ML20135F280
ML20135F280 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Clinton ![]() |
Issue date: | 09/11/1985 |
From: | Fukushima T, Moersfelder A, Porter R ILLINOIS POWER CO. |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20135F244 | List: |
References | |
SPDS-DST-002, SPDS-DST-002-R00, SPDS-DST-2, SPDS-DST-2-R, NUDOCS 8509170211 | |
Download: ML20135F280 (376) | |
Text
I Cynz.mic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 (O
'd I
CLINTON POWER STATION SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM DYNAMIC SIMULATION TEST RESULTS REPORT Prepared By: 2W
~
,, b P /Md 9/d/85 N.YFukush[ma Y[S Sf P. J. Telthorst
/ V6V Tpam,Meml:er V&V Team McAbe ,
,bf bs'(. 9' '.D ..<Y' Vli L'ltbal0o M $W R. B. Porter Y/'/ Y T Dr. C. O, lidpkins V6V Team Member tiuman Factors
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," /3 Engineering Specialist
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A.E.Moersfeldc[#
V&V Team Member O Reviewed By: C g/[2 . / 9N/8f R. O. Snelson Date SPDS Program Manager Reviewed By: (.[htLL/L,) /9 c', f*
R. D. Freeman Date ERCIP Program Manager Approved By: h 12a _ /f / [
T.k.Ikiley [ '
Date SPDS V6V Program Manager f
Ny/ 8509170211 850913 PDR ADOCK 05000461 F PDR O
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j Dynamic Simulation Document !!o: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0
] Date: August 1985 i
O l ABSTRACT l i
! I t !
This document describes the Clinton Power Station Safety Parameter
= Display System Dynamic Simulation Test Program implemented to measure l the effectiveness of the Safety Parameter Display System in enhancing i
the operators' understanding of the plant status during abnormal plant ;
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transients. !
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Dynamic Simulation Documsnt Not SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 Executive Summary ;
The objective of Clinton Power Station's Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) is to provide a concise display of critical plant variables to
, the control room operators to aid them in rapidly and reliably l determining the safety status of the plant. This report describes the Dynamic Simulation validation test used to demonstrate that this objective has been achieved.
Using the Clinton Power Station simulator, the SPDS Dynamic Simulation Test.was to ocmonstrate, through direct " man-in-the-loop" simulation of potential plant transient / accident scenarios, that the SPDS design objectives related to critical safety function detection / resolution, subsequent execution of the symptomatic Emergency Operating Procedures, and the adequacy of the information displayed met the requirements of SPDS.
The demonstration was accomplished by assessing the performance of two main control room operator teams (of five individuals each) during transient accident scenarios where the SPDS was available and unavailable. Following the tests, the results were evaluated, and operator feedback was solicited and received from the operating teams.
The test results have been summarized in this report.
The SPDS validation test was designed to provide a relative measure of the effectiveness of SPDS in increasing operator response to and understanding of plant accident conditions. The SPDS has been determined to be significant in improving the operators' unoerstanding of plant status for the Clinton Power Station control room.
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Dynamic Simulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rcruits Raport Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 TABLE OF CONTENTS tn) v SECTION PAGE Abstract i Executive Summary 11 Table of Contents 111 Abbreviations and Acronyms viii
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1
. 1.1 Background 1 1.2 DST Objectives 2 1.3 DST Approach 3 2.D TEST HETHODOLOGY 4 2.1 Phase 1 - Test Development 4 y 2.1.1 Test Participants 4 2.1.2 Scenario Development Process 5 2.1.2.1 Scenario Complexity 7 2.1.3 Simulator Application 9 2.1.4 Eva,1uation Criteria 11 2.1.5 Evaluation Development 11 2.1.6 Human Factors Considerations 13 2.1.6.1 Operator Feedback Questionnaire 13 l 2.1.6.2 Human Factors Checksheet 14 2.2 Phase II - Test Preparation 15 l
2.2.1 Test Participants 16 2.2.1.1 Training Department 16 2.2.1.2 Verification and Validation Team 17 2.2.2 Scenario Dryruns 17 2.2.3 Data Gathering Forms and Equipment 18 2.2.4 Operator Training 22 2.2.5 Human Factors Considerations 23 i h)e G
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e Dynamic Simulation Docum2nt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985
-~s TABLE OF CONTENTS (con't) s-SECTION PAGE i 2.3 Phase III - Performance of Dynamic Simulation Test 24 2.3.1 Test Participants 24 2.3.1.1 Operators 24 2.3.1.2 Evaluators 25 2.3.2 Operator Brisfings 27 2.3.3 Test Readiness 27 2.3.3.1 Tewt Preparation 28 2.3.3.2 Scenario Preparation 28 2.3.4 Test Conduct 20 2.3.4.1 Test Scenario Descriptions 32 2.3.4.2 Scenario Walkthroughs 40 2.3.5 Operator Test Reviews 42 2.3.5.1 Scenario Critiques 42
()
2.3.5.2 Classroom Reviews 43 2.3.5.3 Operator Feedback Questionnaire 43 l 2.3.6 Human Factors Considerations 44 3.0 PilASE IV EVALUATION OF TEST REST'LTS 45 3.1 Simulator Response 45 3.2 SPDS Responses 46 3.3 Team Performance 53 3.3.1 Instructor Evaluations 53 3.3.2 Overall Performance Evaluatiens 57 3.3.3 Human Factorm Evaluationn 10 3.3.3.1 Operator Feedback Questionnaires 60 i
3.3.3.2 Human Factor Check Sheet 65 3.4 operator Comments 67 3.5 Results Summary 68
4.0 CONCLUSION
S 71
5.0 REFERENCES
72 Page tv
Dynamic Simulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Raoults Rsport Revision: 0
, Date: August 1985 TABLE OF CONTENTS (con't)
TABLES Table 2.3.4.1-1 Post-Accident Venting Preliminary Alarm Setpoint Limits .
Table 2.3.4.1-2 Secondary Containment / Radiological Release Walkthrough Instructor Intervention Guides ,
Table 3.3.1-1 Instructor Intervention Guides Final Score Comparison Chart Table 3.3.2-1 Team A - Overall Performance Evaluation Summary Table 3.3.2-2 Team B - Overall Performance Evaluation Summary Table 3.3.3.1-1 Operator Feedback Questionnaire Results Table 3.3.3.2-1 Number of Times Reactor Operator Called Out E0P
, Entry Conditions Table 3.3.3.2-2 Nunber of Times Reactor Operator Requested Information Table 3.3.3.2-3 Number of Times Reactor Operator Ca,11ed out Unsolicited Information Table 3.3.3.2-4 Number of Times Reactor Operater Answered Questions or Confirmed Information Table 3.3.3.2-5 Number of Communications Between Shift Supervisor and Other Team Members s
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Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 [
Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 TABLE OF CONTENTS (con't) ,
FIGURES Figure 2.3.4.1-1 Post-Accident Venting Walkthrough Procedure Figure 2.3.4.1-2 Secondary Containment / Radiological Release Walkthrough Procedurc e
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Dynamic Simulation Docum:nt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results.R: port Rzvision: 0 Date: August 1985
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (con't)
APPENDICSS A. Dynamic Simulation Test Plan B. SPDS Scenarios C. E0P Flow Charts D. Instructor Intervention Guides E. Dynamic Simulation Test Operating Team Response - Evaluation Form F. Procedure for Developing Final Scores and. Comparison Values G. Operator Questionnaire H. Human Factors Evaluation'Checksheet SPDS-DST I. Operating Training Package J. Dynamic Simulation Test Scenario - Positions for Observation Chart K. Dynamic Simulation Test Pre-Test Preparation Che'cklist L. Dynamic Simulation Test Results Data Sheet *
{j M. Dynamic Simulation Results Data N. Scenario Evaluation Results
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Dynamic Simulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rseults Raport Rsvision: 0 Date: August 1985 m
's_./) ABBREVIATICNS AND ACRONYMS A
ADS Automatic Depressurization System APRM Average Power Range Monitor ATWS Anticipated Transient Without Scram AUTO Automatic E.
BAF Bottom of Active Fuel BLDG Building
, BOP Balance of Plant l
BWR Boiling Water Reactor
- BWROG Boiling Water Reactor Owner's Group E
(q) C/D Cooldown CGCS Combustible Gas Control System CLG Cooling CNMT Containment CNTL Control
- CONDIT Condition cpm counts per minute CPS Clinton Power Station cps counts per second CRD Control Rod Drive CRT Cathode Ray Tube CSF Critical Safety Function (O
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Dynamic Simulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Raport Revision: 0 Date: August 1985
/'~'N ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS a
DBA Design Basis Accident DCS Display Control System DEG Degrees ,
DEGF Degrees Fahrenheit DC Diesel Generator DIV Division DST Dynamic Simulation Test DW Drywell E,
ECCS Emergency Core Coo, ling System EHC Electro-Hydraulic Control E0P Emergency Operating Procedure
"'S EPG Emergency Procedure Guideline 4
4
/ EVAC Evacuation i
F Fahrenheit ,
FB Fuel Building FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report FT Feet FW Feedwater FZ Fuel Zone E
GAL Gallon GDS Graphic Display System GE General Electric Company LJ Page ix 1
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Dyncaic Simulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002
- l. Test Results Report Revision: 0 .
Date:
j August 1985
- ( ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS f
H ,
1 i
- HFE Human Factors Engineering l HI High I
] HPCS High Pressure: Core Spray HR Hour !
~ H2 Hydrogen-H2-GAS Hydrogen
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IM Instrument Maintenance IN Inches !
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1 INIT Initial I t .
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INJ Injection .
IP Illinois Power Company r
IRM Intermediate Range Monitor j ISOL Isolation t
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K -;
3
- KV Kilo Volts i
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Dynamic Simulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revisign: 0 Date: August 1985 h ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS h
- LBM Pounds Mass LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident i
LP Low Pressure LPCI Low Pressure Core Injection j LVL Level i L2 Reactor Water Level 2
.j , L3 Reactor Water. Level 3 i L5 Reactor Water Level 5 L8 Reactor Water Level 8 ,
i M
MCR Main Control Room '
MDRFP Motor-driven Reactor Feedwater Pump j T MIN Minute MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve
{ MSL Main Steam Line i
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NR Narrow Range NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSED Nuclear Station Engineering Department NUREG Nuclear Regulation i
4 S
h OG Off-gas l
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Dynamic Simulation Docum2nt No: SPDS-DST-002 l Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 1 ;
P PRESS Pressure i PRI Primary PSIG Pounds Per Square Inch Gauge -
0 PWR Power l
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R Radiation RAD RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RCTY Reactivity REC Recorder ;
RECIRC Recirculation REG Regulation REQ'D Required RFP Reactor Feedwater Pump RHR Residual Heat Removal RHRA Residual Heat Removal Loop A >
RHRB Residual Heat Removal Loop B 4
RHRC Residual Heat Removal Loop C >
R0 Reactor Operator ROC Rate of Change. [
RPS Reactor Protection System RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel t RWCU- Reactor Water Clean-Up System .
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) RX Reactor' l i
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Dynt.mic Sinulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0
, Date: August 1985 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS S
S/D Shutdown SDV Scram Discharge Volume ,
SEC Second .
l SEN Sensor SGTS Standby Gas Treatment System SLCS Standby Liquid Control System .
SOE Sequence of Events SP Suppression Pool SPDS Safety Parameter Display System SRM Source Rang ~e Monitor .
SRV Safety Relief Valve j SS Shift Supervisor STA Shift Technical Advisor j
STM Steam S/U Start-Up SUPP Suppression ,
1 SUPV Supervisor
.T_
TAF " Top of Active" Fuel (refers to water level) I
. TDRFP Turbine Driven Reactor Feedwater Pumps TECH SPEC Technical Specification TEMP Temperature T-G Turbine-Generator. i 5.
- UCI Micro-Curies 1
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Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS X
VAC Vacuum ,
VAL Value VF Ventilation System - Fuel Building VLV Valve VP Ventilation System - Primary Containment
? VR Ventilation System - Reactor Building V&V Verification and Validation VX Ventilation System - Switchgear Heat Removal E
WR Wide Range WTR Water Y
1 a
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, Dynamic Si:tulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rasults Raport Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 a
- n.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The objective of the Clinton Power Station (CPS) Safety Parameter
- Display System (SPDS) is to provide a concise display of critical plant variables to the Main Control Room (MCR) operators and to aid them in rapidly and reliably assessing the safety status of the ,
j plant. The SPDS has been designed to meet the requirements of NUREG-0737, Supplement #1, using the guidance specified in NUREG-0800 " Standard Review Plan", Section 18.2.
The Dynamic Simulation Test Plan describes the purpose, scope, performance and evaluation methods for the SPDS Dynamic Simulation Test (DST). The DST was performed using the CPS simulator. This l testing was performed under the requirements of the SPDS -
- Verification and Validation (V&V) Program Plan, as approved for CPS. The DST Plan is included in Appendix A.
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The purpose of the SPDS DST was to demonstrate, through *
, " man-in-the-loop" simulations, that the performance objectives of 4 the SPDS have been met at CPS. This objective was fulfilled by
. running simulator scenarios and viewing operator responses both j . -
4 with and without SPDS.
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1.1 Background
- Subsequent to the incident at Three Mile Island, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued requirements related to the display of key parameters.via a Safety Parameter Display
, safety parameters which would aid the operators in quickly determining the safety statns of the plant and in the-mitigation of f
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Dynamic Simulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 -
Test'Rasults Report' Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 transients / accidents. CPS' implement'ed a design program which integrates the SPDS functions into the Main Control Room design (Nucienet). The SPDS design has been documented in the SPDS Requirements and Design Documents, References 10 and 11, respectively. The CPS.SPDS design'is intended to meet the '
4 requirements of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1. Illinois Power Letter U-60,0066, dated June 13, 1985, provided the NRC Staff with responses to remaining concerns associated with the design and implementation of the Clinton Power Station (CPS) Safety Parameter j Display System. In the CPS response to NRC General Comment #1, Illinois Power reiterated that dynamic simulation testing of the CPS SPDS would be performed. Subsequent to the above s'ubmittal, IP Letter U-600171 dated' July 9, 1985, submitted the Dynamic Simulation Test Plan. The DST results described herein evaluates - i
- the adequacy of the SPDS design-in terms of meeting the -
requirements of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1. This testing fulfills
- the objectives recommended by the NRC Staff during-i s the December 1984 SPDS Design Verification Audit. f 1.2 DST Objectives I
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The DST was developed to meet the-following objectives:
- a. Verify that the information presented on the four CPS f SPDS displays does.not preclude the MCR operator from i
j safely shutting down the plant;.
- b. Assess SPDS impact upon Main Control Room (MCR) personnel i in Critical Safety Function problem detection / resolution !
i and execution of the action steps specified in the CPS 1- Emergency Operating Procedures; i
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i c. Observe and evaluate the CPS-MCR staffing interaction I t
with the SPDS under dynamic plant conditions; .)
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Dynamic' Simulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date:- August 1985
- d. Evaluate-the relationship between the SPDS displayed information and information available elsewhere in the
- MCR and how the operators utilize this relationship; and 4
- e. Obtain operator feedback on the usefulness of the SPDS in performing emergency response actions in the MCR.
The results of this test were evaluated to ensure the test #
object 1ves were accomplished and analyzed for the usefulness of the SPDS.
1.3 DST Approach The Dynamic-Simulation Test Plan consists of four phases, as 1
l follows:
Test development DST preparation i
- DST-performance I j Test Results evaluation
- a. The Plan for the SPDS dynamic simula, tion testing involved four distinct phases. The preliminary phase involved the planning of the test by establishing the j - test plan, evaluation methodology, instructor invention
. guides, test scenarios, checklists, operator feedback -
- questionnaire, test results data sheet, and the equipment to be used for conducting the test.
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- b. The_second phase consisted of testing the scenarios on the CPS simulator. The second phase led to selecting scenarios to meet the criteria described in Section 2.1.4. In addition, the instructor. intervention guides i
were revised.
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t 5 Dynamic Simulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002
. Test Results Raport' Ravision: 0 Date:
August 1985
- c. The third phase of the DS.T involved conducting the test A according to the Test Plan contained in Appendix A.
- d. In the fourth phase, the test results including instructor intervention guides, overall team performance
~
analysis, and human factors considerations were evaluated, r
Section 2.0 describes the development, preparation and
- performance of the Dynamic Simulation Test. The evaluation of the test results is covered in Section 3.0.
2.0 TEST METHODOLOGY Additional information on methodology and the identificction of deviations from the Test Plan are described in this section.
2.1 Phase I - Test Development During the DST development phase, test participants and plant transient scenarios were selected, and evaluation criteria, evaluation methods and human factors analysis methodology were developed.
i 2.1.1 Test Participants j The Verification and Validation (V&V) Team assumed the
- principal role in developing the DST. Required information I was obtained from the Nuclear Training Department,' SPDS Program Management and SPDS simulator programmer. The V&V Team developed the Test Plan, DST scenarios, assigned test evaluators and participants, established evaluation criteria, and coordinated-the test. The test results evaluation and report preparation were the responsibility of the V&V Team.
In addition to the above participants, a Human Factors i . Specialist performed a review and evaluation of the development program.
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6 Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Tsst Results Raport Revision: 0
. Date: August 1985 2.1.2
, Scenario Development Process 7s The Boiling Water Reactor Graphics Display System (CDS) program developed by the BWR Owners' Group was used in 4
developing the DST scenarios. The Graphics Display System (Reference 15) program gathered many transients from various
- sources which covered a broad spectrum of events ranging from .
abnormal to edhrgency events. These included operational transients,'small break accidents, design basis accidents, stuck open relief valves, and Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS). The BWR Owners' Group transient selection process included screening the candidate transients against the following transient selection criteria:
l 1) Important to one or more of the BWR Safety Functions, i These are: Reactivity, Core Cooling, Coolant System Integrity, Containment Integrity and Radioactive Release.
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() 2) Involve operator actions which are assumed to follow plant operating procedures, and in case of emergencies, the emergency procedure guidelines.
Operator action can be categorized in three levels,of importance:
To prevent serious consequences.
To minimize challenges to emergency systems.
Operator interference, as well as monitor plant status, if needed, during complex scenarios.
- 3) Exercise the Graphics Display System The selected transients should exercise the Graphics Display System displays, and challenge the safety functions and their associated safety variables.
- 4) Can be simulated.
Simulator predictions of selected transients should reasonably represent actual plant operation, with no
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, erroneous initiations of systems unconnected with events.
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u Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 ,
] . The final Graphics Display System selection process reduced l the number of transients to twelve. The transients varied from abnormal to emergency events. The transients were I
. categorized into three levels of complexity. The categories were least complex, moderately complex and most complex. The transient complexity was measured in terms of the number of safety parameters influenced by the event, the rate of change in the values of the safety parameters, the degree to which the safety parameters approached their critical safety limits, and the number of operator actions dictated _by the plant operating procedures and the emergency procedure guidelines.
Based upon the BWR Owners' Group efforts, the V&V Team established a set of scenario selection criteria which is tailored to CPS specific requirements such as the symptom-oriented Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and :
simulator design. These criteria included all the consideration within the 4WR Owners' Group program, and are.
O- listed below:
- a. The scenarios shall result in at least one alarm actuation for each of the SPDS Critical Safety Functions (CSF). The CSF alarms require entry into the CPS E0Ps.
These CSFs include Level Control, Reactivity Control, Containment-Control, Radiation Control and H - Gas 2
Control. All CSFs with the exception of hydrogen gas will be exercised. The H gas E0P will not be exercised 2
since it is still under development and has not been approved by NRC.
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- b. Each of the CPS E0Ps shall be exercised extensively as possible. For portions of the event which are beyond the design basis and which the simulator cannot simulate, static walkthroughs shall be prepared and conducted.
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Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Rsport Revision: 0 Date: August 1985
- c. SPDS " invalid" data-indication shall be evaluated.
~('~s s~- d. Multiple equipment failure scenarios which evaluate operator contingency actions using the SPDS support displays shall be included.
- e. Scenario sequences shall be developed to include time-dependent operator actions using the SPDS support
- displays,
- f. Each scenario shall be selected on the basis that it can be simulated.
- g. The selected scenarios are categorized si'mple, moderate,
- or complex . There shall be two scenarios in each of
! these three categories. ,
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1 2.1.2.1 Scenario Complexity i
The DST development plan was to select the scenarios based
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I upon the criteria established using the GDS transients, CPS r Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR-Reference 18) Chapter 15
(,,)\ transients and engineering knowledge.
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- Scenario complexity was chosen to be as closely equal in terms
. of the number of safety parameters influenced by the events,
.; the rate of change in the values of the safety parameters,.the degree to which the safety parameters approach their critical
, safety limits, and the number of operator actions dictated by the Plant Operating Procedures and Emergency Operating l Procedures. Within a given scenario complexity level, the equality of the scenarios permitted the evaluators ,and instructors to grade the performance of the operating teams with the SPDS available and with the SPDS unavsilable to guide
- them through the scenarios. The performance of each team can be measured by the V&V team evaluators, the instructors, and I the Human Factors Specialist.
- The six candidate scenarios and their category of complexity I
j are detailed below:
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e Dyntmic Simulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rssults Raport Rsvision: 0 Date: August 1985 l l
-s Simple Scenarios - Defined as anticipated-to-abnormal plant sm. ) transients such as Main Steam Isolation Valve Closures and small instrument line breaks in the drywell. The scenarios i selected were j 1. Closure of all MSIVs followed by a small instrument line break in the DW.
- 2. Loss of drywell cooling following reactor isolation.
Moderate Scenarios - Defined as design basis accidents such as recirculation suction line breaks. The scenarios selected
., were: -
i 3. Recirculation suction line break with a loss of i Division II power. .
, 4. Inadvertent opening of a safety relief valve (stuck open) with a subsequent recirculation suction line !
break. +
Complex Scenarios - Defined as beyond design basis events.
The scenarios selected were:
- 5. Fuel cladding failure resulting in the closing of all MSIVs followed by ATWS.
l 6. Loss of offsite power with failures of DIV. I & III 4
The selected scenarios were reviewed by Nuclear Training -
+
Department representatives and the SPDS simulator programmer to assure that the scenarios could be implemented on the CPS s
Simulator. Scenarios 2, 5 and 6 were revised following the dryruns as described in Section 2.2.2.
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l The expected transient responses for each of the candidate scenarios were compared to the Emergency Operating Procedure steps to confirm that the scenarios selected followed the E0P
. paths as postulated. The paths taken throughout all of the-E0Ps were highlighted in the EOP flow charts to permit a 4
( fpictorial view of the E0P sections exercised. Each candidate scenario met the criteria established by the V6V team.
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Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rssults Raport Revision: 0 Date: August 1985
' /~ The Staff requested that several plant conditions should be
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considered as part of the Dynamic Simulation Testing. These were:
Reactor water level below the top of the active fuel, j Post-accident venting at pressures beyond containment
, design basis.
Off-site radiological release above alarm limits.
A decrease of reactor water level below the top-of-active fuel
, occurs in;several scenarios selected. Post-accident venting and off-site radiological releases were addressed by preparing two accident scenario walkthroughs. The post-accident venting procedure has been prepared and was used in the walkthrough, however, it is not currently implemented in the E0Ps.. The off-site radiological release above the alert level alarm limit are parts of the existing Radiological Release E0P.
These walkthrough scenarios are detailed in Appendix B.
2.1.3 Simulator Application The current design of the CPS simulator limited the direction i which certain scenarios could follow. Generally the design of the simulator malfunctions were restricted to the failure of a.
specific component or unit and the resulting effects.
l Accordingly, the CPS candidate scenarios selected do not match ,
the GDS transients exactly. The CPS candidate scenarios are
, listed below, together with its comparable BWR Owners' Group transient.
SCENARIO GDS Report (Reference 15) i
- 1. Closure of all MSlVs Scenario 4A ,
followed by a small in-i ,
s rument line break in the
- Dynamic Simulation Documsnt No
- SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Ravision: 0 Date: August 1985 SCENARIO GDS Report (Reference 15)
- 2. Loss of drywell cooling None following reactor isola- Similar to 3A tion.
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- 3. Recirculation suction line Scenario IB
! break with a loss of Divi-sion II power.
4 Inadvertent opening of SRV Scenario 2B
- with a subsequent recircu-l lation suction line break.
j 6. Loss of offsite power with Scenario 2C 4'
failures of Div I and III DGS
] (i.e. total SBO) -
The simulator malfunctions, initial conditions and subsequent failures were established and the E0P flow charts were marked up for the expected E0P path to be taken by the operators in each scenario. Typical simulator malfunctions and initial condition sheets illustrating the information provided to the
- simulator operator for performing the test are shown in Appendix B. A typical E0P flow chart used to develop the-sequence of events within the E0Ps.is contained in Appendix C.
4 With the selection of scenarios, simulator malfunctions, initial conditions, and E0Ps, the preparation for the dryrun of the scenarios could be started. Section 2.2 describes the 1
simulator dry run.
O
Dynamic Simulction Docum:nt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rasults R: port Rsvision: 0 Date: August 1985 7-x3 The simulator dryruns were required to confirm several items.'
_/ First, it was confirmed that the simulator inputs and malfunctions are correct for performing the chosen scenarios.
Second, it was confirmed that the sequence of events follow the prepared E0P flow charts. Third, it was confirmed that the operator actions are in accordance with the V&V Team's expectations. This was important for preparation of the Instructor Intervention Guides used during the DST. These guides are contained in Appendix D. Further details are discussed in Section 2.2.
2.1.4 Evaluation Criteria The development plan required that the operators' performance be evaluated by the V&V Team, Instructors and Human Factors Specialist. The Instructors Intervention Guides served as a checklist to measure the number of interventions required to keep the response of each operating team consistent throughout
()
each scenario. The Instructor Intervention Guides were designed to tally up the total number of interventions or assistances given by Instructors during each scenario.
The Operator Team response - Evaluation Form (Appendix E) was developed for the evaluators. The evaluators consisted of the V&V Team members (5), instructors (2) and the Human Factors Specialist. Each evaluator used the scenario evaluation criteria listed on the evaluation form. Following each scenario, the evaluators were to score the operating teams.
The Human Factors Specialist evaluation criteria are presented in Section 2.1.6.
2.1.5 Evaluation Development The operator response to the candidate scenarios were to be
/m\ evaluated (both with and without SPDS) to determine the
\- /
adequacy and usefulness of the SPDS. Test Plan, Section 3.6 j
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] proposed a rating range of 0.0 to 4.0 to be used by the d
instructors. The SPDS V&V team would assign the final rating based upon a review of the Instructor Intervention Guides, discussions with the instructors, and discussion with the Test Evaluators. The scenario package scores were to have been i
weighed according to their complexity. The above evaluation approach was modified due to the difficulty in assigning weighting factors.
The purpose of the modified evaluation program was to employ the instructors to evaluate the operators and provide the ratings for their performance. The human factors specialist
. evaluated the personnel interaction between operating team members (i.e., team work) and the operator respenses to the SPDS and MCR information (man-machine interaction). The V6V team members were assigned to observing and evaluating a specific operating team member according to his function. For n example, one V6V team member was assigned to* evaluating the d
shif t supervisor on the use of the E0Ps. Another member was assigned to evaluating the SPDS operator (Reactor Operator).
The final assignments of the V&V team members are described in 1
Section 2.2.1.
- The Instructor, V&V Team members and Human Factors Specialist evaluation sheet scores were to be equally weighed. The range and averages for each scenario were to be developed. The comparison of the with and without SPDS scores were to be compared and conclusions derived from the numerical value.
