _ _ _ . _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ , _ . _ _ . . - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ __-m.- _ _ m ._ ____-_m__, -

_ -._.-m,.e+--._,m , .. ,, . , . . - - , . . . . - - - - . ~,-w:,,-me-, ,, g -w -~ , se ea y,---,.,

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE RP10fA1570040 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.5 LOSS OF POWER ' Page 1 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA ERIERGENCY GENERAL ERIERGENCY

1. Loos of AN Oneito Power to 1. Loss of AN OWane Power and Loos 1. Loos of AN OWeite Power and Loos 1. Prolonged Loos of All(OWeite and Esseneel Bueses for Groeter Then of All Onsite AC Power to of AR Onsite AC Power to Onone) AC Power.

15 Reinutes Essential Buseos During Cold Esseneal Buseos.

Shutdown Or Refueling RAods. OPERATING RsDDE. 1,2,3,4 OPERATING B000E. 1,2,3,4 OPERATING B000E: 1,2,3,4 OPERATING 8000E. 5,S,NoRAode . Prolonged loss of at offste and

. The fonowmg condtons exrst . Loss of aE offsite and onste AC onsde AC power as indacated ty

. Loss of a5 offsde and onsee AC power as indicated by:

Loss of offsde power to essental power as indicoled ty Loss of power on essentia; buses buses ETA and ETB for greater than Loss of power on essentral buses ETA and ETB for greater than 15 15 mmutes. Loss of power on essential buses ETA and ETB. mmutes.

ETA and ETB.

AND AND AND AND Both emergency desel generators Failure to restore power to at ' east Standby Shutdown Faciidy (SSF) are supplymg power to theer Failure to restore power to at least one essential bus wthin 15 mmutes. faits to supply NC pump seal respedrve essential busses one essential bus wthe 15 minutes. meecten OR CA supply to Steam

2. Loss of All Vital DC Power. Generators.

OPERATING RAODE. 5,6, No R$ ode 2. AC power to essential busses reduced to a single power source OPERATING RAODE. 1,2,3,4 AND

. The followmg condcons exist for greater than 15 minutes such that an additional single failu o . The followeg conddions exist At least one of the following Loss of offste power to essential could result in station blackout. conddions exist buses ETA and ETB for greater than Loss of both una related EVDA and 15 mmutes. OPERATING 4000E 1,2,3,4 EVDD busses as indicated by bus . Restoraten of at least one voltage less than 110 VDC. essential bus wthin 4 AND e The following condcon exists: hours is NOTIAely.

AC power capabildy has been AND One emergency diesel generator is degraded to one essential bus . Indication of contmumg supp!ymg power to its respective powered from a smgle power source Failure to restore power to at least degradaten of core cooing essential bus. for > 15 min. due to the loss of all but one required DC bus within 15 based on Fission Product one of: minutes from the time ofloss. Bamer monitoring.

SATA SATB END END ATC ATD DGA DG B E!!9

RSCGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE RPf0lA1570tWOO ERAERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.5 LOSS OF POWER Page 2 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EmunnGEnCV

2. C. . ..J Loos of Required DC Power During Cold Shutdown or RefueHng Mode for Geester then ,

is Innuess.

OPERATING ISODE: 5, 6

= The fonounng condsbons exst Unplanned loss of both und rotated d

EVDA and EVDO busses as indicated by bus voRage less than 110 VDC.

AND FaAre to restore power to at least one requwed DC bus withe 15 rnmutes from the time of loss.

END l

l

RACGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE RPf0 fat 5700N10

^

ERAERGENCY ACTION LEVELS - EnclostNo 4.6 FIRE / EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS Page 1 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA ENY GEW EtERGEfeCY

1. Fire Whhin Prh Area Boundary 1. Fire or Expecolon Aflecting the 1. Security Event in a Plant Vital Area. 1. Securtly Event Raou11tng in Lees Of .

Not Extinguished WIthin 15 tilnutes of OperatWNey of Plant Safety Systems Ability to Roach and IAsintain Cold

% or Emplosion Within the Required to Fat =M=% or RAsintain Safe OPERATIIGG ISODE: ALL Shutdoum.

