ML20137J585

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Forwards Draft AEOD Recommendation Tracking Sys Status for Correction to List of Contacts.Response by 860207 to Finalize List for AEOD Annual Rept to Commission Requested
ML20137J585
Person / Time
Issue date: 01/15/1986
From: Heltemes C
NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD)
To: Harold Denton, Taylor J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20136G524 List:
References
NUDOCS 8601230097
Download: ML20137J585 (48)


Text

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. jo,, UNITE'? STATES 8 g- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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JAN 151986 i

MEMORANDUM FOR: Harold Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

, James Taylor, Director Office for Inspection and Enforcement FROM: C. J. Heltemes-Jr., Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data

SUBJECT:

AE00 RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM STATUS Enclosed is a draft copy of the current status of AE0D recommendations. With  !

the recent realignment of functions within NRR, it is expected that a number-of the contacts will be changed. Therefore, in addition to comments on the accuracy of the status, we would ask that you correct the listed contacts as appropriate.

I i We would appreciate a response by February 7 so that the listings can be

! finalized for the AE0D annual report to the commission, kbU

.Heltemesbr., Director l

l 0 ce for Analysis ~and Evaluation of Operational Data-

Enclosure:

( As stated i

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AEOD RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Case Study AEOD/C101 R:sponsible AE0D Engineer: T. Cintula TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

"St. Lucie Natural Circulation Cooldown" 4

RECOMMENDATION 1 Provide a supply of cooling water to reactor coolant pump seals that will not be disabled by a single failure, i

(Recommendation 4e)

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/DE/EQB J. Jackson High Not Scheduled Proceeding satisfactorily.

Will be addressed as part of Generic Issue.65, " Component Cooling Water System Failures."

" Generic Issue 65 comprises task 2 j of Generic Issue 23, " Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failures" and will address the reliability

. of RCP seal cooling systems. The program will determine what steps, if any, NRC should take to increase the reliability of the component cooling water supply to the RCP seals. We will continue to monitor this issue to assure that the recommendation is addressed.

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AE00 RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Case Study AE0D/C105 R9sponsible AE0D Engineer: T. Cintula TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

"Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 Loss of Service Water on May '20,1980" RECOMMENDATION 1

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Installation of dual atmospheric dump valve capability for each steam generator on two-loop PWRs.

(Study recommendation 8(b)3)

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/DSI/AEB T. Quay /F. High Not scheduled Proceeding satisfactorily. This NRR/ DST /SPEB R. Colmar originally was to have been F. Akstulewicz addressed by revision to SRP 15.6.3 as part of Generic Issue 67.5.1,

" Reassessment of Radiological Con--

sequences Following a Postulated Steam Generator Tube Rupture."

It has now been incorporated into USI A-45, " Shutdown Decay Heat Removal Requirements."

RECOMMENDATION 2 Review of steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) analyses for plants licensed prior to the SRP. (Study recommendation 8(b)2)

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/DSI/RSB T. Marsh Medium Not scheduled Proceeding satisfactorily. Will be NRR/ DST /SPEB R. Colmar addressed as part of Generic Issue 67.5.2, "Re-evaluation of SGTR Design Basis Event." Tube ruptures are actively being investigated on a generic basis within USI A-47, " Safety Implications of Control Systems" and

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NT0L licensing issues.

AE0D RECOMMENDATON TRACKING SYSTEM 3

! SOURCE: Case Study AE0D/C105 (continued) t R:sponsible AE00 Engineer: T. Cintula i . TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

"Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 Loss of Service Water on May 20, 1980"

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RECOP94ENDATION 3 Revise SRP 9.2.2 to clarify isolation of nonsafety-related portions of service water system.-

L (Study recommendation 8(a)6)

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/DSI/ASB L. Riani Nearly resolved. Not necessary Proceeding satisfactorily. Will be NRR/ DST /SPEB No value impact addressed in resolution of Generic

needed. Issue 36. Completion scheduled for June 1986. The SRP has been revised t to address this recommendation and the recommendation will be processed as a "no new requirements" issue.-

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AEOD RECOMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM l

RECOMENDATION l SOURCE: Case Study AEOD/CIOS (continued) i l R:sponsible AEOD Engineer: T. Cintula TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

"Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 Loss of Service Water on May 20, 1980" I RECOMENDATION 5 IST of check valves in the instrument air system used to isolate safety-related portions of the system.

(Study reconmendation 8(a)2)

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/ DST /SPEB W. Milstead Low / drop None planned Not proceeding satisfactorily. This issue is to be addressed as part of Generic Issue 43, " Contamination of Instrument Air Lines." AEOD does not agree with the prioritizaticr.

given. NRR has agreed to review the prioritization when the AE00 Case Study on Air $ystem is issued.

l The AE00 Case Study is expected to be completed during the next year.

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AE00 RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Memorandum to Harold Denton from C. J. Heltemes, dated May 2, 1983 Responsible AE00 Engineer: T. Cintula l

TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

Response to NRR Comments on AEOD Report, "Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 Loss of Service Water on May 20, 1980" L

RECOMMENDATION 1 l Accessibility of ADVs for local manual operations for RCS cooldown following a steam generator tube rupture. .

, RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/ DST /GIB A. Marchese High Not scheduled Proceeding satisfactorily.

Currently included in USI A-45.

l A site walkdown survey of nine plants substantiated the AEOD concern of ADV accessibility. At some plants, the ADVs were readily accessible, while ADVs at other plants were difficult to open manually and may cause personnel radiation exposure.

