ML20137M163
| ML20137M163 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1985 |
| From: | SARGENT & LUNDY, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137M160 | List:
|
| References | |
| 19-BDA-1, 19-BDA-1-R02, 19-BDA-1-R2, NUDOCS 8601280204 | |
| Download: ML20137M163 (21) | |
Text
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- SARGENT & LUNDY Calc. For Establishinc Requ' ired ' Calc.No. 19-BDA-1 ENGINEERS Raceway / Cable Separation Distances Rev.2 Datell-5-85 CHICAGO Pace 1 of 21 (x)Sarety-Related ( )Non-Safety-Related Client: Illinois Power Company Precared by##.A 4 4. Da te n - - +-
Project: Clinton Power Station -Reviewed by,L'bMN Da t e .: . c. es-Proi.No.: 4536-35 Equip.No. Aoproved b MN.r3 N Jat Da te //- 6 -IS
/
Resocnsible Division: EPED File: 19-BDA-1 Revision Status: e Revision 0, dated 10-18-85 Pages: 21 Revision 1, dated 10-25-85 Revised Pages: 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 17 per NRC comments.
- Revision 2, dated 11-5-85 Revised Pages: 13, 14, 15, 17, 18.
b Review Methed: Revision 0 - Detailed Review of entire analysis. Revis_ ion 1 ~ Detailed Review of revised sections. s. Revision 2 - Detailed Review of revised , sections.
References:
- 1. Wyle Laboratories Test Report 17769-2, Dated 10-3-85.
- 2. Wyle Laboratories Test Report 17769-1, Dated 8-23-85.
- 3. IEEE 384-1974.
- 4. USNRC Regulatory Guide-1.75, Revision 2.
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Calc. No.: 19-BDA-1 Rev. 2 Date: 11-5-85 Project No. 4536-35 Page 2 of 21 PURFCSE: The purpose of this analysis is to establish minimum acceptable raceway to raceway, raceway to cable, and. cable to cable separation distances between redundant safety-related raceways / cables and between safety and non-safety-related raceways / cables. This analysis, in conjunction with the test program conducted at Wyle Laboratorier (References 1 and 2) has been developed in accordance with IEEE 384-1974, Section 5.1.1.2. BASIS: This analysis is based on a series of tests- (References 1 and 2) which demonstrated that a representative cable when subjected to a conservatively high fault current, would not cause a loss of function in
" target" cables mounted in various test configurations representative of typical plant installations.
ASSUMPTIONS: The following assumptions were used as a basis in determining the specific fault parameters, selecting the test specimens used, and interpreting the test data complied in the Wyle test program.
- 1. The. fault developed within a cable or equipment is assumed not to be cleared due to the failure of the primary protective device.
- 2. A fault is assumed to occur which would be significantly more severe than the worst credible fault which would be expected during actual plant operation.
In achieving high level of fault current cannotthis level of severity, a " typically" be assumed. Even though a very high fault current may produce the highest temperature, it would be for only a very.brief duration due to rapid tripping of the backup breaker or fusing of the cable. Therefore, in an effort to achieve the highest level of conservatism, the fault current selected was one which would sustain a very high level of heat generation for, a long time duration. Another significant parameter adding yet an additional level of conservatism is afforded by the test apparatus which generates a single phase current. The actual fault cable specimen had the three conductors connected in series and then connected to.the test apparatus (see Figure 5, Reference 1, and Figure 6, Reference 2) . This configuration results in an induced current in the conduit which adds significantly to the heat generated by the fault cable. This is demonstrated in the test results where the conduit actually exhibits a faster temperature rise than the fault cable jacket (see Figure I-2, Reference 2). This dual source of heat (fault current plus induced current in condait) test. thereby significantly increases the conservatism of the
r Calc. No.: 19-BDA-1 Rev. 2 Date: 11-5-85 Project No. 4536-35 Page 3 of 21 ASSUMPTIONS - Continued
- 3. The actual fault current selected was based on a typical locked rotor motor current. Locked rotor current would typically result in rapid breakdown of the motor insulation system, which in turn would result in a high level of fault current that would be cleared by the backup circuit breaker or would cause the cable to fuse open. For conservatism, it is assumed that the fault impedance would adjust itself automatically to maintain the initial fault current magnitude, thus extending the test duration. The fault current selected was 1300A based on a typical locked' rotor current which would occur in a~ motor fed by a 500 MCM cable (see Assumption No. 6 for cable selection).
