ML20137M462
| ML20137M462 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1997 |
| From: | NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137M454 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9704080095 | |
| Download: ML20137M462 (16) | |
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U.S. Nuclear Commissioa B16301%ttachment 2\\ Pap 1 MARKUP.OF PROP _QS1 HANGES Refer to the attached markup of the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications.
The attached markup reflects the currently issued revision of the Technical Specifications listed below.
Pending Technical Specifications or Technical Specification changes issued subsequent to this submittal are not reflected in the enclosed markup.
The following Technical Specifications changes are included in the attached markup:
The required test parameter for the motor driven pumpr, is increased from 1460 psid to 1468 psid (3385 feet);
4.7.1.2.1.b.1 The current parameters for the motor driven and turbine driven pumps are changed from differential pressure measured in psid to total head measured in feet; 4.7.1.2.1.b The reference to Specification 4.0.5 is moved in order to clarify that it applies e
to the testing of the motor driven and turbine driven pumps; 4.7.1.2.1.b The bases to the surveillance is changed.
B 3/4.7.1.2 i
9704080095 970331 PDR ADOCK 05000423 P
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- I - 9 6 PLApfT SYSTEMS January 3,1995 g\\.
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AttrIL1ARY FrrDWATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.2 At least three indspendent steam generator auxiliary feedwater pumps and associated flow paths shall be OPERABLE with:
Two motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, each' capable of being a.
powered from separate emergency busses, and b.
One steam turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump capable of being powered from an OPERABLE steam supply system.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTION:
With one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, restore the required a.
auxiliary feedwater pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
b.
With two auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
c.
With three auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, immediately initiate corrective action to restore at least one auxiliary feedwater pump to OPERABLE status as soon as possibir. Entry into I
an OPERATIONAL MODE pursuant to specification 3.0.4 is not persitted with three auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable.
l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i
4 4.7.1.2.1 Each auxiliary feedwater pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 31 days by:
)
1)
Verifying that each non-actomatic valve in the flow path that i
is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position; and 2)
Verifying that each auxiliary feedwater control and isolation l
valve in the flow path is in the fully open position when above 105 RATED THERMAL POWER.
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NILLSTONE - 48117 3 3/47-4 ARENDNENT No. 57.100 g
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March 4,1996
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SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(Continued)
(Ea.a d fansaae LoSp' cincation 4,c,5)
Atleastonceper92 day [sonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISfby:
b.
tot.d heo 1)
Verifying that on recircu on flow each motor-driven pump c
develops 4 : 77;r;;ti;1 ;r;;;;;; of greater than or __ equal
- 0 ;;;;;.t.;; teeted per;;;r. te :p et'.^r. 4.0.,
2)
Verifying that on recirculationfow the steam u ine-driven pump develops a(dif';r;;;;;; pre;;fctef greater than or equal
'"O
- if when the secondary steam supply pressure is (3780 L t ater t tan 800 psig. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3.
auxiliary feedwater pump starts as designed automatically upon l At least once each REFUELING INTERVAL by verifying that each c.
i receipt of an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation test signal.
For the steam turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3.
4.7.1.2.2 An auxiliary feedwater flow path to each steam generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE following each COLD SHUTDOWN of greater than 30 days prior to entering MODE 2 by verifying f1 e 'o each steam generator.
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MILLSTONE - W IT 3 3/47-5 Amendment No. JJ. Jpp,127 enes
s January 31,1995 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES SAFETY VALVES (Continued) 1 w, = Minimum total steam flow rate capability of the operable MSSVs on any one steam generator at the highest MSSV opening pressure including tolerance and accumulation, as appropriate, in 1b/sec.
For example, if the maximum number of inoperable MSSVs on any one steam generator is one, then w, should be a sussiation of the capacity of the operable MSSVs at the highest operable MSSV operating pressure, excluding the highest capacity MSSV.