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2 AEOD RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM -

RECOMENDATION SOURCE: Memorandum dated January 20, 1982 from C. Michelson to Harold R. Denton Responsible AE00 Engineer: M. Chiramal/F. Ashe

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TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

Safety Concerns Associated with Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation in BWPs L RECOMENDATION 1 Safety-related low-low reactor vessel level start of HPCI and RCIC systems should not be prevented or delayed; by nonsafety-related high level trip. '

RESPONSIBLE .

CRGR OFFICE /DIV/8R CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/DSI/RS8 W. Hodges High Not scheduled Proceeding satisfactorily. Assigned '

as Generic Issue 101..

REC 0f0ENDATION 2 Protective functions of narrow range level instrumentation must.be assured in spite of adverse control system protection system interaction.

RESPONSIBLE- CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/ DST /RS8 A. Szukiewicz High Not scheduled Proceeding satisfactorily.

On-going USI-A47 and Generic Issue 101. .

REFEREkCE: Memo dated March 19,.1982 from H. R. Denton to.C. Michelson C-201-1

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I AEOD RECOMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM l RECOMENDATION SOURCE: Case Study AE0D/C202 Responsible AEOD Engineer: T. Cintula TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

" Flow Blockage by Bivalve Mollusks at Arkansas Nuclear One and Brunswick" h RECOMENDATION 1 Caoability to measure cooling water flow should be provided for all safety-related equipment.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/DSI/ASB .C. Hickey Medium Not scheduled

  • Proceeding satisfactorily.-

Pending generic action on biofouling. Generic Issue 51 RECOPMENDATION 2 Develop and implement biofouling control strategies.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/DSI/ASB C. Hickey Medium Not scheddled*' Proceeding satisfactorily.

Pending generic action on biofouling. Generic Issue 51

  • May not be required, if necessary, will be scheduled following completion of Generic Issue 51, " Proposed Requirements for Improving the Reliability of Open Cycle Service Water Systems." The Generic Issue is incorporating Task V of Project FIN B-2977 by RES into GI-51.

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AE00 RECOMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM REC 0f00ENDATION SOURCE: Case Study AE00/C202 (continued)

Responsible AE00 Engineer: T. Cintula }

TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

" Flow Blockage by Bivalve Mollusks at Arkansas Nuclear One and Brunswick" RECOMENDATION 3 Periodic inspection of service water system piping.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR '

OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT . PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS >

NRR/DSI/ASB C. Hickey Medium Not scheduled

  • Proceeding satisfactorily. i Pending generic action on.

biofouling. Generic Issue 51

[ RECOMENDATION 4 Periodic verification of overall heat transfer coefficient on multiple-pass heat exchangers. ,

RESPONSIBLE 'CRGR OFFICE /DIV/8R CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS.

.NRP/DSI/AS8 C. Hickey Medium Not scheduled

  • Proceeding satisfactorily.

g Pending generic action on L biofouling. Generic Issue.51 L '

  • May not be required, if necessary, will be scheduled following completion of Generic Issue 51, " Proposed Requirements.

for Improving the Reliability of Open Cycle Service Water Systems." The Generic Issue is incorporating Task V of- '

Project FIN 8-2977 by RES into GI-51.

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RECOMMENDATION l SOURCE: Case Study AE00/C202 (continued) 1 Responsible AE00 Engineer: T. Cintula l

TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

" Flow Blockage by Bivalve Mollusks at Arkansas Nuclear One and Brunswick" RECOMMENDATION 5 Periodic verification of cooling water flow to all safety-related equipment should be specified in technical specifications.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/DSI/ASB C. Hickey Medium Not scheduled

  • Proceeding satisfactorily.

Pending generic action on biofouling. Generic Issue 51

  • May not be required, if necessary, will be scheduled following completion of Generic Issue 51, " Proposed Requirements for-l Improving the Reliability of Open Cycle Service Water. Systems." The Generic Issue is. incorporating Task V of Project l FIN B-2977 by RES into GI-51.

C-202-3 l .

i AEOD REC 00mENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM REC 0fMENDATION SOURCE: Case Study AEOD/C203 and Memorandum dated May 28, 1982 Responsible AEOD Engineer: E. J. Brown IITLE OR

SUBJECT:

Survey of Valve Operator - Related Events Occurring During 1978, 1979, and 1980.

(See also Recommendation 1 on page S-503-1)

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REC 00MENDATION 1 Existing guidance to bypass thermal overload protective devices associated with safety-related valve motor -

p i operators should be reassessed.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS l NRR/DE/MEB R. Bosnak Medium Not scheduled Not Proceeding satisfactorily.

i Based on a letter from the Director i NRR dated 2/23/83, a plan was to be developed to address this subject.

This was included as part of a pro-posed draft plan for Generic Issue II.E.6, "In situ Testing of Valves."

However, it is our understanding that this effort has not been funded for FY-86.

REC 00MENDATION 2 l Improved methods and procedures for the setting of torque switches should be developed and evaluat'ed relative to valve operability and functional qualification.

, RESPONSIBLE CRGR l OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS l NRR/DE/ -

Medium Not scheduled Proceeding satisfactorily. Based on a letter from the Director, NRR dated l

2/23/83, an existing RES program was.

to be expanded to address this subject.

! This has been included in the Research l .

