ML20135H743

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Transcript of ACRS Subcommittee on Human Factors 850918 Meeting in Russellville,Ak.Pp 284-327.Supporting Documentation Encl
ML20135H743
Person / Time
Issue date: 09/18/1985
From:
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:
References
ACRS-T-1447, NUDOCS 8509240188
Download: ML20135H743 (68)


Text

.

ORJG;NAL O ,

UNI 1ED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF: DOCKET NO:

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN FACTORS i

O s s LOCATION. RUSSELLVILLE, ARKANSAS PAGES: 284 - 327 DATE: WEDNESDAY,. SEPTEMBER 18, 1985 o DECOPh %

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 ___

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 5

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN FACTORS 6 ___

7 Board Conference Room Training Center 8

2. _-_ Arkansas Power and Light P. O. Box 608 Russellville, Arkansas 72801 10 Wednesday, September 18, 1985 The subcommitted reconvened, pursuant to recess, -

12 at 2:10 p.m., David Ward, Chairman of the Subcommittee, D presiding.

Id ACRS MEMBERS PRESENTr 15 D. WARD, Chairman C. MICHELSON 16 ACRS CONSULTANTS PRESENTr 18 J. REED C. WYLIE 19 COGNIZANT STAFF MEMBERr 20 J. SCHIFFGENS 21 NRC STAFF AND PRESENTERS PREPENTr 22 D. JAMES S. McKISSACK 23 R. OAKLEY J._ GRIFFIN 24 J. McWILLIAMS T. COGBURN 25 t

_ _ _ . _ _ . . -_ ._ _ _ _ _ . __ . _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ . - ---m_.-.

O PUBLIC NOTICE BY THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONERS' ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS WEDNESDAY,- SEPTEMBER 18, 1985 The contents of this stenographic transcript of the proceedings of the United States Nuclear Regulatory' Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), as reported herein, is an uncorrected record of the discussions recorded at the meeting held on the above

. date.

No member of the ACRS Staff and no participant at this meeting accepts any responsibility for errors or inaccuracies of statement or data contained in this transcript.

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285 1

PROCEEDINGS 2 MR. WARD: We are on the record now.

3 MR. JAMES: To present the control room design 4 review summary we have with us Steve McKissack. He is the 5 0737 Supplement 1 Control Room Design' Group Team Lead 6

Leader.

7 Steve has been with AP&L for over 10 years. He is 8 IEC Superintendent in the Corporate Engineering Group.

9 Steve, are you going to introduce your other 10 members?

il MR. McKISSACK: Yes, we are going to introduce 12 them.

13 MR. DAMES: Okay.

  • 14 MR. McKISSACK: As he mentioned, I am Steve 15 McKissack, IEC Supervisor and not IEC Superintendent.

16 MR. JAMES: Oh, I am sorry.

17 MR. McKISSACK: As you have seen through these is presentations, the control room design review is part of an 19 intensive effort within Arkansas Power and Light Company to 20 upgrade control rooms, emergencies facilities and 21 procedures.

22 The purpose of this presentation is just to 23 briefly describe AP&L's CRDR program.

24 AP&L's management acknowledged the importance of 25 the control room design review as well as recognized that a r

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, 286 I successful review was a major undertaking requiring the 2 support of a multidisciplined project review team.

l 3 As a result, AP&L has dedicated and continues to 4 dedicate experienced engineers and licensed operators to be 4 5 responsible and accountable for every aspect of the control

. 6 room design review.

7 AP&L has also included human factors specialists 8 who are trained in the field of human factors and are 1

l 9 experienced in control room design reviews.

10 (Slide.)

11 The CRDR team is composed of professionals from 12 various disciplines with the skills necessary to perform 13 the review and the various disciplines that are represented i 14 on the control room design review team consist of senior 15 reactor operators for both ANO-1 and ANO-2, nuclear i .16 systems, engineering, operations assessment, electrical

} 17 design engineering, IEC design engineering and human i

18 factors engineering.

! 19 AP&L's structure.for managing the control room 20 design review is outlined in this organizational ,

21 structure. Basically the primary organizational elements 22 consist of the steering committee, which you have 23 previously had a. presentation on, the NUREG 0737 Supplement f 24 1 Program Coordinator, who is Dale James, and the control 25 Room Design Review Team.

'(:)

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287 lh 1 And since the members of the control room design 2 review team are here, I would like to introduce each 3 member, d First, let me begin with Dan Williams, who is a 5 nuclear systems engineer.

6 Bill Garrison, senior reactor operator for Unit 1.

7 Curt Taylor, senior reactor operator for Unit 2.

8 Al Wrape, electrical engineering supervisor over 9

here. I am sorry, I am going a little fast bere.

10 Bob Terwilliger, operations assessment 11 superintendent.

12 Then Bob Kershner, lead human factors specialist, 13 and he is Vice President of ARD Corporation, i

14 And Gary Young, who is the lead engineer, United 15 Energy Services Corporation.

16 This is a talented group of individuals whose 17 training and experience and direct involvement in the la control room design review'have made the project 19 successful.

20 (Slide.)

21 In addition, the control room design review team 22 has received continuous support and guidance from the 23 steering committee, ahd this five member committee has 24 provided broad management oversight to assure integration 25 of project objectives.

288 I 1 The steering committee is responsible for assuming

! 2 the required expertise, the formulation of the overall 0737 3 Supplement 1 program and its scope and assuring d coordination to accomplish activities on a timely basis.

i f 5 And as mentioned yesterday, there are monthly i

j 6 meetings scheduled to advise the steering committee of the j 7. project status, as well as for the committee to provide 8 feedback and direction to the CRDR team.

9 Now the CRDR teaan is responsible for planning and 10 scheduling and for coo:dinating the total integrated 11 control room design review. The control room design i

12 review activities have included the methods for the review, 13 the identification and the assessment of discrepancies, 14 establishing an overall plan and schedule for the.CRDR and i 15 serving as a resource for support organizations to i

16 integrate all action items.

17 The control room design review team members have 18 been involved in every task utilizing their experience and j 19 plant specific knowledge.

20 In addition, ARD Corporation, the human factors t

21 consultant, and also a CRDR team member has also been j'

22 extensively involved in every aspect of the control room i

23 design review, and ARD Corporation was selected only after j 24 an intensive review and evaluation of their capabilities, j 25 The ANO-1 and 2 control room design reviews will

O

I 289 1

progress through essentially four phases. They will go 2 through a planning phase, a review phase, an assessment 3 phase and, finally, the implementation phase.

4 The initial planning phase for both units ended 5 with our submittal of our control room design review 6 program plan to the NRC in November of 1983, and the Unit 1 7

review began in February of 1984 and has progressed through 8 the review and assessment phases.

The final summary report for Unit 1 was submitted 10 as scheduled in August of this year, and the Unit 2 control

' room design review, the final summary report is scheduled 12 to be submitted in May of 1986. We have completed the 13 assessment phase for Unit 2.

I Id In the next few minutes I would just like to 15 briefly highlight the review processes that we have gone 16 through to collect the pertinent information and identify 17 the human engineering discrepancies.

la The review phase was conducted to determine if the 19 control room provides the operator with the systems status 20 information, the control capabilities, feedback and 21 performance aids necessary to accomplish the operator's 22 functions and tasks effectively.

23 The review phase consisted of the following major 24 activities.

25 (Slide.)

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290

( 1 It consisted of an operating experience review.

2 The operating experience review consisted of the historical 3 event review and the operator's survey.

4 And the historical event review was used to 3

5 utilize the archive documentation that is available to 6 identify areas to' investigate and ensure that the 7 man / machine interface was adequately addressed.

