ML20137G545
| ML20137G545 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 03/24/1997 |
| From: | Hansen A NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137G551 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9704010427 | |
| Download: ML20137G545 (7) | |
Text
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'h UNITED STATES l
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20666 0001 o
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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY l
CENTERIOR SERVICE COMPANY AND l
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY DOCKET N0. 50-346 DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE I
i Amendment No. 215 License No. TF-3 I.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by the Toledo Edison Company, Centerior Service Company, and The Cleveland Electric Ill'uminating Company (the licensees) dated February 14, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; 8.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (') that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and l
safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be l
conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 is hereby amended to read as follows:
9704010427 97o324 PDR ADOCK 05000346 P
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Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 215, are hereby incorporated in the license.
The Toledo Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, and shall be implemented no later than 120 days after issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Allen G. Hansen, Project Manager Project Directorate III-3 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance: March 24, 1997 i
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5 ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 215 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3 DOCKET NO. 50-346
. Replace the following ) ages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. T1e revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.
Remove Insert 3/4 5-5 3/4 5-5 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-2a B 3/4 5-2a B 3/4 5-2b
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l, EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS l
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) l 4.
Verifying that a minimum of 290 cubic feet of trisodium
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phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) is contained within the TSP storage baskets.
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Deleted l
6.
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At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by l
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Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a safety injection test signal.
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Verifying that each HPI and LPI pump starts automatically l
upon receipt of a SFAS test signal.
f.
By performing a vacuum leakage rate test of the watertight enclosure for valves DH-ll and DH-12 that assures the motor operators on valves DH-11 and DH-12 will not be flooded for at least 7 days following a LOCA:
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At least once per 18 months.
2.
After each opening of the ' watertight enclosure.
3.
After any maintenance on or modification to the watertight enclo:ure which could affect its integrity.
The inspection port on the watertight enclosure may be opened l
without requiring performance of the vacuum leakage rate test, to perform inspections. After use, the inspection port must be verified as closed in its correct position.
Provisions of TS 3.0.3 are not applicable during these inspections.
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By verifying the correct position of each mechanical position i
stop for valves DH-14A and DH-148.
1.
Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following completion of the opening of the valves to their mechanical position stop or following i
l completion of maintenance on the valve when the LPI system j
is required to be OPERABLE.
2.
At least once per 18 months.
J DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. 25, 40, 101, 207, 215 k
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES i
With the RCS temperature below 280 F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.
The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that, at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.
The function of the trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) contained in baskets located in the containment normal sump or on the 565' elevation of j
containment adjacent to the normal sump, is to neutralize the acidity of the lost-LOCA borated water mixture during containment emergency sump
/ecirculation.
The borated water storage tank (BWST) borated water has a nominal pH value of approximately 5.
Raising the borated water mixture to a pH value of 7 will ensure that chloride stress corrosion does not occur in austenitic stainless steels in the event that chloride levels increase as a result of contamination on the surfaces of the reactor containment building.
Also, a pH of 7 is assumed for the containment emergency sump for iodine retention and removal post-LOCA by the containment spray system.
The Surveillance Requiremeni. (SR) associated with TSP ensures that the minimum required volume of TSP is stored in the baskets.
The minimum required volume of TSP is the volume that will achieve a post-LOCA borated water mixture pH of 2 7.0, conservatively considering the maximum possible sup water volume and the maximum possible boron concentration.
The amount of TSP required is based i
on the mass of TSP needed to achieve the required pH.
However, a required volume is verified by the SR, rather than the mass, since it is not feasible to weigh the entire amount of TSP in containment. Thpminimumrequiredvolume is based on the manufactured density of TSP (53 lb/f t ).
Since TSP can have a tendency to agglomerate from high humidity in the containment, the density may increase and the volume decrease during normal plant operation, however, solubility characteristics are not expected to change.
Therefore, considering i
possible agglomeration and increase in density, verifying the minimum volume of TSP in containment is conservative with respect to ensuring the capability to achieve the minimum required pH.
ThemjnimumrequiredvolumeofTSPto meet a]l analytical requirements is 250 ft. The surveillance requirement of 3
3 290 ft includes 40 ft of spare TSP as margin.
Total basket capacity is 325 ft.
Decay Heat Removal System valves DH-11 and DH-12 are located in an area that would be flooded following a LOCA. These valves are located in a watertight enclosure to ensure their operability up to reven days following a LOCA.
Surveillance Requirements are provided to verify the acceptable leak tightnass of this enclosure. An inspection port is located on this watertight enclosure, which is typically used for performing inspections inside the enclosure. During the vacuum leakage rate test, the inspection port is in a closed position and subject to the test.
This inspection port may be subsequently opened for use in viewing inside the enclosure. Opening this inspection port will not require performance of the vacuum leakage rate test because of the design of the closure fitting, which will preclude leakage under LOCA conditions, when properly installed.
Proper installation includes independent verification.
DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT I B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 20,123,182,191, 195,207, 215
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS i
BASES (Continued)
Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:
(1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and
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(3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.
Containment Emergency Sump Recirculation Valves DH-9A and DH-9B are de-energized during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 to preclude postulated inadvertent opening of the valves in the event of a Control Room fire, which could result in draining the Borated Water Storage Tank to the Containment Emergency Sump and the loss of this water source for normal plant shutdown.
Re-energization of DH-9A and DH-98 is permitted on an intermittent basis during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 under administrative controls.
Station procedures identify the 1
precautions which must be taken when re-energizing these valves under such controls.
Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) outlet isolation valves DH-7A and DH-7B are de-energized during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to preclude postulated inadvertent closure of the valves in the event of a fire, which could result in a loss of the availability of the BWST.
Re-energization of valves DH-7A and DH-7B is permitted on an intermittent basis during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 under admini-strative controls. Station procedures identify the precautions which must be taken when re-energizing these valves under such controls.
3/4.5.4 B0 RATED WATER STORAGE TANK The OPERABILITY of the borated water storage tank (BWST) as part of the ECCS i
ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA.
The limits on the BWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that:
t 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core following manual switchover to the recirculation mode, and 2)
The reactor wil)F, xenon free, while only crediting 50% of the remain at least 1% Ak/k subtritical in the cold condition at 70 control rods' worth following mixing of the BWST and the RCS water volumes.
These assumptions ensure that the reactor remains subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the BWST and the RCS water volumes.
With either the BWST boron concentration or BWST borated water temperature not within limits, the condition must be corrected in eight hours.
The eight hour limit to restore the temperature or boron concentration te within limits was developed considering the time required tn change boron concentration or temperature and assuming that the contents of the BWST are still available for injection.
l DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2a Amendment No. 191, 207, 215
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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES (Continued)
The bottom 4 inches of the BWST are not available, and the instrumentation is calibrated to reflect the available volume. The limits on water volume, and l
. boron concentration ensure a pH value of between 7.0 and 11.0 of the solution l
sprayed within the containment after a design basis accident.
The pH band l
minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and l
caustic stress corrosion cracking on mechanical systems and components.
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DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2b Amendment No. 4 M, 215 i
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