Contract " Valve Performance Testing " '

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\ C-203-1

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l AE00 RECON 9ENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM

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RECOMMENDATIDN SOURCE: Case Study AE00/C203 and Memorandum dated May 28, 1982 (continued)

Responsible AE00 Engineer: E. J. Brown s

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TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

Survey of Valve Operator - Related Events Occurring During 1978, 1979, and 1980.

RECOMMENDATIDN 3 l

Signature tracing techniques should be developed and tried on selected motor-operated valves as part of the periodic inservice testing program.

RESPONSIBLE CPGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS l

NRR/DE/ - Medium Not scheduled Proceeding satisfactorily. This will IE/DEPER/EGCB R. Kiessel High Not needed be included as part of a proposed l

draft plan (not yet approved) for Generic Issue II.E.6, "In Situ Testing of Valves." It will be covered by=

research programs. A user request memorandum, dated 5/14/84, from the-Director, NRR to the Director, RES addressed this item. Valve testing _

has been completed and a final report ~ is expected in January 1986.

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C-203-2

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AEOD RECOMENDATION TPACKING SYSTEM RECOMENDATION SOURCE: Case Study AEOD/C204 " San Onofre Unit 1 Loss of Salt Water Cooling Event on March 10, 1980,"

l dated July 1982 Responsible AEOD Engineer: H. Ornstein l

h TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

" Single Failure Vulnerability of San Onofre l's Salt Water Cooling System" RECOMENDATION 1 Ongoing efforts of the SEP focus on single failure vulnerability and consequences for the salt water cooling system and other equivalent service and cooling water systems.

, RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS. ,

NRR/DL/SEP E. McKenna High Proceeding satisfactorily. NRR has l NRR/DL/0RB5 W. Paulson (SEP topic IX-3) reviewed SEP plants for such vulnera-bilities. Modifications have been made at SEP plants as appropriate.,

" San Onofre has made several modifi-cations and is performing a relia-bility analysis of the modified salt water cooling system. The analysis is scheduled for completion in May, 1986.

o C-204-1 9 9 L

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AEOD RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM l

RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Memorandum, C. Michelson to Chairman Ahearne, "New Unresolved Safety Issues" dated August 4, 1980/

Memo C. Michelson to H. Denton, " Resolution of Issue Concerning Steamline Break with Small LOCA,"

dated June 23, 1982, Case Study AE0D/C205, "ATOG as Applied to the April 1981 Overfill Event at ANO-1" Responsible AE0D Engineer: H. Ornstein

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TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

Safety Implications of Steam Generator Transients and Accidents RECOMMENDATION 1 Combined primary / secondary side blowdown should be a USI for B&W plants.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/DSI/RSB Sheron High Proceeding satisfactorily. B&W RES Young licensees /EPRI/NRC are jointly funding a test facility to obtain integral systems test data to resolve the uncertainties associated with B&W plant response to SBLOCA and other transients and accidents.

RECOMMENDATION 2 TAP-A47 should focus on equipment modifications or additions to preclude SG overfill as a credible event.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR 0FFICE/DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/ DST /GIB A. Szukiewicz High Proceeding satisfactorily. On-going Generic Issue A-47. NUREG/CR-4385 entitled "Effect of Control System Failures on Transients. Accidents,

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and Core Melt Frequencies at a Westinghouse PWR" has been published in support of A-47 resolution.

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C-205-1

AE00 REC 0pWENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM REC 0fMENDATION SOURCE: Case' Study AE00/C301 Responsible AE00 Engineer: M. Chiramal

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TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

" Failure of Class 1 E Safety-Related Switchgear- Circuit Breakers to Close to Demand" REC 00mENDATION 1 Provide for monitoring the status of the closing circuit of Class 1 E Circuit Breakers and for appropriately selected breakers such as diesel generator output breakers, make the status indication available to the control room operator.

RESP 00tSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT . PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRC L. Riani Proceeding satisfactorily. NRR is re-prioritizing Generic Issue 55 based on Reference 3.

REC 0fMEleATON 2 In the short-term, licensees of operating reactors should establish regular local surveillance of Class 1 E switchgear circuit breakers to monitor the readiness status of the spring-charging motor of each unit.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW -STATUS NRR L. Riani Proceeding satisfactorily. (See status of Recommendation 1.)

C-301-1 ,

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AEOD RECOMtENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOPMENDATION SOURCE: Case Study AEOD/C301 (continued)

Responsible AEOD Engineer: M. Chiramal TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

" Failure of Class 1 E Safety-Related Switchgear Circuit Breakers to Close on Demand"

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RECONtENDATION 3 In addition to the above, measures that tend to preclude dirty or corroded contacts, poor electrical connections, blown control circuit fuses, and improper return of breakers to operable status should be incorporated into the maintenance procedures and used in actual maintenance practice.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR L. Riani Proceeding satisfactorily. (See status of Recommendation 1)

RECOMMENDATION 4 Shift operating personnel should receive periodic training in the logic and operation of circuit breakers equipped with anti-pumping controls.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR L. Riani Proceeding satisfactorily.

IE V. Thomas NA (See status of Recommendation I.)

IE issued Information Notice 83-50 advising licensees of the problems; however, there is little evidence that licensees have reacted to that information. This concern is being reconsidered in NRR re-prioritization of the issue.