- 4. After a period of one hour, it is assumed that the faul't impedance does decrease, but not to a point which would cause rapid fusing of the cable, or which would cause the backup breaker to trip..
Additional conservatism is, therefore, added by increasing the fault current to 1700A and thereby increasing the heat generation for an additional two-hour duration or until the cable fused o' pen.
- 5. The fault condition is conservatively assumed, to remain undetected in the control room with no intervening operator action. The extreme amount of smoke observed during the test adds additional conservatism, since the fault condition could~not credibly remain undetected by the fire alarm system and/or other plant personnel.
- 6. In order to encompass a maximum number of configurations, a 3/c 500 MCM cable is assumed to carry the' fault current.
~
All cables smaller tgan500MCMwouldbeencompassedbythetestduetotheirredu'ced I R heat generation. The small number of potential fault cables larger than 500 MCM~are addressed where appropriate by extending the results of the tests on the 500 MCM cables. In order to conservatively apply these test results to configurations involving cables larger than 500 MCM, the following criteria has been applied: A. The same separation distances are assumed appropriate if an air gap was included (since an air gap provides an excellent insulating ef fect). in' the test configuration and the target is not subject to flame exposure .(see "C" below) . B .; When the fault specimen and the target specimen were tested in a " contact" configuration, a 1" air gap is added, which generally is in accordance with'IEEE 384-1974.- C. - Based on the test results, the only~ configuration requiring consideration of flame exposure is Configuration No 6 which . had the fault cable at the top of a cabla tray. It.is apparent that the fault cable tends to ignite in this configuration due to greater heat retention (caused by the 7 ,e-
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l l Calc. No.: 19-DDA-1 Rev. 2 Date: 11-5-85 Project No. 4536-35 Page 4 of 21 ASSUMPTIONS - Continued surrounding " fill" cables) and the unlimited free oxygen available for combustion. The 1" air gap as tested between a
" target" conduit above a cable tray will, therefore, be increased to a minimum of 12" for both EPR/ HYPALON and TEF EL target cables.
- 7. In order to encompass a maximum number of configurations, a 3/C 500 MCM (copper conductor) cable with a 600V/1000V insulation system is assumed to carry the fault current. Cables with higher insulation ratings would be encompassed by virtue of the fact that they have a more rugged insulating system and have more jacket surface area to dissipate heat.
- 8. In order'to encompass all target cable types, instrument cable was more conservatively assumed since its insulation would be more vulnerable to damage. Both TEFZEL and EPR/HYPALON cables were tested in the Wyle Program, which represents the two types of insulation / jacket material used in the planc.
- 9. The actdal test specimens selected were copper conductor cables taken from actual plant stock. The results of the test program are assumed applicable *for the entire life of the plant based on the successful vendor qualification programs. These programs demonstrated that the cable characteristics remain within acceptable values subsequent to aging and LOCA envircnment simulation. Heat additionally appears to result in,off-gasing of volatiles and, ,
therefore, a " heat" aging program if applied to a fault test specimen may be less conservative.than using actual plant stock.
- 10. It is assumed that all test configurations which included rigid steel conduit are also applicable to similar configurations utilizing "SERVICAIR" flexible, "LIQUIDTIGHT" flexible, or EMT conduit. In order to support this assumption, LIQUIDTIGHT flexible conduit was selected'as the "least rugged" among "SERVICAIR,"
"LIQUIDTIGHT,".or "EMT" and subsequently was tested in various configurations as discussed .in Reference 1, Section III. The primary attribute necessary for a faulted cable conduit, is the ability to contain any flame which may occur. This attribute was successfully demonstrated as discu's sed in Section III of Reference 1. ,
- 11. Unless noted otherwise, separation distances are assumed applicable for both safety-related to redundant safety-related interactions and safety-related to'non-safety-related interactions.
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Calc. No.: .19-BDA-1 Rev. 2 Date: 11-5-85 Project No. 4536-35 Page 5 of 21 DISCUSSION The results obtained through the test program conducted by Wyle Laboratories (References 1 and 2) have been analyzed and applied to _ specific configurations which may occur in actual plant installations. From this analysis, appropriate minimum separation distances have been developed and are summarized in Figure 1 of this calculation. A discussion of each test conducted follows, and includes results, inter-pretations, and appropriate minimum separation distances derived from each configuration tested. Separation distances in parentheses ( ) are applicable only to . configurations involving a tault cable larger than 500 MCM (see Assumption 6) . ) Conficuration No. 1 (Reference 2, Section 1) This configuration included a fault cable in conduit, target cables in i conduit, and target cables in free air. All target cables successfully l passed the test. By direct application, the following separation distances represent acceptable installed configurations: A. Conduit to conduit crossings (Figure 1-10) Horizontal....... 0" (l") Vertical......... 0" (l") B. Horizontal'" fault" conduit to vertical free air target cable crossings (Figure 1-14) Horizontal...... 0" (l") i
- Pa'rallel conduit to cable configurations and cable above conduit configurations were not directly tested, however, these distances have been established through interpretation of test data as follows
- 1. A flame is not considered since the conduit would contain it.
- 2. Overall test results ind'icated that the most severe heat transfer results from direct contact, whereas an air gap precludes significant heat transfer.
The following separation distance, therefore, represents an acceptable installed configuration: I C. Horizontal " fault" conduit parallel to free air target cables (Figure 1-14) Horizontal....... 1" Vertical......... 1" l
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Calc. No.: 19-BDA Rev. 2 Date: 11-5-85 Project No. 4536-35 Page 6 of 21 DISCUSSION - Continued Conficuration No. 2 (Reference 2, Section 2) This configuration included a fault cable in free air, target cables in free air and target cables in conduit. All target cables successfully passed the test. By direct application, the following separation distance represents an acceptable installed configuration. . A. Horizontal free air fault cable to horizohtal free air target ' cables (Figure 1-15)
- Horizontal....... 6" B. Vertical free air fault cable to horizontal conduit (Figure 1-14)
Horizontal.'..... 0" (1") . Parallel free air cable to free air cable configurations (separated vertically) and free air fault cable below a parallel target conduit were not directly tested, however, these distances have been established through interpretations of test data as follows:
- 1. A flame was not produced (other than a brief ignition at the cable ends which occurred when the cable fused open) and is, therefore, not considered.
- 2. Overall test results indicated that the most severe heat transfer results from direct contact, whereas an air gap-precludes significant heat transfer.
The following separation distances, therefore, represent an acceptable installed configuration: C. Horizontal free ' air fault cable to horizontal free air target cables (Figure 1-15) Vertical......... 6" D. Horizontal free air fault cabl'e parallel to target conduit
'(Figure 1-14) i Horizontal....... 1" .
Vertical......... 1" Configuration No. 3'(Reference 1, Section 1) This configuration included a fault cable in a tray and target cables n j tray and conduit. A fire occurred in the faulted cable tray l 4 O
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I Calc. No.: 19-BDA-1 Rev. 2 Date: 11-5-85 Project No. 4536-35 Page 7 of 21 DISCUSSION - Continued approximately 80 minutes into the test and continued throughout the remaining duration of the test. The flames impinged on the targets and the near proximity of the upper tray resulted in a high level of heat retention causing failure of all but one target cable. Subsequent to the fault cable fusing open, it was observed that the fault cable and - adjacent cables self-extinguished. Although the fault criteria was significantly more extreme than would be expected during normal plant operation, it was decided for added conservatism to run new test configurations with increased separation rather than ' educed r fault criteria. Refer to Configuration Nos. 6 and 7 for the results of these tests. Configuration No. 4 (Reference 1, Section II) This configuration included a fault cable in conduit, target cables in ! conduit, and target cables in tray. All target cables passed the test with the exception of the TEFZEL cable in conduit. By direct application, the following separation distances represent acceptable r installed configurations: A. Non-safety-related conduit crossing above or below safety-related cable tray (Figure 1-6) Vertical......... 0" (l") (Note: Separation between conduit above tray and cables in. tray shall be 0"). B. Conduit to conduit parallel runs of 2' or less with safety-related cables having EPR/HYPALON insulation / jacket (Figure 1-11) Vertical......... 0" (1") Non-safety-related conduit to the side of safety-related cable tray (in contact) and conduit to the side-of conduit (in contact) were not directly tested. These distances have been established, however, through interpretation of test data as follows:.
- 1. A fault conduit below a tray would be more severe than being to the side of the tray because heat would tend to. rise into the tray versus heat rising to the side of the tray.
- 2. By similar analogy, a fault conduit below a target conduit would be more severe than being to the side of a target conduit.
The following separation distances, therefore, represent acceptable installed configurations:
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l Calc. No. 19-BDA-1 Rev. 2 Date: 11-5-85 Project No'., 4536-35 Page 8 of 21 DISCUSSION - Continued C. Non-safety-related conduit to the side of safety-related cable tray (Figure 1-6) Horizontal....... 0" (l") D. Conduit to conduit parallel ~ runs of 2' or less with safety-related cables having EPR/HYPALON insulation / jacket (Figure 1-11). . Horizontal....... 0" (l") Separation distances less than 1" for conduit to conduit parallel runs in excess of 2' or which involve TEFZEL target cables generally do not occur (based on typical hanger design) and, therefore, were not tested. If this configuration would arise, separation would be in' accordance with the general guidelines'of IEEE 384-1974 as follows: E. Conduit to conduit parall'el runs in excess of 2' or which involve TEFZEL target cables (Figure 1-12) Horizontal....... 1" Vertical......... 1" " Configuration No. 5 (Reference 1, Section III) , This configuration included a fault cable in flex conduit, in a box, and in rigid conduit, and target cables in flex conduit and rigid conduit. All target cables passed this test and demonstrated the equivalence of flex conduit versus rigid. conduit as a barrier (see Assumption No. 9) . By direct application, the test also-demonstrated that the following separation distance represents an acceptable installed configuration: A. Condelt over box with faulted cable (Figure 1-13) Vertical......... 0" (1") . Other configurations involving conduit and boxes were not directly tested, however, the temperatures of the box during the test indicate that due to the larger surface area of a box (versus conduit), a box will have a significantly ' reduced temperature below conduit when subjected to sinilar heat sources. The ability of a box to disperse and t reject heat better than conduit, therefore, demonstrates that a box can conservatively be assumed equivalent to conduit in any configuration i involving conduit. _The following separaticn distances, therefore, represents acceptable installed configurations. w
Calc. No.: 19-BDA-1 Rev. 2 l Date: 11-5-85 l Project No. 4536-35 Page 9 of 21 DISCUSSION - Continued B. Conduit to the side of a box with a faulted cable (Figure 1-13) Horizontal....... 0" (l") C. Conduit with a faulted cable to box (Figure 1-13) Horizontal....... 0" (1") Vert 1 cal......... 0" (l") Conficuration No. 6 (Reference 1, Section IV) This configuration included a fault cable in tray and conduits. Also included in this test configuration were thermocouple arrays above and to the side of the faulted cable tray. All targets passed the test with the' exception of a TEFZEL cable in conduit crossing 1" above the faulted cable tray. By direct application, the following separation distances represent acceptable installed configurations: A. Safety-related tray above and parallel to redundant safety-related or non-safety-related cable tray (Figure 1-1) e V'rtical......... 24" B. Safety-related conduit containing EPR/HYPALON cables crossing above redundant safety-related or non-safety-related tray (Figure 1-7) - Vertical......... 1" (12") C. Safety-related conduit containing TEFZEL cables crossing above redundant (Figure 1-7) safety-related or non-safety-rei=ted cable tray Vertical......... 12" D. Safety-related conduit to the side of safety-related or non-safety-related cable tray (Figure 1-9)
' Horizontal........ 0" 3
Vartical......... 0" Other configurations involving cable tray and conduit were not directly tested, however, these distances have been established through interpretation of the thermocouple array test data. It should also be noted that the cables surrounding the fault specimen in the tray were observed to be a contributing source of fuel while subjected to the. heat generated by the fault cable. The ambient temperature measurements l
