ML20137M790
| ML20137M790 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point |
| Issue date: | 03/27/1997 |
| From: | Sylvia R NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NMP2L-1698, NUDOCS 9704080180 | |
| Download: ML20137M790 (8) | |
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NIAGARA MOHAWK
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G E N E R ATIO N BUSINESS GROUP 8 Zs3 March 27,1997 cecmc cewem NMP2L 1698 ChiefibCleaf Officer i
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk l
Washington, DC 20555 RE:
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Docket No. 50-410 NPF-69
Subject:
Requestfor Enfonement Discretion to Technical Specification 3.0.3 Requirements Gentlemen:
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On March 27,1997, at 1550 hours0.0179 days <br />0.431 hours <br />0.00256 weeks <br />5.89775e-4 months <br />, following discussions with the NRC Staff, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) was granted enforcement discretion with respect to Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3. The purpose of this letter is to document the basis of the verbal request and to request written confirmation of the enforcement discretion that was granted.
Niagara Mohawk requests enforcement discretion from the requirements of TS 3.0.3. A failure to meet certain response time testing surveillance requirements forced the entry into l
Required Action 3.3.3.b and by reference Table 3.3.3-1. However, inappropriate wording in a previous amendment application that changed Action 36 of Table 3.3.3-1 has resulted in the Action Statements not addressing the present plant condition of more than one inoperable channel per trip function in the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) drywell pressure and reactor water level instrumentation. As a result, at 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br /> on March 26,1997, Niagara j
Mohawk entered TS 3.0.3. However, in accordance with TS 4.0.3, entry into the TS 3.0.3 J
actions was delayed for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to permit the completion of the surveillance tests. The enforcement discretion which was verbally requested and granted on March 27,1997, will permit Niagara Mohawk to complete appropriate respanse time testing for the affected g()/
instrumentation without the need to expose the plant to an unnecessary shutdown.
Niagara Mohawk beneves there is less risk in extending the allowable time for completion of surveillance testing cf the instrumentation than in forcing an unnecessary plant challenge by taking the plant to cold shutdown. Attachment 1 provides Niagara Mohawk's response to the 12 criteria identified in NRC Inspection Manual 9900. These responses provide the appropriate justification for this request for enforcement discretion.
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Page 2 This request for enforcement discretion has been reviewed and approved by the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Station Operations Review Committee (SORC).
Very truly yours,
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B. Ralph Sylvia Chief Nuclear Officer BRS/AFZ/TRFilmc Attachment xc:
Mr. H. J. Miller, Regional Administrator, Region I Mr. S. S. Bajwa, Acting Director, Project Directorate I-1, NRR Mr. B. S. Norris, Senior Resident Inspector Mr. D. S. Hood, Senior Project Manager, NRR Records Management i
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION F
In the Matter of
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Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
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Docket No. 50-410
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Nine Mlle Point Nuclear Station Unit No. 2
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I AFFIDAVIT l
B. Ralph Sylvia' being duly sworn, states that he is Chief Nuclear Officer of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; that he is authorized on the part of said Corporation to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the documents attached hereto; and that all such documents are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief.
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION By Ie I-B. Ralph Sy'Ivia
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4 Chief Nuclear Officer Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day of March,1997.
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NOTAR PUBLIC P+y 6 M*D L% bly)1+]56%7
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i ATTACHMENT 1 REQUEST FOR ENM)RCEMENT DISCRETION i
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He Technical Specification or other license conditions that will be violated.
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Niagara Mohawk has determined that certain Technical Specification (TS) response time testing surveillance requirements (SR) for Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) actuation instrumentation (SR 4.3.3.3) have not been met. Specifically,.the response time for portions of the level and pressure actuation instrument channels for the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system have not been properly tested. TS i
3.3.3b states that if one or more ECCS actuation instrumentation channels is i
inoperable, Niagara Mohawk is to take the action required by Table 3.3.3-1. For this specific situation, Action 36 of Table 3.3.3-1 is applicable. Action 36 reads in part "with the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum i
OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement...". Since there are currently four inoperable channels, the condition of four inoperable channels is not covered by the action, and requires Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) to enter TS 3.0.3. Therefore, Niagara Mohawk is requesting discretionary enforcement from the requirements of TS a
3.0.3.
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De circumstances surrounding the situation, including root causes, the need for prompt action, and identification of any relevant historical events.