C-301-2 e

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AE0D RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM -r s

REC 0mtENDATION _

SOURCE: Case Study AEOD/C301-(Continued)

Responsible AE00 Engineer: M. Chiramal TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

" Fail 6re of Class 1 E Safety-Related Switchgear Circuit Breakers to Close on Demand"

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REFERENCES:

1) Memo to C. H. Heltemes, Jr. from H. R. Denton, June 17, 1983 "AE00 April 1983 Report on Failure of Class 1 E Safety-Related Switchgear Circuit Breakers to Close on Demand .
2) Memo to D..G. Eisenhut from R. L. Spessard, June 1, 1984, "Unmonitored Failures of Class 1 E Safety-Related Switchgear Circuit Breakers to Close on Demand"
3) Memo to R~"M. % Aero from H. R. Denton, March 77,1985"ScheduledforResolvingandCompletingGeneric Issue No. 55 - Failure of Class 1 E Safety-Related Switchgear Circuit Breakers to Close on Derand"
4) Memo to H. R. Denton from C. J. Heltemes, Jr., April 12, 1985 " Generic Issue No. 55 - Failure of Class 1 E Safety-Related Switchgear Circuit Breakers to Close on Demand" 5)' Memo to C. J. Heltemes, Jr. from H. R. Denton, May 9, 1985 "AE00 Concerns Regarding GenNic' Issue No. 55" i

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C-301-3 .

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.9 AE00 RECOMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM 's RECOMENDATION SOURCE: Memorandum from C. H. Heltemes, Jr. to H. Denton, dated March 16, 1984 Responsible AE00 Engineer: D. Zukor

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TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

Low Temperatures Overpressure Events at Turkey' Point Unit 4, AE00/C401 RECOMENDATION 1 Correct the LTOP technical specifications for the 5 areas identified in the report.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/8R CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/DSI/RSB J. Pittman Medium Proceeding Satisfactorily. NRR'has identified this activity as new-generic issue 94. NRR/ DST has -

revised the prioritization to "high" based on our memorandum dated 6/3/85.

We agree with the current priority.

! classification.-

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C-401-1 w  %

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AEOD RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Case Study AE0D/C402 R:sponsible~AE0D Engineer: H. Ornstein

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TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

'" Operating Experience Related to Moisture Intrusion in Electrical Equipment at Commercial Power Reactors" RECOMMENDATION 1 IE should revise the inspection program to ensure licensee adherence to NRC requirements.

i RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS IE/DQASIP/0RPB S. McNeill None Proceeding satisfactorily. Criteria 3 for inspection of electrical equip-ment in IE inspection modules71-707 and 71-710 are presently undergoing revision in response to this recom-a mendation.

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C-402-1

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S0!!RCE: . Case Study AEOD/C403 R:sponsible AE00 Engineer: S. Rubin ,

1 TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

Edwin I. Hatch Unit 2 Plant Systems Interaction Event on August 25, 1982

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RECOMENDATION 1  ;

1

Evaluate the' common mode failure potential of safety systems due to the harsh environment of breaks outside 1 containment being back channelled through floor drain systems.

x RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS

NRR/DSI/ASB' A. Singh High Not scheduled Proceeding satisfactorily. This

. recommendation is being evaluated as part of Generic Issue No. 77, "Back Flow Protection in Common i ;- Equipment and floor Drain Systems."

i Implementation of Generic Issue No. 77

is currently in progress with an 1

expected completion date of 8/86.

L RECOMENDATION 2 il Supplemental arrangements should be provided to assure timely isolation of the ~affected floor drain. system.

if the results of the above evaluation. result ~in unacceptable common-mode safety system failures.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR i 0FFICE/DIV/8R CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS

NRR/DSI/ASB A. Singh High- Not scheduled Proceeding satisfactorily. This  :

j recommendation is being evaluated i

as part of Generic Issue No. 77, "Back Flow Protection in Conson

! Equipment and Floor Drain Systems."

Implementation of GI-77 is' currently in progress with an

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expected completion date of 8/86.

.C-403-1

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AEOD RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Memorandum from C. J. Heltemes, Jr. to H. Denton, dated July 23, 1984.

R:sponsible AE00 Engineer: D. Zukor TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

Case Study-Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps RECOMMENDATION 1 PWR licensees should establish a method to regularly monitor the AFW system to minimize the potential for steam binding.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/ DST /SPEB High TBD Proceeding satisfactorily.

Identified as new Generic Issue 93. Task Action Plan issued 1/2?/85. An IE Bulletin has been issued.

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C-404-1 O

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AEOD RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Case Study Report AE00/C405 R:sponsible AE00 Engineer: S. Pettijohn TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

" Breaching of the Encapsulation of Sealed Well Logging Sources" RECOMMENDATION 1

- Part 39 should require that well logging licensees have specific emergency procedures for handling specific source rupture incidents.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS RES/RAMBR F. P. Gillespie N/A Proceeding satisfactorily. The recommendation has been incorpor-ated into the proposed Part 39.

The proposed Part 39 will be issued for public comment in the near future.

RECOMMENDATION 2 Part 39 should require special physical characteristics for well logging sources.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS

- RES/RAMBR F. P. Gillespie N/A Proceeding satisfactorily. The recommendation has been incorpor-ated into the proposed Part 39. The proposed Part 39 will be issued for public_ comment in the near future.

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C405-1 l

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AE00 RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Case Study AE0D/C405 (continued)

S. Pettiiohn Responsible AE0D Engineer:

TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

" Breaching of the Encapsulation of Sealed Well Logging Sources" RECOMMENDATION 3 Part 39 should preclude licensees from removing or attempting to remove sources from source holders i

without specific authorization in the license.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS RES/RAMBR F. P. Gillespie N/A Proceeding satisfactorily.

