ML20136E500
| ML20136E500 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 11/08/1985 |
| From: | Opeka J NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO., NORTHEAST UTILITIES |
| To: | Youngblood B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 851107-2, A02959, A05334, A2959, A5334, NUDOCS 8511210500 | |
| Download: ML20136E500 (6) | |
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(203) 665-5000 November 8,1985 Docket No. 50-423 A02959 A05334 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Mr. B. J. Youngblood, Chief Licensing Branch No. I Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
References:
(1)
B. J. Youngblood letter to J. F. Opeka, dated September 10, 1985.
(2)
- 3. F. Opeka letter to B. J. Youngblood, dated October 16, 1935.
(3)
B. J. Youngblood letter to J. F. Opeka, dated October 23, 1935.
Dear Mr. Youngblood:
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Supplement I to NUREG-0737 Safety Parameter Display System In Reference (1), the NRC Staff summarized the results of its audit of the Millstone Unit No. 3 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). A request for additional information was also included. Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) responded to this request for additionalinformation in Reference (2).
The SPDS audit report prepared by the NRC Staff's consultant, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, was transmitted to NNECO in Reference (3).
In addition, we were requested to provide by November 8,1935 our schedule to respond to the unresolved items contained in that report. The purpose of this submittal is to provide the requested information, which can be found in Attachment No.1. Most of the unresolved items identified in the SPDS audit report have been fully addressed in Reference (2). In those instances, Reference (2)is appropriately referenced in Attachment No.1.
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2 We trust that this submittal adequately responds to Reference (3).
Very truly yours, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY et. al.
BY NORTilEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY Their Agent F Ou_
J. F. Op6ka V
Senior Vice President cc:
Mr. G. W. Lapinsky, Jr.
NRC Human Factors Engineering Branch STATE OF CONNECTICUT)
) ss. Berlin COUNTY OF HARTFORD )
Then personally appeared before me J. F. Opeka, who being duly sworn, did state that he is Senior Vice President of Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, an Applicant herein, that he is authorized to execute and file the foregoing information in the name and on behalf of the Applicants herein and that the statements contained in said information are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.
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Nbtary Pubtf My Commission Expires March 31,1988 L_
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I Docket No. 50-423 F
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l Attachment No.1 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 l
Response to Request for AdditionalInformation i
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November,1985 L:
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Response to Request for Additional Information item No.1:
The Millstone 3 SPDS V&V program satisfies the V&V needs outlined in NUREG-0800 Section 18.2 and NSAC/39. Northeast Utilities should, however, modify the system loading test to include verification that SPDS response times requirements will be met when the process computer system is operating under worst case loading conditions including non-SPDS uses of the computer.
Responw:
This item was previously addressed in our response to item No. I and item No. 2 in Attachment No. I in Reference (2).
Item No. 2:
Upon completion of the V&V program, summaries of the following test results should be submitted to NRC to allow NRC confirmation that SPDS functions have been successfully validated:
o Integrated System Tests o
Man-in-the-Loop Testing o
100 Hour Availability Test The plan and schedule for resolving any deficiencies noted by this testing should be included with the submittal of the test summaries.
Response
The requested information regarding the Integrated Acceptance Test and the 100-hour availability test was previously provided in our response to item No.1 in Attachment No. I in Reference (2). Man-in-the loop testing was successfully completed on November 7,1935. As indicated in Reference (2), the results of this test will be submitted in summary fashion by December 2,1935.
Item No. 3:
NU must establish a system that insures SPDS displays and status trees remain consistent with the latest version of the plant EOPs.
1 Responses This item was previously addressed in our response to item No.1.f in Attachment i
No.1 in Reference (2).
i Item No. 4:
NU should consider eliminating the wording differences between the SPDS status trees and the EOP status trees, m
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Response
This item will be considered during our Phase II efforts, which will be completed prior to start-up from our first refueling outage.
Item No. 5:
An operating history should be maintained for the SPDS to verify actual experience is consistent with the availability predictions and as an aid in identifying hardware and software modifications that would improve system availability.
Response
Normal. maintenance practices will be employed for the plant process computer /SPDS system.
These practices will ensure that the plant process computer /SPDS is maintained operable to the fullest extent possible and will be repaired as expeditiously as practical.
We believe normal practices will adequately address this item.
We wish to emphasize that the calculated availability estimate is a design availability objective.
Itern No. 6:
NU should consider displaying the synthesized parameter values on teratiary level displays that show the readings of individual SPDS instrument channels.
This feature would assist the operator in understanding the effect of individual instrument readings on the single parameter value used by the SPDS.
Response
This item will be considered during our Phase 11 efforts, which will be implemented prior to start-up from our first refueling outage.
Item No. 7:
The following potential human factors discrepancies should be assessed to determine if correction would be appropriate (i)
When the status of a critical safety function changes, the associated status block changes color. If the change is in the less safe direction the block also blinks for a short time. An audible cue in addition to the blink may be needed to attract the operator's attention.
Response
This item was evaluated during man-in-the-loop testing and will be further evaluated during Phase 11 to determine if any modifications are appropriate.
(ii)
There were numerous minor differences in wording between the SPDS displays and the functional EOPs.
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Response
This item will be evaluated during Phase 11 to determine if any modifications are j
appropriate.
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(iii) Two of the four room displays do not have keyboards to allow desired displays to be called up locally.
Response
All four (4) control room displays have individual keyboards to allow desired displays to be called up. One (1) keyboard, however,is not immediately below its associated CRT. We do not believe that any modifications are necessary.
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