IR 05000267/1985036

Insp Rept 50-267/85-36 on 851201-31.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items, NUREG-0737 Requirements (TMI Action Items) & New Fuel

ML20137J361
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Saint Vrain
Issue date:	01/15/1986
From:	Farrell R, Jaudon J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137J359	List: IR 05000267/1985036 ML20137J356
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.C.1, TASK-TM 50-267-85-36, NUDOCS 8601220410
Download: ML20137J361 (5)

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APPENDIX t

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O. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-267/85-36 License: DPR-34 Docket: 50-267

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-Licensee: Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC)

P. O. Box 840

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Denver, Colorado 80201 Facility Name: Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station Inspection At: Fort St. Vrain Nuclear (FSV) Generating Station, Platteville, Colorado

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Inspection Conducted: Decemb'er 1-31, 1985

- Inspector: [/[/ h ///r/sid;

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f,f. R. E. Farrell, Senior Resident Inspector (SRI) Date Approved: k[/ / /fr/sf j;'<-J.P.Jaudon, Chief,ProjectSectionA / Da'te

- , Reactor Projects Branch

4 r t Inspection Summary

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Inspection Conducted December 1-31, 1985 (Report 50-267/85-36)

. , s - Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of operational safety verification, Ticensee action on previously identified inspection items, ,

!. NUREG-0737 requirements (Three Mile Island Action Items), engineered safety feature; systems, and new fuel inspection. The inspection involved 89 direct inspection hours onsite by one NRC inspecto Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie G f

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-2-DETAILS

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a Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees

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D. Alps,. Security Supervisor T. Borst, Support Services Manager / Radiation Protection Manager L. Brey, Manager,. Nuclear Engineering Division

• R. Craun, Site Engineering Manager

. M. Deniston, Shift Supervisor D.- Evans, Superintendent Operations

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M. Ferris, QA Operations Manager C. Fuller, Station Manager S. Hofstetter, Nuclear Licensing Engineer

- Holmes,~ Manager, Nuclear Services

• J. Gahm, Manager Nuclear Production, F. Novachek, Technical / Administrative Services Manager T. Prenger, QA Services Manager L. Singleton, Manager QA

. Warembourg, Manager Nuclear Engineering The SRI also contacted other licensee and contractor personnel during the

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inspectio '* Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted December 31, 198 . Operational Safety Verification

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The SRI reviewed licensee activities to ascertain that the facility is being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements and that the licensee's management control system is effectively discharging

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its responsibilities for continued safe operatio ,

. The review was conducted by direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent

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J verifications of safety system. status and limiting conditions for

operations, and review of facility record .

Logs and records reviewed included:

. . Shift supervisor logs

. Reactor operator logs

. Equipment operator logs

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Auxiliary operator-logs

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"1 13 . Technical specification compliance logs-i

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' Operations deviations reports:

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5 ; Z .x . ' Temporary'configuation' reports

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" . ,(y ' The~. SRI- also co'ntacted other ' licensee and contractor personnel 'during the -

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' During tours *of accessible' areas, particular attention was. directed tolthe_

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'$9'* 1 " Monitoring-instrumentation;

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. 'H' anger / seismic restraints

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No violations or deviations were' identified.'

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., Licensee Action on Previously' Identified Inspection Item

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-(CLOSED) Violation (50-267/8525-01): " Failure to report." The SRI

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.e reviewed Operations Order 85-19 issued by the IIcensee to ' provide guidance to operations personnel regarding NRC reporting requirements. The SRI'

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also interviewed some of the shift supervisors reg:irding reporting

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D - since the violation was issued.- The licensee's guirlance to' operations

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personnel and the identification and timely processing of reportable items'

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" has been consistant with NRC regulation .

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o y, q  ; This item is close ,

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_4_ NUREG-0737, Three Mile Island Items (CLOSED) Item I.C.1.2.b, " Revised procedure to mitigate inadequate core cooling." The licensee has generated procedures covering inadequate core cooling incidents. These procedures include a matrix of symptoms versus probable cause and direct the reactor operators to take specific actions to mitigate the even This item is close (CLOSED) Item I.C.1.3.b, " Revised procedures to mitigate transients and-accidents." The licensee has generated procedures covering transients and accidents. These procedures include a matrix of symptoms versus probable cause and direct the reactor operators to take specific actions to mitigate the event (s).

This item is close Note: Closure of the above items does not affect the submittal or i

review of the procedures generation package submitted to the NRC by PSC in response to the Commission's order dated August 2, 1985, regarding commitments on Post-Three Mile Island issue . Engineered Safety Feature Systems The licensee is installing a remote actuation capability for the helium circulator brake and seal assemblies. Each of the four helium circulators has a mechanical shutdown seal which constitutes a pressure boundary preventing primary coolant leakage around the circulator shaft when the circulator is shutdown, and a brake to stop circulator rotation prior to activating the circulator mechanical seal thus preventing mechanical seal damag The licensee is installing a remote actuation capability with all controls located in a mild environment accessible to the reactor operators following a high energy 'ine break. The brake and seal are normally activated automatically by the plant protection system or manually from the control room by the reactor operato The remote manual controls are being installed as a confirmatory action item to allow reduced power operation while equipment environmental qualification is pendin The SRI reviewed the design change document governing installation of this remote manual brake and seal actuation. Additionally, the SRI walked the helium tubing runs (helium is the working fluid for actuation of the circulator brakes and seals) and inspected the new control statio Construction is not yet completed. During the inspection period only one of the four helium circulators had the remote manual brake and seal r .-

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-5-t actuation capability installe The SRI will continue to monitor activity in this are No violations or deviations were identifie . New Fuel Inspection During receipt of new fuel, three fuel casks were isolated inside the new fuel building pending internal examination. Two of the fuel casks were the subject of a nonconformance report (NCR) generated by the fuel fabricator at the time of shipmen The fuel inventory papers conflicted with the fuel cask markings, and it was believed that the fuel element in the first cask was that intended to be in the second cask in question and vice versa. A third fuel cask was isolated due to having a broken shipping seal upon arrival at the FSV sit The licensee opened the first fuel cask subject to the NCR and verified that the serial number of the fuel element contained corresponded to the markings on the fuel cask. Consequently, there was no need to open the second fuel cask listed on the NC The SRI observed the opening of the fucl cask which arrived with a broken shipping seal. The licensee verified that the fuel element contained was in proper condition and had the correct serial numbe The licensee's radiological controls were in accordance with procedures and NRC regulations. The licensee's security controls during this activity were in accordance with his security plan and NRC regulation No violations or deviations were identifie . . Exit Interview The SRI conducted an exit interview on December 31, 1985, attended by those indicated in paragraph 1. The SRI reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection at this tim _