Operator performance biasing was to be factored out by having one operating team perform three scenarios without SPDS and three scenarios with SPDS. The three scenarios in the "without SPDS" category included one simple, one moderate and 4
one complex scenario. Additionally, the "with SPDS" category had one simple, one moderate and one complex scenario. The
Dynamic Simulation _ Document No: SPDS-DST-002
. Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 operating team roles were reversed by having one team perform the "without SPDS" group of scenarios and have the other team perform the same group of scenarios "with SPDS". The method of evaluating the test results is detailed in Appendix F.
2.1.6 Human Factors Considerations During test development two kinds of MCR operator performance techniques were developed .in addition to the Instructor Intervention Guides and the V&V Team's evaluation system.
These were an Operator Feedback Questionnaire and a Human
, Factors Check Sheet.
2.1.6.1 Operator Feedback Questionnaires An important part of the evaluation of the adequacy of SPDS during the DST is feedback from the operators after they have N had an opportunity to compare experiences on scenarios of different levels of complexity both with and without SPDS available. An Operator Feedback Questionnaire was developed
- to solicit the operators' responses.
The questionnaire was designed to solicit operator responses and comments in six different areas relating to the usefulness of SPDS and a seventh area concerning the operators' s judgements of the validity of the questionnaire itself.
The seven areas covered by the questionnaire are: Overall usefulness of the SPDS display, SPDS display design adequacy, display formats, relationships of SPDS indications to the E0Ps, specific information displayed, pictorial displays, and questionnaire validity. These seven areas correspond to the seven aspects of SPDS identified in the DST Plan as being important in terms of operator comments. The questionnaire is provided in Appendix G.
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Dynamic Simulation Docussnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Raoults Raport Rsvision: 0 Date: August 1985 2.1.6.2 Human Factors Check Sheet
, Several aspects of the MCR operators' performance during the DST are considered to be important in the overall evaluation i of the usefulness of the SPDS. These include the level and type of interaction of the R.O. with the SPDS displays, the ,
immediacy of the R.O.'s response to alarms on the SPDS, the
- R.O.'s interaction or time sharing between the SPDS and other
. r
.upon verbal communications among the control room team members.
A Human Factors Checksheet was developed to permit an observer to record the R.O.'s interactions with SPDS and the various i'
kinds of verbal communications between the R.O. and the other team members. The R.O.'s interaction with the SPDS displays ,
were to be noted separately for the summary display and the I g support displays in terms of his response to CSF alarms, ;
V non-CSF alarms, and parameter information. The notations were simply either "immediate" or " delayed". His interactions between SPDS and other control room displays and controls were f
to be recorded in terms of potential actions categorized on the checksheet as " ignored SPDS", " cross checked between SPDS I
and other displays," or " Fixated SPDS."
Verbal communications between the R.O. and other team members were to be recorded in terms of four categories. The first of I
these is the number of times the R.O. calls out E0P entry f conditions as a resuir of the occurrence of a CSF alarm on !
t SPDS. On the checksheet this category was labeled "give '
directions". Other categories of communications of '
significance include the R.O. requesting information from other team members, the R.O. answering questions or confirming information for other team members, and the R.O. giving f I
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6 Dynamic Staulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rasults Rsport Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 1
- "x unsolicited information to other team members. These categories were identified, respectively, on the check sheet. 6 as " request information," " answer / confirm," and "give information." -
4 The kinds of data to be recorded on the checksheet will partially meet two of the DST objectives identified in the Dynamic Simulation Test Plan, (Appendix A). These are:
4
- " Observe and evaluate the proposed CPS MCR staffing interaction with the SPDS under dynamic plant conditions," and I
j " Evaluate the relationship between the SPDS l- displayed information and information available i
elsewhere in the MCR and how the operators utilize i . this relationship."
- The Human Factors Check Sheet is provided in Appendix H.
- 2.2. Phase II - Test Preparation I
j During the test preparation phase of the DST, test participants were trained, scenario dryruns were completed, I
scenarios were finalized, data gathering equipment was acquired and tested and operator training lesson plans were i
- prepared.
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Dynamic Simulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Razults Rsport Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 2.2.1 Test Participants 4'
During the DST preparation phase, participants from four '
different organizations were involved in providing the expertise and direction necessary to accomplish the Dynamic Simulation Test. The four organizations included:
i IP Training Department including Training Specialists, Simulator Programmers and Instructors.
IP/Baldwin Associates audio-visual Technicians and Cameramen. .
Verification and Validation Team.
IP/NSED Computer Engineering.
! i 2.2.1.1 Training Department The Training Department was responsibic for all technical q '
training provided to the CPS Operators, both in the classroom and on the simulator. For the Dynamic Simulation Test, the
- Director of Training identified the Operator candidates who l
.i 1
would be qualified to man the Control Room, assigned Training Specialists who would develop classroom materials and j participate in simulator training exercises. He also provided j competent instructors to participate in'the development of realistic scenarios which would thoroughly test the Operators responses, both with SPDS and without SPDS.
The Training Specialists developed the Operator training l programs for SPDS, participated in validating the scenarios during the dry run phase and helped to conduct the SPDS simulator training program for the Operators.
It was determined that the actual Dynamic Simulation Test
~
should be videotap,ed and voice-recorded to capture as much of i -
the test data as possible. During the scenario dryruns. .
provisions were made to bring a video camera into the
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Dynamic Simulation Docum:nt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rssults R& port Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 (3 simulator to confirm that the Test could be adequately
(,e) recorded, to determine how many cameras would be needed, and where they should be positioned to monitor the Operating Team's actions. It was concluded that two video recorders j would be adequate to provide coverage of the SPDS display and the Team interactions among panels P601, P800 and P801.
- 2.2.1.2 Verification and Validation Team 9 Numerous meetings were held at the site,to develop the necessary scenarios and to determine how to evaluate the Operating Team's responses. The scenarios were pre-tested in practice sessions, called dryruns, to validate them. Members of the V&V Team were assigned evaluator roles for the actual Dynamic Simulation Test. Each V6V Team member generated various documents which would be used during the Test to monitor the SPDS performance and to gauge the associated
- Operator responses.
2.2.2 Scenario Dryruns The purposes of the scenario dryruns were to confirm the ability of the Simulator to perform the selected scenarios, confirm that the sequence of events followed the prepared E0P procedural steps as predicted by the V6V team, and prepare the Instructor Intervention Guides using the sequence of events in each scenario.
The scenario dryruns were performed on July 20 and 26, 1985.
The dryruns were performed at the CPS Simulator with the assistance of Nuclear Training Department personnel. Each scenario (1 through 6) was run several times to obtain all the necessar'/ information to finalize the simulator malfunctions, initial conditions, and E0P flow charts.
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Dynenic Simulction Docun:nt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rscults Rsport Revision: 0 Date: August 1985
' N Scenarios 5 and 6 were modified for various reasons. Scenario 5 was changed such that a manual scram could not be performed by the operators. This change forced the operator to use the SLCS to shutdown the reactor. The revised scenario was re-run several times on July 26, 1985, to obtain the sequence of events.
Scenario 6, a full station blackout resulted in power failure to the SPDS displays and therefore was not useful to the DST.
Therefore, a new scenario was selected. Scenario 6 became a
" Loss of feed water with failure of all high pressure makeup systems." (GDS transient IC). A dryrun of the new scenario 6 was conducted on July 26, 1985, to obtain the necessary information to prepare the Instructor Intervention Guide.
Appendix B contains the scenario summary descriptions, initial conditions and simulator malfunctions for the final selected
- f scenarios.
2.2.3 Data Gathering Forms and Equipment The Verification and Validation Team used various equipment during the Test preparation phase, to gather and preserve the test data to support the test evaluations. The following equipment was tried during the scenario dryruns and proven to be useful for test data collection:
(a) Clocks - Several V&V team members used portable clocks and a stopwatch to monitor the approximate scenario intervals between significant events and operator responses. The time information was subsequently factored into the expected response times shown on the Instructor Intervention Guides.
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'N (b) Video Tape Cameras - Two video tape cameras with recorders were used during the DST based on observations made during the test preparation phase. The scenario dry runs indicated that it would be useful to record the SPDS display changes on the #5 CRT and the movements of the operating team as they responded to the scenario events.
The Audio / Visual Technician subsequently arranged for camera tripods to support the ccmeras, sufficient video tape cassettes to record all six scenarios for both Operating Teams, lighting equipment to optimize video recording, microphones to record intra-team communications, and video monitors to play back the video and audio records. Camera locations are shown on the
" Positions for Observation Chart" in Appendix J.
(c) Strip Chart Recorders - A List of the six most
, significant process parameters which should be recorded was prepared during the dryruns. These are included on the Dynamic Simulation Test Checklists in Appendix L.
This list tabulated the parameter names, process ranges, recorder pen numbers, pen ink colors and the simulator computer identification numbers for each scenario. Two three-pen continuous strip chart recorders, permanently
~
mounted on the Nuclenet panel, were used to record the
, six selected parameters during each scenario.
(d) E0P Flow Charts - During the test preparation phase copies of the E0P Flow Charts were marked to record the Operating Team anticipated responses to the scenario-events. These marked E0P Flow Charts became the basis for evaluating the Operating Team's responses during the actual DST and were used to establish the Instructor Intervention guides. One master Flow Chart was prepared thereby documenting which E0P paths and what quantity of
, ()
E0P decision points were exercised during the DST. These flow charts are provided in Appendix C.
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_ . _ - _ _ . - _ . . . _ __ _. . _ ~ . _.. . . _. ..___ _ _ _ . . . . _
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!_ N (e) Pre-Test Preparation. Checklist - The Scenario dryruns indicated that there were many initial conditions and test variables which had to 'tue checked, reset, initialized or established to enable accurate testing.
' ~
The Pre-Test Preparation Checklist set out in Appendix K evolved from the necessity to ensure that all the initial l
t conditions and test variables were controlled properly
- and to check all the data gathering equipment, before j running each scenario. ,
i I
j (f) Positions for Observation Chart - A chart of the j Nuclenet operating area was made to show the
] relative locations of the main control panels, the j
] Operating Team, the instructors and evaluators, and ,
the data gathering equipment to be used for the DST. I
{ The " Positions for Observation Chart" is contained in
- Appendix J. .
i
~
This Chart also depicts the video camera locations and i their viewing areas, the microphone locations, the 1
instructors and Operating Team general paths of movement
' i and work stations, including the Simulator Programmer, !
the Audio / Visual Technician and the cameramen who l
a remained outside the main operating area.
The positions of each of the V&V Team evaluators is designated on the Positions for Observation Chart.using his initials. t I
4 4
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{
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(g) Human Factors Checksheet - Certain V&V Team evaluators used the Human Factors Checksheet to record the raw data concerning the Operating Team's interface with the SPDS, the Team's intra-communications and their relative movements to be used for the DST. A copy of the ,
" Human Factors Evaluation Checksheet" is included in Appendix H of the report.
(h) Instructor Intervention Guides - The format of the Instructor Inte'rvention Guides included the E0P entry conditions and the sequence of events for various plant process variable conditions during which the operator would take action. In addition, these guides identify expected operator actions and the corresponding intervention point for each step.These guides were developed for the instructors to record instances where guidance was given to the operating teams. The Instructor Intervention Guides for each of the six 1
.i scenarios are included in Appendix D.
Each of the two instructors completed his own copy of the Instructor Intervention Guide for each scenario and each
, team.
(1) Operator Team Response Evaluation Form - The V&V Team developed an Operator Team Response Evaluation Form.
This form gathers evaluation ratings from each V&V Team member regarding how well the Operating Team performed during each scenario. The final ratings will be based i
upon a review of the Instructor Intervention Guides, and i
discussions with the instructors, operators and the other test evaluators. The data from these Evaluation Forms is further reduced as described in Paragraph 3.3.2, entitled "Overall Performance Evaluations".- These forms are provided in Appendix E.
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Dynamic Simulation Doc'umsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rasults Raport Revision: 0 Date: August 1985
/N (j) Operator Feedback Questionnaires - The Human Factors
\,^
~
Specialist developed an " Operator Feedback Questionnaire" based on his knowledge of the DST and experiences during the Test preparation phase. For further discu'ssion of the use of the Operator Feedback Questionnaire, refer to paragraph 2.3.5.3 of this Report.
This form is provided in Appendix G.
i i
2.2.4 Operator Training The Plant Operators selected to perform the DST, received classroom and simulator training design and operation of SPDS.
The V&V Team reviewed the lesson plan,s, before the SPDS j training was conducted and thus ensured that the appropriate objectives were met.
, The Operator SPDS Training classes familiarized the operators
(- s with the four SPDS CRT display formats and how the Critical
\s./ Safety Function alarms signal that E0P entry conditions have been met. Other training topics included the sensor and data validation schemes, ATWS, SCRAM and neutron trip indications; SPDS alarm sequences, how to select an SPDS display on other 3 MCR CRTs, and the rate of change information available on the primary display.
Following the SPDS classroom training, the Plant Operators were given a demonstration of how SPDS functioned on the simulator. Part of the simulator training included practice scenarios with SPDS available. Throughout the training sessions, questions and answers were freely exchanged. The operator training package is included as Appendix I.
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Dynamic Simulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002
. Test R2sults Raport' Ravision: 0 Date: August 1985 2.2.5 ' Human Factors Considerations C
The primary purposes of the preliminary dynamic simulation testing were to evaluate the feasibility of the appropriateness of the scenarios and the usefulness of control
, room operator performance measures.
The preliminary simulator test served as a training period for the testing team. It also provided an opportunity to make some important observations of various human factors aspects of the overall test planning and conduct. Specifically, the preliminary test provided an early indication of how an
- operator might use SPDS during the course of different kinds of event scenarios and of how useful SPDS might be as an adjunct to Nuclenet displays. Observation of the operators during their interaction with SPDS and their comments during debriefings indicated that the CPS SPDS is effective as a means of informing operators of the overall status of the v plant in terms both of the critical safety functions and of significant individual parameters. It became apparent as successively more complex scenarios were simulated, that the operator was using the compact presentation of relevant 4
parameters to obtain and/or reinforce his assessment of overall plant condition as well as to make diagnoses of specific events. Specific observations confirm that the decision to display the CSF boxes on all of'the Nuclenet CRTs was a good one. These displays provide 15 mediate informarion about E0P entry conditions easily visible to all control room personnel. The operator responsibic for the SPDS made appropriate selection of support displays following CSF-alarms. Beginning with sce w ic No. 5 (the first of the complex scenarios) the (Y'au or opent considerably more time
. studying the informt9.I'+ be ?DS support displays than he had J'
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IT- with the simple and moderately. complex scenarios. Several times he was observed to consult SPDS and then move to the 3 core cooling displays and panels. Alternately, he would scan '
his regular Nuclenet'and control board displays and then
, return to SPDS support. displays to confirm and integrate information. SPD$ may be much more useful to the operator for *
)- ' obtaining.an integrated understanding of a complex event sequence than for simple events. ,
i.
2.3 Phase III - Performance of Dynamic Simulation Test 1
I In the test performance section, the test participants, the
, make up of the plant operating teams,-the evaluators and their functions, and'the. instructors' functions are identified. In-addition, operator briefings,. test preparations, test' conduct, i and a description of the test scenarios /walkthroughs are
'i provided. Finally, the scenario critiques, classroom reviews,
+
operator feedback questionnaires-and the-Human Factors Checksheet are described. 1
^ 3.1
. Test Participants 1
The test participants comprised the team of operators'and the j evaluation team who gathered data from the test.
l' ,
- , 2.3.1.1 Operators
[. The Plant Operations Department'and Plant Technical Staff ,
, provided two groups pf~ operators designated as Team A and Team B. 'Each. team comprised trained personnel including:
One (1) certified Reactor Operator; One (1) certified Senior Reactor Operator;
, Two (2)- Shif t/ Control' Room Supervisor (SRO certified);
and One (1)-Shift Technical Advisor 4
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Dyncaic Sinulttion Docusant No: SPDS-DST-002 Tast Rasults Rsport R* vision: 0
. Date: August ~1985 7-~ This represents the expected manning level for the CPS MCR
\ _,) during emergency plant operation.
2.3.1.2 Evaluators
?
Normal control room operation was simulated with phone calls to and from the control room regarding plant status, maintenance requests, and dispatcher contact directly affecting each scenario.
The instructors monitored progress through the transient using the Instructor Intervention Guides to ensure each scenario followed the planned plant conditions.
- They intervened as required,to ensure that each team took the required action, without specified time periods.
The evaluators monitored control room operation with SPDS available and with SPDS unavailable. This included:
(
Entering and using the E0Ps.
Monitoring indication and color changes on the SPDS summary and support displays, and the use made of this information.
Monitoring of other control room indications.
Actions taken to minimize the effects of the plant transient and to return the plant to normal operation.
Intra-team communications.
Analysis of the transient and plant conditions throughout each scenario.
The effect of using SPDS on overall performance of the Operating Team, b\
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Dynamic Simulation Docuzant No: SPDS-DST-002 Test R: cults R: port R: vision: 0 Date:
- August 1985
-~s The test evaluators have recorded notes on Operator Team i
'N ,) Response Evaluation Form during the running of each scenario. At the conclusion of each scenario, and prior to proceeding to the next scenario, the evaluators rated the team performance based upon the Evaluation guides
, provided on this form and discussed in Section 3.3.2. The V&V Team personnel, the Nuclear Training Department Instructors, and the Human Factors Specialist, that participated in the test, performed this evaluation.
The bulk of these evaluations were performed immediately after the DST was completed to maximize the validity of the conclusions reached. The final eva'luation of the scenario ratings was completed by the SPDS V&V Team.
These ratings were recorded for further evaluation of the test results.
The DST evaluators included the following personnel:
fm)
'w/
V&V Team Personnel T. L. Riley - V&V Project Manager Licensing Project Engineer T. Y. Fukushima - Consultant SPDS V%V/ Design Background (S. Levy Inc.) Human Factors for SPDS Plant Systems Background Computer Systems Background Dr. C. O. Hopkins - Consultant V&V Human Factors (University of Illinois) Human Factors Background Plant Systems Background A. E. Moersfelder - Consultant V6V Program Manager (CYGNA Energy Services) Computer Systems Background Plant Systems Background R. B. Porter - Consultant V&V Project Engineer (CYGNA Energy Services) Computer Systems Background Plant Systems Background
[~ j P. J. Telthorst - Licensing Project Engineer SPDS Human Factors Plant Systems Background
6 Dynamic Simuletion Docum:nt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Raport Rsvision: 0
. Date: August 1985 Nuclear Training Department V
The Nuclear Training Department provided two (2) instructors knowledgeable in the operation of the CPS Simulator, Plant Systems, Emergency Operating Procedures, and the SPDS.
2.3.2 Operator Briefings ,
The V&V Team program manager briefed each operat1ng team on the activities to ba completed during the DST, post-test debriefing and evaluation. He introduced the evaluation team to the operating team, describing the role of each person and his location in the control room. He described the scenarios to be controlled including quantity, complexity, length, and
, sequence of simulation. Operating Team response actions would i
be evaluated with respect to the usefulness of the SPDS under the postulated plant conditions. ,
j The types of data which would be gathered and the process of analyses from which results would be derived were identified.
The events for each scenario were outlined, which included:
Setting up the scenario in the simulator and evaluator
~
team preparation.
Explanation to the operating team of the initial plant conditions for each scenario.
The evaluator team prepared to run the tests and evaluate the results by insuring all required documentation was available.
2.3.3 Test Readiness The test readiness was ensured through the preparation ,
I activities described below.
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Dynamic Simulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Tszt Rasults Raport Revision: 0 i Date: August 1985
- .s 2.3.3.1 Test Preparation (G)
The evaluator team prepared for the test by setting up 2 video cameras for the planned viewing areas. One video monitor was setup in a classroom for post-test viewing and debriefing.
Audio recording was setup and checked as part of this phase.
One stop watch was available to time selected events.
2.3.3.2 Scenario Preparation
, At the beginning of each scenario, the evaluation team completed several" actions for test readiness, including:
Programmed into the trend recorders'the six process poigts to be trended with their planned ranges. Refer to Appendix B.
Reset the simulator.
Programmed into the simulator the plant initial conditions and scenario transient conditions at the O)
( , correct time throughout the scenario.
Checked that sufficient trend chart paper was available in each recorder.
~
, Marked each chart with " Start", scenario number, run number, team letter, initial time and date; and turned on the chart drives to a speed of 1" per minute. At the end of the run, the chart drives were shut off and the charts were marked "End", scenario number, run number, completion time and date.
Confirmed that a new video tape was in each recorder.
checked the view and focus and turned on each camera and recorder.
Confirmed that the cassette sound recorders had sufficient tape and turned them on, noting the scenario number, run number, team letter, initial time and date.
The Dynamic Simulation Test Checklist which was used for each g'} scenario is shown in Appendix K.
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_ 2.3.4 Test Conduct The routine for conduct of the SPDS DST was established prior to the performance of the test. A basic outline of this test
- conduct was provided in the SPDS DST Test Plan (see Appendix I
A). .
i The composition of the operating teams and test participants is described in Section 2.3.1. Each operating team consisted of 5 personnel representative of the expected MCR manning *
. under transient / accident conditions.
The performance of each scenario included a pre-test briefing given by the Drill Leader to the on-shift operating team. In i
some instances this pre-test briefing identified special evolutions that were to take place during the on-shift duty
, cycle (e.g. SRV testing and RCIC full-flow testing). For each
( scenario, the plant initial conditions were also specified.
At the completion of this pre-test briefing, the operating team was questioned to ensure their readiness to commence the scenario. Then the simulator was taken out of " freeze" and the data gathering commenced. Typically, a two to six minute time period was then allowed for purposes of operator familiarization with Main Control Room (MCR) status and indications. Following this initial time period, the actual scenario " events" would commence.
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,f~s( During each scenario the basic operator team response and (s / operational philosophy was observed and data was collected.
The following typical categories were used by the V&V Team to monitor the response of each team for each scenario:
- 1. Operator responsibilities
- 2. Use of the E0Ps .
- 3. C6mmunications 4 Understanding of plant conditions
- 5. Overall team coordination These categories were used later in the evaluations to determine the usefulness of SPDS ( See Section 3.0).
The V&V Team Chairman participated as the Drill Leader.
Problems identified during the course of each scenario were 1 reported to the Drill Leader for resolution. This ensured a central focus of attention to allow each scenario to progress smoothly. .
Each of the two instructors utilized the " Instructor
- Intervention Guides" (see Appendix D) to monitor, the Operating Team's response during the scenario. If required actions were not taken by the team within pre-specified time intervals, a guidance was given by the instructors to the operating team to ensure each scenario progressed as planned. Some operator ,
action points specified on these guides were not required in those cases were plant conditions did not develop as anticipated. Typically, this occurred when the operating team responded quickly to impending conditions, i
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Dynamic Simulction Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Ts2t R:culta R; port Rsvision: 0 Date: August 1985 r' Each evaluator on the V&V Team also monitored the operating
\_ / team's response during the scenario. Specific functions were pre-assigned to the evaluation team, as follows:
- 1. One evaluator (Drill Leader) monitored the overall response;
- 2. One evaluator monitored the SPDS display indications;
- 3. One evaluator monitored the communications received and given by the NUCLENET Operator (SPDS user);
- 4. One evaluator monitored the communications received and given by the shift supervisor (this included interactions with the E0Ps)
- 5. One evaluator monitored the Operating Team's use of plant systems; and
- 6. One evaluator, the Human Factors Specialist, monitored the Human Factor Engineering of the SPDS and the Operating Team's response.
Each evaluator then graded the response of the operating team l',,)
( ,j (from his individu"a'l perspective noted above) at the conclusion of each scenario.
Each Operating Team received a total of 6 scenarios (See Sections 2.1.2, 2.2.2, and 3.1 for descriptions of each scenario). The same 6 scenarios were used on each team for purposes of test consistency. Of the 6 scenarios, 3 were run with SPDS available (one simple, one moderate, and one complex) and 3 were run without SPDS available (one simple, one moderate, and one complex). The V&V evaluators gathered data for each scenario so that later comparisons could be made. The simulator run time for each scenario varied but was approximately 30 minutes. The operating team was notified by the instructors and Drill Leader once the scenario was terminated (Simulator placed in " freeze"). Each scenario was terminated once stable plant conditions were achieved.
m Overall, the simulator scenario runs took approximately 5.6
( ) hours to complete.
% J' -
6 DynrCic Simulction Docu2;nt No: SPDS-DST-002 Ts:t R2culto R port Ravicion: 0 Date: August 1985 f- 3 2.3.4.1 Test Scenario Descriptions
( )
v This subsection provides a description of each of the six scenarios used in the Dynamic Simulation Test of SPDS. The basie operator actions taken to control Critical Safety ,
Function parameters are also described. Appendix B provides the following related material:
Summary of SPDS Scenarios Simulator Initial Conditions and 9 Malfunctions List (for each scenario).
Graphic pre,sentation of each parameter recorded from the Strip Chart Trend Recorders.
Trend Recorder Pen Assignment Summary.
Trend Recorder Parameter Data Tables.
Scenario 1 - Small leak in the Drywell following a
_, reactor isolation event (GDS Event 4A).
! )
v This transient scenario is one of the two scenarios classified as " simple" in complexity level. This. type of scenario is primarily influenced by the initiating simulator malfunction. .
This scenario is characterized by an inadvertent isolation of the four main steam lines (one MSIV in each line) followed by an automatic scram, and a subsequent loss of FW flow. The motor driven Reactor feedwater pump (MDRFP) is not operative due to an intentionally inserted simulator malfunction which results in a pump trip upon demand. Operator attempts to restart the MDRFP will result in a failure of the pump to stay running.
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1 1
Dynamic Simultticn Docunant N2: SPDS-DST-002 Tsot R3:ults R pert Rsvision: 0 Date: August 1985 p,_ Operator action during this scenario is to control the RPV
( ) Water' Level between Levels L3 and L8 using the high pressure v
core cooling equipment (RCIC and HPCS). The small instrument line break in the DW was expected to raise DW temperature above the E0P entry condition (135'F). However, during the conduct of the DST, only a small rise in DW temperature was experienced. As a result, one train of DW Cooling was tripped to cause temperature to rise an additional amount. SRV cycling was controlled to maintain RPV pressure below 960 psig.
The small instrument line break resulted in invalid .
indications of RPV Water Level (wide range) and RPV Pressure ,
on the SPDS Support displays. The operators recognized this and confirmed actual level and pressure using other Main Control Room indications.
Suppression Pool Temperature was the only remaining Containment
[} control parameter of concern. The pool temperature rises due to SRV cycling, and the operator action is to place the RHR in the pool cooling mode. Eventually RPV depressurization and cooldown would be required to allow DW entry to fix the leak.
Scenario 2 - Loss of DW Cooling following a reactor isolation event.
This transient scenario is one of the two scenarios which are classified as " simple" in terms of degree of complexity. This type of scenario is primarily influenced by the initiating simulator malfunction. However, in this scenario, the loss of DW Cooling adds additional complication compared to Scenario 1 because more operator actions are required to control DW environmental conditions. This scenario is similar, in terms of the over-all plant response, to Scenario 1 (e.g. in both cases a reactor isolation condition reaults).
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Dynamic Simulction Docur:nt No: SPDS-DST-002 Tcat Rsculta R: port R: vision 0 Date: August 1985 This scenario is characterized by a Turbine Generator trip due O
h to an amphenol connector failure followed by a Turbine Stop Valve closure and an automatic ecram. A FW runback occurs and operator actions to control RPV Water level focus initially on the use of the TDRFPs and the MDRFP. If RlV Water Level drops below L2, is not recovered quickly, and the valve group
< isolation signals are not reset in a timely manner, then a loss of instrument air to the inboard MSIVs could occur,
, resulting in loss of TDRFPs. Alternatively, if RPV Water Level is recovered too quickly and exceeds L8, then the TDRFPs j v'ill be lost on the L8 auto-trip signal. High pressure core cooling is available as needed.
i l
In any case, the Main Condenser is not available as a heat sink due to the failed closed Turbine Bypass Valves (loss of EHC Hydraulics). As a consequence of the loss of the Main l Condenser, some SRV cycling occurs to relieve RPV Pressure.
j The rising Suppression Pool Temperature that results requires j the operator to place RHR in the Pool Cooling mode.