! 8 . Industry-wide and in-house documents were reviewed 9 for human factors relevancy and for potential applicability 10 to the ANO control rooms.

l 11 The operator's survey was to obtain the special

.' 12 pertinent knowledge that operating personnel possess i

, 13 regarding both the positive and the negative control room n features which they had experienced or observed.

l 15 Operating personnel were asked via a questionnaire i

16 to identify positive and negative features of the control I 17 room in all plant modes of operation. The questionnaires l 1

4 18 were analyzed by the human factors specialist and then the 19 human factors specialists when conducted confidential 20 follow-up interviews to address any concerns that came out 21 of the questionnaires.

22 Following the operating experience review was the l 23 task analysis. The task analysis entailed the 24 identification of operator functions primarily using the 25 EOP's and other selected procedures.

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291 1

a The control room inventory. The control room 2 inventory was to establish a reference set of data which 3

identified instrumentation and controls within the control d

room, all displays, controls and annunciators were coded 5 into a computerized data base.

6 The verification process, the human factors 7 specialist conducted computerized sorts to determine if the 8 appropriate equipment was in the control room to perform 9

each task required or the availability of the 10 instrumentation.

II And then they also conducted these sorts to 12 determine whether or not the characteristics of each piece 13 of equipment offered the operators sufficient control

{}- " '

id capabilities to efficiently accomplish his task or the is suitability of the instrumentation.

16 The validation process, the validation consisted 17 of exercising an operating crew through major scenarios to 18 determine whether functions allocated to the operator could 19 be accomplished effectively within both the structure of 20 the emergency procedure and the design of the control room 21 as it exists.

22 -

Finally, the control room survey. The control 23 room survey consisted of a comparison by the human factors 2d specialist of the instrumentation control features to a 25 human factors check list which was derived from NUREG 0700.

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292

( 1 After the completion of the review process, we 2 went into the assessment phase. Primarily the discussion 3 here will evolve around Unit 1. The control room design i

4 review resulted in the identification of 462 HED's.

5 These HED's were evaluated to determine the extent j 6 to which they affected the plant safety, the plant 7 operability and personnel safety. A systematic method was ,

8 used to evaluate the significance of the HED's and the ANO i i 9 assessment team reviewed and assessed every BED.

t j 10 The team members were asked to evaluate the HED's 11

giving attention to the following human factors type 12 considerations, the impact on physical performance, the 13 impact on sensory or perceptual performance, the impact on

! 14 cognitive performance, the interaction with other task i is variables,'the impact or potential impact on the operating

.16 crew error and the impact or potential impact on plant 17 safety.

(Slide.)

is 19 After considering these factors, the assessment i

20 team members evaluated the significance of the HED based on 21 the following categories.

I 22 Essentially they are the three here. The category 23 one type significance was the highest significance and it 24 could affect or has substantially affected a plant safety

, 25 system or operator response during an emergency situation.

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Category two was significant, could affect or has 2 substantially affected a non-safety system or operator 3 response during routine, non-emergency operation, d

And category three was the least significant or 5 could or has affected the operator's response in a non-6 substantial-way.

7 glide,)

8 The rating forms were compiled and the results were 9

provided to each team member. The assessment team met to 10 discuss the individual ratings and to reach a consensus on

" the final rating of each HED.

12 This table illustrates the source of the Unit 1 13 HED's and their significance rating by source. From this

' ~~

Id it can be seen that 67 percent of all HED's came from the is check list survey, but only 21 percent of the category one 16 HED's ---

17 MR. MICHELSON: What does HED stand for'?

18 MR. McKISSACK: It stands for human engineering 19 discrepancies.

20 The operator survey produced S5 percent ---

21 MR. WARD: Where did you get the 21 percent?

22 MR. McKISSACK: It is the result of a checklist 23 survey. It would be 4789 divided by the 42 that is down 24 there at the bottom.

25 MR. WARD: Those that are category one?

. . -. -. - . -..-....- _.. -_ - - -_- ..-_ _- ~. --

I 294 I 1 MR. McKISSACK: Category one. The checklist

, i 2- survey produced 21 percent of the category one.

) 3 MR. WARD: Oh, okay.

l l 4 MR. McKISSACK: The operator survey produced the '

i .

! 5 23 there or.55 percent of the category one HED's, and of I a .

! 6 the category two it produced 47 percent.  !

l 7 As shown down at the bottom there, 80 percent of l 1

i 8 the HED's were rated as least significant.  !

9 The intrinsic value I guess of the control room  !

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i 10 design review has been evidenced by the 42 discrepancies 11 which have been identified as highest significance and the 12 .51 discrepancies which have been identified as significant.

l 13 The process of corrective action is underway. In j 14 some cases these HED's or some of the HED's have already  ;

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, 15 been corrected.

16 MR. WARD: What ir your schedule for the rest of j .17 them?

i l 18 MR McKISSACK: We are working on the process now ,

j 19 of establishing the corrective action schedule. We have 20 got an in-house design change process that we are involved 21 with and some of them are in the process.  !

22. Those related, such as the Reg. Guide 197 HED's i

23 are in the process of having design changes incorporated .

. 24 right now. Some of them as a part of the process already l l

j 25 had design changes underway and were incorporated during a lC l

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295 i 106 outage, there are others that are scheduled for say the 2 next outage.and some of the more significant ones that 3 require further study may be further down the road.

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296 mg #2-1-SueW1 MR. WARD: Well, let's see, you are going to 2 do all of Category 1 and 2's?

3 MR. McKISSACK: All of Category l's are going 4 to be addressed.

5 MR. WARD: Okay. You will either do them or 6 decide they don' t need to be done?

7 MR. McKISSACK: That's correct.

8 J1R WARD: Are the 369, Category 3, is th at 9 deciding they don' t need them, need to be done?

10 MR. McKISSACK: Not necessarily. Just be-11 cause they were Category 3 didn' t mean that we weren' t 12 going to do anything about them.

,e-) 13 There were sdhe Category 3's that it was i

14 convenient to do them. It was convenient for us to 15 go ahead and do them.

16 MR. WARD : Ye ah . And I guess you were

. 17 probably as aware of the June Davis-Besse incident as I

i 18 we are , the fact that there was an ATD they hadn' t fixed 19 but were going to next year?

20 MR. McKISSACK
Yes.

21 MR. WARD: And they got in a little trouble.

f 22 MR. McKISSACK: Okay. As mentioned, the 2

l 23 control room design is in process, has been and will 24 continue to be an important consideration for ANO-1 25 and for ANO-2.

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  1. 2-2-SueW1 AP&L is committed to an ongoing human factors 2 program to build upon the experience and knowledge which 3 AP&L has gained through the control room design and 4 review process.

5 MR. WARD: Do you think -- let's see , have 6 you learned that there .is something in the process here 7 that you can shorten or somehow short-cut some of the 8 steps you took here il the approach for Unit 2?

9 MR. McKISSACK: Utilizing the knowledge, 10 yes.

11 MR. WARD: But I mean, if you look at the 12 different types of review and which of them yielded the 13 most high category -- HEDs I guess.

14 Well, maybe that's not too -- you've got 15 some out of each . type. I mean, the check list had 16 sort of a low efficiency, but in yielding important

. 17 HEDs but it did yield some, so --

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  • 18 MR. McKISSACK: -That's correct. We are g to essentially using the same process on Unit 2 that we t

j 20 used on Unit 1. ,

_f 21 Okay. Dale, that's all I have.

f 22 MR. WARD: Any cuestions?

8 (No response.)

l 23 24 MR. McKISSACK: We have reviewed those 25 for Unit 1. We have reviewed the Category 1 HEDs O

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  • 298 (A

,) .#2-3-SueW relative to their safety significance to the plant.

2 Given sufficient time to correct them through our pro-3 cess, and basically they have come back and said that

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4 they are not a safety concern at this point.

5 MR. WARD: Well, they've got to be a safety.

6 concern or you .wouldn' t be bothering to fix them.

7 MR. McKISSACK: Well, they are not an ad-8 verse impact on the operation of the plant.

9 MR. WARD: You are willing to wait I guess?

- 10 MR. McKISSACK: Yes. ,

i

. 11 MR. WILLI AMS : They have all been evaluated I

. 12 with respect to whether they are the type that you 13 might have to shut the plant down and get is fixed, or 4

14 you want to jump right in and push everything else 15 out of the way and fix it right now.

16 And none of them fell into those categories.

- 17 MR. WARD
Thank you, Steve.

i I l l 18 MR. JAMES: Back on schedule. Our final g 19 presentation before John makes his closing remarks will c

.  ; 20 be on the . primary coolant inventory management system.

21 Making that presentation will be Ron Oakley.

I f 22 Ron is also like Steve, Supervisor in the Corporate I&C

,! 23 . Engineering Group.

24 Ron has been instrumental in all of the 25 Supplement 1 issues. A good majority of them have been O's v -

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(,).#2-4-SueWi worked on by the people in his group.

2 Ron.

INDEXX 3 MR. OAKLEY : Thank you.

4 (Slide.)

5 The title that Dale used, the primary 6 coolant inventory monitoring,is what we are going to 7 be talking about.

8 (Slide *)

g To put that ~ in perspective with the entire 30 issue of inadequate, what I call an inadequate core it cooling monitoring strategy, you have your margin to g2 saturation monitoring, your vessel above core level 73 13 monitoring, your qualified or core exit thermocouple V% signal processing, and then for Unit 1, B&W reactors, 34 15 your hot leg level monitoring.

16 I'm going to talk about all of those and

17 concentrate on the cooling inventory monitoring but i 18 put it in perspective with the entire issue of accident 19 management, if you will.

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j 20 MR. WARD: Ron, you are just going to talk

$- 21 about Unit l?

I MR. O AKLEY : I will be ' talking about b6th f 22 2

23 uni ts .

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24 MR. WARD: Oh, you are?

25 MR. OAKLEY : Yes. The hot leg level is tT L.)

300

  1. 2-5-SueW1 for Unit l- only, and it's a B&W reactors measuring 2 hot leg level.

3 MR. WARD: I understand.

4 MR. OAKLEY: All right.

5 (Slide.)

6 The TSAT monitor history for ANO-l~, in 19 79 7 we added capability to calculate margin- Saturation on 8 the plant computer. - That was a short-term fix that'we e added that capability very quickly af ter the Three Mile 10 Island event.

11 In 1980, we came in and added TSAT calcula-12 tors , microprocessor base calculator.

At that time, we took the NON-lE or non-nuclear instrumentation in-

'O 13 14 puts to the system. That was all we had available at 15 the time.

16 We subsequently upgraded the system to 17 fully Class 1-E with qualified RPS inputs. And so we

.j 18 have a fully qualified TSAT monitoring system on ANO-1.

g Ig As for ANO-2, we also added the capability

20 ' cx1 computer in ' 79 and then came back and added the fa ~ 21 TSAT calculators in ' 80 with narrow range inputs which f 22 was the best we could get at the time.

23 And we subsequently added qualified wide 24 range inputs to the TS AT calculators for ANO-2. And 25 -diat system is fully 1-U.

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301 (3

(,,/ #2-6-SueW For the core-exit thermocouple system for 2 ANO-1, in ' 79 again we added the -- thirty-two of the 3 CET signals to our plant computer that -- so that the 4 operator would have information of core-exit thermo-5 couple temperature at the top of the core there.

6 And our plans are in the next refueling, 7 1R7, August of ' 86, estimated date , to add Class 1-E 8 thermocouples for twenty-four of the incore instruments.

9 The core-exit thermocouple is a part of your incore 10 instrument. It is one of the sensors.

11 So we are going to be replacing those instru-12 ments with qualified instruments and cabling in the r^ 13 next outage. That would be six instruments per quadrant I 14 qualified.

15 We will have that capability in August 16 of '86. The way we are incorporating that is , 'as we

- 17 replace incore instruments as they burn up, we are i 18 trying to utilize their life, we are replacing them g 19 with qualified instruments.

s j 20 So, actually in August of ' 86, we will only f 21 have sixteen qualified. The cabling will be there a

f 22 for twenty-four. And when the next eight burn up, it 23 will be an outage af ter that when we will have twenty-24 four.

25 But the final system will have twenty-four (3

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302

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(_ . #2-7-SueW qualified CETs.

l 2 MR. WARD: Ron, you said you put thirty-two i

3 to the plant computer. I notice on -- I thought I 4 observed on the SPDS this morning there were --

! 5 MR. OAKLEY: You are correct.

l l

6 MR. WARD: -- fifteen or seventeen.

l

7 MR. OAKLEY
It's actually sixteen of them l

l 8 are on the SPDS and sixteen are on the plant computer 9 currently.

l l 10 MR. WARD: Oh , there is a dif ferent --

11 MR. OAKLEY: In between -- there is a l 12 middle step there that I didn' t put up there. You 13 are correct.

<! 14 Currentiv, we have transferred sixteen 15 of them to the SPDS to give us a little more, I guess, 16 diversity and reliability in the interim until we l

. 17 get the total qualified.

l I

i 18 And any of the qualified signals will go g 19 to the SPDS as well. All twenty-four of them, t

l  ; 20 By the time, you will -- by the time you 21 add them up after we get through there will be more f -

22 than -- there won' t be a total of fif ty-six. That's 1 t l 23 a little bit misleading. Some of those thirty-two 1

! 24 will go away because the instruments are getting re-l 25 placed or the ones that go to plant computer.

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(_): #2-8-SueW But there will be more than thirty-two 1 2 when we are finished. I think the number is like 3 thirty-seven or thirty-nine, forty, something like that.

4 MR. WARD: Okay.

5 MR. OAKLEY: For ANO-2, in our last refuel-6 ing we upgraded all the cabling in outside containment l

7 and signal processing for Class 1-E.

8 And we are currently evaluating our in-9 containment cabling against the environmental qualifica-Io tion. We feel that that system is already qualified 11 and we are just addressing it against the EQ requirements 12 of Reg Guide 1.97.

13 So that's where we stand on core-exit i

  • 14 thermocouple.

15 (Slido.)

I 16 Unit 1, with the hot leg, we are going to l

g 17 go with the Delta P instrumentation. On each of the l 18 hot legs we will be installing in next refueling, 19 August of ' 86, we will be installing both narrow and g

l  ; 20 wide range level indications on each hot leg.

fa 21 The wide range is to cover the entire range f 22 of the hot leg. . We've gone and put in -- or, we are t

l 23 going to be putting in narrow range indication in areas 24 where we feel specific valuable information can be 25 attained to the operator, the top of the hot leg, candy O

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(_, #2-9-SueW cane . And there is a middle region there in the candy 2 cane, too, that we are addressing with some narrow 3 range indication.

l 4 Ue are trying to get the improved accuracy 5 in those areas to give the operator good information, 6 unambiguous information.

7 And we will also be using reference leg l

8 temperature compensation for even further measurement l

l 9 accuracy.

i l 10 MR. REED: I can, I guess, understand the 11 reason for putting the instrumentation on to monitor 12 level in the hot leg candy cane on the Til side. Well,

! 13 there's not much difference between TII.

