ML20136G987

Comments on NRC Policy & Procedure for Enforcement Actions; Policy Statement,In Response to USEC Privatization Act

ML20136G987
Person / Time
Site:	Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Issue date:	03/14/1997
From:	Woolley R UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORP. (USEC)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
References
FRN-62FR6664, FRN-62FR6677, RTR-NUREG-1600 62FR6677-00001, 62FR6677-1, AF56-2-049, AF56-2-48, AF56-2-49, GDP-97-0037, GDP-97-37, NUDOCS 9703190019
Download: ML20136G987 (10)

Text

_-

FRCM suSEC 301-564-3210 1997.03-14 17151

1. 347 P.02/11 United States D0CKETED Ennchment Corporatton USNRC 2 0emocracy Center S

6903 Rockledge Dnve Bethesda, MD 20817 W MAR 17 A7 :50 s

Teh (301)564-3200 Fw(301)564 3201 United States 0FFICE OF SECREI RY Enrichment Corporation DOCKETING & SERVICE BRANCH DOCKET NUMBER PROPOSED RULE N mmc, March 14,1997 gg

/

Secretary SERIAL: GDP 97-0037 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP)

Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS)

Docket Nos. 70-7001 and 70-7002 USEC Comments on "NRC Policy and Procedure for Enforcement Actions; Polley Statement" 62 Fed. Reg. 6667 (February 12,1997)

Dear Sir:

On behalf of the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), I am pleased to proside comments on the NRC's Policy and Procedure for Enforcement Actions in response to the'USEC Privatization Act.

The recently amended NRC Enforcement Actions Policy (NUREd-1600) places Gaseou Diffusion Plants (GDPs) in the same base civil penalty category as nuclear power reacton (Category "a").

Placing the GDPs into the power reactor category is inappropriate!and excessive, since the primary GDP risks are not nuclear (resulting from radioactivity), nor maddate Category I security protection, but are in fact, primarily associated with hazardous chemical materials with consequences and risks similar to the non-nuclear chemical industry regulated by other ' ederal agencies.

f USEC believes that the GDPs should be included in Category "b" hf Table 1A along with licensed fuel fabrication facilities. This re assignment more properly l recognizes the similar consequences of the hazardous chemical accidents at the GDPs and at other chemical facilities compared to the much higher potential radiological consequences associated with reactor accidents.

The GDPs should not be singled out from other fuel cycle facilities for separate treatment.

/

9703190019 970314 PDR ADOCK 07007001 C

PDR

'F 3 5/O

F e USEC 301-564-3210 1997,03-14 17:51

1. 347 P.03/11 i

i i

Docketing and Service Branch March 14,1997 l

GDP 97-0037 Page 2 l

l l

The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is also providing conunents to the NRC on the Staff's changes to the Enforcement Policy. NEI's comments address both the $110,000 pase civil penalties and the i

l changes to those " examples" of violations that apply to the fuel cycle industry as a whole. USEC l

concurs with NEI's comments, which underscore and support our views. lIn addition, USEC is also l

providing additional comments on those Enforcement Policy " examples" ofiviolations that are specific to the GDPs.

i We would be pleased to d'iscuss these comments with you. Please contact me at (301) 564-3413 or Ms. Lisamarie Janiel at (301) 564-3247.

i Sincerely,

5. 0 Edh.f;,

Robert L. Woolley Nuclear Regulatory Assurance and Policy Manager 1

i i

t i

1 I

i i

i

= "

FROr4 tUSEC 301-564-3219 1997 03-14 17:52

1. 347 P.o4/11 e

i COMMENTS ON i

AMENDED USNRC ENFORCEMENT POLICY 4

L CIVIL _ PENALTY STRUCTURE The recently amended NRC Enforcement Actions Policy (NUREG-1600) places the Gaseous Diffusion Plants (GDPs) in the same base civil penalty category as nuclear power reactors (Category "a" $110,000). Placing GDPs into the power reactor category is inapprypriate since the primary i

GDP risks are not nuclear (resulting from radioactivity), nor mandate Category I security protection, but are in fact, primarily asWd with hazardous chemical materials with consequences and risks similar to the non-nuclear chemical industry regulated by other federal agencies.

Radiological Safety The principal risks associated with nuclear power plants are due t9 the large inventory of radioactive fission products and the decay heat generated, which requiret, continued heat removal even after shutdown. Neither of these characteristics exist at the GDPs. Measures of the approximate severity of potential nuclea-hazards and radiological condequences of accidents at 4

GDPs are compared to those at a nuclear power plant in the followind, table.

Table 1 Comparison of Approximate Radiological Hazards Radiological 1000 MWE Gaseous Diffusion Plant Hazard Nuclear Power Plant l

Radiological 1,100,000,000 Curies 2/U Curies Inventory (Noble gases and iodine) [5]'

(Total cdscade inventory) [ll Radioactivity Release 330,000 Cunes 13 Curies to Environment for (Noble gases and iodine released (Release ld operational from worst design basis accident from containment in first 24 postulate hours.) [6]

accident.h[2]

j Radiological Dose at Site Boundary for Worst Beyond Design 140,000 Rem [7]

0.9 Rem [3]

Basis Operational Accident f

The above comparison demonstrates that the potential radiological con a nuclear power plant are more than 100,000 times those possible at a GDP. In addition, there are approximately 100 nuclear power plants and only two GDPs in the United States, i

i The radiological effects of a UF, release are discussed in NUREG-114,0.2 The NUREG states, in part, " Accompanying radiation doses would not be of significance," and indicates that the 1 Number in brackets indicates the basis for the values (see bases at end of comments).

NUREG 114o, "A Regulatory Analysis on Emcrgency Preparednces for Fucl Cyc' c and Other Radioactive 2

Msteria1 Licensees," 1991.

l

- _ _ _ _ ~

t FROM tOSEC 301-564-3210 1997s93-14 17852 0347 P.05/11 1

1 4

i harmful effects of a UF, release are due primarily to the chemical toxicity of the UF and the i

products resulting from its reaction with moisture.

l The worst case consequences of an accident at a nuclear power plant could lead to from 3,000 to 80,000 fatalities. [8] By comparison, estimated off-site consequences'of a worst case accident I

at the GDPs could lead to the exposure of approximately 20 to 500 timeh fewer persons to levels of toxic materials (primarily hydrogen fluoride) that could be life thrasthing. [4] It is clear that i

puttmg the GDPs in the same category as nuclear power plants is not sspported by similarity in maximum accident consequences, either radiological or, as shown below, toxicological.

l 1

Chemical Safety i

The GDPs (and the family of fuel manufacturing, refining, milling and fabrication plants) are j

j

==minHy chamini industrial facilities that handle radioactive material. ! As indicated above, the i

i majority of GDP on-and off-site accident risks comes from the hazardous, toxic and reactive l

chemical materials supporting the uranium processing and fabricatiod operations. Significant inventories of fluorine, hydrogen fluoride, and chlorine trifluoride are used in the process or are j

i bound chemically with the uranium. In addition, as is quite comme'n at industrial facilities, j

chlorine is used for water treatment. These materials, especially hydrogen fluoride, produced l

in the reaction of UF, with atmospheric moisture, are the primarylhazardous chemicals of I

concem at GDP facilities.

i l

Both EPA and OSHA are tasked with ensuring safe operating practices at chemical facilities throughout the U.S. which handle and process hazardous materials. Ficently (December 1_996) a memorandum of understanding was established between the EPA aid OSHA which defines i

the strategy for these government agencies to jointly investigate major chemical accidents, Regulatory guidelines for the investigation of chemical accidents arel embodied in the OSHA f

j Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and the more recent 29 CFR 1910.119 OSHA l

regulations on Process Safety Management. EPA's authority over the proper management of i

handous materials at chemical plants such as the GDPs includes the Resource Conservation and l

Recovery Act, Section 3008; the Comprehensive Environmental Resl onse Compensation and i

Liability Act, Section 103; the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, Section 325; the Toxic Substances Control Act, Section 16; and the Clean Aid Act, Section 113.

I Table 2 summarizes the base NRC civil monetary penalties levied for accidents at nuclear facilities and compares those civil penalties to EPA and OSHA civil penalties for accidents involving highly hazardous chemical materials at U.S. industrial facilliies.

Because the potential GDP risk of injury to on-site workers or the ofLsite public is primarily from accidental hazardous chemical releases, it would be appropriate to' assign a civil monetary penalty consistent with the statutory maximum penalty available to the %PA and OSHA, which is on the order of $27,500 per violation. The assignment of the GDPs to the same base civil penalty category as nuclear power nators is inappropriate and the penalty amount is inconsistent with that utilized by other federal agencies for similar facilities where, like the GDPs, the principal risk is due to non-nuclear hazards.

FROM IUSEC 301-564-3216 1997,03-14 17:53 c347 P.06/11 Table 2 Comparison of Civil Monetary Penalties for U.S. Industry l

Regulated Industry U.S. Code Citation / Reference Penalty Notes Nuclear Power - Reactors NUREO 1600, Table I A, a 5110,000 (1) i Nuclear fuel Producth.h - Gaseous NUREO 1600, Table IA, a S110,000 (1)

Diffusion Plants Nuclear Fuel Production /Manufacturmg NUREO 1600, Table I A, b

$27,500 (1)

- Fuel Fabrication Facilities l

Nuclear Fuel ManufacturingProduction NUREO 1600, Table IA, c 511,000 (1)

- Fuel Refining and Milling Facilities and Test Reactors Nuclear Research Fac1htles NUREO 1600, Table I A, d 55,500 (1) i i

Chemical, Petrochemical, Industrial EPA - Resource Conservation A S27,500 (2) and Manufacturing Industries -

Recovery Act (RCRA)-Violation of Handling AcutelyI!azardous Chemical Subtitle C, per violation maximum.

Materials EPA - Clean Air Act. Stationary Air

$27,500 (2),(3)

Pollution Sources, Civil Penalty per violation EPA Toxic Substances Control Act -

$27,500 (2)

PCBs, per violation EPA - Emergency Planning &

Community Right-To-Know Act Class 1 S27,500 (2)

& !! Administmtive and Civil Penalty, l

per violation EPA - Comprehensive Environmental

$27,500 (2)

Response, Compensation and Liability Act, per violation OSHA Act - Section 17. Penalty

$7,000 serious (4)

Structure, per violation S25,000 serious

& willful Notes to Table 2:

(1) NUREG 1600.

(2) A4]usted for inflation per 40 CFR Parts 19 and 27, Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustment Rule,61 Fed.

(3) Discussions with EPA Enforcement Branch personnel indicate that a se Reg. 69,390, December 31,1996.

discharge) of a regulated hazardous chemical substance would be treated as non-conkpliance with the Stationary Source Statutes, even though the Station Source Statutes arc employed primarily for the regulation of permitted (4) Department of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Admini:tration, Of11ce of Gene industrial chronle long term releases.

Assistance, " Field Inspect 4n Reference Manual (FIRM),Section IV.C. Penalties", September 26,1994

. - ~.

- - ~ -. - -.. -. - -.... -

-.. - _ ~ ~.. ~ ~ - - - -

FROM sUSEC 301-564-3210 1997 03-14 17:53

1. 347 P.07/11 f

1 4

i i

i Security Signincance i

From a nuclear material safeguards and security perspective, the policy fails to consider the reduced significance of events at a GDP. Nuclear power reactors arc required to have armed i

security officers and a capability to defend the plant against adversaries pho are well armed with l

automatic weapons and explosives. USEC does not possess strategie special nuclear material (Uranium enriched to above 20% U-235). The absence of strategic special nuclear material i

combined with the low radiological inventory, allows the USEC leased facilities to be placed in Security Protection Category III; which has much lower security protp' etion requirements than Category I in which nuclear power plants fall. For example, a GDP is not required to have j

alarmed fence lines, CCTV cameras, redundant alarm stations manned 24-hours a day, and i

supplementary weaponry to counter terrorist adversaries. The requireinent to have weapons is j -

based on a radiological sabotage event which is not a design accident fo' r low enriched uranium at the GDPs.

The enforcement policy does not take into account the security posture at the GDPs. The majority of examples describe events which occur at power reactors add are not relevant to the i

GDPs. Fines of $110,000 are excessive and do not consider the security measures in place or l

mandated by the NRC.

i Ability to Pay With regard to the secondary factor of ability to pay, again it is inappippriate to single out the GDPs from other fuel cycle facilities whose financial resources are similar.

.a l

l II. MODIFICATION TO ENFORCEMENT POLICY EXAMPI.FR OF VIOLATIONS

)

Modifications are suggested in Table 3 to the examples of violations for each severity level contained in the Supplements to the Enforcement Policy. These modihcations are proposed to j

provide consistency where appropriate between the Supplements, to clafify the intent of several of the examples, and to elimin* language which appears to exceed

's authority, Many of i

l our concerns are described in more detail in the NEI comments, ch we endorse. In j

particular, in addition to the changes which we are proposing in Table, we agree in principle

[

to those comments submitted by NEI which discuss why the occurrence of an event such as the unavailability of a safety system or the loss of a criticality control may n' t necessarily be caused o

by a violation of NRC requirements and should not necessarily lead th an enforcement action in every case. While such events are serious and necessitate prompt attention, they may not be attributable to a regulatory violation and could occur through no fault!of the facility operator.

Therefore, we suggest that the enforcement policy be clarified to address NEI's comments in this j

regard.

1 i

j i

_. ~ - - -..

- ~... - -. _. ~. -. - -

. -.. - - ~. - -

~. ~. - - -

., _ - - ~.. -

FROM IUSEC 301-534-3210 1997.03-14 17:54 48347 P.08/11 4

i i

1 Table 3

{

Proposed Modifications to Example Violations i

Example #

Proposed Modification l

Note j

A. Severity LevelI l

3

'A $afety gimit, as defined in 10 CFR 76.4 R$ the Technical Safety M (1) 5.

being exW or 6.

Significant injury or loss oflife due to a toss of control over liansed or certified M estivmes; (2)

_ _t -, _ g _. _ ;.

p.3g

. < > __a.3.,... a mi_ _g m _< a.

^ +.' b c'-

d = '.

j t

}

B. Severity LevelII l

A,, ystern designed,tgg!y, cat,cy,ynitigate a,,se[ious,,sapjg eye, nt,

,g, (3) 2.

s 4

A N'm

de i-;-

'-- ; zw j -(. 7 4:: :.. 1:[ 'ticality controls (or (4) i

+

control systems) for a sin 8 c nuclear criticality scenario when a critical mass of $ssile material was 1

present ; :::::-t y re:i':hk, such that a nuclear criticality accident was possble; or

{

5.

The

'al for a significant injury or loss oflife due to a loss of control over licensed or certified (2)

., -?"2; M:d p;w= ^ ^ = ' ' p!!:6 'l::r:!= s;2M sid:y,

{

ci - :9de: r -t' b si : ';;;;(;.g.,2=:mt cf'!qdd LT, r,F '-- kj -- _,,....d methode)-

C. Severity LevelIII j

5.

A substantial potential for exposures, radiation levels, contamination levels,jor releases, including (2) j releases of toxic material MEMEEBRIMilRN caused by a failure to comply with NRC regulations, from licensed or certified activities in excess of Mgulatory limits; 13.

A system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event: (a) Not being able to perform its (5) i intended function under certain conditions (e.g., safety system not operable unless utilities j

available, materials or components not according to specifications).f.4. O 3;j, N Q T

j

(_

.~.

. or (b) Being degraded to the extent tha1 a detailed evaluation would be req to determ e operability; i

l 18.

A failumtoesemblish; maintain-ennplement J:7.E '." i. '~ R R ; a3 but one criticahty (6) control (; -.' r,r -) for a single nuclear aiticality scenario when a critical mass of fissile I

1 material was present c.

" j = "- t N R + ? 5 'H : C:7 WW:' 7FIJ j

M such that a nuclear criticality accident was possible ;

D. Severity LevelIV l

s (6) 8 A failure to-j"Y ;!- n mamta:n j

when the amount of fissile material available j

was not, be :: 'd.kc: hs; sufficient to result in a nuclear criticality.

l i

l 1

i

. _ _ _ _ =.. -. - -. - -

~..~__. __

391-564-3310 1997.03-14 17855 4347 P 09/11 FROM IU3E0 1

Notes to Table 3:

(1) Proposed language is intended to be consistent with other Supplements ofi,the Enforcement Policy. In addition, " Safety Lindts" are only defined in 76.4 arid the TSRs. The reference to "the application" in general should be eliminated.

j (2) Events that do not involve certified materials or chemical processes thatl could impact the safety of certified materials should not be included as a violation example. Injuris caused by release of non-radioactive materials are outside the scope of NRCs jurisdiction. If thefe has been no " radioactive material... released" then injury must be due to purely non-radiological hazards.