The loss of DW Cooling in this scenario leads to a rapid rise in DW Temperature and Pressure. Operator actions to recover I DW Cooling will, of course, fail and DW Pressure ultimately I exceeds the high pressure ~ (1.68 psig) trip. The operator starts the CGCS Purge Compressors to attempt to control DW Pressure per the E0Ps. The 2 psig pressure results in an MSlV closure (if not already isolated by the inboards as describ~ed above) and actuation of emergency core cooling systems. This complicates operator action to control Suppression Pool Temperature since RHR shifts to the LPCl mode and a 10 minute interlock on the RHR. heat exchanger bypass valves prevents an immediate return to the Pool Cooling mode of RHR.
Operator actions are required, as needed, to control Containment Pressure below 3 psig using the SGTS.
, .. - , - - -a - r.-.--,-, ,..,.,.,-,,,--en, . - - - , - - - - - - , , - -
Dynamic Simuletion Docu a nt Noi SPDS-DST-002 Tsst Rzsults Rsport Rsvision: 0 Date: August 1985 Eventually a controlled RPV depressuri$ation and cool-down O would be required to allow DW entry to fix the DW Cooling problems.
1 Scenario 3 - Recirculation Suction Line Break with Loss l of Division II Power (GDS Event IB)
, This transient scenario is one of the two scenarios which are ,
classified as " moderate" in complexity level. This scenario involves a design basis c.:cident where a double-ended guillotine rupture of the Recirculation Suction Line is postulated to occur. Such events are characterized by a large rate of change in several plant safety parameters. Early in this event operator action focuses mainly on monitoring the actuation of the reactor protection system (i.e., automatic
, scram) and the initiation of Emergency Core Cooling System l (ECCS) equipment.
As a direct result of the rapid reactor blowdown through the line break, RPV Water Level drops off-scale low below the Bottom of Active Fuel (BAF). The operator verifies automatic actuation of the HPCS and RCIC systems. RPV Water Level is confirmed to recover within the Fuel Zone Range instrument j [i.e., above Top of Active Fuel (TAF)] due to the operation of these systems and the additional makeup water provided by '
LPCS. All three LPCl (RHR/A, B, and C) pumps are unavailable initially since RHR/A is out of service and RHR/B&C fail to start on a loss of Division II 4.16 KV power. Eventually RCIC
- isolates on low Steamline Pressure (about 50 psig). This loss of RCIC is not significant to RPV flooding and level restoration actions since HPCS and LPCS are capable of maintaining RPV indicated Water Level well above TAF.
i Initially in this scenario, operator actions to control
- Containment /Drywell parameters are futile since there is no i
RHR decay heat removal capability and DW Cooling and x .
- , . - , - , , .r _
, - - - + , . , , ,_,,.n e.,,e. , , , - , . - - - - , - - , - - - - -
Dynamic Simulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Tsot R2sults R: port R: vision: 0 Date: August.1985 Containment /Drywell ventilation systems all isolate on the RPV low water level and DW high pressure signals present. One train of the CGCS purge compressors (Train A) remains to provide some small value in controlling DW Pressure.
Ultimately (@ t=20 minutes following the DBA Recirculation Suction Line Break), RHR/B&C is restored by actions to recover
'the Division II 4.16 KV bus. This allows actions to complete RPV Flooding and Level Restoration E0P Contingencies.
Eventually, RHR/B is placed in the Suppression Pool Cooling Mode of operation to control any approach to pool Heat Capacity Temperature Limits.
Finally, high pressure ECCS suction will switch from the RCIC Storage Tank to the Suppre,ssion Pool. As a result, Suppression Pool Water Level ultimately drops below the low-low setpoint (due to ECCS drawdown) and the Upper Pool Dump actuates.
Scenario 4 - Inadvertent Opening of an SRV with a Subsequent Recirculation Suction Line Break This transient scenario is one of the two scenarios which are classified as " moderate" in complexity level.
In this scenario, the plant is initially at power with SRV testing in progress. The operators are instructed that through use of a special test procedure they are to open one SRV at a time, for one minute each, and monitor Suppression Pool Temperature. The use of the RHR Pool Cooling mode is specifically prohibited by the test procedure so that the rate of change of pool temperature can be more accurately measured.
When the Suppression Pool Temperature reaches 105'F the test is to be terminated and the plant restored to normal power operation.
v
. ~ ~ . . _ . - . _ - . .. -. . . .. =._ - . . ..
Dynamic Simulation , Document No: SPDS-DST-002 i Toot Rssulta Raport R visiont 0 Date: August 1915 i' !
Following completion of the special SRV test, the scenario transient begins with an inadvertent opening of an SRV. This SRV then sticks open. Operator actions taken involve repeated attempts to close the stuck open SRV, monitoring Suppression
] Pool Temperature and eventually manual reactor scram when temperature reaches the 110*F Technical Specification limit or after two minutes, whichever occurs fitst.
i
- i. :
) At about the same time the Shift Supervisor inserts a manual i
4 reactor scram, a-design basis accident double-ended guillotine l
rupture of the Recirculation Suction Line is postulated to j occur. As with Scenario 3, this event is characterized by a ;
large rate of change in several plant safety' parameters. f l I Operator actions to restore and maintain RPV Water Level,
{ subsequent to the line break, are nearly identical to those I
discussed in Scenario 3. However, in this particular i scenario, these actions are generally quicker and more successful due to the availability of RHR (LPCI/A B. and C).
Actions performed by the operator to control Drywell/
Containment parameters are essentially the same as discussed i in Scenario 3. The higher initial Suppression Pool i
Temperature, due to SRV testing, and the availability of the RHR system results in the use of the Pool Cooling mode of l operation sooner in this scenario.
. c 1 Scenario 5 - Failure to Scram with Turbine Generator Trip following Scram Discharge Volume Isolation.
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j, Dynamic Si:: ult. tion Docu=nt No: SPDS-DST-002
- Test Raults Rcport Rsvision: 0 1
Date: August 1985 i
This transient scenario is one of the two scenarios classified !
( as " complex". For each of these scenarios, multiple j malfunctions, postulated to occur initially or sequentially,
- could result in plant degraded conditions unless timely
- corrective actions are taken by the operators. For this case, j- . all E0Ps related to level, pressure, reactivity, and containment control are implemented simultaneously. !
e s The initiating events for this scenario involve an isolation t for the SDV. Two control rods are postulated to-have leaking scram valves. This is identified by the Reactor Operator via the " Rod Drift Alarm" on the NUCLENET Console. Concurrent with this alarm, a "SDV Not Drained" alarm occurs as a result j of the rising water level in the SDV due to the leaky scram i j valves. The operator then identifies the affected Control i
Rods by monitoring control rod notch position indication (initially all Control Rods are full out at notch 48 due to a '
end-of-core life coastdown condition). Minor fluctuations in j Reactor Power also occur.
Additional alarms occur as SDV Water Level continues-to rise.
l Prior to reaching the required reactor scram level, CRD Pump A ,
(operating) fails. The operator action is to attempt a start I
of CRD Pump B, which also fails. At this time, operator
- attempts to manually scram the reactor fails (planned l simulator malfunction). The Shif t Supervisor then directs an Auxiliary Operator to go and m'anually open the RPS breakers.
Ultimately the SDV fills to the scram level and an automatic-
, scram failure occurs.
4
- i Conditions requiring Boron injection (high Suppression Pool !
l Temperature and Reactor Power above 3%) will result in a j . lowering of RPV Water Level during SLCS operation. HPCS is L s
inoperative and level is controlled by the operators using RCIC and feedwater. t a
2 6
Dynamic Simuletion Docunsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Tsat R3 ulto Rsport R: vision: 0 Date: August 1985 g-~s Containment conditions of concern relate to temperatures in i \
\__/ the Suppression Pool and Containment atmosphere. Available Containment and Drywell HVAC is utilized to control environmental conditions. When reactor shutdown is achieved on baron,' the event is terminated and plant recovery actions are discussed.
Scenario 6 - Loss of Feedwater Flow with Failure of High Pressure Makeup Systems.
This scenario is one of the two classified as " complex". For each of these scenarios, multiple malfunctions postulated to occur initially or sequentially could result in plant degraded conditions unless timely corrective actions are taken by the operators.
Initially the plant is operating at 94% power (end of core life condition) and RCIC full-flow testing is in progress, f%
- The initiating event involves an RClc Steamline Break inside t
w)
Secondary Containment. The operator actions are defined in the Secondary Containment / Radiological Release Control E0P.
These actions include notification of the plant Radiation Protection Department verification of automatic isolation of RCIC and establishing Secondary Containment integrity. These actions assure control of RCIC Room area temperatures.
Subsequently (t=1.0 minute), a total loss of FW flow occurs coincident with a trip of all Condensate Booster Pumps. As a result of this, and the unavailability of HPCS and RCIC, no high pressure makeup water is available to the reactor. RPV Water Level continues to decrease. As the RPV Water Level drops and approaches TAF, the operator, recognizing the availability of the low pressure ECCS equipment, initiates the ADS. Such action reduces the RPV Pressure, and brings the high capacity LPCI/LPCS flow to the vessel causing the .
[}
x_ -
r'ecovery of RPV Water Level.
Dynamic Simuletion Tsat Resulta Rsport. Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Rsvision: 0 Date: August 1985 Upon controlling the RPV Water Level, the operator places one
) of the RHR pumps into the Pool Cooling mode, and thus reduces the Suppression Pool Temperature.
Resetting of the low RPV Water Level isolation signals, once water level is fully restored, allows recovery of DW Cooling and HVAC systems for purposes of Containment /Drywell control.
2.3.4.2 Scenario Walkthroughs The simulator response to Scenarios 3, 4, and 6 led to the reactor water level decreasing to below the top of the active '
fuel.
A level control entry condition to the E0Ps was ,
exercised.
Since.the water level decreased below the top of i active fuel, the level restoration contingency was entered.
Level restoration directed the operators to input water into the RPV with two or more available primary injection systems .
4 The above event description therefore addresses one of the Staff's requests related to the decrease of water level below the TAF.
f The Staff also requested that two other beyond design basis i accident sequences be addressed as part of the DST. They were ,
}
4 post-accident venting at pressures above containment design
} basis and off-site radiological releases above the alert Level
- alarm limit.
i Post-Accident Venting at above Containment Design Pressure \
l
- Containment venting following an accident is a last resort
! action if all other mitigation actions fail. If the .
containment pressure continues to increase to a level where containment integrity may be lost, then venting would be required.
l Under these conditions the containment temperature i
! is greater than 185'F and all available containment cooling Ik i
e Dynamic Simuletion Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Toat Rasults Raport Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 and venting systems such as containment sprays, RHR
( pool cooling, SGTS, HV'AC are ineffective. CPS E0P Procedure ;
4402.01 directs the' actions to be taken for post-accident ;
venting. Figure 2.3.4,1-1 is a pictorial representation of the above procedure used for the operator walkthrough. The walkthrough was conducted following Scenario 5. failure to
, scram with a turbine trip following a scram discharge volume isolation. ,
Scenario 5 was chosen because it was the most realistic event in which core degradation could occur. Conditions with main condenser available and without main condenser available were reviewed.
Off-Site Radiological Release Above Alert Level Alarm Limit
. The final off-site radiological release alarm limit has not been established at this time. Therefore, preliminary set
() point limit for the HVAC and SGTS shown in Table 2.3.4.1-1 were used. Also shown in Table 2.3.4.1.-1 are the flow rates r
and calibration values used to calculate the alarm limit. The
, assumed'off-site radiological release alarm set point for the SPDS was 1.0 Ci/sec. The calculated alarm set point for the vent stack and SGTS are shown in Table 2.3.4.1-1.
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. - . - . . ~ . - - . _. - . . . . _ - -_ . ._ ..,. .- ..
Dyncaic Simulation Docum:nt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rscults R2 port Ravision: 0 Date: August 1985
- -g Tne entry condition for this scenario walkthrough is included
! %_,) in CPS E0P 4406.01, Secondary Containment / Radiological Release Control - Emergency. Shown in Figure 2.3.4.1-2 is the pictorial representation of the E0P procedural steps to be
] taken. The procedure path is highlighted _in the figure.
Table 2.3.4.1-2 is the Instructor Intervention Guide for this j scenario walkthrough.
2.3.5 Operator Test Reviews At the conclusion of the test. several evaluations took place and discussions were held with the operating team members as .
described in the following subsections.
j 2.3.5.1 Scenario Critiques Immediately following termination of each scenario a brief critique was held. During this time the following typical dialogue occurred:
1
- 1. The Instructors discussed the event, questioned the operating team members regarding what happened, and provided their overall evaluation of the responses i observed;
- 2. The Operating Team members discussed their actions,-
provided feedback on the SPDS (when applicable), and critiqued the test itself; and l l 3. The Drill Leader, as well as various other members of the i V&V Team, reviewed the SPDS usage (when applicable),
t.
j discussed the E0P actions, and solicited any additional I
! comments from the participants. :
l l
) e These critiques proved most valuable for the purposes of j overall operator feedback on the development of an operational
) response strategy for interfacing with the SPDS.
I 4
Dynamic Simulction Document Not SPDS-DST-002 To:t Rsculto R2 port Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 fg 2.3.5.2 Classroom Reviews
( )
v Following each day's simulator testing, approximately 1-2 hours was spent in the classroom with the V&V Team members,
, the Operating Team personnel, and the Instructors. During this time the following activities occurred:
- 1. The Drill Leader reviewed each scenario, the actions taken by the Operating Team, and the Instructor Intervention Guide comments;
- 2. The Drill Leader provided summaries of the overall evaluations made for each scenario;
- 3. The Drill Leader discussed the usefulness of the SPDS, for those events where SPDS was available;
- 4. The Instructora provided any additional comments, where applicable;
- 5. The Operating Team members discussed their individual actions;
- 6. The Operating Team provided additional comments on the
() SPDS displays;
- 7. The Operating Team members critiqued the overall test; ~
- 8. Selected portions of the video / audio tape recordings were reviewed by all participants; and
. 9. The Operating Team members and the Instructors completed a feedback questionnaire (see Section 2.3.5.3 and 3.3.3 for details).
The classroom review phase was most useful as a test results summary and wrap-up session for each day of the DST.
2.3.5.3 Operator Feedback Questionnaires immediately following the DST debriefing of each team, the Operators were requested to complete the Operator Feedback Questionnaire. The instructions to the Operators stressed the anonymity of responses of individuals. It was noted that the
[')
v responses to the questionnaire were not to be used as part of a
4- - - , - - - , .
Dynamic Simul ti n Dscus:nt No: SPDS-DST-002 Tcat R cults R:psrt R: vision: 0 Date: August 1985
- any kind of evaluation of specific individuals' performance,
( _,
, but were to be used to help determine whether or not the design and performance objectives of SPDS had been met.
Operators were instructed to answer the questions with a simple YES or NO and to use a space provided for comments if they wished to expand upon their answers or if they felt that additional comments would help the V&V Team evaluate the usefulness of SPDS.
Operators were allowed as much time as they needed to complete the questionnaires. The last operator of each team to
, complete the questionnaire returned all team members' questionnaires to the V&V Team. .
2.3.6 Human Factors Checksheet During each scenario, the Human Factors Specialist focused his
() observations on the R.O. 's interactions with SPDS, NUCLENET displays and other MCR indications, and on the R.O.'s verbal communications with other control room team members. These observations were recorde'd on the Human Factors Checksheet.
A preliminary analysis of the verbal communications records was made following the completion of the DST scenarios for Team A. On the basis of these data and of observations of how the Shif t Supervisor appeared to have been communicating with other MCR team members, it was decided to use the Checksheet for Team B to record separately the verbal communications between the Shif t Supervisor and other team members, in addition to the records of R.O. communications. The test team member whose primary responsibility was to observe the use of the E0Ps, kept a record of the Shif t Supervisor verbal communications for Team B on the second day of DST. ;
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Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002
( Test Results Report Revision: O Sheet 1 of 2 Date: August 1985 Table 2.3.4.1-1 Calculation Of SPDS
- Alarm limits
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Dynamic Simulation Documentho: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0 Sheet 2 of 2 Date: August 1985 Table 2.3.4.1-1 i
- Calculation Of SPDS Alarm Limits
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CLINTON POWt.R STATION INSTRUCTOR INTERVENTION CUIDES
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Dyncaic Sirulation Documsnt Not SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 l
l 3.0 PHASE IV - EVALUATION OF TEST RESULTS t
All DST data were gathered and evaluated by the V&V Team. This section of the report provides the results of these evaluations and 4
describes the methodologies used. These evaluations include the Simulator response, the SPDS response,.the Operating Team performance, and an overall results summary.
3.1 Simulator Response The CPS Simulator was utilized in the performance of the SPDS DST as noted'in Section 2.1.3. Due to the design freeze
. placed on the Simulator during its fabrication, several instruments were not available that otherwise would have been used by the operating teams in evaluating plant conditions.
Several aspects of ,the Main Control Room design not available
~
on the Simulator are listed below. .
N Containment Continuous Purge Panel (12" system);
N
- Post-accident uonitoring instrumentation added to meet Regulatory Guide 1.97; Additional post-accident monitoring instruments added to implement the CPS Emergency Procedure Guidelines; Drywell and Containment High Range Gamma Monitors; Containment /Drywell Hydrogen and Oxygen Monitoring Panel; Various ECCS logic modifications implemented to fulfill NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan) requirements; and Various instrument panel changes implemented during the Preliminary Desige Assessment of the MCR and/or the Detailed Control Room Design Review (Human Factors changes and enhancements).
k
- . , , w - . * - -
_ , _ - . - _ - - . _ _ . - . -~_--- -. -. ~ _ - .
Dynamic Simuistion Docursnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rasults Raport Ravision: 0 i Date: August 1985 t
g It is expected that overall operator responses would have been
\ss/ improved had this equipment been available on the Simulator.
However, for purposes of this evaluation, these factors were not considered significant. ;
All operating team personnel had previously completed the CPS i License Review Courses (LRC). Thus, these personnel had received extensive training on the use of the E0Ps, plant ,
systems, and the CPS Simulator.
I The CPS Simulator basically duplicates the BWR/6 NUCLENET Main Control Room. The capabilities of the Simula~ tor to impose a wide range of malfunctions according to a programmed sequence enabled the performance of the scenarios required to fully exercise the SPDS. Each scenario was pre-tested on the Simulator prior to the DST.
In reviewing the response of the CPS Simulator, the V&V Team considered expected plant behavior based on the FSAR, the GDS transients, and general engineering experience. Overall, the responses were as expected. Appendix B provides the plots of selected plant parameters recorded on the two NUCLENET-Strip Charts. These plots are labelled to identify key events and l operator actions taken'during each scenario for ease of I
review. The tables in Appendix B provide time-sequenced data for each scenario, with time zero corresponding to the
' time of the initiating event (s) from these trend records i
l 3.2 SPDS Responses During the DST all of the Critical Safety Functions on the .
l
.I- . , - -m - ,,y -~..w_cm.,,._-- -_
--e-. , -.-- -.--.
I
' Dynamic Simulation Docuu nt No: SPDS-DST-002 Tsat Reculto Rzport Rsvision: 0 Date: August 1985 I
p SPDS summary display and many of the entry conditions into b each E0P were tested. The CSF parameters correspond to entry conditions to the following E0Ps:
Level Control 4401.01 Containment Control 4',02.01S Cooldown
- 44')3.01 Reactivity Control 4404.01 Secondary Containment / Radiation 4406.01 #
Release Control The H2 Gas Control was not tested since the E0Ps have not been completed as yet.
Each scenario was started with the SPDS summary display on CRT No. 5 with all valid indications green. The SRM bar and value were white, since power was at 94%. The sensor validity alarm under the " Rad" CSF box was white since the "Off-site Rad Alert Level, Stack and SGTS" values were invalid and indicated O
Q white on the " Radiation Release Control" CSF display. These were invalid since the related inputs have not been implemented in the Simulator. All parameters and process related graphics were green except the MSIVs which were red, indicating all operations were normal and all signals were valid at the beginning of each scenario. During alarm conditions on SPDS, only the NUCLENET alarm blev since the SPDS horn has not been implemented on the Simulator. .
Reflashing of the CSF boxes was not used since it will not be available on the Plant Process Computer.
The SPDS responded correctly to all CSF alarm conditions and to operator actions in selecting support displays and the summary display. The appropriate CSF alarm turned red when an E0P entry condition was reached. If the E0P entry condition was displayed on the summary display, the bar and digital m
value also turned red. The appropriate CSF support display was selected when the operator pressed the appropriate
~
pushbutton.
Dyntaic Simulation Docum:nt No: SPDS-DST-002 Tsst Rasults Rxport Rsvision: 0 Date: August 1985
,e-~3 The CSF alarm box associated with E0P entry condition which l ms caused the change from green to red on the CSF Support display when the value of the correspondi'gn parameter exceeded its alarm setpoint. All valid values of the process variables on the SPDS followed the simulated values'of the Simulator.
Reverse video was not tested since it had not been implemented on the Simulator. The rate of change section of the SPDS summary display was not tested, since program changes are in progress and these have not been incorporated into the SPDS simulator as yet.
' Scenario 1 - Small leak in Drywell following a reactor 2
isolation event (CDS Event 4A).
The Level Control CSF alarm box turned red and the operator determined that the MSlVs were closed when he selected the
_s Level Control display. The operator selected this display
,, foremost during the scenario. The display colors and I
indicated values tracked reactor water level drop and recovery, SRV openings and closings, scram demand, suppression i
pool temperature rise, and drywell pressure and temperature changes.
The Containment Control CSF alarm box turned red and the operator determined that drywell temperature exceeded 135'F by selecting the Containment Control display.
The Level Control display appeared to be the most useful SPDS display to the operator during this scenario.
a l .
V w w
Dynamic Sieulation Documint No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rssults Rmport R* vision: 0 Date: August 1985 p- Scenario 2 - Loss of DW Cooling following a reactor
(,,/ isolation event.
The Level Control CSF and Containment Control CSF alarm boxes turned red when the turbine tripped scramming the reactor, and the drywell coolers tripped. The operator determined that drywell temperature exceeded 135'F and caused the entry to the E0Ps as noted on the Level Control display. He switched briefly to the Containment Control display to confirm that drywell temperature was the only immediate problem. He continued monitoring on the Level Control display throughout the manual reactor scram until reactor water level recovered. .
Then he reselected the Containment Control display, while he purged using the CGCS compressors to control drywell pressure.
The SPDS consistently tracked all conditions.
,The Level Control display appeared to be more useful during the early portion of the scenario, while the Containment j Control display was more useful later.
J Scenario 3 Recirculation Suction Line Break with Loss of Division 11 Power (GDS Event 1B)
The Level Control alarm box turned red when the reactor water dropped, caused by the recirculation suction line break.
Almost immediately, the Centainment Control alarm turned red.
The operator determined that the Containment Control entry was caused by high dryvell pressure and temperature by selecting the Containment Control display. He reselected the Level Control display to monitor the scenario, selecting the Containment Control display pericdically for brief checks.
The display colors and indicated values tracked reactor water level, reactor power,-reactor pressure, drywell pressure, drywell temperature, suppression pool water level, suppression pool temperature, containment pressure, containment
[~} temperature, reactor scram and SRV's opening and closing, v
t Dynamic Siculation Documint No SPDS-DST-002 Test Risults Rsport Rsvision: 0 Date: August 1985 fx The Level Control display was the most useful SPDS display to s- the operator throughout this scenario, while the Containment Control display was periodically used. The drywell and containment indications were requested by the supervisor -
periodically. The SPDS was more useful in this scenario than in Scenarios 1 and 2.
Scenario 4 - Inadvertent Opening of a SRV with a Subsequent Recirculation Suction Line Break.
The Containment Control alarm box turned red, when the suppression pool temperature exceeded 95'F while the operator was performing SRV testing. The operator determined this by selecting the Containment Control display. Shortly after the operator reselected the SPDS summary display, the Level Control alarm box turned red and when the recirculation 4
suction line broke. The operator determined that the Level Control entry was caused by low reactor water level. He then On determined that Containment Control was reentered on high j drywell pressure and temperature by selecting the Containment Control display. He reselected the Level Control display to monitor the scenario and periodically checked the Containment Control display. The display colors and indicated values tracked reactor water level, reactor power, reactor pressure, drywell pressure, drywell temperature, suppression pool water
~
I ;
level, suppression pool temperature, containment pressure, containment temperature, reacter scram and SRVs opening and closing.
The drywell and containment indications were requested by the supervisor periodically. The SPDS was more useful in this scenario than in Scenarios 1 and 2.
1 4
G
Dynamic Simulttion Docum:nt No: SPDS-DST-002 Tect Rzeults R: port Rsvision: 0 Date: August 1985 s Scenario 5 - Failure to Scram with Turbine Generator Trip i 1
\. / following Scram Discharge Volume Isolation.
The Reactivity Control alarm box turned red when the attempt to scram failed with reactor power above 3%. The operator selected the Reactivity Control display and observed the SRV, ATWS, Neutron Trip, Scram and "May Require Boron" graphics in red. In addition, reactor pressure and reactor power exceeded the alarm limits thereby indicated in red. The SRVs opened as result of the turbine generator trip and caused s.uppression pool and drywell temperature to increase. The Conta'inment Control alarm box turned red. The operator selected the Containment Control display and determined that suppression pool temperature and drywell temperature had exceeded their alarm values for entering the E0P. 'He reselected the Reactivity Control display.
,_, The display colors and indicated values tracked reactor level,
/
( ,5) reactor pressure, SRV actuation, drywell, containment and suppression pool indications related to this scenario.
The Level Control display was the most useful SPDS display to the operator throughout the scenario, while the Containment Control display was used only periodically. The drywell and containment indications were requested by the supervisor periodically. The SPDS was more useful in this scenario compared to Scenarios 1, 2, 3 and 4.
k
(\' ) .
Dyntmic Sirulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rssults R port Rsvision: 0 Date: August 1985 ts Scenario 6 - Loss of Feedwater Flow with Failure s- of High Pressure Makeup Systems.
The Radiation Control alarm box turned red as a result of a RCIC steam line break in the secondary containment. The operator selected the Radiation Control display and observed that secondary containment high temperature and delta temperature were in alarm. He notified the Rad Protection supervisor and verified containment valve group isolations on Y
the Level Control display.
The Level Control alarm box turned red when the feedwater and condensate pumps failed. At the same time, HPCS was tagged out of service. The reactor level bar and digital value on the summary display also turned red. The operator selected the Level Control display and observed low reactor water level i -
and " scram" in red. Almost immediately,'the Containment
,, Control alarm turned red. The operator selected the
( Containment Control display and confirmed that drywell temperature was above 135*F. The operator periodically reselected the Containment Control display to monitor the drywell, containment and suppression pool parameters, until the transient was under control. The display colors'and indicated values tracked reactor level, reactor pressure, reactor power, SRV action, drywell containment and suppression pool parameters throughout the scenario.
The Level Control display was the most useful SPDS display to the operator throughout this scenario, while the Containment Control display was used periodically. The drywell and ,
containment indications were requested by the supervisor periodically. The SPDS was more useful in this scenario compared to Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4.
r
Dynamic Simulation Docum:nt Not SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985
('NJ' ) 3.2.7 Summary of Scenario Responses The SPDS tracked the scenarios effectively monitoring all valid inputs and entry / recovery conditions for the E0Ps.