1 On March 26,1997, Niagara Mohawk discovered that the SR 4.3.3.3 for response time testing of the HPCS system reactor level and drywell pressure actuation instrument channe!:: had not been adequately performed. In 1993, the methodology for response time testing was changed and portions of the response time testing procedures were deleted.
Niagara Mohawk submitted an application for amendment on December 7,1992, that requested revisions to TS Section 3/4.3, " Instrumentation," to increase the surveillance test intervals and allowable out-of-service times (AOT). A change was requested for Action 36 of Table 3.3.3-1 to extend the AOT in part "a" from I hour to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. In a supplement dated April 2,1993, Niagara Mohawk changed the wording of Action 36 from "with the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement..." to "with the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement..." This change inadvertently failed to address a
. situation where more than one channel is considered inoperable. Therefore, an incorrectly worded amendment resulted in NMP2 being in a condition requiring immediate shutdown in accordance with TS 3.0.3.
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The safety basis for the request, including an evaluation of the safety significance and potential consequences of the proposed coune of action. This evaluation should include at least a qualitative risk mesessment derived from the licensee's j
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PRA.
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Niagara Mohawk has determined that response time testing for the HPCS system reactor level and drywell pressure actuation instrument channels has not been.
adequately performed. This resulted in all four instrument channels for each trip function being declared inoperable. Although the inoperability of these instrument channels results in a condition no more severe than that which currently requires declaring the HPCS inoperable, the current situation is a condition not covered by the TS, and therefore entry into TS 3.0.3 is rwe==y, requiring initiation of a plant i
shutdown within one hour.
The requirement to shut down the unit results from inappropriate wording in the l
phrasing of the TS action statement for this condition, and does not represent a potential detriment to the public health and safety. The deficient TS phrasing is not the result of any change to the plant design or operation.
Specifically, the TS action statement only addresses a situation where there is one less channel than required, while the plant is in a condition with all four channels inoperable. The action statement for the stated TS condition results in declaring HPCS i
inoperable and taking the appropriate TS action. For the HPCS inoperable condition, the TSs allow 14 days to rectify the situation.
The condition of the HPCS being inoperable has already been evaluated for the oparation of NMP2 and is reflected in TS 3.5.1 which permits up to 14 days to restore the system to operable. Therefore, not enforcing TS 3.0.3 for an additional 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> in order to complete the necessary testing of the instrumentation does not result in a condition outside that already evaluated and addressed by the TS. Furthermore, the NMP2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Evaluations [ Individual Plant Examination (IPE) and Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE)] included the HPCS i
system reliability and the plant impact associated with its inoperability. This included the consideration and quantification of system unavailability for up to 14 days as permitted under TS 3.5.1. For the current situation, the HPCS system, while administratively inoperable, is available should an event occur. While the reliability of the automatic initiation function cannot presently be absolutely assured, the overall impact on HPCS reliability is minor, and this condition has a small impact on risk.
Accordingly, the proposed course of action results in no safety significance and no potential adverse consequences.
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'Ibe basis for the licensee's conclusion that the noncompliance will not be of potential detriment to the public health and safety and that neither an unreviewed safety question nor a significant hazards consideration is involved.
Niagara Mohawk has evaluated this issue and has concluded that there is no sigmficant hazards consideration involved with the requested Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED). The significance of HPCS inoperability has already been evaluated, and the TSs allow up to 14 days to rectify the situation. Although response time testing was not adequately performed for portions of the subject instrument channels, the channel functional tests, calibrations, channel checks, and logic system functional tests for these j
instruments are believed to have been appropriately performed. Thus there is no safety i
consequence associated with the request to extend the allowable time to complete the
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instrumentation testing necessary to re-establish HPCS operability.
i Niagara Mohawk has evaluated this request using the criteria set forth in 10CFR50.92,-
and determined that it does not involve a significant hazards consideration nor an
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unreviewed safety question.
i Operation of NMP2 in accordance with the enforcement discretion will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
1 The condition of the HPCS being inoperable has already been evaluated and TS 3.5.1
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permits up to 14 days to restore the system to operable. Therefore, the action statement interval to complete the necessary testing of the instrumentation does not result in a condition outside that already evaluated and addressed by the TSs.
