ML20137J286
| ML20137J286 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/01/1997 |
| From: | Hoyle J NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137J293 | List: |
| References | |
| COMSECY-96-053, COMSECY-96-53, DSI-2, SECY-96-053-C, SECY-96-53-C, NUDOCS 9704030262 | |
| Download: ML20137J286 (11) | |
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4 April 1, 1997 SECY NOTE:
The following documents are being released to the public at this time:
1.
Text of DSI 2 (Oversight of the Department of Energy) 2.
Staff Requirements Memorandum dated March 28, 1997.
3.
Views of Chairman Jackson dated January 29, 1997.
4.
Views of Commissioner Rogers dated January 17, 1997.
5.
Views of Commissioner Dieus dated January 28, 1997.
6.
Views of Commissioner Diaz dated January 27, 1997.
i 7.
Views of Commissioner McGaffigan dated January 28, 1997.
O John C. Hoyle 4
Secretary of the Commission i
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COMSECY-96-053 i :
3.0
SUMMARY
ANALYSIS OF COMMENTS
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This section describas the staff's analysis comments for each direction-4 Each DSI analysis je i
setting issue (DSI) paper as well as general remarks.(1) statemen'. of wl l
.m contains the following:
Commission's preliminary viens, (3) summary of consents which includes (a) ; y l
significant/important co e n',s that could directly affect the preliminary 8
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view,(b)commentsonotheroptions,(c)commentsonimportantomissions,($
j comments related to questions
.O comments on internal / external factors, (e)dum, if applicable, and (4) a
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included in the staff requirements memoran
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chronological list of commenters.
OVERSIGHT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EN f
3.1 3.1.1 The Direction Setting Issue and the Options J
Should the NRC seek to expand its regulatory authority and responsibilities to l
include DDE facilities?
Support Broad Responsibility for NRC Regulation of DOE i
l Option 1:
1A Support the Adoption of the Advisory Committee Recommendations j
Use the Division of Responsibility that Applies to IB l
Commercial Facilities l
Ninimize Jurisdictional Conflicts Between NRC and Other IC Agencies Support Broad Responsibility for Regulating Certain Types of DOE l
Option 2:
Facilities Regulate Only Non-Defense DOE Facilities i
2A Regulate only DOE Facilities that are Similar to Those 28 Presently Regulated by NRC Regulate All DOE Sites and Facilities Except for 3
2C l
Environmental Restoration Facilities.
l Capose Broad NRC Responsibilitj for Regulating DOE Facilities 1
j Option 3:
. Confine NRC Jurisdiction to Existi'ng DOE Facilities 3A Accept Jurisdiction for DOE Facilities on an Incremental 3B l
Basis Only Take No Position on Broad NRC Responsibility for DOE Facilities Option 4:
3.1.2 Commission's Preliminary Views This view would be consistent The Commission preliminarily favors Option 4.
with the position the Commission has taken on this issue in the past; that is, i
the NRC has not actively pursued the added respons l
time schedule to develop and initiate a regulatory program, the NRC could i
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provide adequate regulatory oversight of DOE, if asked.
If NRC were to be given added regulatory ov usight of DOE facilities, the Commission would prefer that the regulatory responsibilities be placed on the
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NRC on an incremental basis and that some type of prioritization methodology l
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be used to determine the types of DOE facilities that, if subject to NRC oversight, would provide the greatest potential benefit to public health and safety.
Since the Comission is tentatively accepting the option that the NRC will not take a position on accepting broad respansibility for DOE facilities (Option 4), it would neither encourage nor oppose new legislation giving it broader authority over DOE nuclear facilities.
3.1.3 Summary of Comments A.
Significant/Important Comments Directly Affecting the Preliminary Views or the Direction-Setting Issue Most commenters did not support the Comission's preliminary view of adopting Option 4, and several comenters strongly encouraged the Comission to aggressively pursue external regulation of DOE under Option 18.
For example, the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors (CRCPD) and the Organization of Agreement States (0AS) were of the opinion that NRC has the experience and resources necessary to regulate DOE.
Furthermore, the OAS was I
concerned that the option of taking no position on the external regulation of DOE would only exacerbate the problem and that proactive and careful planning for NRC external oversight was necessary.
The OAS went on to state that although it may be politically expedient to take no position on accepting the broad responsibility for regulating DOE, the NRC should be prepared to express its intent to provide adequate regulatory authority over DOE if asked to do so by Congress.