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(_'- 14 But what are the reasons for so doing?

15 The reasons for so doing is because of the way the 16 pressurizer is arranged and the way it's piped to the

. 17 surge line so that the pressurizer might be full but I

l 18 the candy cane might be empty?

19 Is that what you are saying? The re fore ,

j 20 you jeopardize the natural circulation path. If you f 21 don' t have power, why you might not be getting the 3

d 22 heat moved into the steam generator.

l 23 Is that what's behind this?

24 MR. COGBURN: That's correct. It's to i

25 give you an indication that you are losing --

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(m) #2-10-SueG MR. REED
Allowing you do, let's suppose

! 2 it's halfway down the hot leg, what are you going to 3 do?

4 MR. COGBURN: Well, I don't know. Jim 5 McWilliams might rather answer that.

6 MR. McWILLIAMS: Halfway down the hot leg 7 you are in pretty good shape, because you enter the 8 reflux boiling mode where it recouples to the steam l

9 generator.

10 If you are further from about halfway down l 11 to right up to the top of the candy cane , heat transfer 12 goes from -- you lose the reflux boiling mode and then 13 you have to go back solid to recoup to the generator.

14 In other words , you lose coupling in that 15 zone. And what we were trying to do with the narrow l

l 16 range level is to tell the operator that is where he 17 is. He is okay, because he is in a reflux mode and by g

18 l having the lower part of the narrow range , if it's 19 dropping then he knows that he is going to eventually l'

1 g 20 lose reflux boiling mode.

21 MR. REED: So what you do is you get i 22 into some complex decisions and determinations on the j j 23 part of the operater as to whether or not he is --

24 MR. McWILLIAMS: All of the decisions as 25 f ar as core protection have already been made. You are l

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  1. 2-ll-SueW in the full HPI cooling mode and all that. You are 2 the re . In other words , you are to the point with one

! 3 exception of btmping the ptmps. And that criteria won't 4 change.

5 MR. REED: Let's assume we have loss of 6 outside AC. So, you don't have any pump bumping 7 capacity. So, your HPSI is on and it's trying to de-a liver, and you don' t know whether you've got the e coupling for the secondary side of the steam generator i

10 or not.

l 31 MR. McWILLIAMS: You know you' re coupling.

l 12 We don' t need the level to know that you are coupled.

1 13 The level is just a backup to tell the operator what

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x0 14 the inventory and RCS is doing.

15 The level is not used in any decision-16 making process as f ar as what he does to protect the

. 17 core. The level we are at is used -- it was added I

l 18 as an order.

Is Dut the use of it is to tell him what l g 20 the inventory is doing. And that's all. It does f3 ,qi not make any decisions in the process of protecting f 22 the core.

t l 23 MR. HARD: So you are saying af ter you l

24 get the system in, you won't be changing your Eops?

25 MR. McWILLIAMS: He will change the displays

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1 l

307

  1. 2-12-SueW to reference it. And we are planning right now --

2 we are working with B&N and the Owners Group with

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l 3 generic guidelines. As it looks right now, it will be I 4 there strictly as guidance to'te11 what the leve1 of the 5 core is doing in the vessel.

6 MR. COX: Alan Cox. The ' electromatic relief valve r

7 would be open, high point vents would be open, and

.. 4 8 you will have full HPI at that point.

9 . MR . COGBURN: The Owners Group in concert 10 with NRC Research are funding a test f acility to 11- validate a lot of these things, too. And it costs 12 many _ millions of dollars to validate in an actual model 13 &at is full size, you know, that it will work this .

1 14 way.

END #2 15 Joe flws 16

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18 19

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' 21  ;

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3-1-JoeHal 308 1 MR. OAKLEY: Moving along, I think we are going a

O

'd 2 to be running against the clock here in a few minutes, the 3 above core level monitoring approach for 1 and 2 is to 4 utilize radcal gamma thermometer.

5 I have a cross section that I will pass around -

6 so you guys cr_n take a peek at it.

7 This is a cross section of the actual rod.

8 In order for us to have used this instrument 8

that was developed by technology for energy, we had to do 10 some confirmatory testing- to . prove its performance, if you 11 will, for ICC monitoring, or level' monitoring.

12 We did that at Oak Ridge National Lab back in ,

18

'83, late '83 early '84. That testing was successful.

14 j We have installed the hardware on Unit 2 in is -

our last refueling outage, March of '85. The system is now 16 in the control room. The displays are in the control room 17 and available there for operator use and familiarity.

q I8 We are undergoing site acceptance testing 18 currently. Prior to placin'g the system in operation, we

" will incorporate it into the EOP even if it is merely 21 telling the operator that this is information for his 22 knowledge.

23

-But it will be incorporated into the EOPs.

24 There will be an SPDS display added.

h( 26 There will be operator training on how the equipment

'3-2-JoeWal 309 m

1 and system works, and it will be -- the displays, the EOPs,--

)

2 the whole thing will be looked at from human factors.

3 So, the entire 737 Program, Supplement 1, will 4

be folded in as we have in most of the issues over the 5 past few years. .

6 And on Unit-1 we intend to pu't the system in in 7 August of '86.

8 MR. REED: Where do these gamma thermometers 9 go?

10 MR. OAKLEY: Where do they go?

11 MR. REED: Underneath the head, or where.

12 MR. OAKLEY: ,

If you could hold that question for o

0)

N 13 a few more minutes, I have got reactor vessels and pictures 14 and I will show you where they go.

15 First, I want to tell you real quickly why we 16 chose the system, Gamma Thermometer.

17 For Unit-2, we actually have the instrument going 18 into the core, and we are measuring some absolute temperatures, 4

19 and the system has the capability of making the coolant

  1. heat transfer, and Delta-T across the core.

21 I will show you that in a second when I show you 22 a picture of what we have in Ehe reactor at Unit-2.

23 The system was very versatile. You see how small 24

([ ) the cross section of the rod is there. Unit-2, we were able e

25 to replace an in core instrument with no ' modifications

. . _ . . - . = . - . ._ .

3-3-JoeWal '

310 1 to the reactor vessel, which was a~ big concern of ours as 0 2 far as impact on operations and outage schedules and what

?

3 not. -

4 It is a very sturdy instrument there. It is s

5 basically solid rock, and it has been used extensively in 6 European reactors for power monitoring, so it is shown to 7 perform over the years.

8 MR. WARD: .Used for power monitoring.

9- MR. OAKLEY: Power monitoring, that is correct.

t 10 I will show you in just a second the philosophy of how it

.11

, works, and I can tell you'how it works for power monitoring.

1 H . It is standard thermocouple processing, and I i( , is mentioned the cost effectiveness just goes into how you 14 can install the hardware and maintain it, and what not.

15 This is a quick cross section of the rod. It 16 is blown up. You see it very small -- a very small picture 17 of it there.

L 18 The center of.the pack there are the actual -- it 19 is a, eater in the very center. You have the thermocouples

~

20 here, and then you ~have the core rod and the outer jacket

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l' 22 MR. WARD:, The thing' that we are looking at is-

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23 the cross section --

-(

} 24 :

MR. OAKLEY: You are looking at it just like 25 this right here.

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i l

3-4-CoeWal 311 1 (Pointing.)

2 Okay? Now, you have a rod -- depending on which 3 reactor -- say 40 foot long, and you have got sensors at 4 different spots in the -- along the length of that rod.

5 An actual sensor, when there would be numerous 6 of them in the_ reactor, would look like this.

7 (Pointing.)