The recommendation has been incorporated into the proposed

Part 39. The proposed Part 39 will be issued for public coment in the near future.

REC 0l#4ENDATION 4

! A determination should be made whether or not extremity (finger) badges are required for personnel engaged j in well logging activities.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NMSS/FCMC Cunningham N/A Currently under review by NMSS.

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AE0D RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: __

Case Study AE0D/C405 (continued)

R:sponsible AE00 Engineer: S. Pettijohn

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TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

" Breaching of the Encapsulation of Sealed Well Logging Sources" RECOMMENDATION 5 The interface between the well owner, well logging company, and companies specializing in recovery operations should be defined.in order to establish the regulatory responsibility and authority over recovery and well logging operations.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/8R CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS RES/RAMBR F. P. Gillespie N/A Proceeding satisfactorily.

The recommendation has been incorporated into the proposed Part 39. The proposed Part 39 will be issued for public comment in the near future.

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b AE0D RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM REC 0tWENDATION SOURCE: Case Study AE0D/C501 NUREG/CR-3551 R:sponsible AEOD Engineer: H. Ornstein

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TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

" Safety Implications Associated with In-Plant Pressurized Gas Storage and Distribution Systems in Nuclear Power Plants" RECOMMENDATION 1 Require procedures to provide protection to prevent unacceptable damage to safety-related equipment from portable gas cylinder missiles.

I RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS i

i IE/EPER D. Kirkpatrick Unresolved. Reviewed by IE and NRR.

"i NRR/SPEB .R. Colmar No action at this time. IE considered i issuing an IN on this item. However, IE has decided not to issue a notice '

j at this time. IE will consider an information notice if " pressurized gas related events" do occur in the future.

NRR believes that SRI 3.5.1.1 and 3.5.1.2 arefadequate, and that no NRR action is necessary.

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C-501-1

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AE0D RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM

, RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Case Study AE0D/C501 NUREG/CR-3551 (continued) 4 Responsible AEOD Engineer: 'H. Ornstein

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TITLE OR'

SUBJECT:

" Safety Implications Associated with In-Plant Pressurized Gas Storage and Distribution Systems in

Nuclear Power Plants"
-i RECOMMENDATION 2 l

Require Protection to prevent hydrogen explosions or fires in areas containing or impacting operation of safety 1 related equipment.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR 4

0FFICE/DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS

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.f NRR/SPEB R.'Colmar- Proceeding satisfactorily. SPEB is i

presently prioritizing the' matter of backfitting requiring the installation.

- of excess-flow valves son hydrogen lines in operating plants. (Safety issue No. 106 " Piping and the Use of Highly Combustible Gases in Vital Areas.")

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AE00 RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMENDATION SOURCE: Case Study'AEOD/C501 NUREG/CR-3551 (continued)

R sponsible AE00 Engineer: H. Ornstein

-TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

" Safety Implications Associated with In-Plant Pressurized Gas Storage and Distribution' Systems in Nuclear Power Plants" 4

RECOMMENDATION 3 Identification of lines and tanks.

OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/SPEB. R. Colmar Drop Unresolved. No NRR action planned.

NRR believes that without a risk assessment demonstrating how the identification of lines and tanks will significantly affect core melt frequencies and/or radiological releases,.the NRC would not have the authority to require such identifi -

L cation.

AE00 recognizes the fact that proper
line and tank
identification.is an example of low cost, simple, good

,i- housekeeping at the plants, the cost l of which would be dwarfed by plant specific risk assessments. AE00 be-lieves that the issue of proper.line' and tank identification'should be

. addressed by NRR's Division of' Human Factors; however, presently

-there are no regulatory bases to justify such action.

F C-501-3

. . - . . . - . - .- - . . - - _ . . . . .. . . . _ - . .~ .- . , . ..-

1 AEOD RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM

. RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Case Study Report AE0D/C502 i-R sponsible AEOD Engineer: Peter Lam

[ TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

"Overpressurization of. Emergency Core Cooling Systems in Boiling Water Reactors" o RECOMENDATION 1 Disable the nonsafety-related air operator associated with the testable isolation check valve on the injection line in the emergency core cooling systems.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR i- OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS

-j NRR/DBWRL/RSB W. Hodges High- December 1986 Proceeding satisfactorily. Assigned

} as new Generic-Issue 105 with an i expedited schedule of resolution.

f: RECOMENDATION 2 t

Perform leakage testing of the testable isolation check valve prior to plant startup after each refueling outage or following maintenance, repair or replacement of the valve. .

, RESPONSIBLE CRGR i 0FFICE/DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS '

3 NRR/DBWRL/RSB- W. Hodges High December.1986 Proceeding satisfactorily. Assigned '

as new Generic Issue 105 with an-i expedited schedule of resolution.  ;

1 C-502-1 h ,

w- ,.- _. . _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

AE0D RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION SOURCE:- Case Study Report AE0D/C502 R:sponsible AEOD Engineer: Peter Lam TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

"Overpressurization of Emergency Core Cooling Systems in Boiling Water Reactors" i RECOMMENDATION 3 Reduce human errors in maintenance and surveillance testing activities.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/DBWRL/RSB W. Hodges High December 1986 Proceeding satisfactorily. Assigned as new Generic Issue 105 with an expedited schedule of resolution.

REC 0fetENDATION 4 Study reducing the frequency of surveillance testing of the isolation barriers of the emergency core cooling systems during power operation.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/DBWRL/RSB W. Hodges- High December 1986 Proceeding satisfactorily. Assigned as new Generic. Issue 105 with an expedited schedule of resolution.