Accordingly, the requested enforcement discretion does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Operation of NMP2 in accordance with the enforcement discretion will not create l
the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
The condition of the HPCS being inoperable has already been evaluated and TS 3.5.1 permits up to 14 days to restore the system to operable. Therefore, granting of the requested discretionary enforcement in order to complete the necessary testing of the instrumentation does not cause any plant systems to operate in an unanalyzed condition. This request extends the time interval allowed for completion of the
' instrumentation testing necessary to restore HPCS to operability. The request does not l
extend the inoperability period for HPCS currently permitted by the TSs. Therefore, the requested enforcement discretion does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
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l Operation of NMP2 in accordance with the proposed enforcement discretion will not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
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As discussed above, the TSs permit HPCS to be inoperable for up to 14 days. As
-l described above, the enforcement discretion permitting an extension of the time allowed to complete the instrumentation testing necessary to restore HPCS operability will not extend the current TS limitation on HPCS inoperability. Accordingly, the 3
plant will remain within the TS bases for HPCS and the margin of safety is not l
affected.
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'Ibe basis for the licensee's conclusion that the noncompliance will not involve adverse consequences to the environment.
As discussed above, this enforcement discretion does not result in a significant hazards consideration. In addition, the enforcement discretion does not involve any changes in the way in which any plant systems are operated, nor does it affect the caoability of the i
associated systems to perform their intended function within the acceptance limits assumed in the plant safety analyses. Therefore, the enforcement discretion does not create a potential for significant changes in the types, or a significant increase in the amount of any effluents that may be released offsite, either during normal operation or any accident condition, nor does the proposed enforcement discretion involve a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
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Any proposed compensatory measums.
The condition of being ontside of TSs results from the performance ofinadequate response time testing and inappropriate wording in Action 36 of TS Table 3.3.3-1. As a compensatory measure, Niagara Mohawk has declared HPCS inoperable and entered the necessary action statement for TS 3.5.1. This action is appropriate when compared to the Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ITS) and the intent of the original NMP2 TSs. Other compensatory actions are being taken to minimize the potential for l
l transients while instrumentation testing is being completed. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system is being protected by precluding any maintenance activities during this period. The plant work schedule has been reviewed, and control room 4
activities and other station work that could have the potential for causing system perturbations is being minimized.
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The justification for the duration of the noncompilance.
Response time testing has started on the instrumentation and is expected to be completed within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> beginning at 1550 hours0.0179 days <br />0.431 hours <br />0.00256 weeks <br />5.89775e-4 months <br /> on March 27,1997. The condition of being outside of TSs resulted from inappropriate wording in making changes to i
Action 36 of TS Table 3.3.3-1. As described above, TS 3.5.1 permits up to 14 days to J
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Based on this, reasonable assurance exists to support continued safe operation during this 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period.
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A statement that the request has been approved by the facility organization that normally reviews safety issues.
This request for enforcement discretion was reviewed and approved by the NMP2 Station Operations Review Committee (SORC) on March 27,1997.
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'Ibe request must specifically address how one of the NOED criteria for appropriate plant conditions specified in Section B is satisfied.
NMP2 is currently operating. This enforcement discretion meets criteria 1(a) of j
4 Section B of Part 9900. Entry into TS 3.0.3 requires a plant shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Niagara Mohawk is in a 3.0.3 condition because ofinappropriate wording associated with a previous amendment to Action 36 of TS Table 3.3.3-1. The condition of HPCS being inoperable has already been evaluated and TS 3.5.1 permits up to 14 days to restore HPCS to operable. Niagara Mohawk believes there is less risk j
in continued operation than in forcing an unnecessary plant challenge by taking the plant to cold shutdown to comply with the requirements of TS 3.0.3.
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If a follow-up licensee amendment is required, the NOED request must include
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marked up TS pages showing the proposed TS changes. The actual license l
amendment request must follow within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
The duration of the discretionary enforcement will allow completion of necessary i
testing and exiting of TS 3.0.3. Therefore, Niagara Mohawk does not believe a TS j
amendment is required to resolve this issue. However, the present wording of Action 36 of TS Table 3.3.3-1 remains inadequate. Therefore, Niagara Mohawk will correct the inappropriate wording with a TS amendment request submitted on a non-emergency l
basis by June 30,1997.
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A statement that prior adoption of approved line item improvements to the TS or the ITS would not have obviated the need for the NOED request.
i Niagara Mohawk is in the process of converting to ITS. However, this condition exists because of an inappropriate wording change made by Niagara Mohawk in April 1993 when submitting a supplement to an amendment request. The relief being requested existed in the previous industry Standard Technical Specification and original NMP2 plant specific version.
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Any other information the NRC staff deems necessary before making a decision to exercise enforcement discretion.
Niagara Mohawk knows of no additional information that is necessary for processing of this request.
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