In addition, the OAS stated that although Option 4 may be an acceptable position at this time, the NRC should be prepared to go forward with Options 1A or IB, as the opportunity arises. This view also held by the State of Oregon Health Division, the State of Maryland, and other States.
Similar views were also expressed by a representative of the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) who believed that it was untenable for the Comission to take no position on this issue and by a member of the public (Crites) who stated that the NRC has the capability, to regulate DOE and should pursue it actively. Another comenter (the State of Washington) opposed Options 2 through 4 and observed that as a result cf declining licensing work "a phase-in of DOE oversight over a number of years could be an important factor in NRC maintaining a viable work force for overall radiation protection in this country."
One commenter (Mendelsohn) believed that Option 4 was appropriate but that the Comission should also offer its views on what options it would best be suited to implement if the NRC were given external oversight authority. Another comenter strongly agreed that the NRC should not actively solicit a role in the external oversight of DOE, particularly in the area of nuclear weapons.
One industry association (National Mining Association (NMA] argued that it was appropriate for the Comission not to actively seek oversight of DOE facilities, but if the NRC should become the external regulator, Option IB should be followed.
The association went on to state that there should be external oversight of DOE and that NRC's expertise places it in the strongest position of any existing agency to assuene these responsibilities. One local governmen! (Clark County, Nevada) thought Option 4 was appropriate because it is importent for the NRC to perform its current regulatory respoi ibility well Page 3-2 Phase 11 Stakeholder Interaction Repon
Owrsight of the Departmens of Energy Summary Analysis of Comments and that the agency should not attempt to reduce its effectiveness by A member of an NRC advisory attempting to perform too many activities.
comittee (Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards [ACRSJ) noted that perhaps not the least of the reasons to reject NRC oversight of 00E is theThis comenter also Comission's historic lack of enthusiasm for such a role.
stated tl.at it is arguable whether DOE self-regulation has in fact been A environmental organization (Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power) noted that although Option 4 did not bode well for bringing DOE under harmful.
effective regulatory control, that Option 4 was an appropriate choice because the organization was not convinced that NRC is willing to exert, or capable of exercising, the rigorous form of regulation which DOE needs.
B.
Coments on Other Options As noted above, a number of comenters strongly encouraged the Comission to For example, aggressively pursue external regulation of DOE under Option 18.
the CRCPD and the OAS were of the opir. ion that NRC has the experience and resources necessary to regulate D0E.
The OAS stated that of the NRC and the Defense Nuclear facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), only the NRC has the experience necessary to enable a smooth transfer and implementation of Another comenter regulatory responsibility to an outside organization.
NRC's assumption of authority in relation to the gaseous that a similar benefit could be achieved if the NRC exercised a broader regulato'y authority over 00E.
However, this comenter cautioned that it might be better if the NRC adopted Option 2A and did not assume authority over r
DOE defense facilities. The State of Ohio Department of Health supported Option 1, arguing tht all sources of radioactivity should be regulated in the The comenter same way and under the same set of regulatory restrictions.
noted that NRC already has a framework in place and a mechanism for working A public commenter (No Name) with other Federal agencies and the States.
stated that pursuing Option I would provide the NRC with the opportunity to NRC and its employees, and would sharpen their grow, would anergize th:The State of Oregon Office of Energy also supported Option 1 concerned that it might result in significant delays in the cleanup efforts skills.
Therefore, it recommended that the new underway in the DOE nuclear complex.
regulatory responsibilities be added on an incremental basis. The NRC staff comenters from Region IV also endorsed Option 1.
In relation to Option 1, the CRCPD and the OAS also recomended that the The external oversight of DOE be shared between the NRC and State government.
OAS said that the States already have substantial experience regulatingT various aspects of DOE facilities.
given the authority to regulate the DOE facilities that corre Act, as well as facilities with which the States have experience, such as The CRCPD noted that it has a committee on the accelerator facilities.
external oversight of DOE (E-20) and urged the Comission to work actively The OAS with this comittee in planning for the external oversight of D0E.
also recomended that the NRC establish a working group that includes Agreement State representatives to evaluate the options and develop a Another commenter regulatory strategy for the external oversight of DOE.
(State of New Mexico) indicated that this, haring of authority with the States should be on a voluntary basis because some States do not have the staff or Page b3 Phase 115takeholder interacion Report
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Owrsight of the Depanment of Energv Ar: indu:try asso;iation (HMA) believed the money to regulate DOE facilities.
that there may be questionable benefit > and probably significant problems with authorizing Agreement State regphtion of Mf f oo tit ies.