(3) Proposed language is intended to be consistent with other Supplements ofithe Enforcement Policy and l

to clarify that a violation has occurred only if action steps mandated by the license or certificate are not i

taken.

(4) Proposed language is intended to clarify intent, which we understand is to address the loss of all criticality controls (i.e., the " complete" loss of all such controls). The change id also intended to eliminate ambiguous language (i.e., "or reasonably available").

i f

(5) Proposed language is intended to clarify that a violation has occurred onlyif action steps mandated by the license or certificate are not taken, 4

(6) USEC endorses NEI's comments concerning these examples; namely that such events may no attributable to a regulatory violation and could occur through no fault of the facility operator. In the absence of deleting these examples completely, USEC has, at the very leas', proposed language wh 4

t is intended to (a) clarify intent which we believe is to address a loss of dotible contingency, but not a criticality controls, (b) clarify that a violation has occurred only if action steps mandated by the licen or certificate are not taken, and (c) eliminate ambiguous language (i.e., "or reasonably available" and "but could have been").

4 J

q 4

1 i

~. ~.

- - - -.. _. -... =

t FROM IUSEC 301-564-3210 1997.o3-14 17855

1. 347 P.10/11 References to Table 1: Basis for hazard and risk values

[1]

ODP RADIOLOGICAL INVENTORY' l.2 E6 lbs UF6 for 2260 MW

- Based on Table 4.1.1-1 Portsmouth SAR.

0.676 lb U/lb UF6 and 2.2 lb/Kg gives 379 E6 gm U Natural Uranium has specific activity of 7 E-7 Ci/gm, hence j

379 E6 x 7 E 265 Curies (rounded off to 270 Curies)

[2]

RELEASE FOR WORST ODP OPERATIONAL ACCIDENT

)

62,400 lb UF6 release

- Based on Section 3.4.2.1.1.7, Updated SAR, POEF-LMES-89.

Similar to above this corresponds to 13 Curies of Uranium.

9

[3]

GDP SITE BOUNDARY RADIOLOGICAL DOSE Rounded off to 0.9 Rem

- Based on Table 3.4.9, Updated SAR, POEF-LhES-89.

[4]

WORST CASE GDP OFF-SITE CONSEQUENCES Threshold for life-threatening effects is 50 mgU uptake or 50 ppq for the Portsm HF.

- Based on Tables 5-6 and 5-7, RTM-96, Supplement-i j

ODP, Response Technical Manual.

Distance to above thresholds is 2.4 miles and 1.4 miles, respective y.

- Based on Figures 3.4-23 and 3.4-25, Updated SAR,IPOEF-LhES-89.

1 Maximum number of persons in one sector out to 2.4 miles is approximately 150. This is 53 at 1-2 miles plus % of 203 at 2-3 miles to SSW in year 2000.

- Based on Figure 1.3-9, Updated SAR, POEF LMES-89.

4

[5]

1000 MWE RADIOLOGICAL INVENTORY 343 E6 Curies of noble gases 715 E6 Curies ofIodine 1.1E9 Curies of noble gases and iodine I

- Based on core inventory per MEW by nuclide from WASH-1400.

1

FROM IUSEC 301-564-3310 1997 03-14 17:55

1. 347 P.11/11

[6]

RELEASE FOR 1000 MWE DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT 343 E3 Curies of noble gases E3 Curies ofIodine 350 E3 Curies of noble gases and iodine released in first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

- Based on item 4 core inventory, 0.1% per day cont' inment leak rate and a a

decontamination factor of 100 for 25% ofiodine.

[7]

1000 MWE SITE BOUNDARY DOSE FOR BEYOND DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT 140,000 Rem

- Based on "U.S. Department of Energy Defense Programs Safety Survey Report," November 1993.

j i

[8]

WORST CASE 1000 MWE OFF-SITE CONSEQUENCES j

l 3000 to 80,000 fatalities

- Latent cancer fatalities for 5 reference plants for iniernal initiating events at IE-8/yr. Exceedance frequency from " Severe Acclilent Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants," NUREO-1150, Vol.1.

j i

i l

i l

l i

l I