Protected Area Soundary. Shutdoum.

.- Intrusen mto any of the follounng plant OPERATING RIOOE. ALL OPERATING MODE. ALL OPERATING RIDOE. 1,2,3,4,5,6 stees by a hostile force:

• Roador Buikhng . Loss of physcal control of the control e Fire in any of the follounng areas not . The follounng constens exist:

• Auxiliary Buildmg room due to somnty evert extingushed unthen 15 minutes of control

• Diesel Generator Rooms room notificaten or wennceton of a Fire or . ,-_ _ _ . in any of the follounng

• Control Room . Loss of physicalcontrolof the SSF and control room fire alarm. areas:

• SSF ASP due to securty event.

• Doghouses

• Reador Buildmg

• Reactor Building

• CAS E!dD_

• Auxiliary Building

• Auxiliary Building

• SAS

• Diesel Generator Rooms + Desel Generator Rooms

• Control Room + Control Room . Secunty confirmed bomb

• SSF + SSF decoveredtexploded in a vital area.

• CAS + CAS

• SAS + SAS . Security con 5rmed sabotage in a plant

• Doghouses

• FWST vital area.

• FWST + Doghouses (Appies in

• TurtHne Busiding Mode 1,2. 3. 4 only) END

= Sennce Badg.

+ Intenm Radweste Bldg.

• Equipment Stagog Bldg. AND

= Report by plant eersonnel of an One of the follouring unanticipated explosion withm protected area boundary resulting in visible . Affected safety system damage to permanent strudure or parameter indcatens show equipmert degraded performance

2. Confirmed Security Event Which e Plant personnel report visible Indicates a Potential y '-t= In the damage to permanent Level of Safety of the Plant. structures or equipment unthm the spaceed asse

%es tm ure woe o r e ar e nosos to t tm a%eed e aesmaged e ww to esseh i

= wrese

_ _ ._ _ _ -. _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ - _ . . . . - , _ _ . , . - . ., , , . . . _ -m _..

MCGURE NUCLEAR SITE RPAWAl570040 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.6 FIRE / EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS Page 2 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA ERIERGENCY GENERAL EIAERGENCY

2. Fire or Explosion Affecting the e Securty confirmed bomb mies Operabiety m Safety Syseems descovered vnthan plant Protected Area Requimd to Establish or RAsintain Safe and outsade Vaal Areas. Shutdowm.

e Hostage stuation/ extortion MMN . hM e A violent civil disturbance wehen the owner controsed area.

• The follounng condtions exist Fire or explosion in any of the fogoumg areas:

• Spent Fuel Pool

• Auxikary Building AND One of the following'

• Spent Fuel Poollevel and/or temperature show degraded performance

. Flant personnel report visible damage to permanent structures or equipment supporting spent fuel pool W

Note: Only one train of a system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy this condition.

i i

______.__-._____m_ -

_ r-.. .r- ~ -v--

RACGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE RPMAtS70040 ERAERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.6 FRE/ EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS Page 3 of 3 U88 USUAL N ALERT W AftEA 6 N EEERQEMCY

3. Security Event in a Plant Proescted Area.

OPERATING MODE: ALL e intrusion into plant Protected Aree by a hostee force.

M ,

h i

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE RP/0/N5700f00 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosufe 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS, AND OTHER CONDITIONS Page 1 of 3 AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UIqgASUAL EVENT A12RT SITE AREA ERERGENCY N ERERGENCY

1. Natural and Destrucem Phenomena 1. Netwal and Destructive Phenomene 1. Control Room Evacushen Hos Been 1. Other Cenemens Esisting WMch in the Anecting the Preseened Area. Anecting the Plord Vital Ares. Indheted and Plant Control cannet to Judgement of the Emergency Estalmohed. CoorenstorEOF Director Warrant OPER'1 TING MODE. ALL OPERATING MODE: ALL Doctoration of General E m _ y.