If the maximum number of inoperable MSSVs per steam generator is three, then w, should be a summiation of the capacity of the operable MSSVs at the highest operable MSSV operating pressure, excluding the three highest capacity MSSVs. The following plant specific safety valve flow rates were used:
SG Safety Main Steam System Valva Number (Bank WA )
Set Pressure (psia)
Flow (1bnVhr per loop) l 1
1200 893,160 2
1210 900,607 3
1220 908,055 j
4 1230 g15,502 5
1240 g22,950
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3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM i
The OPERABILITY of the Auxiliary Feedwater System ensures that the Reactor 4
i Coolant System can be cooled down to less than 350*F from normal operating or s
accident conditions coincident with a total less-of-offsite power.
The auxiliary feedwater system is capable of delivering a total feedwater flow of 480 gpm at a pressure of 1236 psia to the entrance of at least three steam generators while allowing for (1) any spillage through the design worst-case break of the Normal feedwater line, (2)ity is sufficient to ensure thatthe des l
ure;.and (3) recirculation flow. This capac adequate feedwater flow is available to remove decay heat and reduce the Reactor 4
Coolant System temperature to less than 350'F at which point the Residual Heat Removal System may be placed into operation.
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l NI,LLSTONE - INIIT 3 B 3/4 7-2 Amendment No. 10'
' INSERT 1 A Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.2.1 verifies that each AFW pump's total head at a recirculation flow test point is greater than or equal to the required total head. This surveillance ensures that the AFW pump performance has not degraded during the operating cycle. 'Because it is undesirable to introduce cold AFW into the steam generators while they are operating, this testing is performed with recirculation flow. This test confirms one point on the pump curve and is indicative of overall performance. This test confirms component OPERABILITY, is used to trend performance, and to detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. The total head i
specified in Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.2.1 does not include a margin for f
test measurement uncertainly. This cor. sideration shall be addressed at the implementing procedure level.
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i Docket No 50-423 l
B16301 i
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Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 Proposed Revision to Technical Specification Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Surveillances (PTSCR 3-9-96)
Retyped Paaes i
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i March 1997 i
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U.S. Nuclear Commission B16301%ttachment 3\\Page 1 RETYPE OF PROPOSED CHANGES Refer to the attached retype of the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications.
The attached retype reflects the currently issued version of the Technical i
Specifications. Pending Technical Specification changes or Technical Specification changes issued subsequent to this submittal are not reflected in the enclosed retype.
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The enclosed retype should be checked for continuity with Technical Specifications prior to issuance.
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PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) b.
At least once per 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5, by:
Verifying that on recirculation flow each motor-driven pump l 1) develops a total head of greater than or equal to 3385 feet; 2)
Verifying that on recirculation flow the steam turbine-driven pump develops a t'stal head of greater than or equal to 3780 feet when the secondary steam supply pressure is greater than 800 psig. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for 2ntry into MODE 3.
c.
At least once each REFUELING INTERVAL by verifying that each auxiliary feedwater pump starts as designed automatically upon receipt of an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation test signal.
For the steam turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3.
4.7.1.2.2 An auxiliary feedwater flow path to each steam generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE following each COLD SHUTDOWN of greater than 30 days prior to entering MODE 2 by verifying flow to each steam generator.
4 MIgLSTONE-UNIT 3 3/4 7-5 Amendment No. JJ, Jpp, J77
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PLANT SYSTDis BASES i
l SAFETY VALVES (Continued) l Minimum total steam flow rate capability of the operable MSSVs w,
on any one steam generator at the highest MSSV opening pressure i
including tolerance and accumulation, as appropriate, in 1b/sec.
t For example, if the maximum number of inoperable MSSVs on any one steam generator is one, then w, should be a summation of the i
l capacity of the operable MSSVs at the highest operable MSSV operating pressure, excluding the highest capacity MSSV.
If the maximum number of inoperable MSSVs per steam generator is three, T
l then w, should be a summation of the capacity of the operable MSSVs at the highest operable MSSV operating pressure, excluding the three highest capacity MSSVs. The following plant specific safety valve flow rates were used:
I SG Safety Main Steam System Valve Number j
(Bank No.)