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C-502-2

  1. 6

AE00 RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM 4

, - RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Case Study AE00/C503 4

R:sponsible AE00 Engineer: H. Ornstein

~

TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

" Decay Heat Removal Problems at U.S. PWRs," December 1985 RECOMMENDATION 1 NRR assess the need for NRC requirements to improve planning, co-ordination, procedures, and personnel training during shutdown to ensure the availability of the DHR system.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS l' NRR The case study has been recently issued. NRR is presently reviewing-

it. Contact has not yet been deter-mined. ,

RECOMMENDATION 2 i NRR require PWR licensees t'o have a reliable method of measuring and monitoring reactor vessel level during shutdown modes of operation and corresponding technical specification requirements.for operability.

RESPONSIBLE- CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR' CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR The case study has been recently issued. NRR is presently reviewing

'it. . Contact has not yet been deter---

mined.

~

C-503-1 O

e 9

AE00 RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Case Study AE0D/C503 (continued)

'l R:sponsible AE0D Engineer: H. Ornstein TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

" Decay Heat Removal Problems at U.S. PWRs," December 1985 RECOMMENDATION 3 NRR require licensees to improve the man-machine interfaces related to DHR operation.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR The case study has been recently issued. NRR is presently reviewing it. Contact has not yet been deter-mined.

RECOMMENDATION 4 NRR should consider DHR suction bypass lines as. alternatives to redundant drop lines (if A-45 concludes that single drop line configurations are unacceptable).

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR The case study has been recently issued. NRR is presently reviewing it. Contact has not yet been deter-mined.

~

C-503-2 I 1 8

4 AE00 RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM i

l RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Case Study AE00/C503 Rispensible AEOD Engineer: H. Ornstein I TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

" Decay Heat Removal Problems at U.S. PWRs," December 1985 'l p RECOMMENDATION 5 NRR consider removal of autoclosure interlocks to minimize loss-of-DHR events, f RESPONSIBLE .

CRGR

- 0FFICE/DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR The case study has been recently

, . issued...NRR is presently reviewing: '

? it. . Contact has not yet been. deter-j mined.'

RECOMMENDATION 6 J NRR should address the issue.of DHR system redundancy to ensure that the DHR system is available during Mode.4, and-i the early stages of Mode 5. .;

RESPONSIBLE CRGR-0FFICE/DIV/BR ' CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR The case study has been recently issued. . NRR is . presently reviewing it. . Contact has not yet been deter-mined. ,

C-503-3 -

e

AE0D RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Memo: C. Michelson to R. Mattson, "NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of IM1-2 Accident -

Draft 3, Task II.E.3 Decay Heat Removal," April 24, 1980 R:sponsible AEOD Engineer: H. Ornstein TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

Reliability of DHR Systems RECOMMENDATION 1 Reliability of DHR systems should be' reviewed and where necessary upgraded on an expedited basis.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR

0FFICE/DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/ DST /GIB A. Marchese High ,s

~

Proceeding satisfactorily.

TAP A-45 Contractor performing work which will address this issue - NUREG report expected February,1986.

o E-001A-1 O

k

5 AE00 RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION '

SOURCE: Memorandum dated-July 15, 1980 from C. Michelson to H. R. Denton

, i

~ R:sponsible AE0D Engineer: M. Chiramal

~~

TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

Operational Restrictions for Class 1 E 120 VAC Vital Instrument Buses RECOMMENDATION 1 4

Impose Technical Specification requirements concerning operational restrictions for Class 1 E 120 Vac Vital- j Buses on operating plants.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR d 0FFICE/DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/DSI/PSB 0. Chopra High Not scheduled , Proceeding satisfactorily.

s Currently being pursued'under.

Generic Issue 48.

i i

e

REFERENCES:

1. Memo dated September 29, 1980 from H. Denton to C. Michelson
2. Memo dated October 25, 1983 from H. Denton to D. Eisenhut .

~

E-005-1

  • .E e-

AE0D RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Memo dated August 27, 1980 from C. Michelson to H. R. Denton Responsible AE0D Engineer: M. Chiramal

'~

TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

Tie Breaker Between Redundant Class 1 E Buses - Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2 RECOMMENDATION 1

. Interconnection between redundant safety-related electrical load groups should comply with . requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.6.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/DSI/PSB M. Srinivasan Medium Not scheduled Proceeding satisfactorily.

Generic Issue 49 has been established for this issue.

I

REFERENCE:

Memo dated October 16, 1980 from'H. R.'Denton to C. Michelson E-010-1 g

e ,

AEOD RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Memorandum to H. R. Denton from C. Michelson, dated January 19, 1981 Rasponsible AE0D Engineer: E. J. Brown

~

TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

Degradation of Internal Appurtenances in LWRs RECOMMENDATION 1 RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/ DST H. Vander Molen Draft priority Not scheduled Proceeding satisfactorily. Agree-was determined ment between NRR and AEOD to include.

to be low. evaluation of loose parts as possible .

(Generic Issue #35) missiles during SG blowdowns has been-reached. Additionally, it was agreed that AE00 would conduct a data search to identify loose p:rts affecting ESF system reliabiisty to assist NRR-in evaluating ESF system concerns (Reference 1). Results of the data search will be compiled and forwarded to NRR.