OPERATING MODE: ALL e Tremor fee and vehd alarm on the " strong . Vahd *0BE Exceeder Alarm on 1 AD- OPERAT30G MODE: ALL motion N* 13.E7 . The fosoenng condsons esset:

. Other constens einst which in the e Tremor fet and vakd alarm on the

• Peek . Tomado or high winds: Control Room evacuebon has been '- -4 of the E..-,

. er shock annunciator" iniheted per AP/1(2yA/5500f17.. Coordmetor/ EOF Desclar tr**. (t)

Tomado stnking plant structures wthm ar*=I or imminert substartel core e Report by plant personnel of tomado stnkmg the vital aren AND degradshon with potereal for loss of withe protected area boundary contammert, or (2) potertet for uncertrolled

. Reactor Buddog Control of the plant cannot be redenuclNje releases. These reteeses can e Vehscle crash into plant structures or . Auxiliary Buddmg estabbshed from the ASP or the SSF reasonably be expected to exceed systems wenn protected area boundary . FWST unthe 15 meutes Erwronmental Protecbon Agency Proledwe

. Diesel Generator Rooms Achon Guidehne levels outside the one e Report of turtune fadure resultog m caseg . Control Room 2. Other Conditions Existing Wluch in the boundary penetrahan or damage to turtune or . SSF -- , - -.; of the Emergency generator seats. . Doghouses CoorthnatorEOF Director Warrant E!E

. CAS Declaration of Site Area Emergency

2. Release of Tonic or Flammable Gases . SAS Deerned Detrimental to safe Operation OPERATING MODE: ALL of the Plant. OR

. Other condshons exist whichin the OPERATING MODE: ALL sustamed unnds 2 60 mph for > 15 Judgement of the Emergency trunutes. Coordnator/ EOF Drector educate actual or e Report or detection of toxic or flammable likely maior failures of plant funchons gases that could enter withm the aste area . Turtune fahre generated trussiles, vehicle needed for protechon of the public.

boundary in amounts that can affect safe crashes or other catast$uc events operation of the plant. causmg visible structural damage on any of E!E the following plant structures i

1

- , -, _. -- - - _ ~.

I MCGU:RE NUCLEAR SITE RPMA/570040 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS - Enclosesre 4.7 L NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS, AND OTHER CONDITIONS Page 2 of 3 AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT SITE AREA EREHEElfCY (MIEftAL ERElt1EldCY UIWSUAL EVENT e Report by I ar=1 Courvy or State Omensis . Reactor Ekskerig for potenhol se of see pereennel . Atomary Buiktng bened on ansee evert . FWST

. Diesel Generator Rooms

3. Other Canetsons Emissing Wilhicts in the . Corerol Room .

Judgement of the Emergency . SSF CoennnesorEOF Dwecnor Warras . Doghouses Doctorationof anUnassualEvent. . CAS

. SAS OPERATW8G B000E: ALL . Unenste heat sink (Stwidby Nuclear Senace Water Pond e Other condibons esent which in the Dem and Dikes and comen's judgement of the Emergency Ford Dem and associated Dihes)

Coordinator / EOF Deector ewhcate a potenhol dem of the level of safety of 2. 8te4 ease of Tomic or Florvenable Genes the plant. Within a Facility Structwe Which Jeopardares Operation of Systems EMI Reaguered to IAamtain Safe Operations or to Estatheh or Maintaan Cold Shutdown.

OPERATW8G BAODE: ALL

. Report or detection of toxic gases wehin a Facehty Structure in concentrahons that wW be his threatenrig to plant personnet

. Report or detecbon of flammable gases within a Facery Structure in concentrabons that will effect the safe operatiert of the plant.

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._ ~. - - _ . . - . - -

. . _ _ _ = . . ..

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE RP/0/A/5700f00 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4,7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS, AND OTHER CONDITIONS Page 3 of 3 AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UptlSUAL EVENT SITE AREA EhERGENCY GE3ERAL EINJtGE90CY ALERT Strudures for the aturve EALs:

. Reactor BJdng

. Aummary suk8ng .