4 Invalid inputs were highlighted, in white, for further operator action. The SPDS concentrated in one display the key parameters for monitcring the drywell, containment and suppression pool for easy, one man surveillance. It increased operator awareness of the appropriate E0P for action. The usefulness of the SPDS increased markedly for the complex scenarios. The Dynamic Simulation Test results are provided in Appendix M.
3.3 Team Performance Team performance comprised instructor evaluations, overall performance evaluations and human factors evaluations. ,
'\- / 3.3.1 Instructor Evaluations Two certified simulator Instructors participated in the SPDS DST. Both are members of the CPS Nuclear Training Department and they received prior training on the SPDS in the classroom.
Each Instructor completed the " Instructor Intervention Guides" shown in Appendix D. This set of checklists was developed for Instructor Intervention during the execution of the scenarios, in case the operator responses to the events deviated from those called for by the Emergency Operating Procedures. The intervention points were selected to allow sufficient margin for operator action. They were used only when no action or the wrong action on the part of the operators would not allow the successful completion of the transient or accident scenario. This kept each scenario within an expected framework, enhancing consistent evaluations, s
p
( ,) The data for evaluating operator actions were generated for each team on each scenario by comparing the actual number of times the instructor did not intervene with the total number of possible instructor interventions. Thus A
Dynamic Simulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rasults Rzport Ravicion: 0 Date: August 1985 s the decimal numbers were obtained according to the following example:
For Team A - Event 5, Complex (ASC)
- 1. Total Possible Score = total number of possible instructor interventions = 44
- 2. Total score = actual number of times the instructor -
did not intervene = 37
- 3. Final score (ASC) = 37/44 = 0.84 Then these decimal values were tabulated in Table 3.3.1-1 according to whether.SPDS displays were available or unavailable.
~
s
, The results of the data gathered on the Instructor Intervention Guides is provided in Table 3.3.1-1. Appendix N provides the following' support documentation for Table 3.3.1-1:
h t Appendix N.1 Total Possible Score Detail (For each of the six scenarios)
N.2 Total Team Score Detail (Team:A for each scenario)
N.3 Total Team Score Detail (Team B for each scenario)
N.4 Total Possible Score Summary Total Team Score (A)
To'tal Team Score (B)
Final Score Summary Final Score Comparison Chart Appendix F provides the procedure used for completing each of the score sheets identified above.
Three comparisons were made with this data. These are
[ ) described below, together with the overall results achieved.
%J Dynamic Siruit,tlon Documtnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rscults R2 port Ravision: 0 Date: August 1985 O Comparison 1 Results In Comparison 1, the final scores between teams in the same scenario were compared. The difference in final scores between the case where SPDS was available (with SPDS) and the case where SPDS was unavailable (without SPDS) was calculated.
In four (4) comparisons the number of overall response actions 5 taken were improved for the team with SPDS. In one (1) comparison the number of overall response actions taken were the same between teams. Finally, one (1) comparison showed a slight improvement in the number of overall response actions taken for the team without SPDS (this latter comparison is for Scenario 5, the ATWS with a loss of Main Condenser). This data supports the conclusion that the team which had SPDS available typically handled the same scenario better. The average improvement in overall response was about 10% with SPDS.
Comparison 2 Results In comparison 2, the final scores within the same team between scenarios of the same level of complexity were compared. The difference in final scores between the case where SPDS was available (with SPDS) and the case where SPDS was unavailable (without SPDS) was calculated.
In five (5) comparisens the number of overall response ac'ticns taken withir. a team were impreved, for a given level of scenario compicxity, when SPDS was available. In the comparison between Scenarios 3 and 4, (DBA Recirculation Suction Line Breaks), Team A overall response was about the same. The same comparison for Team B showed a better response when SPDS was available during Scenario 4. This data supports the conclusion that the overall response O
b ,
4 Dynamic Simulation. Document No: SPDS-DST-002
.Tast Rasults R2 port Ravision: 0 Date: August 1985
~'g of an operating team was improved when.SPDS was available for s/ use. The average improvement in overall response was about 10% with SPDS.
o Comparison 3 Results +
In Comparison 3, the total average score within a level of scenario complexity was compared. The difference between the case when SPDS was available (with SPDS) and the case when SPDS was unavailable (without SPDS) was calculated.
l In all three comparisons the overall performance scores were better when SPDS was available to assist in determining the
. plant symptomatic conditions. The average improvement in
- overall response was about 12% with SPDS. These results were generally true irrespective of the level of scenario complexity.
The following qualitative conclusions have been drawn:
- 1. The team with SPDS available generally handled the same scenario better;
- 2. Scenarios of the same complexity level were better handled with SPDS; and
- 3. The final score comparison differences were similar and f
relatively independent of the operating team involved.
- 4. SPDS assists plant' operators in the recognition of E0P entry conditions;
- 5. SPDS assists plant operators to identify plant conditions specifying required actions'within the E0Ps; and
- 6. SPDS assists plant operators in verifying the restoration ,
of stable plant conditions during emergency operations.
. -~
-++ - w +
Dynamic Simulation Docum:nt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Racults Rsport Rsvision: 0 Date: August 1985 3.3.2 Overall Performance Evaluations O-Each of the two instructors and each member of the V&V Team (six evaluators) completed evaluation forms (see Appendix E) on the overall operating team performance. These forms
. provided an evaluation guide.which was used to rate the performance on a scale from 1 to 5. The assigned ratings for each scecario (by team) were made by evaluating the following j general categories of performance:
- 1. Questions asked by Operating Team members
- 2. Operating Team coordination
- 3. System usage 4 Knowledge of plant status i
- 5. Use of E0Ps
- 6. Team communications
- 7. Use of SPDS (where applicable) )
- 8. Verification of plant response and recovery.
Tables 3.3.2-1 (Team A) and 3.3.2-2 (Team B) provides the !
"Overall Performance Evaluation Summary." The tables identify the performance ratings given by each Instructor / Evaluator for each Scenario run during the SPDS DST. The Scenarios are labelled in the tables as "1w", "2 w/o, "3 w", etc. For example, for Team A "5w" means scenario 5 with SPDS. For Team B. "3 w/o means scenario 3 without SPDS. Note that Team A had SPDS available for scenarios 1, 3, and 5. Team B had SPDS available for scenarios 2, 4. and 6.
The data shown in Tables 3.3.2-1 and 3.3.2-2 supports the following general conclusions:
- 1. Both teacs' overall performance averages were higher for those events where SPDS was available.
( Team A Rating Improvement = 0.6 Team B Rating Improvement = 1.3
= -
e Dynamic Sirulation Docum nt No: SPDS-DST-002 Tast Rasults Raport- Ravision: 0 Date: August 1985
- 2. Both teams' cumulative performance average (irrespective O of SPDS) was good. The average rating was about 4.0 for each team. This rating shows overall good team coordination and system usage and generally consistent knowledge of plant status. This data is reflective of good training and an adequate Main Control Room layout.
C 3. " Comparison Totals" This block in the tables provides data associated with I the Instructor / Evaluator ratings between Scenarios of -
similar complexity for each team. With six Scenarios, two Scenarios per complexity level (Scenarios 1 and 2 were simple, Scenarios 3 and 4 were moderate, and Scenarios 5 and 6 were considered complex), three (3) comparisons were thus made from each set of Instructor / Evaluator ratings. The results indicate that the overall performance was better with SPDS as
() follows:
Team A = 58%
Team B = 75% ,
4 " Comparisons Within Scenario Complexity" This block in the tables provides data associated with the relative benefit of SPDS between levels of scenario complexity. The deltas were determined by taking the difference between the total' cumulative rating for scenarios with SPDS and scenarios without SPDS. For example, in Table 3.3.2-1 the Total delta Moderate was calculated as follows:
Total cumulative rating for Scenario 3 w ' rich SPDS)
= 36.
O
_7 ..
,s
- Dynamic Simulation Documsnt No
- SPDS-DST-002
. Test Rasults Report Ravision: 0 Date: August 1985 4
Total cumulative rating for Scenario 4 w/o (without SPDS) =-31.
Total delta Moderate (for Team A) = 3 w - 4 w/o =
36-31 = 5.
The results generally indicate that the overall team performances were improved and that each team's awareness of ,
plant status and the required E0P actions increased with Scenario complexity when SPDS was available for use. Thus, 3 the SPDS provided more assistance to the operating team as the .
4 g
. level of scenario complexity increased.
In summary, the following key results are noteworthy:
(1) Operating team performance was improved when SPDS was used; J
(2) SPDS was rost useful for the complex scenarios; I (3) Team comr.unications and awareness of plant status was (i
improved with SPDS. '
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Dynamic Simulation- Document Not SPDS-DST-002 Test Rssults Raport Ravision: 0 Date: August 1985
("')
-\,,)
3.3.3 Human Factors Evaluations Human performance evaluations, in addition to the team performance evaluations by instructors and test team members consist of analyses of the responses to the Operator Feedback Questionnaire and the data recorded on the Human Factors Checksheet. . l 3.3.3.1 Operator Feedback Questionnaires The YES and NO responses made by the operators to each item on the Operator Feedback Questionnaire were counted. The totals are presented in table 3.3.3.1-1. The responses of the two instructors who helped conduct the DST are shown separately in '
this table. Generally, the operators agreed with each other in their responses. Major areas of agreement within each of the categories of questions are summarized below along with some consideration of the items about which the operators disagreed.
Overall Usefulness of SPDS.' In response to questions regarding overall usefulness of SPDS the operators indicated that the SPDS did provide a quick overview of plant status and was useful in detection, resolution, and execution of action steps specified in EOPs. All operators felt that their team's performance on the Simulator Scenarios was better with SPDS
['N
() than without it. All but one operator felt that detection and diagnosis of events was faster with SPDS. No one felt that SPDS misled the team in interpreting plant conditions and no one believed that SPDS displays imposed additional mental workload requirements. '
The operators' answers disagree by greater than an eight to two count on only 5 of the,19 items in this category.
There was greatest disagreement (5 Yes - 5 No) about the item which asked "Was your previous training on SPDS sufficient for you to use SPDS effectively in this simulation test?" In view of the limited time available for specific SPDS training, it is not surprising that some operators felt that they may have performed more efficiently with SPDS if they had received more training prior to the test. This is confirmed by the evaluators observations and the DST performance measures that show a definite and positive learning effect with successive SPDS scenarios. Part of the general increase in level of ;
proficiency shown throughout the scenarios probably resulted from the operatore learning to work with each other effectively as a team. However, there is strong evidence that ,
the team members were also learning how to use SPDS most effectively in their coordinated actions as a team. >
O m ,~ ,v-,- - - -- --- , . , _ ,, - , , - , - , ,
a
- Dynamic Simulation Documsnt Not SPDS-DST-002 Tsat R:ssults Raport Rsvision: 0 Date: August 1985 SPDS Design Adequacy. The operators were in general agreement O- that the SPDS design is acceptable. They disagree by a difference greater than 9-1 on only two of the thirteen questions in this category. There was unanimity of belief that the color code aided in identifying conditions, that it
- was easy to select the appropriate support display and that it 2 - was not necessary,to make references or. perform calculations to interpret the displays. The operators believed that the
< use of the summary display and support displays facilitates j the use of SPDS in normal and emergency conditions. They
. agree that it is easy to interact with the displays and the integrated information on them; that information is well
- grouped and symbols are appropriate and unmistakable; and that there are positive indications of the completion of a sequence or restoration of a condition to normal. The major disagreement (5 Yes - 5 No) was in the answers to the question "Should any of the information be displayed in a different format?" Seven operators believed that the displays led directly to the next action, either a,n activation response or getting additional information from the NUCLENET or _other
- displays and three operators did not.
j Display Formats The operators were in general agreement regarding display formats. The greatest disagreement was seven for to three against on any of the twelve questions in this categories. There was complete agreement among operators that the summary display provides an adequate indication of O CSF alarm boxes, that it is not difficult to cross check or cross compare for relationships in the information shown on the support displays and that the support displays are useful in assessing plant conditions during emergencies. Seven of
, the ten operators felt that the information shown on the summary display was useful in assessing overall plant j conditions during normal operating conditions and in
- indicating the beginning of deviations from normal conditions.
It should be recognized that this question would be most appropriately answered by those members of each team that were responsible for monitoring the SPDS during the early stage part of each scenario before the " initiating" event occurred.
These team members would be the R.O. primarily and the shift d
supervisor to a somewhat lesser degree.
Nine of the ten operators believe that the bar graphs were an effective way of displaying information en the summary display and that the parameters are organized logically.-There was j general agreement that the sumscry display is not cluttered.
However, no more information should be shown on the display.
The only generally negative reaction to display formats was with regard to the " increasing" and " decreasing" arrows on the summary. display. Eight of ten operators believed they were not useful.
Relationships of SPDS to E0PS. :The operators were l
p).
\, . unanimous in their belief that the design of SPDS is useful e
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Dynamic Simulation Docum2nt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rasults Rsport ,
Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 for the monitoring of E0P entry conditions, that the SPDS h displays clearly show the status of the CSF, and that compared to operations without the use of SPDS, the display of a CSF alarm boxes on the SPDS displays facilitates the operator entering the appropriate E0Ps. There was general agreement (8 to 2) that it is useful to display CSF alarm boxes on all of the NUCLENET CRTs.
Specific Information All of the operators indicated that the SPDS displays do not contain too much information. The SPDS information is displayed clearly and accurately, and that the bar graphs and digital information are precise enough for interpreting plant conditions to make decisions. The Operators believe that the information displayed on SPDS helped in making decisions and no one believed that SPDS hindered decision making.
Three of the ten operators indicated that additional information regarding the CSF should be displayed. However,
. only two of the Operators specified the additional information. One operator suggested more information on containment isolation status and the other operator asked for ECCS information.
.. Pictorial Displays The Operators considered the pictorial displays to be readily understandable, with the pictorial representations of plant elements and structures being immediately recognizable. The outlines representing plant elements and structures made it easy to locate and identify information and to help integrate information from different sources.
The operators believed that the pictorial displays provide an overall perspective of CSF parameters and does not conflict l
trich their mental models of the plant's structure and operation. One operator. believed the plant area graphics l detracted from the data displayed.
i Ouestionnaire Validity The answers to the questions relating to questionnaire validity showed high agreement among the operators. All Operators believed that the questionnaire was a valid procedure for obtaining operator feedback to i evaluate the SPDS displays and that the questions were relevant. Generally the operators felt that the i
questionnaires were not too detailed and that the questions were cicarly stated.
Operator Comments The operators were encouraged to write comments in a space at the side of each question on the form. The comments permitted the operators to expand their 3 answers beyond a simple YES or N0 or to qualify an answer or to provide additional information that an operator might I
,-- -. .,,7., .,-y. ,--,w,- em.,g - -, o
Dynamic Sinulation Docum:nt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rscults R: port Rsvision: 0 Date: August 1985
<-' s believe would be useful in helping to evaluate SPDS. The
( ) number of separate comments ranged from a low of one comment by one operator to a high of 22 comments by another. The average number of comments was 10.8. Comments were written for 48 of the 76 questions. In most cases, a question received only a single comment. Of the questions that received multiple comments, most were commented on by no more than two operators. The exceptions to this will be described
, subsequently. All of the comments have been carefully reviewed. All are considered to be important because they bring to the overall evaluation of SPDS the points of view and perspectives of the people who will be using SPDS. These frequently are different from the perspectives of engineers, designers, and managers. Some of the comments may not be valid criticisms of the design and operation of SPDS.
Nevertheless, they are important because, in some cases, they
. provide significant information and insights that are relevant to requirements for familiarization of the operators with SPDS and its purpose, the philosophy behind the requirement for SPDS, and incorporation of SPDS into the regular operator training program. Other operator comments, quite specific to SPDS design and operational features, are valid criticisms that point out ways that the SPDS may be made more useful. It is not the purpose of the DST to suggest design changes.
However, in the interest of complete reporting, the contents of specific comments regarding SPDS design features are
- -'S
, included in the summary of operator comments. A few comments
('"') were of the form, "very much so", " definitely", etc. and thus served only to emphasize the operator's degree of agreement or disagreement with a particular item. In those cases in which cultiple comments were made to a question, there usually was a high degree of uniformity of content of the different operators' comments. There was a marked tendency for each operator to make multiple comments concerning a specific SPDS feature in response to different questions. For example, 6 out of 8 comments made by one operator were related to MSIV display characteristics. Other multiple comments directed at a single feature by an individual operator were in the categories of ECCS information TAF indication, upward and downward pointing arrows, and pictorial outlines on the displays. Typically, comments were not made to expand upon positive answers to the questions. Therefore, the somewhat negative tone of the oummary of comments, taken by itself, tends to present a somewhat distorted, exaggerated view that is at variance with the overwhelmingly positive overall responses to the questicnnaire and other measures of operator and team performance with SPDS. This should be kept in mind when reading the summary of responses. The question that elicited the largest number of written comments was "Are the
' increasing' and ' decreasing' arrows useful?" Four operators commented that they were confusing, and one each stated that they presented too much detail, were not important, not easily
~
r 'y understood, not used very much, and not very useful. In (v)
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e Dyntmic Simulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002
, Test.Rasults Raport Ravision: 0 '
Date: August 1985 I. m response to another question, one operator commented that the j arrows were extraneous and should be deleted, and anothar.
L operator wrote the " acceleration" arrows require some getting used to. Four operators made comments indicating that some of the information should be displayed in a different format.
Three of these made comments about the MSIV indications and ;
one suggested adding an index mark to the level indication to )
show TAF. Comments on MSIV and TAF were also made in response to other questions. The coments regarding MSIV suggested the ,
1
.large symbol for MSIV was not readily understandable, the MSIV e indication needed better labelling, the display should show
- l. ,
when isolation is needed in. addition to showing that ,
j' isolation has occurred, and the information on inboard and ;
i outboard isolations would be useful. In response to the question, "Does SPDS provide the information necessary to i monitor plant conditions?" one operator stated that only j level changes fast enough to use during normal conditions. ,
i One operator expressed " regret that CRT #5 is no longer t
- available," and another stated that the "SE display is much j more effective [than the SPDS' summary display], and a third wrote " I miss having the steam flow / feed flow comparison." -
Similar comments regarding the use of the sununary display i during normal conditions were made to other questions: "5E i display provides much more information on normal plant status," "the primary (summary) display only tells you that i you haven't reached E0P entry conditions,"'the primary display is useful in assessing plant' safety but not normal operating.
, status, and "there is no trend alarm prior.to exceeding limits
! - only after entry conditions have been reached." One operator commented that the primary (summary) display probably is not necessary in that additional information could be added i to the existing DCS. One operator provided a question that he I l thought should have been' asked on the questionnaire "Does l SPDS location (CRTf5) interfere with monitoring normal plant j operation?" His answer to his question was "yes". The #5 is one of the prime CRTs used during normal operations. I use it *
j SPDS I must use a different CRT, thereby diverting my '
attention away from the full core display." One comment was l written about each of the following miscellaneous subjects:
j- the desirability of CSF reflash, another CRT facing the center j of the horseshoe for use by Shitt Supervisor, SPDS fuel zone l
- . reactor water level not referenced to san
- e zero as other '
instruments, and another SPDS/DCS display with ECCS status l would be helpful. Two operators commented that the CSF boxes -
should be smaller, particularly on the DSC displays. Other
~
! written comments stated that SPDS helped direct *he team to !
{ correct E0P entry, provided integrated understat. '1 q of critical plant parameters, provided quick refere e for-much
. needed information, displayed key information simply, made .
- operating easier because information was always'available,.
, provided some parameter information not otherwise directly
!. available, was an aid to better understanding, saved time in
!' leading directly to the next response, easy to use, and I
l :
}
Dynsmic Simulation Docum nt No: SPDS-DST-002 Tsat Rscults R: port Rsvision: 0 Date: August 1985 provides a good mental picture of the plant. Four operators (f '")s
, commented that they could have used SPDS even more effectively if they had received more training prior to the test and one stated that he would have been more comfortable working with the displays if he had more exposure to them previously.
Instructors' Responses The Instructors who completed the questionnaire did not answer all of the questions. There are several reasons for this. In many cases, the questions were worded specifically to focus on an Operator's views about his Team's performance with SPDS, his training on SPDS, and his interaction with SPDS during DST. These questions were not appropriate for the instructors.
Fifty-four questions were answered by one or both Instructors. .
The answers given by the Instructors agreed with the majority of the Operators' answers on fifty of these. On three questions in which the Instructors disagreed with the Operators, the two Instructors disagreed with each other. In response to the ques. tion, "Should additional questions have been asked?", the operators' answers were Yes-1 and No-8 while the instructors' answers were Yes-1 and No-1. The Operators felt that the pictorial representations did not conflict with their mental models of the plant's structure and operation
(-1) but the two Instructors disagreed between themselves.
The Operators answered the questions "Did the SPDS displays
(
(_ ,/
) , tend to claim more of your attention than they should have?"
with Yes-4 and No-6. The Instructors answered Yes-1 and No-1.
The fourth disagreement between the majority of the Operators' responses and Instructors'. responses was to the questicn "Is it useful to display CSF alarm boxes on all of the NUCLENET CRTs?". Eight of ten Operators answered Yes and the one Instructor who answered the question marked No.
3.3.3.2 Human Factor Check Sheet The records of verbal communications between the R.O. and other Control Room Team members have been analyzed and the results are summarized in Tables 3.3.3.2-1 through 3.3.3.2-4 Total Number of Communications Between R.O. and Other Team Members. The total number.of communications between the R.O.
and other team members for all scenarios combined was icwer during the scenarios with SPDS available (238), than during the scenarios without SPDS (288). Although there were differences between the two teams in that Team A had a smaller total (230) for its six scenarios than Team B (296), each team had a lower total number of communications for the scenarios with SPDS available, as shown in the table below.
VERBAL COMMUNICATIONS WITH WITHOUT TOTAL SPDS - SPDS
,-s
( ,) _
TEAM A 102 136 . 238 TEAM B 128 160 288 230 296
Dynamic Simuleticn Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Tsst Rscults Rsport Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 This indicates that the assistance of SPDS leads to fewer
. k'~'/}
, communications resulting from the availability of concentrated critical information.
Call Out of E0P Entry by R.O. The R.O. called out E0P entry a total of six times in the scenarios with SPDS available (Table 3.3.3.2-1). Even in these cases it probably was unnecessary because of the appearance of the CSF alarm boxes on all NUCLENET CRTs, including the one mounted in the control room right side panel adjacent to the two MCR team members responsible for E0Ps. The R.O.s never called out E0P entry in any of the scenarios with SPDS unavailable.
?
Number of Times R.O. Requested Information During the course of scenarios with SPDS unavailable the R.O. requested
, information from other team members a total of 30 times (Table 3.3.3.2-2). With SPDS available, the R.O. requested information only 10 times.
Number of Items R.O. Called Out Unsolicited Information The number of times the R.O. called out unsolicited information to the other team members was approximately equal for the scenarios with SPDS (135) and without SPDS (147). These data are shown in Table 3.3.3.2-3.
/ Number of Times R.O. Answered Questions or Confirmed
(,, ; Information The R.O.s answered questions or verbally confirmed information a total of 87 times during the scenarios with SPDS in service. During the scenarios with SPDS out of service this number increased to 111. These data are shown in Table 3.3.3.2-4 Total Number of Communications Between Shift Supervisor and Other Members of Team B. The total number of verbal communications between the shift supervisor and other members of Team B for all scenarios combined (Table 3.3.3.2-5) was lower with SPDS (78) than without SPDS (84) . This is consistent with the total counts of verbal communications between the R.O. and other MCR Operators with and without SPDS available. However, for the Team B complex scenarios only, the total number of verbal communications between the Shift Supervisor and other team members was larger with SPDS than without SPES. This single deviation from the other results may be due to any one or some combination of factors, no one of which can be evaluated from the data collected during the DST. The results indicate that SPDS as it is implemented on the dedicated CRT and as a selectable display on other MCR, CRTs, reduces the requirement for verbal communications between the R.O. and other MCR Operators and between the Shift Supervisor and other MCR Operators.
7 t
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Dynamic Simulation Docum:nt No: SPDS-DST-002 Tsst Rieults Rsport R2 vision: 0 Date: August 1985
(N 1[n summary, with the SPDS available, communication within the
( ,) '
operating team was lower, and concentrated on E0P entry conditions and critical process values at the point of entering the E0Ps, as well as on stabilizing the plant toward
, the end of each scenario.
4 3.4 Operator Comments This section summarizes the comments made to the
, Instructors and Evaluators by the Operating Team members regarding the SPDS displays as a result of performing the DST.
The source of this information is contained within the various data gathering forms, video tapes and recordings, and notes taken by individual V&V Evaluators during the SPDS training, i during the DST and following the testing (Scenaria critiques, classroom reviews and Operator Feedback Questionnaires).
These comments are listed below: .
- 1. The SPDS provides a quick ov'erview of the safety status of the plant.
- 2. The SPDS was useful in operating team detection, resolution, and execution of the actions required by the E0Ps.
- 3. The team's performance was better with SPDS than without it.
/}
\sj
- 6. The SPDS is not as useful for monitoring normal plant
, conditions.
- 7. Selection of the SPDS displays was easy.
- 8. The color codes used on SPDS display aids in identifying plant conditions.
4
- 9. Some information should be displayed on SPDS in a different format.
- 10. More information should be displayed on the SPDS summary display.
- 11. The symbols used on SPDS displays are appropriate and unmistakable.
- 12. The " Increasing" and " Decreasing" arrows on the SPDS summary display are not very useful.
- 13. Information was easy to locate on the SPDS displays using the pictorial representations.
- 14. Drywell and Containment parameters were concisely displayed and easier to follow than on the Simulator Control Room instruments.
- 15. Several operators considered the location of SPDS displays on NUCLENET CRT #5 is not optimum. Other DCS displays are normally displayed there. Consideration should be given to another location for the SPDS
N displays.
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i r._-. ,m. ~m- - ,- - -w w - -. ._ -
-..e.
Dynamic Sirulation Docursnt No: SPDS-DST-002
'Tsot Rssults Rsport Rsvision: 0 Date: August 1985
.I, 16. The SPDS Software Containment Pressure should be checked on the Simulator. The range of this parameter is -5 to b} +45 psig on the summary display. The bar graph does not appear until pressure rises above O psig.
- 17. Containment Temperature should be considered for display on the SPDS Level / Reactivity Control Support display but not as an entry condition to the CSF alarm box for Level / Reactivity Control.
- 18. Consider providing a digital value for Suppression Pool Water Level on the SPDS Containment Control Support display. -
- 19. The MSIV symbol should be labeled.
- 20. One operator suggested that the " Isolation OK" box on the SPDS Level / Reactivity Control and Containment Control support displays should be enhanced so that the distinction between inboard and outboard isolation valve status can be made. Also it was noted that the number of Containment Isolation valve groups has been changed from 11 to 13,
- 21. The abbreviations used on the SPDS are consistent with other NUCLENET displays and the E0Ps.
The V&V Team has evaluated these key comments and concludes that the basic performance objectives of the CPS SPDS have been met. Operator comments regarding changes to the SPDS N
displays are generally considered to be system enhancements.
As such, it is recommended that.the SPDS design organization consider these comments for potential future implementation.
In particular, this applies to comments #9, #10, #12, #15,
- 17 #18, #19, and #20. On comment #20 however, the display should be corrected to show the status of all 13 isolation groups immediately.
Nuclear Training should consider comment #16 to resolve any SPDS Simulator software corrections which may be required. In addition, more operating time should be given to all operators on the use of SPDS, similar to the Scenarios run for this evaluation, per comment #5. ~
3.5 Results Summary The CPS Simulator models the Main Control Room with the exception of those items mentioned in Section 3.1. The Simulator response to the Scenarios used in the DST was as expected, considering the behavior anticipated from reviews of the FSAR, the GDS transients, and general engineering experience. Key plant parameters were recorded on strip charts, as shown in Appendix B.
During the DST, all of the SPDS CSF boxes were tested. Based on the anticipated E0P. entry conditions for each Scenario, the i
i
Dynamic Simulction Documint No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rzeults Report Rsvision: 0 Date: August 1985 s CSF box indications responded correctly. All E0Ps, with the
( ) exception of the Combustible Gas Control E0P (not yet k- / developed by CPS and approved by the NRC Staff) were utilized by the operating team. The SPDS tracked the Scenario progression by effectively monitoring all valid signal inputs and E0P entry conditions. The SPDS concentrated in one display the key plant parameters for monitoring overall plant safety status. The SPDS was most useful during the complex .
Scenarios and was particularly beneficial in determining Containment and Drywell conditions.
The Instructor evaluations of the Operating Team's response actions, according the E0Ps, were identified in the results obtained from the " Instructor Intervention Guides." Key points derived from the data from Table 3.3.1-1 are as follows; Each Operating Team generally responded to the Scenario events quicker and more effectively with the SPDS available.
The same Scenario was handled best by the team which had SPDS available.
Operating Team awareness of plant status and the ability to achieve stable plant conditions in an effective manner were enhanced for any given level of Scenario complexity with SPDS available, 7g Overall Team performance scores improved about 12% with t
') 12% fewer Instructor interventions with SPDS available irrespective of the Scenaria complexity.
SPDS ass'isted the Plant Operators in the detection, resolution, and execution of the E0P action steps.
The V&V Team comprising of six evaluators including a Human -
Factors specialist and the two Instructors completed the evaluation forms, rating the operating team's overall performance on a scale from 1 - 5. Key points derived from this data (Tables 3.3.2-1 and 3.3.2-2) are as follows:
Team average performance ratings were much improved with SPDS available:
Team A with SPDS = 4.3 w/o SPDS = 3.7 .
Team B with SPDS = 4.6 w/o SPLS = 3.3 Team's overall cumulative rating was about 4.0. This was indicative of an adequate Main Control Room layout and good training.
Operating Team performance ratings increased with SPDS available, as the level of Scenario complexity increased.
<w Results from various evaluations made by the Human Factors Specialist supports the general usefulness and acceptability (V) of the SPDS.
- Dynamic Simulation Document.No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 l
T The comments received from the Operating Teams support the, f conclusions of the Instructors and Evaluators and the Human i f Factors Specialist evaluations regarding the SPDS effectiveness. 1 6
l 1
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p '
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l .
i l
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Dynamic Simulation Document ho: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Ravision: 0 Date: August 1985 Table 3.3.1-1
- m. lN sT R u c TC R. INTERVE N TI ON GdsDEs IriNA w SCO 32 E CO M P AR IG o rJ C W A R.T WITH WITHOUT DIFFERENCE COMPARISON SPDS SPDS (WITH - WITHOUT)
AIS to BlS AlS Q,$[ BIS Q,${
Q B2S go A2S B2S Q,q l A2S Q,68 Q, p,3 i A3M to B3M A3M Q,gg B3M O.70 0.08 34M to A4M 34M o.% ^'"
O.79 O.17 A5C to.35C A5C Q,g$ B5C
~
O.89 -0.0.5 36C to A6C seC ^6 0.% 0.68 0.2.8 COMPARISON 2 WITH WITHOUT DIFFERENCE COMPARISON SPDS SPDS (WITH - WITHOUT) t AIS to A2S AlS Q,gl A2S O.63 0.13 A3M to A4M A3M Q}g A4M Q,]g QQl ASC to A6C A5C Q,g$ A6C O.68 O.16 32S to slS 325 0,ql BIS o,g t o,lo 34M to 33M s4M O.96 B3M O.70 0. 2.6 36C to 35C sec o,q6 BSC Q,gol O.07 COMPARTSON 3 !
WITH WITHOUT DIFFERENCE COMPARISON SPDS SPDS (WITH - WITHOUT)
AIS-325 to A25-31S AIS+B25 = Q,$h A2S+ BIS = 0 74 O. la. l A3M+34M to A4M+33M A3M+B4M = Q,g7 A4M+B3M = Q,7% Q, ASC-36C to A6C+BSC ^6C+B5C = ASC+B6C = O.90 0.78 GIA i Com:arison Notes: Comparison 1 - Between Teams Comparison 2 - Sane Team Comparison 3 - Total Within Same Scenario .Same Scenario With to W/0 SPDS Same Scenar v j Complexity Complexity ' With to W/0 SPDS With to W/0 SPDS
,-- . - - - - - -, . ~ , - , - - . -- . - - - - , - , .,- n,,,-.-,,-e-,- - . - , , , , - - , , -
s- - - -.+- e
o\ p y n.imic Simulatton O O-Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report TABI.E 3. 3. 2 - 1. N" . I' t 1985
'TE.AM A - OVERAtl. PERFORMANCE EVAL.UATION
SUMMARY
lilSTRUCTol:/EVAI.UATOR SCENARIO 1w 2w 3w- 4 W[o SW COMMENTS 6 W[o T INSTRUCTOR #1 5 1 4 4 4 3 INSTRUCTOR #2 5 1/ 4 F 4 3 EVALUATOR #1 . EVALUATOR #2 { EVAI.UATOR #3
} } g EVALUATOR #4 g g "' ]
EVAI.UATOR #5 l [ ] j } EVAL.UATOR #6 / [ ' [ ] TOTA l.S 36 33 36 as ' 31 a*/ /9/ h,3 AVERAGE EVALUATION IJITil SPDS COMPARISON TOTAI.S
' AVERAGE EVALUATIOy 11/0 SPDS 3,7 * # Performance: lletter with SPDS = I4 [68"j) f Perfoimance Same = COMPARISONS WITilIN SCENARIO COMPLEXITY 8 (33*/o) # Performance fict ter w/o SPDS =
2 (Q*[n) Total d Simple : lW-2w/o - 3 . Total A Moderatei:3*i- 'fw4- 5 To t a l g Compl ex z $W -(w/o = __7_ _. -__ m _
V Dynamic. Simulation Document Ho: SPDS-DSYMA)2 Test Hesults Heport Revison: O TABLE 3.3.2 - L Date: August 1985 4 TUAM Es -- OVERAI.I, PERFORMANCE EVAL.UATION
SUMMARY
i, IllSTRUCTOR/ EVAL.UATOR SCENAltIO 1 Wfo 2W 3W[o 4w 6W COMMENTS 5w/o INSTRUCTOR #1 4 { } { INSTRUCTOR #2
} { ] {
EVALUATOR #1
} {
EVALUATOR #2 2
] {
EVALUATOR #3 g { , EVALUATOR #4 Z. ! { EVALUATOR #5 g l { , EVALUATOR #6 TOTAL.s h 3o 3s n 3r 23' @ /90 AVERACE EVALUATION WITil SI'DS h,[ COMPARISON 'lOTAI.S AVERAGE EVAI.UATION W/O SPDS 3,3
# Perfoimance llet t er wi th SPDS - 18 65 */.)
COMPARISONS WITilIN SCENARIO COMPLEXITY i
# Per formance S.une - 6(25')O # Per formance liet ter w/o SPDS - O {0 7.} Total A SimPlc = 2w-l - 5 Total Hoderate= h - -
8_ Total d Complex:6w-5 - 17 _ . _ _ -- =a -w_. .ww r,
Dyn=cic Sirulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Tast Rtruits Rzport Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 js Table 3.3.3.1-1 Operator Feedback Questionnaire Results OPERATOR INSTRUCTOR S TOTALS TOTALS YES NO YES NO
- 1. Does the SPDS provide a quick overview 9 1 2 0 of the status of the plant?
?
- 2. Was the SPDS useful in your team's 10 0 2 0 detection, resolution, and execution of action steps specifi,ed in E0Ps?
- 3. Did SPDS provide an integral overall 6 4 2 0 understanding of what was happening during the sequence of events in each scenario?
4 Did you have more confidence in your_ 8 2 1 0 understanding of plant conditions when your team was using SPDS? (~N () 5. Was your team's performance better 10 0 2 0 without SPDS?
- 6. Was you team's performance better 0 10 0 1 without SPDS?
- 7. Was your previous training on SPDS 5 5 0 0 sufficient for you to use SPDS effec-tively in this simulation test?
- 8. Did SPDS interfere with your handling 2 8 0 1 of events?
- 9. Did SPDS mislead you in interpreting 0 10 0 2 plant conditions?
- 10. Do you feel that your detection and 9 1 2 0 diagnosis of events were faster when you were using SPDS?
- 11. Do you feel that your detection and 0 10 0 2 diagnosis of events were slower when you were using SPDS?
- 12. Did the SPDS displays tend to claim 4 6 1 1 e'~ more of your attention than they should
(%) have?
Dynamic Simuistion Docum2nt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rasults Rsport Rtvision: 0 Date: August 1985 Table 3.3.3.1-1
'Q . ~ ~/' Operator Feedback Questionnaire Results OPERATOR INSTRUCTOR TOTALS TOTALS YES NO YES NO
- 13. Do you feel that SPDS displays 0 10 0 1 imposed additional mental workload requirements?
- 14. Were you comfortable working with SPDS 10 1 0 1 displays? ,
- 15. Does SPDS provide the information 3 7 1 0 ,
necessary to monitor normal plant conditions?
- 16. When there was a CSF alarm, was the 8 1 0 0 appropriate secondary display selected immediately?
- 17. Are relationships among plant parameters 8 2 1 0 1
O more easily and quickly understood when SPDS is used?
- 18. Were there any SPDS indications that 2 7 0 0 were difficult to interpret?
- 19. Did you feel that any of the SPDS dis- 0 10 0 0 plays gave you more information then you needed?
SPDS DESIGN ADEQUACY
- 20. Does having a primary display and 9 1 1 0 secondary displays facilitate the use of SPDS in normal and emergency conditions?
- 21. De the displays lead directly to 7 3 2 0 your making the next response (either an activation response or getting additional information from the Nuclenet and other displays)?
- 22. Is the information on the secondary 10 0 0 0 display east to locate?
[ w
Dynamic Strulation Documtnt Not SPDS-DST-002 Test Rasults Rzport Rsvision: 0 Date August 1985 s Table 3.3.3.1-1 \_ / Operator Feedback Questionnaire Results OPERATOR INSTRUCTOR k TOTALS TOTALS YES NO YES NO
- 23. Is the information easy to identify? 10 0 1 0
- 24. Is it difficult to integrate information 1 9 0 0 on the secondary displays?
- 25. Do you have to make ' inferences or perform 0 10 0 0 calculations to interpret the display?
- 26. Should any of the information be dis- 5 5 0 0 played in a different format? -
Examples: bar graph instead of digital readout, elimination of pictorial outlines, etc.
- 27. Was it easy to select the appropriate 10 0 0 0 s secondary display?
- 28. Was it difficult'to interact with the 1 9 0 0 SPDS displays?
- 29. Does the color code aid in identifying 10 0 2 0 conditions?
- 30. Are the symbols appropriate and 9 1 0 0 unmistakable?
- 31. Is related information well grouped 9 1 1 0 and clustered? ,
- 32. When a sequence is complete or a normal 9 1 0 0 condition restored, is there a positive indication available from SPDS?
DISPLAY FORMATS
- 33. Is the information shown on the primary 7 3 1 0 display useful in assessing overall ,
plant safety during normal operating conditions? 34 Does the primary display provide useful 7 3 1 0 fs indications of the beginning of devia-( j tions from normal operating conditions?
Dynamic Simulation Documint No: SPDS-DST-002 Tast Rasults Raport Rsvision: 0 Date: August 1985 fN Table 3.3.3.1-1 Operator Feedback Questionnaire Results OPERATOR INSTRUCTOR QUESTIONS TOTALS TOTALS YES NO YES NO
- 35. Are the horizontal bar graphs of selected 9 1 0 0 parameters on the primary display an effective means of displaying information?
l
- 36. Does the primary display provide an 10 0 0 0 adequate indication of CSF alarms?
- 37. Is the primary display too cluttered? I 9 0 0
- 38. Should more formation be shown on 3 7 0 1 the primary display?
- 39. Are the parameters shown on the display 9 0 1 0 organized logically?
- 40. Are the " increasing" and " decreasing" 2 8 0 1 Os arrows useful?
- 41. Are the secondary displays useful in 10 0 0 0 assessing plant conditions during the emergency conditions?
- 42. Was it difficult to locate information 0 10 0 0 on the secondary displays?
- 43. Was it difficult to cross check or 0 10 0 0 cross compare for relationships in the information shown on the secondary displays?
- 44. Are the outlines and symbols in the 10 0 1 0 secondary displays readily identifiable?
- 45. Is the design of SPDS useful for 10 0 2 0 monitoring E0P entry conditions?
- 46. Do the displays include information on 7 3 1 0 ,
all of the significant plant conditions l that can affect the critical safety ! functions? - v)
.S 4
Dynamic Simulation Docursnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rszulte Rzport Rtvision: 0-Dzte: August 1985
,_ Table 3.3.3.1-1 \ -
Operator Feedback Questionnaire Results OPERATOR INSTRUCTOR TOTALS TOTALS YES NO YES NO
- 47. Do the displays clearly show the 10 0 1 0 critical safety functions?
~
- 48. Compared to conditions without the use 10 0 1 0 of SPDS, does the display of a CSF alarm on SPDS facilitate initiation
] of the appropriate E0P7 ,
- 49. It is useful to display CSF alarms 8 2 0 1 ,
on all of the Nuclenet CRTs? SPECIFIC INFORMATION
- 50. Do the SPDS displays contain too much 0 10 0 2 information? .
, O' 51. Is there any additional information regarding the critical safety functions 3 6 0 1 that you think that should be displayed?
- 52. Is there any extraneous information 1 8 0 1 that should be deleted?
- 53. Are the bar graphs and digital 10 0 2 0 information precise enough for i interpreting plant conditions and make decisions?
54 Are important limits and parameter 9 1 2 0 ranges clearly displayed?
- 55. Is the information displayed accurately 10 0 2 0
. and clearly?
- 56. Should the amount of detail shown on 2 8 0 1 the displays be changed?
- 57. Did the information that was displayed 9 0 1 0 on SPDS help in making decisions?
- 58. Did the information that was displayed 0 9 0 1 on SPDS hinder the making of decisions? l n-s_-
l 1
, - , , , , .a - , , ,, ---c e, w e .
Dynaaic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Ts:t Rszult Riport Revision: 0 Date: August 1985
,__s Table 3.3.3.1-1 l 1
\- / Operator Feedback Questionnaire Results OPERATOR INSTRUCTOR QUESTIONS TOTALS TOTALS YES' NO YES NO
- 59. Are there any abbreviations that are 0 10 0 1 not immediately interpretable?
- 60. Are there any abbreviations that are 0 9 0 0 not consistent with Nuclenet displays and the E0Ps?
- 61. Are the labels clear and unambiguous 9 1 0 0 in meaning?
PICTORIAL DISPLAYS
- 62. Are the pictorial displays readily 9 1 1 0 understandable?
s 63. Do the pictorial displays provide a 9 1 1 0 ,7 needed overall perspective of critical \~ ') safety function parameters? 64 Do the outlines representing major 9 1 1 0 plant elements and structures make it easy to locate and identify information?
- 65. Do the pictorial displays help integrate 9 1 1 0 information from different sources?
- 66. Are the pictorial representations of 10 0 0 0 plant elements and structures immediately recognizable?
- 67. Do the pictorial representations conflict 1 9 1 1 with your mental model of the plant's structure and operation?
OUESTIONNAIRE VALIDITY
- 68. Is this questionnaire too detailed? I 9 0 1
- 69. Are the questions relevant for helping 10 0 2 0 determine the usefulness of SPDS?
A m.
Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rasults Rsport Rtvision: 0 Date: August 1985 r-~s Table 3.3.3.1-1 I' Operator Feedback Questionnaire Results OPERATOR INSTRUCTOR O TOTALS TOTALS YES NO YES NO . 2
- 70. Were the right kinds of questions asked? 10 0 2 0
- 71. Should additional questions have been 2 8 1 1 asked?
- 72. Are the questions clearly stated? 9 0 2 0
- 73. Do the questions and your answer provide 8 2 1 0 a reasonable accurate and complete account of your evaluation of SPDS?
- 74. Is this questionnaire a valid (but 10 0 2 0 not the only) procedure for evaluating SPDS?
- 75. Can you think of any questions that 2 8 0 1 O should have been asked? If so, please list them below with your answer.
- 76. Please make any other comments your wish.regarding either this questionnaire or the dynamic simulation testing in general.
I Thank you for your cooperation in completing this questionnaire and for your j help during the conduct of the SPDS dynamic simulation testing.
)
l (s_
Dynamic Simulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rasults Raport Ravision: 0 Date: August 1985
. Table 3.3.3.2-1 2 Number of Times Reactor Operator Called Out i
[ E0P Entry Conditions i Without SPDS - With SPDS Level of Scenario Complexity Team A Team B Team A Team B 4 Simple 0 0 0 2 i 1 Moderate 0 0 2 0 Complex 0 0 2 0 j - TOTALS 0 6 3 k a O f 1 { 1 i i 1 I I s 1 - i I e
i Dynamic Simulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 i
. Test Results Report Rsvision: 0 l Date: August 1985 Table 3.3.3.2-2 Number of Times Reactor Operator Requested Information 4
Without SPDS With SPDS 4 Level of Scenario Complexity Team A Team B Team A Team B i Simple. 3 . 8 1 3 4 . Moderate O 4 0 1 , Complex 11 4 3 4 4 i TOTALS 30 10 . i i i i i l 1 l l 1 1 i 4 I J 4 i i
\
Dyns=ic Simulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rssults Rsport Revision: 0 , Date: August 1985 Table 3.3.3.2-3 Number ~of Times Reactor Operator Requested Called Out Unsolicited Information Without SPDS With SPDS Level of Scenario Complexity- Team A Team B Team A Team B
, Simple 34 33 13 28 i Moderate 15 19 13 20 i
i Complex 17 29 30 31 TOTALS 147 135 1 I i l i 1 I i i t i
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; Dynamic Simulation Documtnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rasults Raport Revision: 0 i Date: August 1985 Table 3.3.3.2-4 Number of Times Reactor Operator Answered Questions or Confirmed Information t ,
I a j Without SPDS With SPDS b
- s 1 ,
Level of , 4 Scenario } Complexity Team A Team B Team A Team B 4
, Simple 29 13 10 14 1
-l Moderate 12 23 13 24 i Complex 7 27 15 11 TOTALS 111 87 , I f 6 4 l i i N 1 i i - 4
f Dynr.mic Si::.ulation Docum nt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rssults Raport Ravision: 0 Date: August 1985 . Table 3,3.3.2-5 NUMBER OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SHIFT D ERVISOR AND OTHER TEAM MEMBERS TEAM B Without With Scenario SPDS SPDS Simple Give Directions 9 7 Request Info. 13 10 Give Info. 2 0 Confirm / answer 7 5 31 22 Moderate Give Directions 10 10 Request Info. 16 10 Give Info. 3 1 Confirm / answer 5 4 34 25 O Complex Give Directions 10 13 Request Info. 5 7 Give Info. 2 6 Confirm / answer 2 5 19 31 Total Communications -84 78 O
~ . ~ . - - - - . - . .- - -. _ . . -. . -. -. . - ~ . - . - - . ..
l Dynamic Simulation Docuatnt Not SPDS-DST-002
- -Test Results Report Revision
- 0 -
j- Date: August 1985 1 .
4.0 CONCLUSION
S: I !1 The V&V Team has reached the following conclusions-as a result of ] performing the Dynamic Simulation Test: I
- Conclusion fl. ;
4 i The Dynamic Simulation Test accomplished the objectives as set forth in the' Dynamic Simulation Test Plan. I { The V&V Team has concluded that the DST was a valid test
. in that the Test Objectives were well defined and the Test results were predictable and realistic.
- j. ,
- Conclusion.#2 The SPDS has been successfully implemented in a manner which
- is consistent with the performance objective of NUCLENET. I 1
, SPDS does not interfere with the Operating Team's ability to j control the plant nor does it change or require him to learn , new man-machine interface techniques. The acknowledgement of 1 CSF alarms has been conveniently blended into the existing pushbutton hardware functions. ;
1 l Conclusion #3 a , The performance of the SPDS is adequate to meet the system j design objectives: } The SPDS is a valuable tool in the detection of CSP j alarms and the identification of'EOP entry conditions. j The SPDS consolidates indications of the plant' safety i status-into concise displays which are easily j comprehended and provide a quick overview of the CSFs. - The SPDS promoted and enhanced the exchange of vital - information among the Operating Team and improved their awareness of plant status. The SPDS was more beneficial, as the complexity of the Scenarios increased. The SPDS facilitates the Operator's determination of stabilized plant conditions. Conclusion #4 + l SPDS has been implemented with a high degree of Human - Factors Engineering to optimize the man-machine interface (e.g. displays, selection and alarm
- acknowledgement).
l SPDS has been designed and modified to incorporate the i . consistent use of colors, shapes and patterns in accordance with the color code and Human Factors 4 [ Engineering principles exemplified throughout the Main l Control Room.
,-4,,m- vm., ,n.-w>m,--,--,,eswmn n . m m-m ., w r- A - , n ,,w .~,e-~ ~ . , - , -w,w,- <---++---.-man n-, , - ,-.g-r ,m----m.--4.= ~ea r '-
. . - . . , - . . ~ ._ - . - . _>~.-w, .. -. - +_. .- a - >
+ Dynamic Sinulation Documtnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test R2 cults Rtport Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 The summary display crd the three support displays are , well designed and easily cocprehensible. Conclusion #5 The Operating Team participants accepted the SPDS as a valuable operating tool. r
5.0 REFERENCES
- 1. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities, NUREG-0696. -
- 2. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Clarification of TMI
; Action Plan Requirements, NUREG-0737.
- 3. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Supplement I to NUREG-0737, Requirements for Emergency Response Capability.
, (Generic Letter No. 82-33), December 17, 1982.
1
- 4. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Human Factors Acceptance Criteria for the Safety Parameter Display System. Draft Report, NUREG-0835, June, 1982, i'
- 5. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and i
Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident, Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2, December,1980. t
- 6. C. B. Johnson, F. S. Mollerus, L.: A. Carmichael. Fundamental Safety Parameter Set for Boiling Water Reactors. Nuclear Safety Analysis Center Report NSAC 21, December 1980.
- 7. DPS Verification and Validation Plan for SPDS. Illinois Power
! Company, October 19, 1983. I
- 8. Illinois Power Company Letter U-600171 from F. A~~ Spangenberg to W. R. Butler. " CPS SPDS Dynamic Simulation Test Plan."
I - July 9, 1985. i
- 9. Illinois Power Company Letter U-0676 from R. M. Nelson to j
A. Schwencer (NRC). " CPS SPDS Verification and Validation ! Program Plan." October 28, 1983.
- 10. CPS SPDS Requirements Document. Revision 2, Illinois Power Company, July 23, 1985.
- 11. CPS SPDS Design Document. Revision 3, Illinois Power Company,
- July 23, 1985.
l 12. T. L. Riley, P. F. Telthorst. Evaluation of SPDS using the l Emergency Operating Procedures in Walkthroughs of Selected Accident Scenarios." Illinois Power Company, March, 1985. 1 Dynamic Simulation Docursnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Tsat Rscults Rsport Revision: 0
, Date: August 1985
- 13. Illinois Power Company Letter U-0771, from F. A. Spangenberg
'Ol to A. Schwencer. " CPS SPDS Response to NRC Preimplementatio'n Audit Findings." CPS SPDS Corrective Action Plan. December I i 21, 1984 I
- 14. CPS Emergency Procedure Guidelines. CPS No. 1450.00 CPS Preparation, Review. and Approval of Station Procedures and Documents. CPS No. 10050.01 CPS Emergency Operating Procedures:
a) Level Control - Emergency 4401.01 b) Containment Control - Emergency 4402.01 c) Cooldown - Emergency 4403.01 d) Reactivity Control - Emergency 4404.01 e) Combustible Gas Control (to be written) , f) Secondary Containment / Radiation Release Control - - Emergency 4406.01 -
- 15. General Electric Company. " Simulator Evaluation of the BWR Owner's Group (BWROG) Graphic Display Systems (GDS)".
Document number DE83-015160, May,1983.
- 16. The Singer Company. " Malfunction Causes and Effects Report for the Clinton Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Simulator."
Report Number N75-50-02-02, April 28,1983.
- 17. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Standard Review Plan,
, Safety Parameter Display System. NUREG-0800, Revision 0, November, 1984.
0 0 O
Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 APPENDIX A DYNAMIC SIMULATION TEST PLAN
?
eum O I l ILLIN0IS POWER COMPANY g
, ,--, . - - . - - - - , , - . , - - - - - , -- -,. ,---...-,----,,..c ----------.-,-.---,a----
Drcument No.: SPDS-DST-001 Ravicion: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 O
~
ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY CLINTON POWER STATION SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM DYNAMIC SIMULATION TEST PLAN REVISION 0 Prepared by: V MP M Date: 6/86 S S V&f/ Team '
/
Reviewed b . A Date: IS' O / Nuclear Training '
/
Reviewed by [ _e_ h Date: 0[/ 85' SPDS Project Manager Reviewed by: . Date: t b-8
' P1'arit Operations Approved by: Ms / Date:[# [S SP V&V Projectpnager /
T l i O
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l_ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ , . - - -. - - - - -- '~ '~ ' ~ ~ ^ ' ^
i Document No.: SPDS-DST-001 Ravision: 0 ! Date: June 13, 1985 . Clinton Power Station SPDS Dynamic Simulation Test Plan i i } ) Table of Contents s l Section a Page } l' L i 1.0 SCOPE OF DYNAMIC SIMULATION TEST 1-1 1
2.0 BACKGROUND
PERSPECTIVE 2-1 l i 3.0 TEST METHODOLOGY 3-1 . 1 j 3.1 Scenario Selection Process 3-2 i 3.2 Shift Complement Utilized 3-4 3.3 Test Evaluators & Functions 3-5 4 i 3.4 Simulation Data Gathering & Equipment 3-6 i i l
. 3.5 Test Conduct 3-7 '
3.6 Test Evaluation Criteria 3-8 ? l 4.0
SUMMARY
4-1 l t a 1 i i 4 l 1 i i t 1 i a l t . ; l l l p w -,w,----- -- , ,,,,-n- ,,w-w.-.--e -- ,-,m,,,-me----.~,e-~v,--- .n,~. eve-w--a,- - , , , - - , , ~ ~. ,-v----ew-----e,--, ,wa- w,------,-- , - -,- -
i Decument Ns.: SPDS-DST-001 Revision: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 1.0 SCOPE OF DYNAMIC SIMULATION TEST The objective of the Clinton Power Station (CPS) Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) is to provide a concise display of critical plant variables (categorized according to Critical Safety Functions (CSFs)) to the Main Control Room (MCR) operators to aid them in rapidly and reliably assessing the safety status of the plant. The CPS SPDS has been implemented as part of the Plant Process Computer System, which is an integral part of the NUCLENET control room design. The SPDS has been designed to meet the requirements of NUREG-0737. Supplement #1, using the guidance specified in NUREG-0800, " Standard Review Plan". Section 18.2. This document describes the purpose, scope, performance and evaluation methods for the SPDS Dynamic Simulation Test (DST). The DST will be performed using the CPS Simulator. Such testing is to be performed ) under the requirements of the' SPDS Verification and Validation (V&V) j Program Plan, as approved for CPS. The primary purpose of the SPDS DST is to demonstrate, through " man-in-the-loop" simulations, that the design objectives of the SPDS have been met at CPS. The primary objective will be fulfilled by running simula-tor scenarios and viewing operator responses both with and without SPDS. The decision to perform such testing is a result ~ of concerns identified by the NRC Staff during the December 1984 SPDS Design Verification Audit. These concerns have been resolved by implementing several design O, modifications to the CPS SPDS. Design modifications to the SPDS display formats, human factors enhancements, and a reevaluation of the SPDS Parameter Set constitute the primary changes which have been made. The DST will meet the following objectives:
- 1. Verify that the information presented on the four CPS SPDS displays does not preclude the MCR operator from safely shutting down the plant;
- 2. Assess SPDS impact upon MCR personnel in Critical Safety Function Problem detection / resolution and execution of the action steps specified in the CPS Emergency Operating Procedures;
- 3. Observe and evaluate the proposed CPS MCR staffing interaction with the SPDS under dynamic plant conditions; 4 Evaluate the relationship between the SPDS displayed information and information available elsewhere in the MCR and how the operators utilize this relationship; and
- 5. Obtain operator feedback on the usefulness of the SPDS in performing emergency response actions in the MCR.