REFERENCE:

Memo, K. V. Seyfrit to W. Minners, February 15, 1985, " Evaluation of of Generic Issue No. 35, Degradation of Internal Appurtenance in LWRs"

~

E-101-1 G

G 9

AE0D RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Memorandum from C. Michelson to V. Stello and H. Denton, "Immediate Action Memo: Common Cause Failure Potential at Rancho Seco - Dessicant Contamination of Air Lines," September 15, 1981.

R:sponsible AEOD Engineer: H. Ornstein TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

Air Plant Systems RECOMMENDATION 1 Obtain licensees' experience and assessment of this problem and determine course of corrective action if required.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/ DST /SPEB Milstead Low / Drop Not proceeding satisfactorily.

NRR Prioritized this issue (Generic Issue 43); and recommended that it be dropped. AE0D does not agree with the prioritization, and sent i

NRR a memo requesting NRR hold this issue in abeyance until an AE0D report is written on this subject including additional operational experience. The AE00 Case Study is expected to be completed during early 1986. NRR has agreed to this approach. A recent ACRS memo related to NRR's prioritization of generic issues also indicated agreement with this approach.

E-123-1 r

- e 9

_J

AE0D RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Memorandum from C. Michelson to R. Burnett, dated January 12, 1982 R:sponsible AE0D Engineer: W. Lanning TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

Methodology for Vital Area Determination t

. RECOMMENDATION 1 Improve vital area determination methodology by ensuring the completeness and validity of the generic fault trees and guidelines used to help define " key vital areas."

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NMSS/SG/SGPR R. Dube High None In the spring of 1985, the ED0-

, established an interoffice ~ committee l

to review the vital area assumptions.

This effort should be completed by earlyl1986.

9

~

E-201-1 9

O

t l

AE00 RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM ,

i

t RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Memorandum from C. Michelson to R. Burnett, dated January 12, 1982 (continued)
Rzsponsible AE00 Engineer
W. Lanning

~

TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

Methodology for Vital Area Determination i RECOMENDATION 2 i;

Additional resources should be allocated for developing and evaluating practical methods, other.than '

access controls, to minimize insider threats and.this activity should receive budgetary. priority.

i RESPONSIBLE CRGR

OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY -REVIEW STATUS ,

NMSS/SG/SGPR J.~Yardumian High None Proceeding satisfactorily. ' Generic

Issues A-45, " Decay Heat' Removal" will address reactor design changes to reduce potential risk due to sabotage. A-29, " Nuclear Power
Plant Design for. Reduction of Vulnerability to Sabotage" has~been

. resolved and NUREG/CR-4392 has been -

issued as its resolution.

CRGR has approved the " Insider'

, Rule" and it has been~ transmitted '

j to the Commission by the EDO.

~

E-201-2 3 4

i

AE0D RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Memorandum from C. Michelson to R. Vollmer and R. Mattson dated February 24, 1982 R:sponsible /200 Engineer: M. Chiramal

~~

TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

Spurious Trip of the Generator Lockout Relay Associated with a Diesel Generator Unit-

" RECOMMENDATION 1 Should explicitly verify that seismic qualification of all protective devices used in the control and protection circuitry of DG units has been performed with these devices in their energized, de-energized, tripped and non-tripped.

t states.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR P. Y. Chen High Not scheduled Proceeding satisfactorily.

Issue will be incorporated into ,

USI A-46.

REFERENCE:

Memorandum from H. R. Denton to C. Michelson dated May 11, 1982 i

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E-212-1

'e

AE0D RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Engineering Evaluation AE00/E215 R:sponsible AE00 Engineer: T. Cintula TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

" Salt Water System Flow Blockage at Pilgrim NPS by Blue Mussels"

., RECOMMENDATION 1 Internal inspection of RBCCW HX supply headers RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/DSI/ASB C. Hickey Medium Not scheduled

  • Proceeding satisfactorily. Pending generic action on biofouling Generic issue 51 RECOMMENDATION 2 Periodic measurement of overall heat transfer coefficient on RBRCCW HXs at Pilgrim RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/DSI/ASB C. Hickey Medium Not scheduled
  • Proceeding satisfactorily. Pending generic action on biofouling.

Generic Issue 51.

RECOMMENDATION 3 Periodic measurement of Salt Water System flow to RBCCW HXs RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/DSI/ASB C. Hickey Medium Not scheduled

  • Proceeding satisfactorily. Pending generic action on biofouling.

Generic Issue 51.

(May not be required. If necessary, will be scheduled following completion of Generic Issue 51, " Proposed Requirement fcr Improving the Reliability of Open Cycle Service Water Systems." The Generic Issue is incorporating Task V of Project FIN.B-2977 by RES into GI-51.

E-215-1

'o

- . . - . ..- - . -. . - - _. .- . .- . . =-

i AE0D RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Memo dated June-1, 1982 from C. Michelson to H. R. Denton and R. C. DeYoung R;sponsible AEOD Engineer: M. Chiramal

~

TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

Dcgradation of BWR Scram Pilot Solenoid Valves due to Abnormal Power Supply Voltages.

RECOMMENDATION 1 Implementation of RPS power monitoring system in BWRs should consider ac line . losses and voltage drops between RPS ~ '

power supplies and loads connected to them.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/DSI/PSB -

High Not required Resolved. Being addressed under MPA C-11 "RPS Power Supplies (BWRs)."

Review has been completed for all operating BWR units.

REFERENCE:

Memo dated August 13, 1982 from H. Denton to C. Michelson E-225-1 O

y - a

AE0D RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM TECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Memo dated June 24, 1982 from C. J. Heltemes, Jr. to E. L. Jordan Responsible AEOD Engineer: F. Ashe TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

Failure of ESF manual Initiation Pushbutton Switches i RECOMENDATION 1 Licensees should be made aware of potential problems associated with Cutler Hammer switch assemblies used in low voltage - low current applications.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS IE/DEPER/EGCB .V. Thomas Low Not needed. Resolved. IE has concluded that no further action is warranted.

(Reference 1)

REFERENCE:

Memo from R. L. Baer to K. V. Seyfrit, March 21, 1985, " Failure of Manual of Initiation Pushbutton Switches in ESF Systems at McGuire Station Units 1 and 2" E-227-1 9

b

AE0D RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Engineering Evaluation AE0D/E304 R:sponsible AE00 Engineer: T. Cintula TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

" Backflow Protection in Common Equipment and Floor Drain Systems" RECOMMENDATION 1 Provide backflow protection for drain systems in older operating plants.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR 0FFICE/DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/DSI/ASB A. Singh High 8/86 (If backfit Proceeding satisfactorily._ This is required) issue is being addressed in Generic Issue 77. The task action plan for.

Generic Issue 77 has been prepared and approved. Implementation of the plan is currently in progress with an expected completion date of 8/86.

E-304-1

AE00 RECOMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM e >a

/ /

.. RECON 4ENDATION I ': '

SOURCE: 'Special Study Report - C. J. Heltemes, Jr. to H. R. Denton dated January 13, 1984.

R sponsible AE00 Engineer: E. Trager w + ' ,

TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

" Human Error in Events Involving Wrong Unit or Wrong Train" RECOMENDATION 1

-Consider the need for further clarification or guidance on what constitutes on acceptable independent 2 verification program.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT _ PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS

~

  • NRR Unknown N/A Under Review. NRR was to consider-as a part of Maintenan'ce and Surveillance Pro gram Plan (MSPP).

Scope of_p,lan has been reduced so-e that plan may no longer be a suitable

.dation..

vehicle for resolution of reconn f

, ~- se f

s' su S-401-1

y. .-

h w___________--____--___ ., -- . , _

AE0D RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Special Study Report - C. J. Heltemes, Jr. to H. R. Denton dated January 13,1984-Responsible AE0D Engineer: E. Trager TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

" Human Error in Events Involving Wrong Unit or Wrong Train" RECOMMENDATION 1 NRR review wrong unit / wrong train events and develop appropriate guidance to minimize such events.

RESPONSIBLE CRGR OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS NRR/PPAS/TOSB G. Edison High as Generic N/A Proceeding satisfactorily.

NRR/DHFS Unknown Issue HG-02 NRR and AE0D will spend about 1/3 AE00/NAS E. Trager man-year over next several months on plant visits and reviews to determine /whether WU/WT events

-should be taken up as an issue separate from the Painenance and .

Surveillance Program Plan (MSPP).

S-401-2 s

AE0D RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Memorandum - C. J. Heltemes, Jr. to R. DeYoung, May 11, 1984 R:sponsible AE0D Engineer: S. Rubin TITLE OR

SUBJECT:

Pressure Locking of Flexible Disk Wedge Type Gate Valves. '

RECOMMENDATION 1 r _

Give immediate consideration to issuing a bulletin on the subject of pressure locking of flexible disk wedge-type gate valves.

4 RESPONSIBLE CRGR i 0FFICE/DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY . REVIEW STATUS IE/DEPER R. Singh High eN/A Proceedingsatisfactoril[.

IE prepared a draft bulletin as part of a CRGR review package. ,.

Shortly thereafter, it was learned that INP0 had begun work on an SOER on this subject. AE0D and IE agreed to allow INP0 to address the concerns, and activity by IE on the bulletin was suspended with AEOD- -

agreement. .On 12/14/84, INPO _f issued SOER 84-7 " Pressure Locking '

. and Thermal Binding of Gate Valves."

This document was found by AE00 and IE to be an acceptable substitute "

for the bulletin originally proposed.

IE and AE00 will monitor the LERs, e

and 50.72 Reports for adequacy of c~

corrective actions taken in response to the INP0 SOER..

A review of the licensee reponses will be used to determine the

.J/ ~_ overal? effectiveness of the INPO

"", SOER.

} ,

S-402-1 ,

- - . . . __ ~.-. . - . - . ._. --_.. - - . . . - . . - . - . . ~ . .

{

AEOD RECOMMENDATION TRACKING SYSTEM RECOMMENDATION SOURCE: Special Study Report AE0D/S503 and Memorandum, Heltemes to Denton dated September 19, 1985.

(See also recommendations related to AE00/C203 on pages C203-1 and C203-2.)

i l Rssponsible AE00 Engineer: E. J. Brown

^

TITLE OR.

SUBJECT:

- " Evaluation of Revent Valve Operator Motor Burnout Events" RECOMENDATION 1

In view of the more than 200 motor burnout events, the NRR plan to address motor burnout should be expedited, e

i l RESPONSIBLE CRGR .

, OFFICE /DIV/BR CONTACT PRIORITY REVIEW STATUS , j 4

j NRR Not proceeding satisfactorily.

This~ issue was to'have been 4 addressed in Generic Issue II.E.6, "In Situ Testing of Valves;"'

however,-no contract for'this=

l effort has been funded for FY 86.

l 6

i-3 i ._

i l

.: S-503-1

' ^

!