. Desel Generator Rooms

. Control Room

. SSF

. Doghouses

. CAs

. SAS

3. Control Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated.

OPERATING MODE: ALL i

. Control Room evacuation has been nested per APit(2yA/5503/17.

4. Other Conditions Existing Which in the

- _ . .. .. of the Ernergency

^ ^

CoordinatorfEOF Derector Warrant Declaration of an Alert.

OPERATING MODE: ALL

= Other condshons emst wNch in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordnatos/ EOF Drector indicate that plant safety systems may be degraded and that meressed monitanno of piant functons is werranted l

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. RP/0/A/5700/00

ENCLOSURE 4.8  :

Page l of 3 >

. DEFINITIONS / ACRONYMS j ALERT- Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential l substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA protective action guideline exposure level. .

ALL (As relates to Operating Mode Applicability)- At all times i

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! BOMB- A fused explosive device

. CIVIL DISTURBANCE - A group of ten (10) or more people violently protesting station

! operations or activities at the site. A civil disturbance is considered to be violent when l force has been used in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage plant property. i

- EXPLOSION - A rapid, violent unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of  !

pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage  ;

q permanent structures, systems or components.

! EXTORTION - An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat of force.  :

i- 1 FIRE - Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of i flames is preferred but is NOT required iflarge quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

I GENERAL EMERGENCY- Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of

containment integrity, Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA protective action guideline exposure levels outside the Site Boundary.

HOSTAGE - A person or object held as leverage against the site to ensure demands will be met by the site.

INABILITY TO DIRECTLY MONITOR - Operational Aid Computer data points are unavailable or gauges / panel indications are not readily available to the operator.

INTRUSION / INTRUDER - Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization. l PROTECTED AREA - Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security j perimeter fence.

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1 RP/0/A/5700/00 f ENCLOSURE 4.8 Page 2 of 3 i

RUPTURED (As relates to Steam Generator) - Existence of primary to secondary _ leakage

]

of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE - Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment ,

with the intent to render the equipment unavailable, i SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT- An unplanned event involving one or more of the j following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load i rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip, (4) Safety Injection i l

SITE AREA EMERGENCY - Events are in process or have occurred which involve l actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public. l Any releases are NOT expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA protective  !

action guideline exposure levels outside the Site Boundary. J SITE BOUNDARY.- That area, including the prot:cted area, in which Duke Power  !

Company has the authority to control all activities, including exclusion or removal of i personnel and property.

SLC - Selected Licensee Commitments l TOXIC GAS - A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason ofinhalation or skin contact (e.g. chlorine)

UNCONTROLLED - Event is not the result of planned actions by the plant staff.

UNPLANNED - An event or action is UNPLANNED ifit is not the expected result of nonnal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNUSUAL EVENT- Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

VALID - An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by: (1 ) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or i redundant instrumentation, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel such that doubt ded to the instrument's operability, the condition's existence or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment.

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RP/0/A/5700/00 .

ENCLOSURE 4.8 l Page 3 of 3 ,

VITAL AREA - Areas within the PROTECTED AREA that house equipment important for nuclear safety. Access to a VITAL AREA is allowed only if an individual has been  ;

authorized to be in that area.

VIOLENT - Force has been used in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage plant  !

property.

VISIBLE DAMAGE - Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable j without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or j component. Example damage: defonnation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration,  :

I rupture, cracking, paint blistering.

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RP/0/A/5700/00 J ENCLOSURE 4.9  :

i Page 1 of 2 l

. EMERGENCY DECLARATION GUIDELINES  ;

THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE IS TO BE USED BY THE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR i IN ASSESSING EMERGENCY CONDITIONS.

e The Emergency Coordinator shall review all applicable initiating events to ensure proper  !

classification.

' l e - The BASIS Document (located in Section D of the McGuire Nuclear Site Emergency Plan) is  !

! available for review if any questions arise over proper classification.