The results of thest tests will be evaluated to ensure the test fG objectives were accomplished and to analyze the usefulness of the SPDS. j \ _) A separate test results report will be generated to docucent the DST evaluation. 1-1
Decument No.: SPDS-DST-001 R vision: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 2.0 BACKCROUND PERSPECTIVE
' V The performance of the SPDS DST has been documented as a requirement of the V&V program in the following:
- 1. CPS Doctment No. SPDS-RD-101, " Safety Parameter Display System Requirements Document, Revision 2", Section 4.2.4; and
- 2. CPS Document No. SPDS-DD-102, " Safety Parameter Display System Design Document, Revision 2", Section 6.3.
The DST represents the implementation of these program requirements. The requirements for SPDS in Supplement I to NUREG-0737 Section~4, are:
- a. The SPDS should provide a concise display of critical plant variables to the control room operators to aid them in rapidly and reliably determining the safety status of the plant.
Although the SPDS will be operated during normal operations as well as during abnormal conditions, the principal purpose and function of the SPDS is to aid the control room personnel during abnormal and emergency conditions in determining the safety status of the plant and in assessing whether abnormal conditions wat ant corrective action by operatcrs to avoid further plant degradation. This can be particularly important during transients Ond the initial phase of an accident.
- b. Each operating reactor shall be provided with a Safety Parameter Display Systen. that is located convenient to the control operators. This system will continuously display information from which the plant safety status can be readily and reliably assessed by control room persennel.
- c. The control room instrumentation required (see General Design Criteria 13 and 19 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50) provides the operators with the information necessary for safe reactor operation under normal, transient, and accident conditions.
The SPDS is used in addition to the basic components and serves to aid and augment these components. Thus, requirements applicable to control room instrumentation are not needed for this augmentation (e.g., CDC 2, 3, 4 in l Appendix A; 10 CFR 100; single-failure requirements). The SPDS need not meet requirements of the single-failure criteria and it need not be qualified to meet Class IE requirements. The SPDS shall be suitably isolated from electrical or electronic interference with equipment and sensors that are in j use for safety systems. The SPDS need not be seismically qualified, and additional seismically qualified indication is not required for the sole purpose of being a backup for SPDS. I v 2-l' i l l . . . -. . . . . . . _ _ . . . . . .. ..
3 Drcument Na.: SPDS-DST-001 Ravicien: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 Procedures which describe the timely and correct safety status O assessment when the SPDS is and is not available, will be developed by the licensee in parallel with the SPDS. Furthermore, operators should be trained to respond to
- accident conditions both with and without the SPDS available.
1 i
- d. There is a wide range of useful information that can be provided by various systems. This information is reflected in such staff documents as NUREC-0835, and Regulatory Guide 1.97.
Prompt Laplementation of an SPDS can provide an important contribution to plant safety. The selection of specific i information that should be provided for a particular plant j shall be based on engineering judgement of individual plant licensees, taking into account the importance of prompt implementation.
- e. The SPDS display shall be designed to incorporate accepted human factors principles so that the displayed information can
'be readily perceived and comprehended by SPDS users.
- f. The minimum information to be provided shall be sufficient to j provide information to plant operators about:
(i) Reactivity control (ii) Reactor core cooling and heat removal from the 4 primary system I (iii) Reactor coolant system integrity (iv) Radioactivity control , (v) Containment conditions 5
)
The specific parameters to be displayed shall be determined by the licensee. I The elements of the DST plan described in Sections 3.0-3.6 shall evaluate the adequacy of the SPDS design in terms of these primary requirements. This testing shall fulfill the objectives recommended by the NRC Staff during the December 1984 SPDS Design Verification Audit. !O . 2-2 i . . . . i
- Drcument No.: SPDS-DST-001^
Revisien: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 DST va an for SPDS on the CPS Simulator will involve several distinct phases. The following describes the content of each phase in the sequence in which it will occur: Phase I - DST Development. V&V Team Personnel, in coordination with Nuclear Training and SPDS Program Management, will develop the DST scenarios, (see Section 3.1 for details of this process), assign test evalustots (V6V Team Personnel, two instructors from the Nuclear Training Department, and personnel trained in Human Factors), establish final evaluation criteria, and develop
' final details for the conduct of this test. During this phase, the evaluation and checklist methodology for the testing will be developed.
Phase II - Preparation for DST (Test Shakedown).
, Eight hours of CPS Simulator time will be reserved for the , following preliminaries:
- 1. Test ability to videotape scenarios;
- 2. Trials of microphone placement; O 3. Evaluate ability of CPS Simulator to accurately produce chosen scenarios; 4 Familiarise test evaluators with' the " Evaluation Log Sheets" and checklist for test conduct;
- 5. Familiarise test evaluators, trainers, and human factors personnel, with expected operator response actions; and
- 6. Secure clock, clipboards, and miscellaneous equipment required for the test.
Essentially, this phase will result in familiarization, test readiness and ensure hardware availability. Phase III - Performance of the DST. Eight hours of simulator time will be reserved for performance of the SPDS DST. Two MCR shif t teams (5 personnel per team - 1 Ro (control board operator], 1 RO (controlling the NUCLENET panel and observing the SPDS), 1 SRO (acting as the Assistant Shift Supervisor / Control Room Supervisor], 1 SRO (acting as the-Shift Supervisor] and 1 Shif t Technical Advisor (STA]) will participate in the DST. Each team will be given the same six O .
- i. 3-1 e
i
i i ' Document No.: SPDS-DST-001 {) Revision: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 ] scenarios (3 with SPDS and 3 [different ones] without SPDS). L Each team will receive 5 hours on the simulator and 3 hours in ! the classroom evaluating the results and completing feedback }' j questionnaires. The conduct of the DST is discussed in detail in Section 3.5 and thus is not repeated here. i
\
). Phase IV - Evaluation of Test Results. t i l j The operator response during the selected scenarios will be reviewed (both with and without SPDS) to determine the adequacy and usefulness of the SPDS, Evaluation criteria to .
- be used in this phase are identified and discussed in Section !
{ 3.6 of this report and thus are not repeated here. The test evaluator participants, consisting of V&V Team i personnel, the Nuclear Trai*ing n Department instructors, and j Human Factors' personnel, will perform this evaluation. i The bulk of these evaluations will be performed immediately ! after the DST is completed to maximize the validity of the ! i resulting conclusions. ! s
~
3.1 Scenario Selection Process The scenarios for the SPDS DST will be chosen using the following 4 selection criteria: 1 3
- 1. The scenarios, as a group, shall result in at least one alarm i actuation for each of the SPDS Critical Safety Tunctions j (CSTs). The SPDS CSFs are listed below, along with their associated CPS Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP):
CSF Affected Procedure i I. i Level Control (LVL) No. 4401.01, " Level Control - Emergency" I t { Containment Control (CNMT) No. 4402.01, " Containment l { Control - Emergency: 4, l { None No. 4403.01, "Cooldown - ' ] Emergency" ! i
- Reactivity Control No. 4404.01 " Reactivity
) (RCTT) Control - Emergency" , Hydrogen control No. 4405.01, " Combustible cas j (H2-GAS) Control - Emergency" } l i f i j 3-2 ' \ D
l i l l D:cument No.: SPDS-DST-001 l Revision: 0 l 1 Date: June 13, 1985 Radiation Release No. 4406.01, " Secondary Cnat. / ~ Control (RAD) Radiation Release Control - Emergency". All CSFs, with the exception of "H2-GAS" (the E0P for this has i i not yet been implemented at CPS), will be tested; .
- 2. Each CPS E0P shall be exercised (with the exception of No. 4405.01). This will ensure that a large portion of the required operator action steps will be exercised and evaluated;
- 3. Interfaces with other 4fCR instruments and controls shall be included in each scenario package. In particular, the action taken upon an " invalid" data indication on the SPDS shall be evaluated;
- 4. Scenarios shall be developed to test multiple equipment failures. This will allow evaluation of operator contingency actions as related to the SPDS Secondary Displays;
- 5. Scenario sequences shall be developed to include time-dependent operator action. This criteria allows for an evaluation of liov rapidly the SPDS information can be assessed;
- 6. Operator " team-dependent" actions will be included in the scenario packages. An analysis of the interface between members of the operating team can then be performed; and
- 7. Scenario Limitations - the following limitations shall be placed on each scenario:
Must be simulatable - i.e., with*in the current capabilities of the CPS simulator, as designed; Must permit safe plant shutdown from the MCR (i.e., the Remote Shutdown Panel shall not be included in this testing); Scenarios involving severely degraded cores shall not be developed (such event sequences are too complex for the given time constraints, may not be simulatable, and recovery actions may not be fully accountable within the current procedural framework); and The response to each scenario shall be in accordance with current plant design capabilities. Once the scenario packages have been developed, each will be categorized in terms of the corresponding level of complexity (defined both in terms of the required operator action and the potential risk to plant safety), as follows: 3-3 .
l DecumInt No.: SPDS-DST-001 Revision: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 i (1) Simple l These scenarios are generally of the type classified as
" anticipated plant transients". Examples of such events include a Loss of Condenser Vacuum and a Recirculation Pump Trip without additional major complications or equipment failures. .
(2) Moderate - l These scenarios are generally of the type classified as
" abnormal plant transients". Examples of such events include a Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure with a Stuck Open Relief 3 Valve and a Feedwater Runout with an Automatic Depressurization and Low Pressure Core Cooling unavailable for some period of ti=e. . (3) Complex These events are generally classified as " accidents" due to their level of complexity in terms of both operator response and,the potential risk to plant safety. _ Examples of such scenarios include Anticipated Transients Without Scram - coincident with a Loss of Main Condenser and a Loss of Offsite Power coincident with a Loss of Coolant Accident.
' A total of six scenarios shall be chosen, with two scenarios in each of the categories defined above (one with SPDS available and one without SPDS). The scenarios will be limited to 0.5 hours in length.
! 3.2 Shift complement Utilized The Plant Operations and Technical Departments shall provide for the operating teams to perform the DST. The scenarios will be given in two groups of operators, a Team A and a Team B. Each team shall be composed of the following trained individuals:
l One (1) certified Reactor Operator - will serve as control board operator; One (1) certified Reactor Operator - serving as the NUCLENET
, panel and SPDS operator; i
- One (1) SRO certified Assistant Shif t Supervisor / Control
' Room Supervisor.
One (1) SRO certified Shift Supervisor; and
'One (1) Shift Technical Advisor (STA).
This represents the expected staf fing level for the CPS MCR during postulated plant accident / transient conditions. Use of these manning ' levels for the DST should enhance the validity of the tested response and simulates the expected realistic interface with the SPDS displays. Each operator team shall be given the six (6) simulated accident / i , transient events, as programmed into the simulator, and their response 3-4
. - - - , - _, _ m , ,- . - , _ .
\-
4 l Document No.: SPDS-DST-001 1 Revision: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 actions (3 with SPDS and 3 [different ones] without) will be evaluated l s, )i) with respect to the usefulness of the SPDS under the postulated plant conditions. j i
)
Each operator team shall ecaplete a feedback questionnaire (see Section 3.6 for details) on the advantages / disadvantages of the SPDS and will participate in a follow-up discussion of their responses from the
. simulator tests immediately af ter completion of the schnario packages:
3.3 Test Evaluators and Functions The DST Evaluators shall include the following personnel:
- l. V&V Team Personnel T. L. Riley - V&V Proj ect Manager l Licensing Project Engineer-SPDS T. Y. Fukushima (S. Levy, Inc.) - SPDS V&V / Design Background Human Factors for SPDS Plant Systems Background Computer Systems Background 3 A. E. Moersfelder - Consultant V&V Program Manager i
(CYGNA Energy Services) Computer Systems Background Plant Systems Background s R. B. Porter - Consultant. V&V Project Engineer (CYGNA Energy Services) Computer Systems Background Plant Systems Background I P. J. Telthorst - Licensing Project Engineer SPDS Human Factors
, Plant Systems Background 2
i
- 2. Nuclear Training Department The Nuclear Training Department shall provide two (2) instructors knowledgeable in the operation of the CPS Simulator, plant systems, Emergency Operating Procedures, and the SPDS.
In addition, the Training Department shall provide the following engineer: A. Validivia - Control and Instrumentation Engineer SPDS Design and Programming for the Simulator i l During the running of the scenario packages, test evaluators shall record notes on log sheets. These log sheets will be developed and included in the DST Results Report. At the conclusion of each scenario, l . ) 3-5
=
- l Dscumest No.
- SPDS-DST-001 Revision: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 I
- and prior to proceeding to the next scenario, evaluators shall rate the operator performance based upon the Test Evaluation Criteria discussed in Section 3.6.
l The final evaluation of the scenario ratings shall be the responsibility of the SPDS V6V Team. These ratings shall be recorded for future i , evaluation of the test results..
! Comments made by the members of each operating team tested will be discussed with the test evaluators in a debriefing session immediately after completion of the scenario packages. Operator comments on specific actions taken, decisions made, and the usefulness of the SPDS will be
! reviewed later by the test evaluators, and a comparison will be made to ascertain whether th's original rating needs modification. The training instructors will each complete an " Instructor Corrective ! ! Action" form for each of the six scenario packages. This form will be developed and included in the DST Results Report. Example information 1 to be identified on this form is as follows: - 3 Plant variables / Entry conditions - ) ' Entry conditions of the plant variables that would exceed 1 their safety limits during the transient. ; ) * ! Emergency Procedure step related to the action required. The required operator action to be taken. a Instructor Intervention Points. . e j ) This set of checklists shall be developed for instructor intervention ' i during the execution of the transients, in case the operator responses to the event deviate widely from that called for by the procedures. These I l intervention points are designed to allow sufficient margin for operator action, and are only used when no action or the wrong action on the part of the operators would adversely impact the successful completion of the transient / accident scenario. This will keep each scenario within the same framework, enhancin's consistent evaluation. 3.4 Simulation Data Gathering and Equipment 'l j The following DST equipment. list shall be utilized during the performance of this test progran. Explanatory notes are provided where 4 considered appropriate: Item Number i 4 3 Reason 1 1. Clock 1 Timeline on videotape ' k
- 2. Videotape Camera 2 i Record Scenarios for r future evaluations.
[g / 3. Monitor 1 Review of tape results. 4 i , 3-6. 2
. . - - _ . ._ - . .- . _ _ = . _ - - _ _ . -- ._ - - __. _- _-
Document No.: SPDS-DST-001 ' Revision: 0 , Date: June 13, 1985 l ! .O 4. Videotape Cassettes 6 , . 5. Microphones 2 Record operating team (oscidirectional) conversations
- 6. Test Evaluator Log 75 Record events and actions.
Sheetr - -
- 7. Clipboards 7 ,
! 8. Evaluator Rating Scales 3 4
- 9. Videotape Recorder 2
[ 10. Camera Tripod 2 i i
- 11. Simulator Computer 1 To record scenario data.
- 12. Tape Recorders 2
- 13. Audio Tapes 2 The data from these sources of information will be gathered and tabulated in the DST Results Report. Videotaping of- the scenarios will allow review after the test to ensure the ratings and subsequent '
evaluations are correct and complete . 3.5 Test Conduct . Section 3.0 ' defines four (4) Phases to .the DST Plan. Phase I and II are preparatory in nature and will not be discussed in detail here. r Prior to this test, the plant operators will be trained (classroom and simulator) on the current SPDS design. Nuclear Training shall be responsible for developing SPDS Lesson Plans and ensuring this training
' is completed. The success of this test is dependent upon ec=pletion of the SPDS training. The V&V Team shall monitor this training program to ensure appropriate objectives are met in preparation for the DST.
Prior to performing the test, the operator teams will be briefed on the purpose, scope and conduct of the DST. This briefing will-familiarize the operators to the importance of the DST and will aid in relaxing any pre-test tension on their part. It will be emphasized to the operations personnel participating in the test their performance abilities are not 4 being tested here. Phase III of the DST involves the actual performance of the test for the SPDS. In this Phase, scenarios will be run in a predetermined order. Each operator team' vill see all six (6) scenario packages. Three (3) scenarios will be run with the SPDS available and three (3) scenarios will be run without the SPDS available. f , 3-7
,- v. , ,,-r ,, -, _ . , - - , , ~ .w . . _ _ . , 4-_, __---._-,m e--.m--s e w-- - - --, -.,-, - - -w
Dscument No.: SPDS-DST-001
- Revision: 0 , Date: June 13, 1985 Ai '( ) Scenario packages will be run for a period of 0.5 hours each.
Evaluators will record notes on the Test Evaluator Log Sheets. These log sheets will be developed later and included in the DST Results Report. At the conclusion of each scenario, test evaluators will rate the performance based upon the Scenario Evaluation Guidance identified in Section 3.6 of this report. Transients will also be videotaped.
, recorded for sound and have data captured on the Simulator for later ', evaluation.
Upon completion of the scenario packages, Phase IV of the DST beginse The operator teams vill view the videotapes and audio recordings. ,Each operator will be offered the opportunity to comment on his specific l actions, decisions, etc., in relationship to what is shown on the
- recorded events. Specific comments regarding the usefulness of the SPDS during the tested scenarios will be particularly solicited. This I narration will be done on a separate tape recorder. This information
?
will be reviewed later, and a comparison will be made to ascertain j whether the original scenario ratings need modification. - The last hour of the follow-on debriefing with the operator team members
' will be used for operators to fill out a questionnaire (see Section 3.6) regarding the usefulness of the SPDS. The operators will be asked to rate the questionnaire itself as part of this process.
During the conduct of the DST, the V&V Project Manager shall perform the () function of a-Scenario Leader. Any questions from the Test Evaluators (and/or the operators, for those to which the evaluator cannot respond) which might invalidate the scenario package or affect the test results should b'e directed to the Scenario Leader. Discussion among Test evaluators and among the operating team members and the evaluators should be kept to a minimum (except during instructor intervention - in these cases the discussion should be crisp and clear). This will allow the scenario to proceed without affecting the operating crew being tested or their corresponding response actions. Normal discussion
& between operating crew members will be encouraged.
3.6 Test Evaluation Criteria Following completion of the DST and the subsequent operator debriefing sessions, the test data vill be gathered and tabulated by the V&V Team. Test data includes the following:
- 1. Test Evaluator Log Sheets;
- 2. Instructor Intervention Checklists;
- 3. Scenario Videotapes and Audio Recordings; 4
Notes from the follow-on operator debriefings;
- 5. Scenario Packages; and
- 6. Completed Operator Feedback Questionnaires.
(} 1 3-8 l C
Document No.: SPDS-DST-001 Revision: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 [~' As noted in Section 3.4, the instructors will complete the ratings from
'( the checklists in item #2 above, using the Scenario Evaluation Criteria, immediately following each scenario package. The Scenario Evaluation Criteria are as follows:
Rating Range Description 3.6 - 4.0 No instructor intervention a~nd no questions asked of instructor. Optimum coordination and system usage was noted. Operating Team always knew plant statust-3.2 - 3.6 No instructor intervention. Some questions asked of instructor. Good coordination and system usage. Operating Team always knew plant status. 2.8 - 3.2 Minimal instructor intervention. Some
+
questions asked of instructor. Overall good coordination and system usage. Generally knew plant status. 2.5 - 2.8 Moderate instructor intervention. Frequent questions asked of the instructor. Fair coordination and system usage. Operating Team knowledge of plant status was weak on occasion. 1.8 - 2.5 Frequent instructor intervention. Frequent
~ questions asked of the instructor. Little coordination. System usage not effective.
Often unaware of plant status. 0.0 - 1.8 . Constant intervention and questioning. Response not coordinated. Systems were improperly used. Most times unaware of plant status. The SPDS V&V Team will assign the final ratings based upon a review of the Instructor Intervention Checklists, discussions with the
. instructors, and discussions with the Test Evaluators.
The scenario padage scores shall be weighted according to their cor.plexity (as defined in Secticn 3.1). The weighting factors to be app!ied shall be detemined later, prior to performance of the DST. The weighted scenario ratings will then be summed and nomalized to the 0 - 4.0 scale for final evaluation purposes. This weighting, summing and normalizing process will be performed for the scores fron each operator team evaluated and according to whether or not the SPDS was available or unavailable. Thus, for a given operator team, with a set- ; of six (6) scenario scores, the three (3) scores with SPDS available ! will be weighted summed and normalized, and likewise for the three (3) i scores involving those scenarios where SPDS is not available for operator use.
~
3-9 e l
^ ~" ~ - ~ ~ ~ '~ ~~ ^~~^
it t il - ' ' I! Dtcument No.: SPDS-DST-001 !! Ravicion: 0 Date: June 13,.1985 2s} The final weighted and nocaciized scores between the scenarios with SPDS and those without SPDS will then be compared to determine the net impact due to the SPDS on the operator responses. Generally speaking, high overall scores (on the 0 - 4.0 scale) and a positive delta (overall score with SPDS minus the score without SPDS) will be indicative of an SPDS that has met its design objectives. Low overall scores and/or negative deltas will be evaluated further to allow a determination of
, the root cause as it relates to the SPDS design function.
In addition to the evaluations and ratings identified above, the
- operators will each be given an SPDS Feedback Questionnaire. This j
questionnaire will solicit operator comments on the following example aspects of the CPS SPDS:
- 1. Overall usefulness in the scenarios tested;
- 2. Display selection capabilities and alarm silence functions -
was the design adequate for MCR usage;
- 3. Which display formats were most preferred; 4
SPDS Critical Safety Functions - were the alarms / setpoints useful for E0P entry condition monitoring; i 5. Is there any parameter information that should have been found on all displays but wasn't;
/
- 6. Was the plant pictorial representation and other human factors aspects of the SPDS useful in finding information; and
- 7. ,Is the questionnaire a valid one or can it be improved?
4
~ The operator response to these and other questions shall rdceive a detailed evaluation to assist in the determination if the SPDS meets its design objectives. These responses will be considered in future system design enhancements that may be appropriate for the SPDS. Human Factors consideration of the operator responses to these questions will be necessary to ensure consistent evaluation. The responses will be kept confidential in that the, individual operator comments will be unknown to the V&V Team and others. The overall responses will be tabulated and -documented in the DST Results Report.
1 l 1 3-10 I,
- a ~ - Decument No: SPDS-DST-001 4
Revision: 0 Date: June 13, 1985 4.0
SUMMARY
The Clinton SPDS Dynanic Simulation Test Plan described herein should demonstrate that the SPDS design objectives have been met. The results of these tests will be tabulated and documented in the DST Results Report. 1 .
. l i
l i i I i i J' I i 4-1 .
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4 Dynamic Simulation Document Not SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 t APPENDIX B + 2
*B.1 Summary of SPDS Scenarios , 'B.2 Dynamic Simulation Test Checklist (initial conditions and simulator malfunctions for each scenario) *B.3 Trend Recorder Pen Assignment Summary *B 4 Trend Recorder Parameter Charts ; *B.5 Trend Recorder Parameter Data Table r
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t i }' Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002
- . Test Results-Report Revision
- 0 l Date: August 1985 a
O
~
i i. , i l' 1 , 4 f i I . J APPENDIX B.1 ! w
SUMMARY
OF SPDS SCENARIOS i j i : i l ( i I i ( l I ! i e . .; } i a ?. l i 4 0 -
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O O O Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 Appendix B.1 Page 1 of 4 Table B.1 Summary of SPDS Scenarios Scenario Complexity Initial Conditions Initiating Event (s) Subsequent Events
#1 Small leak Simple '94% Rx Power *Inadvertant "At time t = 5 min.
in the Dry- *Both trains DW Main Steam a small instrument well follow- Cooling avai- 1 solation line leak in DW ing a reactor lable Valve (MSIV) occurs, isolation. ' Suppression Pool Closure (4 *At time t = 15 min. (GDS Event Temperature =90*F valves drift the MSlV closure
#4A)
- Motor Driven closed @ 35%/sec) malfunction is Feedwater Pump removed (this would inoperative allow operators to (unknown .to reopen MSIVs and operators) and re-establish Main will not start Condensor as heat on demand sink)
#2 Loss of DW Simple '94% Rx Power " Turbine Generator *At time t = 15 secs.
Cooling *Both Trains DW Trip due to amphe- a loss of all DW Following cooling availa- nol connector Cooling (both Trains a reactor ble, failure. A & B) occurs, isolation
- Suppression Pool Temp.-90*F.
' Loss of EHC Hydraulics (operators were unaware of this malfunction which results in all Turbine Bypass Valves to fail ,,
closed).
t
) O Dynamic Simulation- Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 Appendix B.1 ,
Page 2 of 4 Table B.1 Summary of SPDS Scenarios , e Scenario Complexity Initial Conditions Initiating Event (s) Subsequent Events
#3 Recirculation Moderate '94% Rx Power.
- Design Basis *Div.II 4.16KV Suction Line ' Suppression Pool Accident-Recircu- Bus Overcurrent Break with Loss Temperature =90*F. lation Suction Trip @ t=10 secs.
of Division *RHR/A Pump out of Line Guillotine *Div.II Diesel II Power. (CDS service (tagged Break. Generator failure Event #1B) out), to start @ t=10
*An RHR/A pump secs. " failure to start"
- Recover Div.II simulator malfunc- Power to 4.16KV tion is also inserted Bus @ t=20 mins.
to avoid auto-actua-tion of the system. .
#4 Inadvertant Moderate '94% Rx Power. 'Inadvertant open-
- Design Basis Opening of an
- Suppression Pool ing of an SRV occurs Accident-Recircu-SRV with a Temp. =90*F. when Suppression Pool lation Suction i Subsequent "Special SRV Temp. is about 105*F- Line Break @ t=2 mins.
Recirculation Testing in progress Valve Sticks open or less (depending on and will not close. . operator action with stuck open SRV). G b
Dynamic Simulation- . Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0 <
- Date: August 1985 Appendix B.1 Page 3 of 4 Table B.1 Summary of SPDS Scenarios Scenario Complexity Ig; 8.a1 Conditions Initiating Event (s) Subsequent Events l
#5 Failure to Complex '94% Rx Power. .
- Scram Discharge 'CRD Pump A (opera- l Scram with " Suppression Pool Volume Vent & ting pump) fails @ L Turbine-Generator Temp. =90*F. Drain Valves fail t=30 secs.
Trip following *CRD Pump B has closed. 'A Turbine-Generator Scram Discharge failed (this is
- Auto / Manual Control Trip occurs @ t=3 mins.
Volume Isolation the standby pump Rod Insertion Fail- 30 secs. so the operators ure occurs. concur- " Loss of EHC Hydraulics i are unaware of this rently. O t=7 mins (this results f condition). 'Two Control Rods in all Turbine Bypass !