8 Differential' thermocouple -- there is a thermo-8 couple, and there is the end of the thermocouple. 'You are 10 measuring the temperature difference between those two points, 11 and what you do is you heat one of the thermocouples, and 12 you have a chamber to make it -- where the heat is harder m '

13 to get away from the area, so one thermocoupler is going to 14 be hotter than the other, depending on the transfer medium, 15 the water or steam, you will have a difference in temperature.

16 It will go up'in steam -- you get something 17 between 40 degrees to 200 degrees, something in that range, 18 depending on the sensor design.

I' This is I guess sensor-types. Another picture

" of the different types of sensors and how they work. This.

21 is a slow sensor where we have. the gap I was showing you.

22 Here is your heater. Your hot thermocoupler 23 here.

) Your response would be'as your water level falls,

( 25 the Delta-T is going to go up between the two -sensors, and

e 312 3-5-Jo:Wal 1- your signal is going to increase.

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2 On a reflood, or as the level is coming back up, 3 you get basically the opposite.

4 This little glitch here is where the cold 5 junction -- when your water level is coming up, the cold 6 junction is going to glitch first, so your Delta-T is going 7 to go up for a short period of time until the level comes 8 on up above the other one, and then it drops substantially.

8 The only difference between the two is you don't 10 have the gap. This one has a much faster response time, 11 as you can see.

U This sensor over here is the traditional or 13 conventional power monitoring sensor, for ICC you can call 14- it a signature of recovery sensor. The signal you get 15 out of it is not as clear for ICC, therefore we chose 16 not to use this sensor for ICC.

17 It is the traditional power monitoring sensor, 18 and it works the way -- primarily, the heater is off during 18 power, and what is heating up the elements, or the sensors, are'the gammas in the reactor. That is the reason it is 21 called the gamma thermometer.

22 So, the one that is insulated from the -- with 23 the gap will not see the gammas -- so you get a Delta-T

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's 24 that is proportional to power.

k.

25 MR. WARD: Heated junction thermocouples -- A and

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6-Jo:Wal 1 B are.

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2 MR. OAKLEY: You can call them whatever you want, 8 I guess. They are Delta thermocouples, with one thermo-4 couple junction heated.

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-5 MR. WARD: 'Go ahead. I still don't know what you 6 are driving at.

7' MR. OAKLEY: ~ The concept of .the heated junction-8 thermocouple is very similar to the concept of this instru-8 ment for inadequate core cooling, if that is the point you 1

10 are trying to make. You are correct.

11 MR. REED: I assume that these junctions are 12 exposed to borated water.

( j! 13 MR. OAKLEY: The junctions are within -- if you 4

14 look at the sensor, that is the rod. It is made of 15 stainless steel --- if you will come back ' to this right 16 here.

17 (Slide.)

18 This is tdue outer -- the full circle, all of 18 that is impregnated inside a stainless steel jacket -tube, 20 so'it'never sees any ' liquid. It is - uithin a solid rod -- not .

21 solid ' rod, b' u t almost.

MR. REED: It doesn't see borated water.

MR.-OAKLEY: ' No , rua . It'doesn't see water at-

-( ) all. It only. sees the' heat transfer through the stainless me steel.

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314 3-7-JoeWnl 1 And the way the sensor itself works, you put a

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N/ -2 bunch of these -- as you saw actually located around there, 3 you put a bunch of them on a rod and you have a bunch of 4 switches that tell you where flua level is at different 5 places. The Delta-T would be high here, high here, high 6 here, and low here, so you would infer that the level is 7

somewhere between these two sensors.

8 (Pointing. )

9 MR. WARD: Okay. So, you have five levels from 10 the top --

11 MR. OAKLEY: This is an example of -- I can show 12 you exacly more like they are, or how they are in Units-1 Ps s/ 13 and.2. That is just a representation.

14 MR. WARD: All right.

15 MR. OAKLEY: We have five segments of these 16 levels, right. This is showing five. We have more than 17 that in our reactors.

I8 This is just a representation.

18 I tell you what. I don't have enough time to E

cover the test program that we did at Oak Ridge, so I am 21 going to bypass that and show you the reactors. You do 22 have the~ slide there.

23 (Slide.)

/~T 24 T) This-is the ANO-2 reactor vessel. As I indicated

- (.:

before, weJreplaced'two in-core instruments. We have 44

3-8-JoeWcl 315 1 in-core instruments, and we actually removed two of them, y ,.

-2 replaced those in-core instruments with these instruments.

.3 This instrument looks just like an in-core 4 instrument. It goes down into the same guide tube slot, 5 and we have these sensors located along that -- within that 6 guide tube . -

7 We have an absolute at the very bottom of the 8 core, and that is where it exited the core -- that is why

, 9~ I told you about Delta-temperature across the core -- we 10 can actually in Unit-2 measure that in that guide tube, 11 We also have some differential thermocouples 12 located to give.us heat transfer in the core.

13 MR. WARD: -If you are measuring the temperature 14 __

s 15 MR. OAKLEY: We measure the absolute temperature 16 at the bottom of the core.

17 MR. WARD: Temperature of.what?

18 '-

i MR. OAKLEY:- Whatever that-water is seeing.

19 MR. COGBURN: The guide tube runs through the 20 center of the fuel assembly.

21 MR. OAKLEY: This is at a specific location.

22

-MR. WARD: I am puzzled why you have got hot 23 1eg leg-and cold leg temperatures in core exit thermocouples.

O why de vom wa t to mee ure --

25 MR. OAKLEY: We were putting this rod in there.

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l'  ; That was . just a bonus.

_ 2 We thought it might be good information.

End 3. -3 MS fois.

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317 l 1 We are measuring heat transfer in the core. The 2 level monitoring is up here. We have four level monitors 3 in the' plenum region, and then we have two level monitors d

j. in the dome region. We have a absolute at the top, and 5 this was primarily for natural circulation cooldown
6 purposes to get us the temperature of the water right there 7 at the head, the latent heat.

i 8 The key thing here is we were able to just replace

' an incore instrument, which was very advantageous from an 10 economic and performance standpoint.

M MR. WARD: So you have got six levels at two 12 locations above the core?

13 MR. OAKLEY: Yes.

i 14 MR. WARD: At six levels above the core at two 4

15 locations.

16 MR. OAKLEY: That is-right. ,

17 MR. WARD: And those that are down in the core, t

18 that say differential would ---

19 MR. OAKLEY: Thioe are differential thermocouples.-

l 20 MR. WARD: Would you be able to follow the water 21 level down there?

22 .MR. OAKLEY: We say we can follow a heat transfer .

23 coefficient, which is really what you want to know anyway.

- 24 We do not necessarily measure a collapsed level in the j

25 core. We don't have the manometer effect in there to give

. O.

318 ,

1 us the collapsed level, but we are able to determine if we i 2 are removing heat from that area by measuring the Delta T.

3 MR. dOGBURN: And you can infer a level in that, j

4 MR. OAKLEY: You can, but we are not saying we 5 measure level in the core.

6 MR. COGBURN: You don't display level per se, 7 inches above the bottom.

8 MR. WARD: Do you display level above the top 9 plate?

10 MR. OAKLEY: Yes.

11 MR. WARD: I mean do you believe that is level, or 4

12 is that just inferred?

13 MR. OAKLEY: We have designed this such that we 14 will be getting a collapsed level above the core.

15 MR. WARD: Okay. Above the core it is in a shroud 16 with a lot of holes in it or something?

17 MR. OAKLEY: Yes. We will have openings at the 18 bottom with an isolator here to separate the regions. So.

19 we do have communication.