• If an event occurs on more than one unit concurrently, the event with the higher classification will be classified on the emergency notification form. Information relating to the problem on 4

. the other unit will be captured on the emergency notification form. j e If an event occurs, and a lower or higher plant operating mode is reached before the I classification can be made, the classification shall be based on the mode that existed at the .f time the event occurred.

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• The fission product barrier matrix is applicable only to those events that occur at hot j shutdown or higher. An event that is recognized at cold shutdown or lower shall not be i classified using the fission product barrier matrix. Reference would be made to the additional enclosures that provide emergency action levels for specific events (e.g. severe weather, fire, security).

e if a transient event should occur, the following guidance is provided.

1. Some emergency action levels specify a specific duration. For these EALs, the classification is made when the Emergency Coordinator assessment concludes that the specified duration is exceeded or will be exceeded (i.e. condition cannot be ro onably corrected before the duration elapses), whichever is sooner.

A

2. If a plant condition exceeding EAL criteria is corrected before the specified duration time is exceeded, the event is NOT classified by that EAL. Lower Severity EALs, if any, shall be reviewed for possible applicability in these cases.

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3. If a plant condition exceeding EAL criteria is not recognized at the time or' occurrence, but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g. as a result of routine log or rec .d review) and the condition no longer exists, an emergency ,

shall NOT be declared. Reporting under 10CFR50.72 may be required. Such a l condition could occur, for example, if a follow-up evaluation of an abnormal condition uncovers evidence that the condition was more severe than earlier believed.

J

RP/0/A/5700/00 ENCLOSURE 4.9 i Page 2 of 2

. 4. If an emergency classification was warranted, but the plant condition has been  ;

corrected prior to declaration and notification, the Emergency Coordinator must consider the potential that the initiating condition (e.g. Failure of Reactor Protection System) may have caused plant damage that warrants augmenting the  !

on-shift personnel via activation of the Emergency Response Organization. The following are applicable:

a. For UNUSUAL EVENTS, the condition shall be reported. The event may be terminated in the same notification or in a follow-up notification. i r

b. For ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY, and GENERAL EMERGENCY, the event shall be declared and the emergency response organization activated.  :

DETERMINATION OF " EVENT TIME" (TIME THE 15 MINUTE CLOCK STARTS)

1. If plant conditions require implementation of EP/l or 2/A/5000/E0 (Reactor Trip or t Safety Injection), increased emphasis shall be given to evaluation of plant conditions for determination of EAL(s) when "kickout" of the diagnostic procedure occurs. " Event i Time" is the time at which the EAL(s) is Cermined.

2. If plant conditions do not require implementation of EP/l or 2/A/5000/E0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection), and conditions of a specific EAL are met, the " Event Time" is the time at which the EAL(s) is determined. ,

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3. The time the event is classified shall be entered on the initial emergency notification form.

MOMENTARY ENTRY INTO A HIGHER CLASSIFICATION If, while in an emergency classification, the specified EALs of a higher classification are met momentarily, and in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator are not likely to recur, the entry into the higher classification must be acknowledged. Acknowledgment is performed as follows:

If this condition occurs prior to the initial notification to the emergency response organization and off site agencies, the initial message should note that the site is currently in the lower classification, but had momentarily met the criteria for the higher classification. It should also be noted that plant conditions have improved and stabilized to the point that the criteria for the higher classification are not expected to be repeated.

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1 ATTACHMENT 6 Selected Pages from

• Critical Safety Function Status Trees i

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f MNS CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES PAGE NO.

EP/1/A/5000/F-0 Core Cooling - Page 1 of 1 Re

• 2 RVLIS Table

" REACTOR VESSEL D/P" SETPOINTS FOR DEGRADED CORE COOLING Required " REACTOR VESSEL 0/P" TRN A TRN B Number of With 1A NC Pump With IC NC Pump NC Pumps On ON OFF ON OFF 4 44% N/A 44% N/A 3 30% 24% 30% 24%

2 23% 15% 23% 15%

1 16% 10% 16% 10%

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MNS CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES PAGE NC.  :

EP/1/N5000/F-0 Heat Sink - Page 1 of 1 6 of 11 Rev.2 1 a,

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