Calc. No.:-19-BDA-1 Rev. 2 Date: 11-5-85 Project No. 4536-35 Page 10 of 21 DISCUSSION - Continued (from the thermocouple arrays) were, therefore, due to a heat source which was not limited to the middle of the tray but' rather also extended toward the tray aides. Figure 2 is a plot of maximum temperatures recorded from thermocouples 39 and 45. Also included on Figure 2 is a plot of maximum target cable temperatures which were 'in Conduit No. CD-5. This conduit was mounted at the same location monitored by thermocouples 39 and 45, and, therefore, provides a correlation between ambient versus target cable temperatures. The temperature plots generally indicate that the conduit provides a damping effect in transmitting heat from a fluctuating ambient. The target cable temperature tends to gradually rise to a-level approximating the average ambient temperature. Figure 3 is a plot of maximum temp,eratures recorded from thermocouples 41 and 47. These thermocouples recorded the highest temperatures of the arrays and will, therefore, be assumed to conservatively represent the ambient immediately to the side of the cable tray. Also included on Figure 3 is a plot of maximum credible target cable temperatures which could be expected based on the ambient versus cable temperature response characteristics plotted in Figure 2. This plot would be indicative of target cable temperatures in conduit, however, it would be appropriate to assume target cables in tray, or/ covered risers which would provide an even greater damping effect in heat transmission'due to larger area of steel involved (versus conduit) . A gradual temperature rise to a level approximating the average ambient temperature can be expected. Note that a target tray would extend f'urther past the fault' tray (versus the conduit in Figure 2) and would experience a significant drop in average ambient temperature. Therefore, assuming that the. target tray would reach the same average ambient as the conduit assumed in Figure 3 would add additional conservatism. Based on Figure 3, the maximum target cable temperature in tray, covered riser, or conduit above, and immediately to the side of a faultad cable tray would, therefore, be j less than*300 F. Throughout the entire test program, there were no target ~ cable failures at temperatures below 300 F. Therefore, a target cable temperature of i 300 F or less for a short period of time (based on Figure 3) represents i an acceptable installed condition. Additional conservatism is afforded
,by virtue of the fact that cable failures did not occur even at temperatures in excess of 450 F.
Based on the preceding, the following separation distances, therefore, represent acceptable installed configurations:
, Calc. No.: 19-BDA-1 Rev. 2 Date: 11-5-85 Project No. 4536-35 Page 11 of 21 j DISCUSSION - Continued E. Safety-related conduit, tray, or covered risers above or to the side of redundant safety-related or non-safety-related cable tray (rigures 1-1,1-5 and 1-9)
Horizontal....... 0" A configuration involving an uncovered tray riser to the side of a cable tray may not include a metal barrier between the fault cable and the target cable. For conservatism, it will be assumed that the target cable temperature instantaneously equals the ambient temperature. Figure 4 is a plot of maximum temperatures recorded by thermocouples 42 and 44. These thermocouples recorded the highest temperatures of the arrays at a distance of 6" to the side of the cable tray. Also included on Figure 4 is a plot.of temperatures of target cables (which passed the test) from Configuration No. 4- These temperatures are well in excess of the ambient temperatures recorded by thermocouples 42 and 44. . The ambient temperatures are additionally assumed applicable to configurations involving a fault cable in a riser since the heat generated will tend to rise as with the fault cable in tray. Significant margin is also demonstrated in Figure 4. Based on the preceding, the following separation distance, therefore, represents an acceptable installed configuration: F. Safety-related open riser t [the side of redundant safety-related or non-safety-related. cable tray (Figure ' l-5) . Horizontal....... 6" Justification to reduce the 1" separation of safet'y-related conduits containing EPR/HYPALON cables above' redundant safety-related or non- ' safety-related cable tray (as was d'emonstrated acceptable by this test) can be demonstrated as follows:
- 1. The' target cable 1" above the cable tray prior to fault cable ignition was below 250 F. and, therefore, well within an acceptable range.
2.- The fault cable ignition would' either be precluded or the flames
'would be contained by adding a solid steel tray cover. A similar analogy applies to conduit below a faulted tray which would actually be less severe since heat would rise from the tray.
Therefore, as long as an air gap exists, the following separation distance represents an appropriate installed configuration:
Calc. No.: 19-BDA-1 Rev. 2 Date: 11-5-85 Project No. 4536-35 Page 12 of 21 DISC"SSION - Continued G. Safety-related conduit containing EPR/HYPALON cables above or below redundant safety-related or non-safety-related cable tray with a solid steel cover (Figures 1-9 and 1-9) . Vertical.......... 0" Configuration No. 7 (Reference 1, Section V) This configuration included a fault cable in cable tr'ay and target cables in cable tray below the faulted tray. All target cables successfully passed the test. By direct application, the following separation distance represents an acceptable installed configuration: A. Non-safety-related cable tray above safety-related cable tray (Figure 1-4) .
, Vertical..........(l")
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REDUNDANT SAFETY OR NON-SAFETY ' NIN '.
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[ CLEARANCE REQUIRED: I "E" VERTICAL.........l- TRAY RISER COVER. A .I I (5) SAFETY TO REDUNDANT SAFETY ,2' MIN WHEN COVER USED OR NON-SAFETY TRAY / RISER I i CC9BINATICNS - J 4 -
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i HORIZCNTAL.......> 0" (COVERED RISER) !iM 8 : 1 I HOR 120NTAL....... 6" (UNCOVERED RISER) M 6*l UNCOVERED COVERED RISERS
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RISERS g SEE (6) NON-SAFETY CONDUIT CROSSING. NOTE ABOVE.BELOW OR TO THE SIDE CF SAFETY TRAY F 4 "E" "N " TRAY CCNDUlTS CLEARANCE REQUIRED: F < HCRIZONTAL. . . . . . 0" ( l ") - CR l VERTICAL. . . . . . . . 0" ( l ") m 5 y NOTE: SEPARATION BETWEEN CCNDUIT ABOVE TRAY AND CABLES IN TRAY SHALL BE >0" 2 l FIGURE I u (CCNT.) W.*
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-,% CLINTON POWER STATICN-UNIT I PROJECT NO.4536-35 PAGE - 15 0F----2i i (7) SAFETY CONDUIT CROSSING ABOVE CONDUIT WITH SAFETY CR NCN-SAFETY TRAY TEF2EL CABLES k F d_ _ _ _ _ _ .
CONDUIT WITH "E" d EPR/HYPALCN CABLES CCNDUITS CLEARANCE REQUIRED: F 4 _{ _ l2" VERTICAL (EPR/HYPALON) I" ( 12") I"(12") VERTICAL (TEFZEL)..... 12" _ _ .
, _ _ _ 7 -_______ ___ M-TRAY (8) SAFETY CCNDUIT WITH TEFZEL CCNDUIT WITH EPR/HYPALON CABLES CABLES ABOVE REDUNDANT SAFETY - CCNDUIT WITH TEFZEL CABLES CR NON-SAFETY TRAY WITH COVER OR BARRIER- 3- 1 # 4 ---
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CLEARANCE REQUIRED: BARRIER "E" CCNDUIT ____-___ __ h _______, u a VERTICAL (TEFZEL)...I~ L~ "RE" CR "N" " TRAY A VERTICAL (EPR/HYP)..>0" TEF2EL [ i i h~ i 2 _3__t__l_______bCC)u!T
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(9) SAFETY CCNDUIT BELCW CR l TO THE SIDE CF REDUNDANT i EPR/HYPALCN CABLES SAFETY OR NON-SAFETY TRAY l