*HPCS is out of have leaking Scram Valves failing closed).
service (tagged out) Valves. This occurs [
*A HPCS " failure to concurrently with '
autostart" Simulator the above. malfunction is also inserted to avoid later auto-actuation l of the system.
, .,- .a - - _,- - - -
Dynamic Simulation - Document No: SPDS-DST-002
- Test Results Report Revision
- 0 Date: August 1985 Appendix B.1 Page 4 of 4 Table B.1 '
Summary of SPDS Scenarios 1 l Scenario Complexity _ Initial Conditions Initiating Event (s) Subsequent Events
#6 Loss of Feed- Complex '94% Rx Power. *RCIC Steamline
- Loss of TDRFPs @ t=
vater Flow with
- Suppression Pool Break in Second- 1 min.
Failure of High Temp, = 90*F. ary Containment. *A trip of the Pressure Makeup *HPCS tagged out "A HPCS " failure to Condensate Booster Systems (GDS of service. autostart" Simula- Pumps @ t = 1 min. Event flC) *RCIC full-flow tor malfunction is testing in pro- also inserted to gress, avoid later auto-actuation of the system.
"A MDRFP trip Simu-lator malfunction is also inserted to avoid later actua-tion.
I t 4 9
V i 1- Dynamic Simulation-_ Document No: SPDS-DST-002 i Test Results Report j Revision: 0- i j- Date: August 1985 1 ( i l'e , i I i , i t ! APPENDIX B.2 ! I ' i Dynamic Simulation Test Checklist I (initial conditions and simulator i j malfunctions for each scenario) i ? I i 4 h i 1 s
- i r
0 L } 4 3 i e b i I i , i i
- 9 l !
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4 i ? I f i i i f i@ 1
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l ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY \ 1
- I l:
l l CLINTON POWER STATION DYNAMIC SIMULATION TEST CHECKLIST s DATE:__________ TIME:_________ SIGNATURE: -_____ ______--__--_____-__ EVENT #_______ RUN # ________ EVENT DESCRIPTION: ----_----------------------_----__-__--------------- VALUE OR CHECKED INITIAL SIMULATOR TIME MALFUNCTION
- 1. INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- a. Reactor Power ----_ ___-_______ __--
- b. Suppression Pool Temperature -__-- ______-____ _-_-
- c. ________--_---_--____________--_ -____ ---________ ----
- d. ____---___----------_---_--_____ _____ --_-__-__-- __--
~ e. --------_------_---___-------_-- ----- --_-_---___ -___
E. ------_-__------------_-_-----_- ----- __--__----- ----
- 2. INITIATING EVENT (S):
- a. -- --_--___-------------------_ ____- --__---_-_ ----
- b. ----------------------_- ----- ----- -------_--- -___
- c. ________________-_______________ _____ ___________ ____
- 3. SUBSEQUENT EVENT (S):
- a. ________________________________ _____ ___________ ____
- b. --___--_-___--------_--__----_-_ __--- --___----__ -___
- c. __------_-------__-------_----__ . ___ ----___--_- __--
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l 1
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - -
9 SYD S ' A* A (j~h
\'
CLINTON POWER STATION DYNAMIC SIMULATION TEST CHECNLIST TIME: '//O5
~
DATE: SIGNATURE: EVENT # l RUN # M!M-EVENT DESCRIPTION: All MSIV Closure followed by Small._ Instrument Line.Br.eak....__ VALUE OR CHECKED INITIAL SIMULATOR TIME MALFUNCTION
- 1. INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- e. Reactor Power 95$ __
~
- b. Supprecsion Pool Terrper atu r e ..
900F,_ / p.o i c. Motor Driven FW Pume ,__ __. _ Gre- j M @ $ 0_8C _.. . ../
- d. __ . _. _
- e. _ _ .
- f. - . _ _ ~ - _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ - . . . . . . . _. . . . .
- 2. INITIATING EVENT (S): 4%
(sa 0 W W
- a. AllMSIVClosure,at35%fsec_.. _.,
MS08 4-0
- b. _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ , . . _ _ . __ .. . __ .__ _ . . . ._. ._ . .
- c. . . _ _ _ . . _ . . . . . . . . .
- 3. SUBSEQUENT EVENT (S):
$$fN
- a. Small Instrume.nt Line_B_.rm L_..____ .. 5. min. _W#n-pb Remove Fault on MSIV's 15 min. MS08
- g. _.
C.
O 5Pbs T.n A w CLINTON POWER STATION DYNAMIC SIMULATION TEST CHECKLIST DATE: S 'h) TIME:YEIU SIGNATURE: - .*' EVENT # 2 RUN # 'I i EVENT DESCRIPTICN: Loss of Drywell, Coolers with Tutbine . Trip. and Loss of ___ _.Byp a s s Valv e s._. _ ___ _ . . _. .. . _ . . . _ . _ _ _ . VALUE OR- CHECKED - INITIAL SIMULATOR TIME MALFUNCTION
- 1. INITIAL CONDITIONS:
ntt 4eer-95'2
/
- o. Reactor Power
- b. Suppreccion Pool Tem:eer ature .. _ .90 F._
- c. Loss of EHC Hydraulics 0.0 _____IC07 _
- d. .. . _ _ . - _
- f. ...._,_ . ._ .. -
(0.0 % 1
- 2. INITIATINS EVENTsS,: MZ$ tj-
- a. _Iurhine_Generato r. Trip. due. to. _ . . Trnl_ _ . . .
Amphenol Connector
- b. , _ _ _ _ . , _ _ , . , , , . , , _ . . . . , _ , , , _ . , _ , , _ _ . , _ . _ ,, __
- c. , _ _ , _ , _ , _ , , . ... _ ,, _ , , , . ... .,_ _
- 3. SUBSEQUENT EVENT (S): r CS C.
(> n- _ lass.of_Ory.well_ Coolars - . . . _ . 4 4 df Jfr sec. ..PC05A&B_ [ f, b- - . . . . _ . _ . . . . - . _ . . _
\
c- . _ . . _ . _ . l l l l
S/Jd5 -Tew 4 ( CLINTON POWER STATION DYNAMIC SIMULATION TEST CHECKLIST DATE: k-'l 0 - I TIME:'/2/ SIGNATURE: _ , . ._ _ y h EVENT # 3 RUN # N4~ EVENT DESCRIPTICN: _Re,cir,cu_la t_ ion. Suc_t_ ion Line Break. Acc_id.ent. with Trip.sf . . . _ _ Division II Power VALUE OR CHECKE!- INITIAL SIMULATOR TIME MALFUNCTION
- 1. INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- o. Reactor Power 0 _.
- b. Suppreceien Pool Terroer a tu r e .. . _900F c- RHRA.-Out-of-ser-v-ice--Pump--Tagged-Out- - - - - ---- - -
- d. RHRA Failure to ita.rt _ . . _ _
0.0 ._RH01A - -- O1 ' e. . . . . _ _ . _. I* . . _ . _ . . . . _ . . _ _ . - . _ . . . . .... _. .
- 2. INITIATING EVENT (S):
- a. Recirculation Suction .Line, Break. _ 0. 0.. ..
RR03
- b. . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ . . . . . . __ .
C. ,,,__ ._.,_ __,_,_ , , , ,
- 3. SUBSEQUENT EVENT (S):
- a. DIV II D.G. Fai lure to _S_ta_t.t_. ._ . 10.sec- DA O I,B _ .
/"g d. DIV II Overcurrent Trio qf 4.16 KY Bus ___10_.s e c ._ EV04BI E V
- c. Recover DIV II Overcurrent Trio nf 70 min _ ED04BI j 4.16 KV Bus
- d. R. e.v. DIV. I V i e. ! - G.w. .d,- 20 mio. DGOIB 7
.5 9 6 5 '7 2 < W k )
CLINTON POWER STATION DYNAMIC SIMULATION TEST CHECKLIST DATE: /0 ' TIMEIb SIGNATURE: y EVENT # 4 RUN # # EVENT DESCRIPTION: _Inadyertent_0pening o_f SRV with Recirc. Suction Line Break 4 VALUE OR CHECKEL INITIAL SIMULATOR ' TIME MALFUNCTION
- 1. INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- o. Reactor Power _00.:00 95" _.
- b. Suppreccion Pool Temperature 00:00 a1059E ._ .
Ma
- c. iiPCS Suui. ion ~vaiye._f _vm RCIC. Storage _. = 0 0.eL^ t "i' v e.rianu a l ly.
AE4 T f.k 3 T1sd Cluded we Ren t b Croiuators afts. Aviv Ini tiatiorr
- d. Operator p_egoging SRV tes_ti_ng Procedure allows S.P. temp. to rise to 1050F.
- e. ..
$= . . . _ . . . . . . . - . -..._ ... . .. _...- . . , - . ..
- 2. INITIATING EVENTtS):
~
- a. Juadyer. tent.open.ing of. SRV (F041 A) .A0__. ._ HPIBA_
- b. .- -5.lY
- - . A. m.. N.1 .. /[{aw ..
[P. ,. O
.ff.s/D.]-l'l4 -lg /
- c. . _ _ . . . . . _ _ _ . . . _ _ . . _ . . . . . . . _ . . . _ . . _ _ . . , _ . . _.
- 3. SUBSEQUENT EVENT (S):
- o. .Batir.cm_ Suction..Line_Bceak --- -- . - 2:00 - .-RR03 ---.-
S
.eu.e aoe e. 4 . ..e.. u _ m oure C.
SP65 Tr A
) CLINTON POWER STATION DYNAMIC SIMULATION TEST CHECKLIST DATE: bl0
- TIME:' M 9 SIGNATURE: &f EVENT # 5 RuN , N+
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Fa.i. lure. to Scram._w_ith_ Turbine .Ge_neratqr Trip following . _ _ _ _ Scram Discharge Volume Isolatiou . .. . . .. . . . . . . VALUE OR CHECKED INITIAL SIMULATOR. TIME MALFUNCTION ,
- 1. INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- o. Reactor Power %95% _[
- b. Suppreccion' Pool Tener a tu re Cf d N/M
- c. _CRD. Pump. B_ failed-- -.._ . . - . . . _ - - . .
-LC088 - -- -- .HPN Failure._to._ Auto-start .(alSo-tagged - HP 01- - - - / --
Inoperative)
- v. _ _ . .
- 2. INITIATIN3 EVENT (S).
00:00
- m. SDV Vent & Drain Valves Close. _0 . . _LC01.__ _. __[
00:00 -
- b. Au.to/Ma_nua.l C. o. nt.r.o. l. Ro.d Ins.e..r.t. io..n -
0 .RP01
- c. Leaking Scram Discharge Valves ..h. ._ .LC06
- 3. SUBSEQUENT EVENT (S):
00:30
- c. CRD Pump A Failure . _ .._ . 30.sec. _. .. . LC08 A 03:30 Turbine- Generator Trip 05:0 C EG02
. _w Olb- '/
- c. Loss of EHC Hydraulics (Byoass Valved - On - nn ,; Trn7
Wf0 TW b [(JD S O1 V CLINTON POWER STATION DYNAMIC SIMULATION TEST CHECKLIST DATE: 1-( 0 -Ts' TIME:'/Clo SIGNATURE: / . EVENT e fi RUN # N4 EVENT. DESCRIPTION: _Los s..of_Ete.dwa ter_11 ow.with Fai lu re_of. Hi.g b_ P re s s u re_ __ Makeup Systents__ . _ _ . . __. .._ ... _ . __ __ VALUE OR CHECNED INITIAL SIMULATOR I *
- 1. INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- o. Reactor Power N _._
- b. Suporeccion Pool Temperature 90 F
- c. .RCIC Full Flow Testing in Progress _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ , . _
d HPCS (tagged out) ,, _ b, .
. .. =
I
- f. .. . . - . . . . . . ._. . _ . . . . . . -- _.._. .
- 2. IN*TIATING EVENT (S):
- a. RCIf_SteamU ne Rrpak..(.in..Sec.. _. -. -0040 _--M 04 Containment) i
- b. HECS Eai. lure .ta_ Auto-Actuate - =- 00:00 -.-. . HP 01
- c. Motor-Driven Feedwalgr_P.um_p Trio .
00:00 _FWO_8C._,_ .c
- 3. SUBSEQUENT EVENT (S):
- a. _ Loss of Turbine-Driven Feedwater Pump,s _01:00 ,
FWO8A/B __ - g b$ Condensate Booster Pump Trip 01:00 FWO6A,B,C,D V c. O #
# -
- M gasWea *w -.9 g ,
l
~
fj~ a a . _t), (, yit. 5' CLINTON POWER STATION DYNAMIC SIMULATION TEST CHECKLIST O c ' ,j DATE: 9 - l' ' ? f TIME: _ ll.A~ ~ SIGNATURE: t s[]/
, b. mi . 0'I- * ~~~
EVENT # 1 RUN # A EVENT DESCRIPTION: _ All MSIV__ Closure _ followe.d by Smal.l..In.strument Line Br_eak_. . . . . VALUE OR CHECKE;. INITIAL SIMULATOR TIME MALFUNCTION
- 1. INITIAL CONDITIONS:
c ,.
- c. Reactor Power 100% **
900F
'b. Supprecsion Pool Temperature ..
- c. Moto{ Driven FW Purng _ . . , , _ _ 0. 0 _ __FWO.8C ,
- d. . . _ _ , _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _
P. _ .._ I* _ _ . . . . _ _ . . . . _ . _ . . .. ..
- 2. INITIATING EVENT (S):
0.0 V
- a. All MSIV Closure at 35%/,sec. ____., ,. ...
MS08 l
- b. _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ , _ . . _ _ . , ____ . _ _ . . _ . _ __ _ ____
- c. . . . . . _ . _ .
- 3. SUBSEQUENT EVENT (S):
?
A AL
- s. Small InstrumeJ1t Line Break _ _ _ _ _ 5..mi n . _. R R tS B .E '
Remove Fault on MSIV's 15 min. MS08 v b. c.
- r . .- , . . - . - -
f.d',n LS vak WU ~ O CLINTON POWER STATION DYNAMIC SIMULATION TEST CHECKLIST ,/ \ .m' $ ?
// </ / ~
TIME: / b_), y DATE: .,9 r' SIGNATURE: . _ ft. _ ._ .E# EVE.4T # 2 RUN # <, '#/ ~ , EVENT DESCRIPTION: _ Loss.of_ Dryyell.Co.olers with Tutbine Trip and Loss of . . _ _ Bypass V.Ives . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ VALUE OR CHECKEL INITIAL SIMULATOR
~
TIME MALFUNCTION
- 1. INITIAL CONDITIONS:
ts
- a. Reaetor Power _ _ _ . _
ITIUT' 7 @c . _ . . _ 1
- b. Suporeceien Pool Temperature .
0 _90 F. ."
- c. Loss of EHC Hydraulics . . .
0.0 _____.IC07 _.
- d. .. . . . . _ _ . . . . . . _ _
e.
- f. . . - _ . . - .. _. . . . _ . _. .
- 2. INITIATING EVENT (S):
\ v
- a. _T. urb.ine_ Generator _Ir.ip..due 1o_.._..~ 0J1 . - TC01 Amphenol. Connector
- b. _ ___ _ ___ .._, _.____ __ . . . ....._ _ _ . . . .
- c. .._____ . _ _. . _ . . .__. ..
j .
- 3. SUBSEQUENT EVENT (S):
- a. Loss of Drywell_ Coolers _ _ _ _ .15 sec. _...P405AM .I' l __.__
- b. __ ,_ . _ _ . .
c.
Tc
- m O
- .y ., ' f'M O CLINTON POWER STATION DYNAMIC SIMULATION TEST CHECKLIST '
/' -3 / f, ]. \ ~
DATE:'J-l'
- f TIME: ,A.'N SIGNATURE: _ . _ _ _ ['
I' EVENT # 3 RUN # . EVENT DESCRIPTION: _Recircula_ tion Suc. tion Line Break. Acci.d.ent. with Trip of . . _ . Division II Power VALUE OR CHECKE: INITIAL SIMULATOR TIME MALFUNCTION
- 1. INITIAL CONDITIONS: -
- 7' ' -
- c. Reactor Power 1110% g.g _ . . .
- b. Suporecelon Pool Temperature .900F C- RHRA Out-of-serv 4ce--Pump Tagged-Out- - - - - - -
- d. RHRA Fai l ure to._jita.tt_.__ .... ___ _ _ 0.0 .._._. RH01A $
- e. _ ___ . _ . _ _ . _ . .
- 2. INITIATING EVENT (S):
- a. _ Recirculation Suction..I.ine Breal 0.0 _..
RR03 .E _
- b. _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . . _ _ . . _ . . . . _ . _ . _ . . _ _
- c. _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . . _ . _ . . .
- 3. SUBSEQUENT EVENT (S):
- o. DIV II D.G. Failure to Start _ _ . _ . 10_sec- D.40_LB
- b. DIV II Overcurrent..Itio of 4.16 KV Bus ._10 sec._ E'D04Bl_ ._T ED04BI "
- c. Recover DIV II Overcurrent Trio nf 20 min-4.16 KV Bus cl. R. c.u DIV. 3. hs.1 - G.mer.de- 20 m . DGOIB
Tc.% 6 q
- d .7 'M U CLINTON POWER STATION DYNAMIC SIMULATION TEST CHECKLIST ,..
! m/, ' I / ^'M ' + ' '* 7 DATE: 9./t .Pr TIME: M,E, SIGNATURE: - .
EVENT # 4 RUN # t'A . EVENT DESCRIPTION: Inadvertent Opening of SRV 'with Recirc. Suction Line Break VALUE OR CHECKED INITIAL SIMULATOR ' TIME MALFUNCTION
- 1. INITIAL CONDITIONS:
v
- a. Reactor Power nn nn 95% _ . _ .
- b. Supprecsion Pool Terroerature _00:00 .s1059F V
- c. _HPCS Suction Valve from RCIC Storage.
_ 0. 0_ ' Sftt _Va]ve. Manually. "' Tank FaTled Closed Reset by Evaluators after Auto Initiation '~
-h'
- d. 0perator p_erforming SRV testing _.
Procedure allows S.P. temp. to rise to 1050F.
- e. __.
a I* . . . . _ . _ . . . _ . . - - . . . . _ . . . . . . . .. -. .
- 2. INITIATING EVENT (S):
"~~
- a. .Ittadverlent_optrii ng sf.. SRV . ( F041 A) . nn _
_ HPIBA_
- b. _ _ , _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ . . _ _ _ . . . ... . . _ . _ _ . . . _ . . _ . _ .
- c. ___ _ .
i
- 3. SUBSEQUENT EVENT (S):
- s. Recir.c. Suction _Iina Rraak _ 2:00- -- DP.03 . 2-i s
- b. ._. _ ,,
_ _ _ . f c.
. , _ _....mr., _ . . , , . _ _ . _ , , ,
Ef% v.f t, :.r N O CLINTON POWER STATION DYNAMIC SIMULATION TEST CHECKLIST . l i
); i ./ :
1 9 / e' I- Q. s j/ . _( ;_ ~ W ' A'r/' , '~f ~~' DATE: 9 // ' 2' TIME: SIGNATURE: EVENT # 5 RUN # d.d - ' EVENT DESCRIPTION: Failure to Scram with Turbine .GeECLLtar Trip following . . _ _ Scram Discharge Volume IsolaJion _.. _ ._. . . . . _ _ . VALUE OR CHECKED INITIAL SIMULATOR TIME MALFUNCTION
- 1. INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- o. Reactor. Power s95% ,. _. f
- b. Supprecsion Pool Temperature _.
90 F
- c. _CRD. P"mn B failed - - - . . . - - . - -
-t-CO8B -
O HPct Failuro en Aumrt-(also-tagged ( ] d. inoperative)
-HP 01-- - --
O* . . . .
- f. .. -- - - - . . . . . - . . . . .. .
d'$
- 2. INITIATING EVENT (S):
00:00 -
- c. _SDV Vent & Drain Valves._Close _0 ... LC09 00:00 ~'
- b. _ Auto / Manual Control Rod Insertio.f.__ . 0._ . .. .RP01 Failure 00:00 f
- c. Leaking Scram Discharge Valves . _0 LCQ6 .._ . 2.~~
- 3. SUBSEQUENT EVENT (S):
00:30 .- I c. CRD Pump A Failure _ . . . 3Q_sec. __ LCORA . _ . . I t O Turbine Generator Trip 05:00 EG02
~~~~ -~~
Q b* _ . _ - . Loss of EHC Hydraulics (Bvoass valuaci Ten 7 ~-
- c. OA*nn
~
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CLINTON POWER STATION DYNAMIC SIMULATION TEST CHECKLIST *
/ i 3 DATE: * - # TIME: L' M SIGNATURE: M O # '
EVENT # 6 RUN # Ms EVENT DESCRIPTION: J.oSS.,Qf Feehater Flow wi.th_Eailure of High P.ressura i fakeUD Systems ,__ , _ , _ _.._ , .. _ ,___ _
? VALUE OR CHECKED INITIAL SIMULATOR TIME MALFUNCTION
- 1. INITIAL CONDITIONS.
*J400t%- Mfo h -
- a. Reactor Power __
- b. Suporecelon Pool Temperature 900F
- c. _RCIC_ Full Flow Testing in Progress _ . , ___
,[
- d. HPCS (taggedout) _ , _ _
' ~j~
- e. __.
- f. . . . . .
- 2. INITIATING EVENT (S):
' ' ~
6 DfnA
- a. RCic Staamlina Rraa Q D..D. - . . -
Containment)
- b. HECS_Eailute_.ta_Auta-Actuate --00L-40 _
HPal
- c. Motor-Driven Feedwater Pumo Trio 00:00 FWO8C
- 3. SUBSEQUENT EVENT (S):
~~
- a. Loss of Turbine-Driven Feedwater Pumps 01:00 FWO8A/B Condensate Booster Pump Trip 01:00 FWO6A,8,C,0 -
b. c. I i i i
___7_.. Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 4 Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 i l 1
, APPENDIX B.3 -
I TREND RECORDER PEN ASSIGNMENT
SUMMARY
I i i I I l .i h 2 ,1 t 4 e a l i i i ILLIN0IS POWER COMPANY
- - . - - - - - - - - - - . - - - , , - - - - . , - - - - - , , - - - , - - - - - - - , _ ~ , - , , , , , , . . . , , - . - . . . , . , , , . . - - - , - - - - - - .,_a , . ~ - - - - - - - - - . - , - - - - , - - - - - - -
- - - - . _ _ _ . . - ~ . - . . - . - .. .. -. - . . - -
Dynamic Simulation Trend Recorder Document'No: SPDS-DST-002 i Test Results Report Pen Assignment Revision: 0 Appendix B.3 Summary Date August 1985 Table B.3-1
. EVENT # 1 - Team A ,
08/10/85 PEN POINT ZERO FULL PEN NO. NO. DESCRIPTION VALUE SCALE SCALE UNITS COLOR 1 CM-BA002 SUPP POOL TEMP QUAD 2 89.89 80.00 180.0 DEG F Red 2 , CM-BA007 DW ATM BULK AVER TEMP 131.9 100.0 300.0 DEG F Blue 3 B21DA008 DRYWELL PRESSURE A .05 0 5.00 PSIG Green 4 RP-DA201 RPV PRESSURE A 1012. 100.0 1100. PSIG Red S NB-DA401 RX WTR LVL WIDE 18.32 -10.00 40.00 INCHES Blue
. RANGE A .
6 C51DA021 APRM POWER LVL 92.55 0 100.0 % Green ' CIIANNEL
- -- , -e ,s n. -a v e - --
O O O Dynamic Simulation Trend Recorder Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Pen Assignment Revision: 0 Appendix B.3 s Summary Date August 1985
~
Table B.3-2 EVENT # 2 - Team A 08/10/85 .
- PEN POINT ZERO FULL
- PEN NO. NO. DESCRIPTION VALUE SCALE SCALE UNITS COLOR ,
1 CM-BA002 SUPP POOL TEMP QUAD 2 89.89 80.00. 180.0 DEG F Red 2 CM-BA007 DW ATM BULK AVER TEMP 131.9 100.0 300.0 DEG F Blue 3 B21DA008 DRYWELL PRESSURE A .05 0 5.00 PSIG Green 4 RP-DA201 RPV PRESSURE A 1012. 100.0 1100. PSIG Red 5 NB-DA401 RX WTR LVL WIDE 18.32 -10.00 40.00 INCHES Blue RANGE A 6 C51DA021 APRM POWER LVL 92.55 0 100.0 % , Green CllANNEL
V O O . O Dynamic Simulation Trend Recorder Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Pen Assignment Revision: 0 Appendix B.3 Summary Date August 1985 Table B.3-3 EVENT f 3 - Team A . 08/10/85 PEN POINT ZERO FULL PEN NO. NO. DESCRIPTION VALUE SCALE SCALE UNITS COLOR I 1 CM-BA002 SUPP POOL TEMP QUAD 2 89.89 80.00 180.0 DEG F Red 2 CM-BA007 DU ATM BULK AVER TEMP 131.9 100.0 500.0 DEG F Blue ! 3 B21DA008 DRYWELL PRESSURE A .05 0 30.00 PSIG Green 4 RP-DA201 RPV PRESSURE A 1012. 0 1200.00 PSIG Red . 5 NB-DA404 RX WTR LVL FUEL ZONE 18.32 -150.00 50.00 INCHES Blue i 6 CM-BA205 PRIM CNMT PRESSURE 92.55 -5.0 30.0 PSIG Green I f 4
O O O Dynamic Simulation Trend Recorder Document No: SPDS-DST-002 ,
- Test Results Report Pen Assignment Revision
- 0 Appendix B.3 Summary Date August 1985 Table B.3-4 EVENT f 4 - Team A 08/10/85 :
PEN POINY ZERO FULL PEN NO. NO. DESCRIPTION VALUE SCALE SCALE UNITS COLOR 1 CM-BA002 SUPP POOL TEMP QUAD 2 89.89 80.00 180.0 DEG F Red l 2 CM-BA007 DW ATM BULK AVER TEMP 131.9 100.0 500.0 DEG'F Blue 3 B21DA008 DRYWELL PRESSURE A .05 0 30.00 PSIG Green 4 RP-DA201 RPV PRESSURE A 1012. 0 1200. PSIG Red 5 NB-DA404 RX WTR LVL FUEL ZONE 18.32 -150.00 50.00 INCHES ' Blue : 6 CM-BA205 PRIM CNMT PRESSURE 92.55 -5.0 30.0 PSIG Green t b
O O O w l Dynamic Simulation Trend Recorder Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Pen Assignment Revision: 0 t
-Appendix B.3 Summary Date nugust 1985 Table B.3-5 EVENT'f 5 - Team A -
08/10/85 . PEN POINT ZERO FULL PEN , NO. NO. DESCRIPTION VALUE SCALE SCALE UNITS COLOR
- 1 CM-BA002 SUPP POOL TEMP QUAD 2 89.89 80.00 180.0 DEG F Red ;
- 2 CM-BA007 DW ATM BULK AVER TEMP 131.9 100.0 300.0 DEG F Blue 3 B21DA008 DRYWELL PRESSURE A .05 0 5.00 PSIG Green 4 RP-DA201 RPV PRESSURE A 1012. 100.0 1100. PSIG Red i
5 NB-DA401 RX WTR LVL WIDE 18.32 -150.00 50.00 PSIG Blue '
. RANGE A 6 C51DA021 APRM POWER LVL 92.55 0 100.0 % Green CilANNEL G
O O O
- Dynamic Simulation Trend Recorder Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Pen Assignment Revision: 0
- . Appendix B.3 Summary Date August 1985 s
Table B.3-6 l EVENT f 6 - Team A 08/10/85 PEN POINT ZERO FULL PEN NO. NO. DESCRIPTION VALUE SCALE SCALE UNITS COLOR 1 CM-BA002 SUPP POOL TEMP QUAD 2 89.89 80.00 180.0 DEG F Red 2 CM-BA007 DW ATM BULK AVER TEMP 131.9 100.0 300.0 DEG F. Blue . 3 B21DA008 DRYWELL PRESSURE A .05 0 5.00 PSIG Green 4 RP-DA201 RPV PRESSURE A 1012. 100.0 1100. PSIG Red 5 NB-DA401 RX WTR LVL FUEL ZONE 18.32 -150.00 50.00 INCHES Blue
-6 CM-BA000 9 CNT AVERTEMP 92.55 100.0 200.0 DEG F Green 4
4 i w
-Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 ~
- l. Test Results Report Revision: 0 j Date: ' August 1985 i
1 . l@ i I l ! i i ! l- !. APPENDIX B.4 I i ; ! TREND RECORDER PARAMETER CHARTS f-I 6 4 1 1 i 4 i i I I I I I l I i O ILLIN0IS POWER COMPANY - e-
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- Dynamic-Simulation Document No
- SPDS-DST-002 l- Test Results Report Revision: 0 j Date: August 1985 l
l l@ 1 l 1 i 4 { APPENDIX B.5 TREND RECORDER-PARAMETER DATA TABLES 4 ?, 1 i i I } 4 4 !O t ( i i
- I i
) i i - i 9 . I- ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY l l (~.- .