4 20 MR. WARD: Oh, okay. And the rest of it is just 21 down through the fuel ---

22 MR. OAKLEY: You probably are measuring level down 23 here, but we can't prove it.

24 MR. WARD: Okay.

25 (Slide.)

()

-- - - - , .= ,e-. - - - - , - - - , .,-- e- ,-n -.--

319 1

MR. OAKLEY: Moving right along, Unit 1 wasn't' 2

quite as easy because our incore is coming up through the 3

bottom and we couldn't do it the same way. So we removed i l

d the center control rod drive mechanism and are going to

]

5 insert, or we will remove the center control rod drive 6

- mechanism and we will insert two instruments in its place.

7 We will have differentials and absolutes, and one absolute 8 at the top for the same reason as on Unit 2.

9 MR. WARD: That is just at one location?

10 MR. OAKLEY: Well, if you will notice, there are 11 two rods there.

12 MR. WARD: Okay. Two rods at one location. '

i - 13 MR. OAKLEY: At one location, and they will meet l, 14 the separation criteria 279 I believe it is.

15 (slide.) ,

16 This is'just a representation. It is not 17

necessarily ANO-1 or 2. You have your rod measuring level, 18 and you run your cabling out through the reactor building.

19 What is shown here is a data processor. This is a 20 microprocessor based system that processes these Delta 21 temperatures and infers level or heat transfer, and even on j

22 Unit 2 we are running calculations for power monitoring.,

23 The potential future application of this 24 instrument as a power monitoring instrument, that is kind 25 of a research project, if you will, but it is there as a.

i.

320 1 possibility.

2 And then we go to our qualified displays and we 3 are also going on.to the SPDS, which is not shown here.

4 This is just kind of a one line of what it would look like.

5 (Slide.)

6 Arkansas is the only utility, or we were the 'only 7 utility to go out for this Radcal program. There is one

.; 8 other utility, Consume.r,s Power Pallisades, that is pursuing 9 this application. I am not sure when they are scheduled to 10 install their CE reactor very similar to ours in Unit 2, 11 and they are going to go with an incore instrument. They

]

12 saw those benefits that we saw on Unit 2 of not having to i

13 cut flanges on the reactor and m8'dify reactor internals, a 14 big plus.

15 MR. WARD: Well, let's see, a lot of-the CE plants 16 have used the heated junction thermocouples.

17 MR. OAKLEY: Right.

18 MR. WARD: What was wrong that approach?  !

19 MR. OAKLEY: We evaluated the. heated junction 20 thermocouple and we evaluated the Delta P monitoring t

21 system. The primary reason that we went with the Radcal 22 was I would say, if I picked one reason, was ease of-i 23 ~ installation on ANO-2. It was a risk up front that the j 24 technology wasn't proven. So we had to undergo that test 25 project. But we felt that it was worth that risk, and the

(()

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l

- . - . - . - . -A

321 a 1 testing was successful and we do have the equipment 2 installed in Unit 2.

3 MR. COGBURN: Well, there was also a lot of 4 reliability proven in European reactors.

5 MR. OAKLEY: There were numerous reasons. In 6 fact, this benefit slide that I showed a while back ---

7 (Slide.)

8 --- and I was trying to be brief, but we went for 9 it for a lot of reasons, reliability of the sensors we felt 10 was good. We were involved in the design ourselves, and we H felt like that we could develop a good system with the 12 vendor.

13 MR. JAMES: Thank you, Ron.

-~" 14 To wrap things up, I asked John Griffin to come in is and talk just for a few minutes. John is the Senior Vice 16 President of Energy Supply, and has been instrumental in 17 all of the integrated approaches that we have taken to the 18 0737 Supplement 1 issues.

19 John.

20 MR. GRIFFIN: Thanks, Dale.

21 First of all, I would like to extend my 22 appreciation to the enmmittee for taking the time to come 23 out and spend two very full days with my staff in looking 24 at an awful lot of information. I know we have thrown an 25 awful lot of stuff at you over the last couple of days.

O

r 322

( 1 I hope that in looking back on it that it was the i

2 type of information and the type of material that will be 3 of benefit to you and it is the type of thing that you l 4 wanted to see, which I am sure was instrumental in making 5 you come to the decision to come out and visit a few 6 . plants.

7 We are certainly very, very thankful for you to e give us the opportunity to have spent the time with you.

9 My staff has been enthusiastically looking forward to the 10 opportunity I think to kind of show, I won't say show off, 11 but maybe display some of the things that we have been 12 . working on over the last five to six years very hard.

13 I think it should be obvious to the casual 14 observer that a lot of the things that you have seen and a

15 lot of the systems and the approaches that we have in place
16 today can only have occurred as a result of an awful lot of 17 hard work by an awful lot of people.

is I think the philosophy that we have taken from the

! 19 very beginning kind of has two thrusts.

20 One, we have to do it as a team. We have to have 21 every part of the organization involved from the operators 22 through the engineers, the staff support. The entire i 23 organ'ization has to work together to get things 24 accomplished. And the end result of what we produce has to 25 be of benefit to the people that are going to use that Lo . ,

323 1

product.

2 If I have stressed anything as we have gone  :

3 through this thing, it is to make sure whether it is going 4 to be the operators that are using the equipment or whether 4

5 it is the training staff or whether it is the maintenance ,

6 people, that they have had a chance to input and to be 7 involved in the development and the design of that thing so 8 there is a sense of ownership, that there is a sense of 9 recognition on the front end that, yes, we agree that if- we 10 proceed with that approach that it is going to work and it ll is going to be of benefit.

12 We have worked very hard, and I hope that you  !

' . 13 didn't hear any of some of the we, they talk that a lot of l

4 14 times you see within large organizations. I try to think 15 that we have been pulling.together as a team, and I think 16 to a large extent that is probably one of the main reasons 17 that we have been able to accomplish as much as we have in .

18 the last several years.  :

19 The other approach is we have tried to be 20 responsible managers in terms of identifying what the real 21 I needs of the organization are, the needs of the people and i 22 the needs of the staff, and not wait for th'se o needs to be '

23 regulated or ordered by anybody.

24 We have agreed that we have a need, and that need 25 had to be met for us to better-and more safely operate the l0

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. - - . = .

324

( 1 ' unit. . We have proceeded independently and have not waited 2 to be ordered or directed to do so. I think that has had a 3 tremendous payback to us, and this facility I think is a

~4 good example.

5 We have had the benefit of this facility in 6 operation for training and for emergency response now for 7 going on over four years, or five years I guess. If we had a . hung back and waited, we may just be now getting into the 9 things. So I think that approach as been very strong.

10 I mentioned at lunch today that the commitment of 11 the company and of the company's resources to the nuclear 12 program has been tremendous. In' thinking back over the 13 last five years, I can't think of a single item that we 14 have really felt we needed to improve the operation up here 15 that we haven't been able to get.

16 There has been an awful lot of involvement on the 17 part of our Board of Directors and enthusiastic support for 18 our programs and a visibility on their 'part of coming up 19 here and being actively involved in what is going on. We 20 have just had tremendous support. It is not often that you ,

21 can walk into a Board of Director's meeting and say I need  ;

22 $28 million to build two simulators and get applauded for 23 it. I was a little bit apprehensive when I walked in that

  • 24 day, but came out with a smile on my face. We have that 25 kind of support.

()

t

325

(;3 ,

s )J 1 I think we have come an awful long ways in the 2 last five or six years. We have accomplished an awful 3 I think you probably got a sense today that we have lot.

d got an awful lot going on right now, and we are not 5 through.

6 7 fully anticipate that over the next four or five 7 years we are going to be just as busy, and we are not going 8 to be satisfied to rest on any laurels or any 9

accomplishments that we have made.

10 I think that all of us recognize that we have

" probably had more room for improvement than a lot of 12 utilities in the last five years. We have come a long ways 13 in that direction and we are going to continue to

~

14 proceeding that direction.

15 One of the things my people say is they don't 16 think I am ever satisfied. I don't think we can afford to 17 ever be satisfied, especially in this part of the la business. We have to continue to strive to improve.

19 When we are clearly the best operating utility in 20 the country, then I will talk about slowing down a little 21 bit, but we have got a. ways to go.

22 Again, I do appreciate your taking the time, and.

23 we have enjoyed it. It is not always that easy to get 2d people to come-to Arkansas. I hope, if nothing else, you 25 realize that everybody does wear shoes.

326

( 1 (Laughter.)

2 But, again, thank you very much for the l 3 opportunity to meet with you and spend some time with you.

4 MR. WARD: Well, John, thank you, and I would like 5 to thank all of your staff. You gave us I think a real 6 good two days.

7 When we came down, our chief purpose was to get 8 educated and learn how perhaps what might be a typical 9 utility was implementing programs, and this I think is a 10 tremendously important area of particularly power safety.

i 11 I don't know how typical you are, but I think we have seen 12 a lot more energy and initiative funneled into this group l 13 of programs than we are likely to find at the majority of O 14 other utilities.

15 I personally was very impressed with your efforts 16 and the gcod engineering that seems to be behind the 17 programs. So I am very glad we came.

18 MR. GRIFFIN: I had one other. comment, and every.

19 time I do this I say that I ought to write the notes down 20 and use them, but I wrote the notes down and left them some 21 place else.

. 22 (Laughter.)

. l

, 23 One thing I did want to comment on is I said I am j 24 proud about all the things that we have accomplished, and I 25 am. I mean there is no question that I am proud of'this

()

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327

() I building and proud of the SPDS. I am proud of the fact 2 that we have got simulators.

3 But the thing I am proudest about are the types of 4 The people people that I have got in the organization.

5 that you have seen in the two days, the people that have 6 made the presentations, you don't accomplish the things we 7 have accomplished without this quality of people, and that 8 is our biggest resource. We have got a super staff of 9

dedicated people which makes my job a lot easier as a 10 result.

11 MR. WARD: Okay. Thank you.

12 Dale, particular thanks to you for arranging 'a <

--- 13 host of things for us.

14 At this point we will adjourn the meeting as far 15 as the record is concerned.

16 (Whereupon, at 3:07 p.m., the meeting adjourned.)

17 ******

18 l

19 20 i

21

22 i

23 24 25

O CRDR DISCIPLINES o SENIOR REACTOR OPERATORS CANO-1 / 2) o NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ENGINEERING o OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT o ELECTRICAL DESIGN ENGINEERING o ISC DESIGN ENGINEERING o MUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING l

O -

a_

Control Room Design Review ANO l' I

,- O NUREG-0737 SUPPLEMENT 1 PROGRAM STEERING COMMITTEE NUREG-0737 SUPPLEMENT 1.

PROGRAM COORDINATOR - SPOS 0.E. JAMES - RG.I.97 i - E0Ps

- ERF l CROR TEAM LEADER i

S.L. MCKI'SSACK G.G. YOUNG, COORDINATOR AFL SUPPORT ORGANIZATION 1

i

. LEAD G.O.NUCLEAF HUMAN ANO-1 ANO SERVICES DESIGN ANO-{

FACTORS (SYSTEMS ENGINEERING SPECIALIS ,
OP RA ONS OPE IONS E Sii ENGR)

R.L. KERSHNER 0.H. WILLIAMS B.L. GARRISON C.W. TAYLOR B.A.TERWILLIGER A.J. WRAPE III 1

1 O c==erot ace = o te.= aevi 2 ors aiz eto-e

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1 i ,

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l CRDR REVIEW PROCESS i  :

i i

i o OPERATING EXPERIENCE REVIEW  !

1 o TASK ANALYSIS-

. i i

i 0 CONTROL ROOM INVENTORY  :

i 1

o -VERIFICATION  :

t i

I &

! 1 i i i o VALIDATION  :

i I

.t i

i. I

! o CONTROL-ROOM SURVEY I

l e

P l

i O

. . l

_ . . . , _ , _ , _ . , _ _ _ _ . _ . - _ . _ . . . _ . _ ---.____m._-_________.J_-

h V

f io -

i i

): HED ASSESSMENT HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERATIONS i-

o

.i IMPACT ON PHYSICAL PERFORMANCE i

o

\ IMPACT ON SENSORY / PERCEPTUAL PERFORMANCE

o IMPACT ON COGNITIVE PERFORMANCE i o

! INTERACTION WITH TASK VARIABLES O o i

IMPACT OR POTENTIAL IMPACT ON OPERTING CREW .

ERR j o l -

IMPACT OR POTENTIAL IMPACT ON PLANT SAFETY I

i 1

1 4

i 1

)

I i .

l y

1 e

i.

!O i

i HED SIGNIFICANCE CATEGORIES  ;

i I. HIGHEST SIGNIFICANCE COULD AFFECT OR HAS SIJBSTANTIALLY AFFECTED A PLANT

SAFETY SYSTEM OR OPERATOR RESPONSE DURING AN EMERGENCY i

SITUATION t

II. SIGNIFICANT .

5 COULD AFFECT OR HAS SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTED A NON-SAFETY l SYSTEM OR. OPERATOR RESPONSE DURING ROUTINE, NON-EMERGENCY OPERATION-l III.'LEAST SIGNIFICANT COULD OR HAS AFFECTED OPERATOR RESPONSE IN A NON-SUBSTANTIAL WAY 4

i e

I i .

O i

I

.._- - __ - _l .- -.- , ,_ . , .. - . -.- .. -..-..-..:-----.-....

Control Rocm Design Review ANO 1 REVIEW SECTION # HEDs BY SIGNIFICANCE RATING SUBTOTAL HED TOTALS PHASE (AS APPLICABLE) 1* 2* 3* OF HEDs** BY PHASE"*

CHECKLIST 1. WORKSPACE DESIGN 1 (8%) 0 (0%) 12 (92%) 13 (4%) 308(66.7%)

SURVEY

2. COMMUNICATION 0 (0%) 1 (17%) 5 (83%) 6 (2%)
3. ANNUNCIATORS 3 (12%) 5 (19%) 18 (69%) 26 (8%)
4. CONTROLS 0 (0%) 3 (20%) 12 (80%) 15 (5%)
5. VISUAL DISPLAYS 3 (6%) 2 (4%) 43 (90%) 48 (16%)
6. LASELS AND 1(100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (0%)

LOCATION AIDS

7. PROCESS 0 (0%) 0 -(0%) 120(100%) 120 (39%)

COMPUTERS

, 8. PANEL LAYOUT 1 (2%) 9 (14%) 54 (84%) 64 (21%)

) 9. CONTROL-DISPLAY 0 (0%) 1 (7%) 14 (93%) 15 (5%)

I41TEGRATION OPERATOR 23 (22%) 24 (23%) 56 (55%) 103(22.3%)

SURVEY HISTORICAL 1 (50%) 0 (0%) 1 (50%) 2 (0.4%)

REVIEW ..