The CRCPD, the Texas Mpartment of He#Yn, me otte Stan agencies r? commended that any external omrMght legisicon whrdi provisions for NRC funding similar to that provided for the NRC ams.ight trf Lt.ifC or the provision for the NRC to assess fees agunst DOE for M3 regulatory expenses.
In a similar vein, the OAS stated that the NRC needs to ensure that the costs associated with the regulation of DOE are not treated as overhead and The OAS recommended that the Omnibus distributed among the NRC licensees.
Budget Reconciliation Act be amended to reduce the amount recovered from fees fts by the amount necessary for DOE activities and that DOE should pay fc.
program directly.
In relation to Option 1, one commenter (State of Ohio, Emergency Planning) believed that DOE should retain responsibility for safeguards and security at A different commenter (Davidson) supported NRC's assumption of its facilities.
safety and safeguards responsibility, noting that the NRC safeguards program has often been more progressive than DOE's and to split these responsibilities With respect to Option IC, the OAS and the with DOE would be troublesome.
State of Washington recommended that the NRC seek jurisdiction over naturally occurring and accelerator-produced radioactive material (NARM) for purposes of The CRCPD indicated that an NRC role in the external oversight of D0E.
external regulation of DOE would lead to a more consistent national approach The OAS agreed with the position in Option IC that the NRC to the NARM issue.
and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) should resolve their overlapping responsibility for regulating mixed waste by determining the largest contributor to the waste's hazard and giving the lead to the agency An industry association (NMA) also supported this that regulates that hazard.
A local government (Clark County, Nevada) believed that adopting position.
would "8alkanize" the Option IA (the Advisory Committee's recommendations)
The CRCPD and the Texas national structure of nuclear responsibility.
Department of Health stated that the exclusion of " nuclear explosives safety" from the external regulator's jurisdiction should be narrowly and carefully implemented to ensure that a full review of the safety aspects of a facility One commenter (Oregon Office of Energy) disagreed with could be conducted.
the Advisory r.ommittee's recomendation that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) should assume a major iegulatory presence at DOE This commenter believes that NRC has a fine record of ensuring facilities.
worker safety in nuclear operations and that bringing OSHA in would be costly A citizens organization (League of Women Voters of Rockford) and redundant.
This commenter believed that OSHA should regulate DOE worker safety.
generally agreed with the DOE Advisory Comittee recommendations in Option 1A, particularly the provision for citizen suits.
In terms of Option 2, the OAS and the CRCPD emphasized that external oversight should include DOE weapons assembly and disassembly facilities (0ptions 2A and Relative to Option 2C, the 2B) would exclude these types of facilities).CRCPD and the OAS stated th Another commenter (Dragoun) noted that NRC external regulator's purview.
oversight results in more thorough and timely remediation of contaminated sites, which would support Option IA.
In regard to Option 2C (exclude environmental restoration f acilities), another commenter (Mendelsohn) stated that there is no conflict between DOE's mission and the protection of public health and safety in this case, and consequently, there is less need for an Phase 11 Stakeholder Interacion Repon Page 3-4
Oversight of the Department of Energy Summary Analysis of Comments external regulator for environmental restoration. An NRC staff member n that the jurisdictional changes cited in Option 1C in be pursued for application to the Comission's existing regulatory program.
Examples cited included giving NRC jurisdiction o and implementing " environmental standards" for NRC facilities; and giving mixed-waste regulation to the agency responsible for the constituent the fo Relative to Option 1B, two commenters (States of Washington and New Mexico) indicated that OSHA s the largest hazard.
A member of an looking at combining the benefits of parts of several options.
NRC advisory comittee (ACRS) stated that it might be profitable to examine DOE as a collection of unique sites and thus regard DOE as 35 potential licensees rather than as a single potential client or as 8 NRC a limited role for providing technical assistance to DOE on issues re to site cleanup, where "most of the expensive blunders" are occurrin provide a quality assurance check to ensure that the technology selecte according to this commenter.
The commenter further site cleanup is technically feasible and defensible.
noted that this role fits with the NRC's values of " integrity, service to the public."
has based their conclusions on sound science and weeding out expensive solutions that won't work, NRC could reduce the cost burden for the taxpayers."
One commenter (State of New Mexico) scoported Option 38, NRC acceptance facilities on an incremental basis only under either Section 202 of the Energy This commenter stated Reorganization Act or 00E privatization initiatives.that this option mentality on the part of NRC, under which NRC would I
C.