Set Pressure (psia)
Flow (1bs/hr per loop) j, 1
1200 893,160 l
2 1210 900,607 3
1220 908,055 1
l 4
1230 915,502 I
5 1240 922,950 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM The OPERA 8ILITY of the Auxiliary Feedwater System ensures that the Reactor Coolant System can be cooled down to less than 350*F from normal operating or l
accident conditions coincident with a total loss-of-offsite power.
1 The auxiliary feedwater system is capable of delivering a total feedwater i
flow of 480 gpm at a pressure of 1236 psia to the entrance of at least three steam generators while allowing for (1) any spillage through the design worst-case break of the Normal feedwater line, (2) the design worst-case single fail-ure; and (3) recirculation flow.- This capacity is sufficient to ensure that j
adequate feedwater flow is available to remove decay heat and reduce the Reactor j
Coolant System temperature to less than 350*F at which point the Residual Heat Removal System may be placed into operation.
Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.2.1 verifies that each AFW pump's total head i
at a recirculation flow test' point is greater than or equal to the required total head. This surveillance ensures that the AFW pump performance has not degraded i
during the operating cycle.
Because it is undesirable to introduce cold AFW into i
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 5 3/4 7-2 Amendment No. Jpg, e
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PLMIT SYSTEMS
$1]LIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (Continued) the steam generators while they are operating, this testing is performed with recirculation flow. This test confirms one point on the pump curve and is indicative of overall performance. This test confirms component OPERABILITY is used to trend performance and to detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. The total head specified in Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.2.1 does not include a margin for test measurement uncertainty. This consideration shall be addressed at the implementing procedure level.
3/4.7.1.3 DEMINERALIZED WATER STORAGE TANK The OPERABILITY of the demineralized water storage tank with the minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to maintain the RCS at HOT STAND 8Y conditions for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> with steam discharge to the atmosphere concurrent with total loss-of-offsite power, and with an additional 6-hour cooldown period to reduce reactor coolant temperature to 350*F.
The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.
3/4.7.1.4 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY The limitations on Secondary Coolant System specific activity ensure that the resultant offsite radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 dose guideline values in the event of a steam line rupture.
This dose also includes the effects of a coincident 1 gpm primary-to-secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line. These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 5 3/4 7-2a Amendment No. Jpg, one j
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Docket No. 50-423 B16301 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 Proposed Revision to Technical Specification Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Surveillances (PTSCR 3-9-96)
Backaround and Safety Assessment i
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March 1997
1 U.S. Nuclear Commission
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B16301\\ Attachment 4\\Page 1 Bacinound 1
l Technical Specification Surveillance 4.7.1.2.b requires the testing of the i
Auxiliary Foodwater motor driven and turbine driven pumps on recirculation flow l
at least once per 92 days. The purpose of the surveillance requirement is to assure that the auxiliary feedwater pumps have not degraded below their J
required design capabilities. The proposed changes to the surveillance are to i
I increase the required test parameter for the motor driven pumps from 1460 paid j
to 1468 psid, rep; ace the current parameters for the pumps from differential pressure measured in psid to total head measured in feet, move the reference j
to Specification 4.0.5 and modify the Bases to the surveillance.
f Safety Assessment i
The increase in the required test parameter for the mc, tor driven pumps from J
j 1460 psid to 1468 psid was the result of recent reviews of Millstone Unit No. 3
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l design bases. The review of the previous calculation that established the acceptance criteria for the surveillance revealed that the criteria was developed with a non<:onservative pump degradation allowance. A revised calculation j
revealed that the required differential pressure for the motor driven pumps should be 1468 psid.
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j The replacing of the current surveillance parameters for the motor driven and turbine driven pumps from differential pressure measured in psid to total head measured in feet is to account for the effect of water density on pump performance during each surveillance test.
The use of pump total head measured in feet will provide a more accurate determination of pump degradation from the surveillance test results. The required differential pressure for the motor driven pump of 1468 psid was changed to a total head of 3385 feet at a water temperature of approximate ly 41 degrees F. The required differential j
pressure for the steam driven pump of 1640 psid was changed to a total head of 3780 feet at a water temperature of approximate!y 41 degrees F.