VEPIFICATION AVAILABILITY 7 (24%) 3 (10%) 19 (66%) 29 (67%)

SUITABILITY 1 (7%) 1 (7%) 12 (86%) 14 (33%)

VALIDATION 1 (17%) 2 (33%) 3(50%) 6 (1.3%)

TOTAL HEDs 42 (9%) 51 (11%) 369(80%) 462(100%)

  • THESE PERCENTAGES ARE BASED ON THE SUBTOTAL OF HEDs. ** THESE PERCENTAGES ARE BASED ON g THE HED TOTALS BY PHASE. *** THESE PERCENTAGES ARE BASED'ON THE TOTAL NUMBER OF HEDs.

Table 8.1 HED Sumary from Detailed Listings in Volume 2 of this Report 8-2

4

, f

1 a  !

i

! l I i

!O

ANO-1 & 2  ;

+

i i PRIMARY COOLANT  :

t

! INVENTORY MONITORING  :

t i i i

i i l 1  !

i i i

! SEPTEMBER 18, 1985  !

i i

t PRESENTATION TO ACRS-HUMAN FACTORS SUBCOMMITTEE i

'O -

l 1

1 l

I i

1 L,O .

l 1, -

i 1

O INADEQUATE CORE COOLING MONITORING STRATEGY MARGIN TO SATURATION (TSAT) MONITOR

REACTOR VESSEL AB'0VE-CORE LEVEL MONITOR 4

QUALIFIED CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLES.(CETS) l RCS HOT LEG LEVEL MONITOR (ANO-1 ONLY) i 1

i.

L O

1 i.

?

G a

i 1

J i

O

~ ~ - - - , - , - - , , . , . - . , . - . - - . - . , - , - - - , , . . - . - , . . , , . - , . . , - , - - - . , , , . , , - . , - . , . - , , , , . . . - - . , , , , ~ , - . - _ . .

O TSAT MONITOR HISTORY ANO-1 PERFORMED MARGIN TO SATURATION CALCULATION VIA PLANT COMPUTER (1979)

INSTALLED TSAT CALCULATORS WITH NON-1E (NNI) TEMP.

INPUTS (1980)

UPGRADED SYSTEM TO CLASS-1E WITH QUALIFIED (RPS)

TEMP. INPUTS (1982) t ANO-2 i

n U

PERFORMED MARGIN TO SATURATION CALCULATION VIA PLANT COMPUTER (1979)

INSTALLED TSAT CALCULATORS WITH NARROW RANGE TEMP.

INPUTS (1980)

ADDED QUALIFIED WIDE RANGE TEMP INPUTS TO SYSTEM (1983) 4 0

1 O CORE EXIT THERM 0 COUPLES (CETS) HISTORY ANO-1 ADDED SIGNALS FROM 32 CETS TO PLANT COMPUTER (1979)

WILL UPGRADE 24 CETS (6 PER QUADRANT) TO CLASS 1E DURING NEXT REFUELING (AUGUST 1986)

ANO-2 INSTALLED CLASS 1E CABLING (0UTSIDE CONTAINMENT) AND SIGNAL PROCESSING DURING LAST REFUELING (SPRING 1985) bFEN R NMENTA QUA FCAhbN

(-)

O r

9 O

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O RCS HOT LEG LEVEL MONITOR (AN0-1 ONLY)

  • UTILIZE zip INSTRUMENTATION WILL INSTALL SYSTEM DURING NEXT REFUELING (AUGUST 1986)

EACH HOT LEG WILL BE SUPPLIED WITH:

WIDE RANGE LEVEL INDICATION TO COVER ENTIRE HOT LEG, AND NARROW RANGE LEVEL INDICATION TO PROVIDE IMPROVED ACCURACY WILL INCLUDE' REFERENCE LEG.TEMPERATU.C.E COMPENSATION FOR ACCURACY OF MEASUREMENT i O \

F

+

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I m n,,- n ,w , ---o,-.----x-an,-, , ---mn- e,-- , , .c-- - n ~+y.4---,-w <gm.p .. ,, -

O REACTOR VESSEL AB0VE CORE LEVEL MONITORING DESIGN APPROACH UTILIZE RADCAL GAMMA' THERM 0 METERS (RGTs') DEVELOPED'BY TECHNOLOGY FOR ENERGY CORP.

FIRST PERFORM CONFIRMATORY TESTING AT OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABS TO PROVE PERFORMANCE OF RGTs (1983 - 1984)

INSTALLATION SCHEDULES ANO-2 MARCH 1985 (LAST REFUELING) -

AVAILABLE FOR OPERATOR USE a FAMILIARITY SITE ACCEPTANCE TESTING UNDERWAY

-)

  • DECLARE OPERATIONAL AFTER COMPLETION OF REVISED E0PS SPDS DISPLAY GPERATOR TRAINING HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW ANO-1 AUGUST 1986 (NEXT REFUELING)

O

l .

.O BENEF.ITS DIRECT CORE MONITORING (ANO-2)

ABSOLUTE COOLANT TEMP (IN-CORE)

COOLANT HEAT TRANSFER MONITORING 21T ACROSS THE CORE DESIGN VERSATILITY l

PERMITS FABRICATION TO UTILIZE EXISTING REACTOR .

INTERNALS DESIGN (ICI GUIDE TUBE, CONTROL R0D GUIDE COLUMN)

ALLOWS FOR DESIGN TO MEET PLANT SPECIFIC REACTOR INSTRUMENTATION NEEDS ROBUST DESIGN MONOLITHIC PROBE SOLID ROD HEATER OPERATING EXPERIENCE 312 SENSOR YEARS SERVICE IN REACTORS

STANDARD THERMOCOUPLE SIGNAL PROCESSING ALARA COST EFFECTIVE

! HARDWARE INSTALLATION l

MAINTENANCE

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CALIBRATION l

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Figure 5. Radcal assen61y with manometer tube for measuring collapsed liquid level.  ;

W O

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THE CONFIRMATORY TEST PROGRAM ,

O HAD THREE PRIMARY OBJECTIVES l

e DEMONSTR ATE TH AT THE R ADC AL INSTRUMENT C AN EFFECTIVELY MONITOR l l

ICC OVER THE ENTIRE REACTOR VESSEL. l e PROVIDE DATA TO DETERMINE THE BOUND ARY CONDITIONS ON UN AMBIGUOUS ICC MONITORING PERFORM ANCE - R ATE OF INVENTORY LOSS (BLOWDOWN) - R ATE OF INVENTORY G AIN (REFLOOD).

i e PROVIDE D ATA TO SELECT THE OPTIMUM SENSOR TYPES AND ARR ANGEMENT FOR Q ANO-1 AND ANO-2.

l O l

THE PRIM ARY OBJECTIVES WERE O ACCOMPLISHED IN A THREE PH ASE TEST PROGR AM e AIR W ATER TEST SERIES ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS B ASIC RESPONSE D AT A M ANOMETER TESTING e UPPER HEAD TEST SERIES PWR INITI AL CONDITIONS UPPER HE AD CONFIGUR ATION STE ADY ST ATE TEMPER ATURE "O AND FLOW D AT A

~~

BLOWDOWN AND REFLOOD TR ANSIENT D AT A e IN-CORE TEST SERIES -

PWR INITI AL CONDITIONS FUEL L ATTICE CONFIGUR ATION STEADY ST ATE TEMPER ATURE AND FLOW D ATA BLOWDOWN AND REFLOOD TR ANSIENT D AT A O

R ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS

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CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER O'

d This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the matter of:

NAME OF PROCEEDING: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN FACTORS DOCKET NO.:

PLACE: RUSSELLVILLE, ARKANSAS O

DATE: WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1985 were held as herein appears, and that - this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

~

t M N b (TYPED) b ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Official Reporter Reporter's Affiliation O .