Comments on Important Omissions The OAS, the CRCPD, and several States noted that no discussion was provi on the resource implications of the NRC's dele 9ating external oversi I
authority to State governments.
whether it wouldn't be a wiser decision to encourage Agreement State authority at increased levels rather than having all external regulation performed by One commenter (Dragoun) stated that the direction-setting issue (OSI) does not fully address the economics of the various proposals and do the NRC.
not incorporate evidence suggesting that the NRC's costs of regulation may b less than the costs of DOE's self-regulation.
The OAS and the State of Washington also noted that the description of " DOE facilities" in the DSI needs to be refined. For example, transuranic waste must be included; the distinction should be made between operational and Another comuenter (Mendelsohn) stated retired low-level waste facilities.
that if NRC were to regulate DOE, conflict-of-interest concerns would arise These because of the NRC's use of 00E laboratories for regulatory support.
conflict-of-interest concerns could have a eignificant impact on how the NR obtains technical assistance and research support.
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Ontsight of the Depanment of Energy Summary Analysis of Comments that there needs to be more discusnon n th NRC external ettersight could actually accomplish over and above DOE's shift to ega M i.tg its facilities under the Administrative Procedure Act.
One comenter (Moeller) recommenced thut ttts range v! N T 3 regulatory devices for external oversight of DOE incluue toe yp)itat un of.ar "'open market trading rule" to the cleanup of DOE facilities.
/.nother commenter (Johnson) believed that the NRC should not allow DOE to use civilian reactors to produce tritium. Another comenter (State of Washington) stated that any congressional action in this area should specifically address the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act's (CERCLA) preemption of licensing under other laws, contending that the preemption does not benefit worker or public safety due to radiation exposure, and in some cases conflicts with other Federal laws. An industry comenter (ABB-CE) noted several omissions in the DSI, for example, the evaluation of alternatives for NRC in addition to those discussed by the Advisory Committee.
The comenter suggested alternatives such as the NRC's fulfilling an advisory role similar to the DNFSB or an exchange of NRC and DOE personnel. A member of an NRC advisory comittee (ACRS) noted cther features of the DOE's approach to safety that would be at odds with the NRC's safety approach, such as the fact that DOE's Order and Rule system does not make systematic use of industrial standards; that there is no DOE equivalent to the Standard Review Plan; that regulatory guides are either nonexistent or less explicit; and that there is no consistent safety approach between different sites or even between different' activities at the same site.
An industry association (Nuclear Energy Institute) [NEI] noted that the DSI doe not discuss the transition mechanisms that would be needed and the methods to facilitate the transition.
D.
Coments on Internal / External Factors One commenter (Fairobent) stated that the hazards from DOE facilities are largely similar to those from commercial nuclear facilities and there is no reason for DOE not to be regulated by NRC. Furthermore, this comenter believed that the split between DOE self-regulation and NRC external regulation has negative implications from the standpoint of public credibility. A member of the public (Lewis) reiterated this theme, noting that exemption of DOE from regulation destroys public trust. The CRCPC clso noted that NRC's high standards should not be cited as a problem in terms of DOE oversight but rather as a positive factor.
Several comenters were concerned that NRC might employ a different set of regulatory standards for DOE than it employs for regulation of comercial facilities. However, two comenters (USEC and Detroit Edison) cautioned that it may be difficult to treat some DOE facilities the same as NRC facilities from a regulatory perspective because there is no design basis for these facilities.
In terms of resource implications, another public comenter (Crites) stated that the number of DOE facilities is only a fraction of what the NRC presently regulates on the comercial side and that the resource requirements could be eased by the transfer of DNFSB personnel to the NRC.
Representatives of the NET stated concerns about the source of increased funding for the NRC's regulation of DOE and about the effect such responsibilities might have on the civilian reactor program.
The OAS noted that many DOE sites operate in the
" fish bowl" of public interaction and several have citizens' advisory boards that are very active in site operations. Therefore, the OAS believes it is not j
correct to state that DOE may not be accustomed to the "open" NRC process. An industry association (NEI) stated that the openness of NRC licensing Page 3-6 Phase 11 Stakeholder Interaaion Repor.
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Owrsight of the De,rmment of Energy Sasunary Axa zis of Comments r
activities to the public was a key factor in ensuring public credibility and that this openness will be constrained in the oversight of DOE because of Another commenter (State of Washington) stated defense security requirements.
that the EPA already regulates DOE and that the NRC should not face overwhelming problems in regulating another Federal agency.
Comments on Staff Requiremen';s Memorandum Questions E.