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"RE" CR "N" CLEARANCE RECUIRED: TRAY
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VERTICAL (TEFZEL)..... l' "E" i CONDUITS : i m J >0 ' b 8 TEFZEL l l CABLES (10) SAFETY CCNDUIT TO REDUNDANT SAFETY CR NON-SAFETY CCNDUIT "E" CRCSSINGS CONDUITS h 1 CLEARANCE REQUIRED: HCRI ZCNTAL. . . . . . 0" ( l ") "RE" OR "N" CR CONDUIT VERTICAL. . . . . . . . 0" ( l ") a. (II) SAFETY CCNDUIT WITH EPR/ ', : 2"____,,i, HYPALON CABLES PARALLEL TO 8 i
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NON-SAFETY CCNOUITS CCNDUIT i ' CABLE
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ENGINEERING CALCULATICN CALC. NO._1.9_ _BD A - L gggtyl - ,, t ILLINOIS PCWER CCMPANY CLINTON PCWER STATICN-UNIT 1 REV.NO.--- R.---- PROJECT NO.4536-35 PAG,t _ j]_ 0F _ _2j _ (12) SAFETY CCNDUIT TO SAFETY OR NCN-SAFETY CCNDUIT IN PARALLEL "E" CCNOUIT RUNS GREATER THAN 24" CR WHICH _F 4 _ ..I_ INYCLVED TEFZEL CABLE I~
"RE" OR "N" CONOUIT CLEA9ANCE REQUIRED: h 4 ~l~
HORIZCNTAL.......l" I CR VERTICAL.........l" w (13) SAFETY TO REDUNDANT SAFETY OR NCN-SAFETY CCNDUIT TO BOX CCMBINATIONS "E"/~N"/~E" CONOUITS l2 h a CLEARANCE REQUIRED: "RE"/"E"/~N" BOX 2 HCRIZCNTAL...... 0"(l") CR VERTICAL........ 0"(I") a (14) SAFETY TO REDUNDANT SAFETY OR "E"/~N"/"E-l' l2 NCN-SAFETY CABLE IN FREE AIR FREE AIR ; ' TO CCNDUIT CCMBINATICNS CABLES l G. _ _1____t____ 3
--w I" ~ r l-CLEARANCE REQUIRED: I i -_-
l HCRIZCNTAL(CROSSING). . . > 0" ( l ") ,p
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(15) SAFETY TO REDUNDANT SAFETY CR I L NON-SAFETY CABLE TO CABLE [ "E" [ "RE" CR "N" ) i FREE AIR j. FREE AIR 1 IN FREE AIR CABLE j r CABLE i i i CLEARANCE RECUIRED:
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VERTICAL........ 6" I ( l-CCNFIGURATION KEY ALL CABLE TRAYS IDENTIFIED AN THIS FIGURE ARE OPEN SOLID BOTTON TYPE UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED. CONDUIT SEPARATION IDENTIFIED IN THIS FIGURE IS APPLICABLE TO EITHER RIGID' STEEL. FLEXIBLE OR ENT. RACEWAY SEGREGATICN IDENTIFICATION IS AS FOLLJWS:
"E" SAFETY RELATED OR ASSOCIATED "RE" REDUNDANT SAFETY RELATED OR ASSOCIATED "N" NON-SAFETY RELATED DIMENSICNS NOTED IN PARENTHESES APPLY TO RACEWAYS CONTAINING CABLES LARGER THAN 500 MCH.
SEPARATICN DISTANCES ABOVE CPEN CABLE TRAYS SHALL BE TAKEN FRCH THE TCP GF THE TCPMOST CABLE IN THE TRAY OR FROM TCP GF THE TRAY SIDE RAILS (WHICHEVER IS HIGHER). BARRIERS MAY BE UTILIZED IN LIEU OF THE SOLID TRAY COVERS ILLUSTRATED IN
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2 CCNFIGURATICNS (2). (3) AND (8). WHEN UTILIZED. BARRIERS SHALL CONFCRM TO THE RECUIREMENTS OF IEEE 384-1974. FIGURES 2, 3 AND 4.
-- SEPARATICN DISTANCES FCR JUNCTICN BOXES AND PULL BOXES NOT COVERED BY CCNFIGURATICN SHALL BE THOSE SHOWN IN CONFIGURATICNS (6). (T). ( 8 ). (9) AND (l4) BY ASSUMING g THAT A BOX IS EQUI"ALENT TO CCNDUIT.
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