Dyntmic Simulation- Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Raport Ravision: 0 Date: August 1985 Trend Recorder Parameter Data Table Appendix B.5-1 8/10/85 EVENT #1: . TEAM A with SPDS Small Leak In The Drywell Following a Reactor Isoluation Event STRIP CHART RECORDER #1 TIME Supp. Pool Temp. DW Temp. DW Pressure 00:00 90*F 132*F 0 psig 00:38 99'F 133*F 0 psig 01:15 94*F 133*F 0 psig 04:52 95'F 133*F 0 psig 08:13 95'F 133*F 0.1 psig 09:19 96*F 133*F 0.2 psig
. 10:19 96*F 133*F 0.4 psig 11:11 96*F 135"F 0.6 psig 12:19 96*F - 142*F 0.8 psig 13:27 97'F 142*F 0.9 psig 15:16 97*F 138'F 1.1 psig 16:05 97'F 137'F 0.1 psig -
d O m
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Dynr.mic Simulation Documsnt No: SPDS-DST-002 Tsat Rasults Rsport Revision: 0
. Date: August 1985 Trend Recorder Parameter Data Table - Appendix B.5-2 8/10/85 EVENT #1: TEAM A with SPDS Small Leak In The Drywell Following a Reactor Isolation Event STRIP CHART RECORDER #2 RPV (WR)
TIME RPV Press. Water Level APRM Power
- 00:00 1012 psig 18.3 in. 92.5%
00:04 1095 psig 18.3 in. 92.5% 00:08 1015 psig 18.3 in. 92.5% 00:11 1080 psig 18.3 in. 92.5% 00:15- 1050 psig 0.5 in. 92.5% ., 00:17 1010 psig 35.5 in. 92.5% 00:22 990 psig 18.5 in. 0% 00:38 940 psig 4.5 in. 0% 00:41 930 psig 5.5 in. 0% I 00:52 990 psig 8.0 in. 0% 01.11 1015 psig 4.8 in. 0% 01:30 910 psig 7.1 in. 0% 01:36 900 psig 6.5 in. 0% 1 01:51 930 psig 1.5 in. 0% 02:19 960 psig 8.2 in. 0% 02:49 980 psig 7.0 in. 0% f 03:51 920 psig 11.5 in. 0% 4 03:58 940 psig 13.0 in. 0% ' 04:06 945 psig 10.5 in. 0% 04:49 965 psig 21.0 in. 0% i
__ _ . . _ _ . . _ . _-...m _ _ _ . _ . . . _ . . . _ _ .__ _ . _ . _ . . . . _ _ _ Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 Trend Recorder Parameter Data Table O- - 1 Appendix B.5-2
- 8/10/85
- EVENT #1
- TEAM A with SPDS Small Leak In The Drywell Following a Reactro Isolation Event STRIP CHART RECORDER #2 RPV (WR)
TIME RPV Press. Water Level APRM Po'wer 05:00 930 psig 23.0 in.' 0% 05:15 940 psig 16.2 in. 0% , 06:45 980 psig 27.0 in. 0% j 07:00 920 psig 28.2 in. 0% 07:15 925 psig 40 in. 0% I i i l ' 1 l E o _____.--,-r.- -
~ ~ _ _ _ . , . , , , , , . , _ , _ _ _ _ _ . _ , _ _ _ _ , , , , .
Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 O Test Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 Trend Recorder Parameter Data Table Appendix B.5-3 EVENT #2 Loss of Drywell Cooling Following a Reactor Isolation Event Team B - With SPDS Strip Chart Recorder #1 Time Supp. Pool Temp.(*F) DW Temp.(*F) DW Press. (psig) 00:00 90 130 0 i 00:02 95 130 0 0:055 95.5 130 0 0:075 96 130 0 00:11 97 130 0 ( ) 00:12 97.5 130 0 00:15 98 130 0 1 00:16 98 131 0 00: 19 98 132 0 1 0:225 97 134 0 00:30 95 136 -0 4
~
00:40 94 , 138 0.05 00:50 94 143 0.10 01:00 94 146 0.15 01:15 94 148 0.25 01:30 94 150 0.30
?
01:45 93.5 154 0.40 02:00 93.5 158 0.49 0
~, - - - - e - -,,e ,w-- u - - ~ ~ ~ -e
g-. Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 Trend Recorder Parameter Data Table Appendix B.5-3 (continued) EVENT #2 Loss of Drywell Cooling Following a Reactor Isolation Event Team B - With SPDS Strip Chart Recorder #1 Time Supp. Pool Temp.(*F) DW Temp.(*F) DW Press. (psig) 03:00 93.0 166 0.7 04:00 93.0 176 0.9 05:00 93.0 186 1.1 06:00 93.0 194 1.3 07:00 93.0 204 1.45 08:00 93.0 210 1.65 09:00 93.0 230 0.65 10:00 93.0 235 0.75 . 11:00 93.0 242 0.75 12:00 93.0 248 0.85 13:00 93.0 254 0.95 14:00 93.0 259 1.025 O O O e
. Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-00.2
( Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 Trend Recorder Parameter Data Table Appendix B.5-4 EVENT #2 Loss of Drywell Cooling Following a Reactor Isolation Event Team B - With SPDS i Strip Chart Recorder #2 TIME RPV Press (PSIG) Rx Wtr Lv1(in) APRM Pwr(%) 00:00 1015 17.5 92 00:02 1100 17.5 92 00:05 1020 17.5 92 00:07 1050 17.5 92 s 00:11 1080 17.5 92 00:12 1090 -9.0 92 00:15 1070 7.0 92 00:16 1070 16.0 92 00:19 1020 7.5 92 , 00:23 1000 -7.5 92 00:30 940 -7.5 0 00:40 930 2.5 0 00:50 920 20.0 0 01:00 900 40.0 0 01:15 850 40.0 0 01:30 860 40.0 0 01:45 880 40.0 0 02:00 890 40.0 0 0 03:00 910 40.0 0 1 04:00 -920 40.0 0
, . , , , . - , . - , . , - - y- %- , _. - , .__ ___
. ._ __ ~. _
l Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 Trend Recorder Parameter Data Table
- Appendix B.5-4 (continued)
EVENT #2 , Loss of Drywell Cooling Following a Reactor Isolation Event . Team B - With SPDS l Strip Chart Recorder #2 TIME RPV Press (PSIG) Rx Wtr LvL(in) 'APRM Pwr(%) 05:00 930 40.0 0 06:00 940 40.0 0 07:00 950 40.0 0 l 08:00 960 40.0 0 09:00 970 40.0 0 10:00 980 40.0 0 11:00 980 40.0 0 12:00 980 40.0 0 l 13:00 930 40.0 0 14:00 915 40.0 0 O
. - . - - . ----<--n- - . , , - , -e > - - - - , ,- -----,va+-w- -g - , -- -~,,
Dynamic Simulation Documtnt: SPDS-DST-002 Test Rssults Raport Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 s Trend Recorder Parameter e Data Table Appendix B.5-5 8/10/85 EVENT #3: TEAM A with SPDS
' Recirculation Suction Line Break with Loss of Division II Power STRIP CHART RECORDER #1 TIME Supp. Pool Temp. DW Temp. DW Press.
00:00 90*F 132*F 0 psig 00:11 96*F 236*F 18.4 psig 00:22 98'F 105'F 9 psig 00:38 99'F 152*F ~9 psig O 00:50 100*F 170*F 8.3 psig 01:11 101*F 192*F 8.2 psig
. 01:49 103*F 224*F 6.8 psig 02:19 104*F 224*F 6.3 psig 02:58 105'F 220*F 6.3 psig 06:49 105'F. 224*F 5.7 psig 11:15 103*F 224*F 5.4 psig O
4 i Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 Trend Recorder Parameter Data Table Appendix B.,5-6 8/10/85 TEAM A with SPDS EVENT #3: Recirculation Suction Line Break with Loss of Division II Power STRIP CHART RECORDER #2 (FZ) RPV TIME RPV Press. Water Level Cnst. Press. 00:00 1012 psig 2 50.0 in. .01 00:19 372 psig -88 in. .01 00:25 264 psig -88 in. 0.25 00:41 132 psig -88 in.' 2.7 psig 01:30 28 psig~ -148 in'. 2.7 psig 02:04 24 psig -4 in. 2.8 psig 02:34 12 psig 120 in. 2.7 psig 02:41 10 psig 210 in. 2.8 psig 04:15 0 psig !18 in. 3.1 psig 10:12 O psig 20 in. 3.4 psig 11:20 0 psig 50 in. 3.3 psig e 9 O
~
1
Dymamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Peport Revision: 0
; Date: August 1985 Trend Recorder Parameter Data Table -
Appendix B.5-7 . J EVENT # 4: Inadvertent Opening of SRV with a Subsequent Recirculation Suction Line Break l Team B - With SPDS . Strip Chart Recorder #1 I Min:Sec DW Press. TIME Supp Pool Temp.(*F) DW Temp.(*F) (psig) I 00:00 106 136 0.0
- 04 107
- 07 107 236 0.0
~
- 11 108 108 20.0
- 19 109 108 10.0
- 37 i
- 41 111 180 9.0
- 45 112 200 8.5
- 60 112 204 8.0
- 67 113 208 8.0 1:16 114 237 7.5 1:20 114 237 2:00 114 230 7.0 3:00 116 228 7.0 3:30 117 226 7.0 l l
4:00 117 226 7.0 i
- 4
- 53 116 i l 5:00 115 226 7.0 6:00 115 226 7.5 7:00 116 226 7.5 I
l
Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 (' Test Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 i Trend Recorder Parameter Data Table Appendix B.5-7 EVENT # 4: Inadvertent Opening of SRV with a Subsequent Recirculation Suction Line Break Team B - With SPDS Strip Chart Recorder #2
~
Min:Sec RPV Press Rx Wtr Pri Cnmt Press a TIME (psig) Lvl (in) (psig)
; , 00:00 980 250 -0.10 00:04 924 -118 -0.10 00:08 780 -118 -0.10 00:11 480 O- 00:15 340 -118 -0.10 00:19 276 -118 -0.10 00i22 240 -118 !2.0 00:26 00:30 168 -118 !2.7 00:34 00:38 120 -118 22.7 00:41 180 -146 12.7 00:45 00:49 90 -90 22.7 01:00 60 -20 12.7 iO I
r , - , . _ _ . - _ . _ . - _ , , . . _ , . - _ . . _ _ , . _ _ . . . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . . _
. . . . . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ - _ . . . _ . _ ._ . . ~ . _ . - _ . - _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _
Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Report Revision: 0 Date: Augurt 1985 Trend Recorder Parameter Data Table Appendix B.5-7 EVENT # 4: Inadvertent Opening of SPV with a Subsequent Recirculation Suetioit Line Break e- !
- Team B - With SPDS
! Strip Chart Recorder #2 I Min:Sec RPV Press Rx Wtr Pri Cnmt Press ] TIME (psig) Lvl (in) (psig) 01530 !50 ) , 01:41 !50 1 01:48 !50 4 02:00 20 150 23.1
, 03:00 12 150 !3.4 i
! 04:00 12 250 3.4 s ) j 05:00 0 - 150 23.6 e t i t s { 8 . . - _ . - . . _ -- . - - - - . - - - . _ . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 g Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 j Trend Recorder Parameter a Data Table Appendix B.5-9 8/10/85 EVENT #5: Failure to Scram with Turbine Generator Trip Following Scram Discharge Volume Isolation STRIP CHART RECORDER #1 TIME Supp. Pool Temp. DW Temp. DW Press.
~
00:00 90*I' 132*F 0 psig 00:19 96*F 132*F 0 psig 01:49 107'F 132*F 0 psig 03:41 127'F 138'F 0.1 psig 03:56 124*F 142*F 0.3 psig , 05:56 125'F 170*F 1.1 psig 4 07:56 126*F 196*F 1.7 psig 09:56 126*F 214*F 2.1 psig 11:56 125'F 232*F 2.6 psig 15:41 124*F 258'F 3.0 psig I i l
p Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Q Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 Trend Recorder Parameter Data Table Appendix B.5-10 8/10/85 EVENT #5: Failure to Scram with Turbine Generator Trip Following Scram Discharge Volume Isolation STRIP CHART RECORDER #2 ($R) RPV ' TIME RPV Press. Water Level APRM Power 00:00 1012 psig 118.3 in. 92.5% 00:08 950 psig !18.3 in. 90% ] 00:22 950 psig 50.0 in. 60% l l 00:28. 950.psig 50.0 in. 27% 00:34 950 psig 40.0 in. 49% 00:56 950 psig 30.0 in. 34% 01:13 1020 psig !34.0 in. 47% 01:24 1100 psig !26.0 in. 50% 01:35 1015 psig !18.0 in. 50% 01:49 1025 psig !34.0 in. 53% 02:00 1045 psig !18.0 in. 40% 02:09 1070 psig 16.0 in. 45%
~
02:26 1060 psig !23.0 in. 55% 02:49 1060 psig 28.0 in. -55% 03:36 1020 psig 20.0 in. 60% 03:45 1100 psig !36.0 in. 63% 04:00 1045 psig !24.0 in. 68%
- + r - - , , ,- - n,. ,
[N ( Dynamic Simulation Test Results Report Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 Trend Recorder Parameter Data Table
~
Appendix B.5-10 (continued) 8/10/85 . EVENT #5: Failure to Scram with Turbine , Generator Trip Following Scram Discharge Volume Isolation Y ' STRIP CliART RECORDER #2, - (WR) RPV TIME RPV Press. Water Level APRM Power 04:05 1030 psig 225.0 in. 31% 04: 12 1030 psig ~222.0 in. 100% 04:18 1100 psig !22.0 in. 53% 04:24 1020 psig . 22.0 in. 92% 04:30 1090 psig 24.0 in. 56% C 05:00 1020 psig 25.0 in. 63% 06:00 910 psig -68.0 in. 11% 07:00 890 psig -78.0 in. 5%
'08:00 820 psig -86.0 in. 1%
09:00 760 psig -74.0 in. 0% 10:00 705 psig -70.0 in. 0% 11:00 720 psig -66.0 in. 0% 12:00 740 psig -63.0 in. 0%
's 13:00 720 psig -64.0 in. 0% \
N Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 s Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 Trend Recorder Parameter
' Data Table e Appendix B.5-11 EVENT #6 Loss of Feedwater Flow with Failure of j High Pressure Makeup Systems Team B - With SPDS Strip Chart Recorder #1 ' -
Min:Sec DW Press. Time Supp. Pool Temp. (*F) DW Temp.(*F) (psig)
. 00:00 90' 132 0 4 .
, 00:05' 90 132 0 1 00:10 90 132 0 00:20 90 132 - 0 00:30 90 132 0 00:37 30 132 0 00:50 90 132 - 0 01:00 90 132 0 i 01:15 90 132 0 01:30 90 132 0 01:45- 90 132 0 02:00 90 132 0 4 02:30 90 132 0 02:45 90 134 0
'03:00 90 138 0 -03:30 90 146 0.2 l Q ~
Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 Trend Recorder Parameter Data Table-Appendix E.5-11 EVENT #6 Loss of Feedwater Flow with Failure of High Pressure Makeup Systems Team B - With SPDS Strip Chart Recorder #1 Min:Sec DW Press. Time Supp. Pool Temp.(*F) DW Temp. (*F) (esig) 04:00 90 154 0.35 04:30 90 158 0.5 05:00 90 166 0.65 05:30 93 170 0.80 06:00 96 172 0.90 i 06:30 105 174 0.95 07:00 98 175 1.0 07:30 101 178 1.0 08:00 102 180 1.1 08:30 103 182 1.1 09:00 ~ 103 182 1.125 09:30 104 184 1.05 10:00 112 172 0.55 m O
.,,y .-* . +e 9
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Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 j O' Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 i Trend Recorder Parameter Data Table Appendix B.5-12 EVENT #6 Loss of Feedwater Flow with Failure of High Pressure Makeup Systems . Team B - With SPDS Strip Chart Recorder #2 Min:Sec Time RP7 Press.(psig) Rx Wtr LVL(in) Cnmt. Temp. (*F) 00:00 1010 50 113.5 00:05 980 50 113.5 1 00:10 940 50 113.5 i 00:20 940 50 113.5 () 00:30 940 50 113.5 00:37 910 50 113.5 l i 00:50 900 50 113.5 01:00 890 , 30 113.5 01:15 880 50 113.5 01:30 870 50 113.5 01:45 840 50 113.5 02:00 840 , 50 113.5 02:30 760 50 113.5 02:45 550 50 113.5 03:00 460- 50 114 03:30 290 22 114 04:00 150 22 114 t 04:30 100 50 114 05:00 100 50 '114
~
05:30 100 50 114
- - , - _ _ y - - , .- r-- y y
f Dynamic' Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0 ( 4 Date: August 1985 Trend Recorder Parameter
~
Data Table Appendix B.5-12 (continued)- EVENT #6 Loss of Feedwater Flow with Failure of High Pressure Makeup Systems Team B - With SPDS Strip Chart Recorder #2 Min:Sec 1 Time RPV Press.(psig) Rx Wer LVL(in) Cnmt. Temp. (*F) j
; 06:00 100 50 114 06:30 100 50 114 07:00 100 50 114 07:30 100 50' 114 08:00 100 50 114 08:30 100 50 114 09:00 100 50 114 1
09:30 100 50 114 10:00 100 50 114 i i I O l r,_m c..., ,wv. - ..,, _. . . . . , - . _ ~ , - - _ -
5 - l Dynamic Simulation . Document No: SPDS-DST-002 4 Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 4 [ APPENDIX C EOP FLOW CHARTS t f i L i i l 4 i l 1 I 1 i l l l ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY l
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i Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 - 1
. I 1
APPENDIX D INSTRUCTOR INTERVENTION GUIDES i t l l l l e ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY
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PAGE i of 7Au3osl EVENT
- 2 TRANSIENT d ~2. - S tbAPt EE.
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PAGE 5 of @ gust % /'78 TRANSIENT -
Fall,u RE To SCRAM (*oMPLEX A re c a r>. x- 33 tylT4 TUR8/AIE GEUERATOR TR/P FOLLChilA16 6e2AA4 DIScllARGE VD),ttAtE /SotA T/04)
CaJuT Plaint V.. r t .it. l elCond i t ion ICOP Required Operator Action Action Taken lustruc, tor Intervention Step Guided Ind. Point seos cum c. ,4- i .o - Ac u . . l .Jg . ala ~
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COMPANY QI Ct.lNTON POWER STATION INSTRilCTOR INTERVENTION ClllDES SAFETY PARAMETER DISPI.AY SYSTEM HEVISION: Muft/$f 9 IYh EVENT
- 5 l' AGE 6 of h U TidNSIENT d 5 i
M PPe.w D a y. D j CNMT Plant V.ir ialil e/Cond i t ion EOP Required Operator Action i
Step Action Taken Instructor Intervention Ind. Guided Point
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dPPCMbox D. wnTH FMt.t<R& OF Hl4H PRE %llR6 MAKEttP STST5h16 (CC[4{lgx )
SEC.CNMT.
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_ A epenn s>. k wnli FAILURE OF Int & )H ypsy,oR6 MAKEttP 6)91EM6 (COMPLEX Plant Varlaisle/ Condition b Required Operator Action Action Taken l '
Ind. Guided ""'
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II.I.INise d . . COMPANY Cl.lNTON POWER STATION INSTRilCTOR INTERVENTION CU1 DES SAFETY PARAMETER DISPI.AY SYSTD1 ltEVISION: M14 d k I9EO EVENT ll[o PAGE $ of [
TRANSIENT; LoGG of FEsploATec F40(d A PPcw Di x. I). ,
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LVL Plant V.ortable/ Condition EOP Required Operator Action Action Taken Step Instructor intervention Ind. Cuided Point RPV Waler level 1.0 *Acknagledge est: Alarm. /Johfg operators 6 eder decreases < L3. o Enter Level Cowlvol EoP o 5Pys LvL c6F EOP.
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r II.I.INOL ...d COMPANY O O CLINTON POWER STATION INSTRUCTOR INTEltVENTION ClllDES SAFETY l'AltAMETER IllSPl.AY SYSTEM HEVISIDH: Mt4gtA$ j i%S PAGE 4 of [p EVENT 45-b TRANSIENT: LoM oF FEEDWATEC RO(d A petuoix 3). g,TJ/ FAILLARE OF HIGH PREM!dE MAKEUP sysreMs (c.osetex3 LVL Plant Vartable/Conditton EOP Required Operator Action Step Action Taken Instructor Intervention Jnd. Guided Point TPV (dater level 4.l E. der- "Eme ne #
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exceeded boto or-).hi8
b O ll.l.lNOlu . .. ..A COMPANY Cl.lNTON POWER STATION INSTkUCTOR INTERVFNTION ClllDES SAFETY PARAMETER DISPl.AY HEVISION: Ms4gs46 klNb EVENT -M8 THANSIENT; I_Ofr6 OF FEGIYdATEA Flow A vveno.t D. WIT 1l FAlLHREccompesa OF fil@l PRE 44uRc MAKEUP SYSTE416 CNMT . -
Plant V..rlable/ Condition EOP Required Operator Action Action Taken Instructor Intervention Step Ind. Culded s Point 5f'M cdMr Alarm 1.0 o Enky. con %innwd AJolifg operaior6 to enler OI.p vrpeit hp. con b i ece. eoe.
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j Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0 Date: August 1985 f .
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l APPENDIX E
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i OPERATOR TEAM RESPONSE - EVALUATION FORM :
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APPENDIX E
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SPDS DYNAMIC SIMULATION TEST
- 73 OPERATOR TEAM RESPONSE - EVALUATION FORM Team: Date:
with SPDS : w/o SPDS
-S cenario/ Event # :
Scenario / Event
Description:
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i Evaluation Guide Rating Description 5 No questions asked of instructor /evalu-ator. Optimum coordination and system usuage was noted. Operating Team always knew plant status. 1 J 4 Some questions asked of instructor /evalu-ator. Overall good coordination and sys-tem usuage. Generally knows plant status. 3 Frequent questions asked of instructor /
- evaluator. Fair coordination and system usuage. Operating Team knowledge of plant status was weak.
t 2 Frequent questions asked of instructor / evaluator. Overall coordination of re- ; sponse was weak. System usuage was not effective at times. Operating Team
- of ten unaware of plant status.
1 - Constant questions asked of instructor / evaluator. Response was not coordinated. Systems were improperly used. Most times unaware of plant status. i Assigned Rating: Instructor / Evaluator Signature: j General Comments:
- _( as applicable) t
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Dynamic Simulation Document No: SPDS-DST-002 Test Results Report Revision: 0 l Date: August 1985 3 i APPENDIX F t i
. SPDS DYNAMIC SIMU'.ATION PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING FINAL SCORES AND COMPARISION VALUES i
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__.. . . . . _ _ _ ._ -_ - . _ . m. -_ _ - .. = _ . ___.- . . . . _ _ _ _ _ i ILLINOIS POWER .i S.?DS DYNAMIC SIMULATION APPENDIX F f PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING Page.1 FINAL SCORES AND COMPARISON VALUES i i TABLE OF CONTENTS I 4 P_a,jte,, l I. METHOD OF EVALUATING SPDS 1 4 i II. TOTAL POSSIBLE SCORE DETAIL FORM 2 l III. TOTAL TEAM SCORE DETAIL FORM 3 i i IV. TOTAL POSSIBLE SCORE FORM 4 V. TOTAL TEAM SCORE 4 VI. TOTAL SCORE
SUMMARY
FORM S VII. FINAL SCORE COMPARISON CHART 6 J d i I i 1 f (- 1 i i 1 i f i l !
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ILLINOIS POWER APPENDIX F SPDS DYNAMIC SIMULATION Pags 2
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PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING 1 FINAL SCORES AND COMPARISON VALUES N Page 1 of 6 d I. METHOD OF EVALUATING SPDS The method of evaluating the SPDS has been established. A. Each scenario will be run once by each team, one half with SPDS and half without SPDS according to the Chart below: SCENARIO COMPLEXITY TEAM A TEAM B IS Simple AIS with SPDS BIS without SPDS 2S Simple A2S without SPDS B2S with SPDS 3M Moderate A3M with SPDS B3M without SPD6 4M Moderate A4M without SPDS B4M with SPDS SC Complex A5C with SPDS BSC without SPDS 6C Complex A6C without SPDS B6C with SPDS B. The criteria for selecting evaluation points and their initial value have been set. They will include:
- i. E0P entry conditions, with a value of 2
- 11. E0P branch points resulting in an SPDS change, with a value of 1.
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i C. The total possible score on a scenario is the sum of possible entry conditions x 2 plus possible branch points resulting in SPDS changes. O k,- D. The total score on a scenario is the sum of entry conditions identified x 2 plus branch points resulting in SPDS changes identified. E. The Final Score on a scenario will be Total Score divided by Total Possible Score. . P. The final scores will be compared with SPDS and without SPDS
- 1. Comparison 1 - within each scenario and different teams including:
A15=to BIS, B2S to A2S, A3M to B3M, B4M to A4M, A5C to B5C, B6C to A6C.
- 11. Comparison 2 - Within each complexity and the same team with different scenarios including: .
AIS to A2S, A3M to A4M, A5C to A6C, B2S to BIS, B4M to B3M, B6C to B5C. iii. Comparison 3 - Composite score within each complexity with different teams and scenarios. The final scores for the 2 applicable scenarios will be averaged. The averages will be compared. AIS + B2S to A2S + BIS, A3M + B4M to A4M + B3M, i 2 2 2 2 , ,~ ASC + B6C to A6C + BSC l w-------g 4 - --- - w,-
ILLINOIS POWER APPENDIX F SPDS DiNAMIC SIMULATION Paga 3
- PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING FINAL SCORES AND COMPARISON VALUES Page 2 of 6 1
s- Y II. TOTAL POSSIBLE SCORE DETAIL FORM
, A. PURPOSE ,
To Quantify the maximum possible value of each scenario using entry conditions and branch points with SPDS changes as identified in the transient flow charts with instructor corrective actions. B. FORM COMPLETION
- 1. Scenario Write the number of the transient. An example is " Event 1".
- 2. Date ,
1 Write the date on which the form is completed, i 1
- 3. Total Possible Entry Conditions (E) l
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