In its preliminary views, the Commission did not pose any additional questions for public comment.
3.1.4 List of Commenters WRITTEN C0f94ENTS 1.
October 21, 1996, Organization of Agreement States (Robert Quillin) 2.
October 23, 1996, Agreement States /NRC Regulators' Meeting Summary 3.
October 24, 1996, United States Enrichment Corporation (Lisa Jarriel) 4.
October 28, 1996, State of Washington, Department of Health (Terry Frazee) 5.
October 29, 1996, Richard Barkley, U.S. NRC 6.
November 3, 1996, Marvin Lewis 7.
November 4, 1996, State of New Hampshire (Dianne Tefft) 8.
November 5, 1996, State of New Mexico (Bill Floyd)
November 2,1996, Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power (Judith 9.
Johnsruti)
November 7, 1996, State of Mississippi, Department of Health (Robert 10.
Goff) 11.
November 12, 1996, State of Kansas, Department of Health and Environment (Ronald Fraass) 12.
November 13, 1996, State of Oregon, Office of Energy (David Stewart-Smith) 13.
November 14, 1996, League of Women Voters, Rockford (Betty Johnson) 14.
November 14, 1996, State of Oregon, Department of Human Resources (Ray Paris) 15.
November 14, 1996, South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (M.K. Batavia) 16.
November 21, 1996, Barry Mendelsohn, U.S. NRC Page 3 7 Phase 11 Stakeholder Interaction Repon
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owrsight oftheP;_.. ;= ofEnergy Summary Ar.&pis of Commenw 17.
Nsvemb9r 21, 1996, State of Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (Ronald Wascom) 18.
November 21, 1996, Georgia Department of Natural Resources (Thomas Hill) i 19.
November 21, 1996, Utah Department of Environmental Quality (William J.
Sinclair) 20.
November 22,.1996, South Carolina Electric and Gas Company (Gary J.
Taylor) 21.
November 27, 1996, ACRS (John T. Larkins)
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22.
November 27, 1996, NEI (Thomas D. Ryan) 23.
November 27, 1996, State of Texas, Department of Health (Richard Ratliff) i 24.
November 27, 1996, CRCPD (William P. Dornsife) 25.
November 27, 1996, U.S. NRC (Dyle Acker) i 26.
December 2, 1996, U.S. NRC (Thomas Dragoun) 27.
December 2,1996, State of Ohio, Department of Health (Robert E. Owen) i 28.
December 2, 1996, State of New Jersey (Jill Lipoti) i 29.
Decen:ber 2,199o, State of Maryland, Department of the Environment (Roland G. Fletcher) 30.
December 2,1996, ABB-CE (Charles B. Brinkman) 31.
December 2, 1996, vennis Bechtel 32.
December 2,1996, National Mining Asscciation (Richard L. Lawson) 33.
December 2,1996, Illinois Departmect of Nuclear Safety (Thomas Ortciger) 34.
December 3, 1996, No Name i
35.
December 3, 1996, The League of Women Voters of Rockford (Betty Johnson) 36.
December 4, 1996, U.S. NRC (John Davidson)
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ORAL COP 99ENTS
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Washin9 ton, D.C. (October 24 - 25, 1996) pages 15 - 38 1.
Ruth McBurney, CRCPD 2.
Bob Crite, Gaithersburg, MD i
3.
Richard Ratliffe, OAS t
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Owrsight of the Depanment of Energy Sameary Aes,zis of Comments 4.
Judith Johnsrud, ENCP 5.
Edward Regnier, U.S. DOE i
6.
Lynn Fairobent, ALT. Inc.
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Lisa Jerri11, USEC 8.
Rob NcDouga11, SAIC Colorado Springs, C0 (October 31 - November 1, 1996) pages 147 - 154 1.
Pedro Salas, Tennessee Valley Authority 2.
Bill Sinclair, OAS 3.
Bill Floyd, New Mexico Environmental improvement Department 4.
John Trotter, Polestar Applied Technology 5.
Steve Floyd, NEI i
5.
Ken Weaver, CRCPD Chicago, IL (November 7-8, 1996) pages 140 - 157 1.
Steve Collins, OAS I
2.
Kristen Erickson, Michigan State University 3.
Jim Williams, State of Ohio i
4.
Roger Huston, NEI Ron Fraass, State of Kansas, Department of Health and Envirvament 5.
6.
Gorden Appal, Illinois Department of fluclear Safety 7.
Ron Wittschen, Detroit Edison Page 3-9 Phase 11 Stakeholder Interacion Report
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