ML20136C635

First Interim Deficiency Rept Re Possibility of safety- Related Electrical Equipment Adversely Affected by Failure of Piping Supported to Seismic Category I(L)B.Initially Reported on 851121.Next Rept by Unit 1 Fuel Load

ML20136C635
Person / Time
Site:	Bellefonte
Issue date:	12/23/1985
From:	Hufham J TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
NUDOCS 8601030376
Download: ML20136C635 (3)

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w-t TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 SN 157B Lookout ce ECgg Ep.I8 December 23, 1985 BLRD-50-438/85-32 BLRD-50-439/85-30 U.S. Nubicar Regulatory Consission Region II

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Attention:

Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Admlnistrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Dr. Grace:

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT MAY BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY FAILURE OF PIPING SUPPORTED TO SEISMIC CATEGORY I(L)B -- BLRD-50-438/85-32, BLRD-50-439/85 FIRST INTERIM REPORT

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The subject deficiency was initially reported.to NRC-0IE Inspector Al Ignatonis on November 21, 1985 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as SCR BLN MEB 8509. Enclosed is our first interim report. We expect to submit our next report on or about six months before fuel load of unit 1.

If there are any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

c Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 1

Q OAW riager({fL ensing K

Enclosure V

cc:

Mr. James Taylor, Director (Enclosure)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consission Washington, D.C.

20555 Records Center (Enclosure)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 9601030376 B5 y

PDR ADOCK O PDR g

An Equal Opportunity Employer MM7

1 ENCLOSURE

'BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT MAY BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY FAILURE OF PIPING i

SUPPORTED TO SEISMIC CATEGORY I(L)B BLRD-50-438/85-32,.BLRD-50-439/85-30 10 CFR 50.55(e)

SCR BLN MEB 8509 l

FIRST INTERIM REPORT

,, Description of Deficiency

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. Safety-related electrical equipment is located noir piping that is supported I

to seismic category I(L)B which does not require pressure boundary retention.

The electrical equipment may fail due to the fluid spray from the piping, should a pressure boundary failure occur.

Generic implications for other TVA nuclear plants were addressed by a A

Potential Generic condition Memorandum.

Similar conditions for other TVA i

nuclear plants are documented by the following:

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - NCR SQN CEB 8409.

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - NCR WBN SWP 8265 and to be addressed by the results of the Potential Generic-Condition Memorandum investigation.

l Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant - SCR BFN NEB 8512 and SCR j

BFN CEB 8524.

I Safety Implications Water spray on the electrical distribution equipment may cause the equipment's protective device to operate, which will result in loss of board power to I

safety-related systems. Water spray on I&C equipment and local test / control panels may result in spurious actuations, erroneous indications, and failure 4

lof operation of safety-related components.

Therefore, if this condition had remained uncorrected, the safety of operations of the plant could.have been adversely affected.

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. Interim Progress A study will be done to determine which safety-related electrical equipment, located in areas with seismic category I(L)B piping, is positioned close enough to the piping to be threatene.d by the spray from potential pipe i -

pressure boundary failures. Primary' safety-related electrical equipment that is threatened by the spray from potentially failed seismic category I(L)B supported piping will be protected by one of the following methods:

--Upgrading the equipment by additional sealing

--Protection from spray by covering with shielding

--Replacing with equipment qualified to withstand spray

--Supporting piping to seismic category I(L)A, which assures pressure boundary retention.

TVA will provide a final report on this defic'lency upon conclusion of the scoping study and definition of the corrective plan. Completion of corrective actions will be completed no later than six' months before fuel load of unit 1.

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