The moving of the reference to Specification 4.0.5 from specification 4.7.1.2.1.b.1 to 4.7.1.2.1.b is requested to clarify that the requirements of i
Specification 4.0.5 applies to both the motor driven and turbine driven pumps.
Also, the Bases to surveillance 4.7.1.2.1 is being modified to expand the description of surveillance testing.
These are considered administrative l
changes.
Based on the above, the proposed Technical Specification change is safe. In addition, NNECO has determoed that the proposed change does not to involve an i
l unroviewed safety question.
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Docket No. 50 423 B16301 i
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Attedwnent 5 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 Proposed Revision to Technical Specification Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Surveillances (PTSCR 3-9-96)
Sionificant Havards Consideration and Environmental Considerations i
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t U.S. Nuclear Commission B16301%ttachment 5\\Page 1 S'ionificant Hazards Consideration NNECO has reviewed the proposed changes in accordance with 10CFR 50.92 and has concluded that the changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration (SHC). The bases for this conclusion is that the three criteria of 10CFR 50.92(c) are not satisfied. The proposed changes do not involve a SHC because the changes would not:
1.
Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed changes to Technical Specification Surveillance 4.7.1.2.1.b to increase the required test parameter for the motor driven pumps from 1460 psid to 1468 psid and replacing the current parameters for the motor driven and turbine driven pumps from differential pressure measured in psid to total head measured in feet are consictent with equipment design criteria and does not significantly increase the probability of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed changes to increase the required test parameter for the motor driven pumps from 1460 psid to 1468 psid and replacing the current parameters for the motor driven and turbine driven pumps from differential pressure measured in psid to total head measured in feet provides the necessary assurance that the pumps will function as required in accident analyses and does not significantly increase the consequence of an l
accident previously evaluated.
The moving of the reference to Specification 4.0.5 in order to clarify that it applies to the testing of the motor driven and turbine driven pumps and the modifications to the bases section are administrative and do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an l
accident previously evaluated.
l Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in i
the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated.
2.
Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
l The proposed changes to Technical Specification Surveillance 4.7.1.2.1.b to increase the required test parameter for the motor driven pumps from 1460 paid to 1468 psid and replacing the current parameters for the motor driven and turbine driven pumps from differential pressure measured in paid to total head measured in feet does not change the operation of the i
t U.S. Nuclear Commission B16301\\Atiediment 5\\Page 2 auxiliary foodwater system or any of its components during normal or i
accident evaluations.
The moving of the reference to Specification 4.0.5 in order to clarify that it applies to the testing of the motor driven and turbine driven pumps and I
the modifications to the bases section are administrative and do not j
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
3.
Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
l The proposed change to Technical Specification Surveillance 4.7.1.2.1.b to increase the raferenced total head of the motor driven auxiliary j
feedwater pumps during surveillance testing provides an acceptable margin between the required surveillance and design pump performance i
to provide assurance that the pumps will operate consistent with systern evaluations and does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The change in the referenced units frcm differential pressure measured in psid to total head measured in feet for the motor driven auxiliary and j
turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps during surveillance testing is to account for the effect of water density on pump performance during each test and does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
4 The moving of the reference to Specification 4.0.5 in order to clarify that it applies to the testing of the motor. driven and turbine driven pumps and the modifications to the bases section are administrative and do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
In conclusion, based on the information provided, it is determined that the l
proposed changes do not involve an SHC.
EnvitonmentaLcensiderations i
NNECO has reviewed the proposed license amendment against the criteria of 10CFR51.22 for environmental considerations. The proposed changes do not involve a SHC, do not significantly increase the type and amounts of effluents
7 U.S. Nuclear Commission B16301%ttachment 5\\Page 3 that may be released offsite, nor significantly increase individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposuret. Based on the foregoing, NNECO concludes that the proposed changes meet the criteria delineated in 10CFR51.22(c)(9) for categorical exclusion from the requirements of environmental considerations.
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