U-600250, Forwards SPDS Dynamic Simulation Test Results Rept. SPDS Tracked Progression of Scenarios by Effectively Monitoring Emergency Operating Procedure & Enhanced Exchange of Status Info
| ML20135F241 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 09/13/1985 |
| From: | Spangenberg F ILLINOIS POWER CO. |
| To: | Butler W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20135F244 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 U-600250, NUDOCS 8509170202 | |
| Download: ML20135F241 (2) | |
Text
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U-600250 L30-85(09-13)-L 1A.120 ILLIN0/8 POWER COMPANY IP CLINToN POWER STAtloN. P.o. Box 678. CLINToN. ILLINOIS 61727 Docket No. 50-461 September 13, 1985 Director of Nuclear. Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. W. R. Butler, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Clinton Power Station (CPS)
Safety Parameter Display System Dynamic Simulation Test Results Report
Dear Mr. Butler:
The purpose of this letter is to provide the NRC Staff with the results of the dynamic simulation test of the CPS Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). The attachment, entitled " Dynamic Simulation Test Results Report", provides a detailed description of the test development, test performance and test results evaluation.
Illinois Power Company (IP) Letter U-600066, dated June 13, 1985, provided the Staff with CPS responses to remaining NRC concerns associated with the SPDS design development and implementation process.
In the CPS response to NRC Ceneral Comment #1, IP reiterated that dynamic simulation testing of the CPS SPDS would be performed.
Subsequent to the above submittal, IP Letter U-600171, dated July 9, 1985, provided the "SPDS Dynamic Simulation Test Plan".
The purpose of the SPDS Dynamic Simulation Test (DST) was to demonstrate, through man-in-the-loop simulation testing, that the performance objectives of the SPDS have been met at CPS. This purpose was fulfilled through the following test objectives:
1.
Verify that the SPDS displayed information does not preclude the Main Control Room (MCR) operators from safely shutting down the plant; I
2.
Assess SPDS impact on critical safety function problem detection / resolution and execution of the actions specified in the CPS Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs);
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Observe and evaluate the MCR staffing interaction with the SPDS under dynamic plant conditions; I
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Evaluate the relationship between the SPDS displayed 40 h
information and information available elsewhere in the MCR; $pCbdg,fM'[
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Obtain operator feedback on the usefulness of the SPDS in N,@
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e n.LL L-The SPDS DST was performed on the CPS Simulator. Two teams of a
operators (with five individuals per team) were each given six pp:
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o U-600250 L30- (09-13 )-L 1A.120 scenarios. These scenarios ranged in complexity depending upon the number of critical safety functions impacted, the availability of plant systems and equipment during the scenarios, and the number of required operator actions. For each operating team, three scenarios were run with SPDS available and three scenarios were run without SPDS. This provided a well defined basis for comparison of the operating team responses for each level of scenario complexity. Each of the existing CPS E0Ps were exercised during the DST. The SPDS Verification and Validation (V&V) Team, assisted by two Nuc1 car Training Department instructors, a Human Factors Specialist, and various support personnel, completed the DST development, preparations, performance, and results evaluations.
The results of the SPDS DST, as described in detail in the attachment, support the following major conclusions:
1.
The SPDS tracked the progression of each scenario by effectively monitoring the E0P entry conditions (i.e., the plant critical safety functions);
2.
The SPDS promoted and enhanced the exchange of plant status information among operating team members through concise displays that are casily comprehensible; 3.
The benefits of the SPDS increased as scenario complexity increased; and 4.
The human factors engineering principles designed into the SPDS (e.g., color and shape coding, information presentation, alarm acknowledgment and display selection) were accepted by the operators with no discrepancies noted.
In general, the overall response capability, response timing, and use of the E0Ps were enhanced, for each operating team, for those scenarios in which SPDS was available.
IP considers the results of these tests strongly support the major conclusion that the CPS SPDS has met the design performance objectives and therefore the requirements of NUREG-0737, Supplement #1
(" Requirements for Emergency Response Capability"). Should the Staff have any questions regarding the SPDS DST results, please contact me.
Sincerely yours, h (c.(,AJ M F. A. Spangenberg Director - Nuclear Licensing Nuclear Station Engineering TLR/kaf Attachment ec:
B. L. Siegel, NRC Clinton Licensing Project Manager NRC Resident Office NRC Administrator, Region Ill Office Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety