ML20135E565
| ML20135E565 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 08/28/1985 |
| From: | Hufham J TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8509160446 | |
| Download: ML20135E565 (3) | |
Text
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37 4o1 1630 Chestnut Street Tower II August 28, 1985 c
t, BLRD-50-438/84-02 co BLRD-50-439/84-02
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II q)
Attn:
Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator no 101 Mariatta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323
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~~
Dear Dr. Grace:
BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - FAILURE TO INCORPORATE INCREASED SUPPORT LOADS INTO DESIGN - BLRD-438/84-02, BLRD-439/84 FINAL REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector P. E. Fredrickson on December 22, 1983 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 2661. This was followed by our interim reports dated January 18 and April 20, 1984.
Enclosed is our final report.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.
Very truly yours, TEN' LESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY b]s
,o Vy Xll J. W. Hufham, Manager Licensing and Risk Protection Enclosure cc:
Mr. James Taylor, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Records Center (Enclosure)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 h
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An Equal Opportunity Employer 1
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ilgpr TNCLOSURE BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 FAILURE TO INCORPORATE INCREASED SUPPORT LOADS INTO DESIGN BLRD-50-438/84-02, BLRD-50-439/84-02 NCR 2661 10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency During the course of scheduled NRC-0IE Bulletin 79-14 walkdown exercise, a number of supports on rigorous analysis problem N4-1KE-4, for the essential raw cooling water (ERCW) system, were discovered not to be in agreement with analysis data in regard to loads and movements. Some supports were designed by ITT Grinnell while the remainder of these supports were designed per TVA's load-rated typical progra=. Specific support designs found to be disagreeing with ERCW analysis drawings 1KB0506-KE-41 R1 and 1KB0506-KE-42 R2 were:
1KE-MPHG-0046 R3 1KE-MPHG-0054 R1 1KE-MPHG-0097 R2 1KE-MPHG-0049 R0 1KE-MPHG-0057 R0 1KE-MPHG-0101 R0 1KE-MPHG-0051 R0 1KE-MPHG-0059 R0 1KE-MPHG-0114 R0 1KE-MPHG-0053 R0 1KE-MPHG-0061 R0 1KE-MPHG-0127 R0 1KE-MPHG-0140 R0 There are two separate parts to this deficiency. Part 1 consists of a failure to review the revised analysis drawing 1KB0506-KE-41 R1.
This drawing is a support load table for supports which were designed by ITT Grinnell. TVA support review personnel reviewir.g the revised drawing learned that other changes to analysis problem N4-1KE-4 were scheduled as a result of engineering change notice (ECN) 1626. Therefore, the support review personnel decided to defer the review until ECN 1626 was incorporated.
When the new analysis drawings were issued, the revised analysis review was completed, identifying all needed changes for the subject analysis and for ECN 1626. All supports found to be inadequate were identified to be redesigned. No Office of Engineering (OE) procedures were violated in failing to review the above drawing revision. The time lag between the second analysis issue and support review caused the analysis and the supports to temporarily disagree.
Part 2 consists of a failure to revise the support detail sheets for TVA-designed load-rated typical supports for changes made on support load table drawing 1KB0506-KE-42 R1.
These supports were placed on construction hold and identified to the Office of Construction (OC) by memorandum dated November 17, 1982, as requiring revision. The personnel reviewing the supports at the site released the listed supports with no revision required.
This resulted from an error by the site personnel in determining when a support required revision for an analysis change. OE determined that the incorrect release of rigorously analyzed typical supports which required revision for analysis changes was a generic error at Bellefonte Nuclear Plant (BLN).
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' Safety Implications The subject supports, if not corrected, could become overstressed due to increased loads and movements. Additionally, these supports might not restrain the piping in the correct direction (s) due to changes in the sizes of the loads. These conditions would invalidate the piping seismic analysis and jeopardize the safe operation of the ERCW system. Since the ERCW system is an essential safety-related system, its failure in an emergency situation would adversely effect the safety of the plant.
A similar situation would occur for load-rated typical supports found on other systems.
Corrective Action The following ITT Grinnell supports on 1KB0506-KE-41 R1 were placed on construction hold to be redesigned per OE procedures:
1KE-MPHG-0046 R3 1KE-MPHG-0054 R1 1KE-MPHG-0049 R0 1KE-MPHG-0057 R0 1KE-MPHG-0051 R0 1KE-MPHG-0059 R0 1KE-MPHG-0053 R0 1KE-MPHG-0061 R0 The following typical supports were placed on hold per ECN 1626 for changes due to that ECN:
1KE-MPHG-0097 R2 1KE-MPHG-0101 R0 1KE-MPHG-0114 R0 1KE-MPHG-0127 R0 1KE-MPHG-0140 R0 To correct the generic error, OE has reviewed all load-rated typical supports (including those identified above) on rigorously analyzed problems to resolve the deficiency. Those supports found in error have been revised to reflect the correct analysis information. OE personnel (who now review typical supports instead of OC) have been instructed in the proper methods of revising typical supports. Also, Bellefonte Engineering Project (BLEP)
Engineering Procedure (EP) 44.77 has been revised to ensure that all TVA load-rated typical supports identified by revised analysis review as needing review are properly handled. This action should prevent recurrence of these de ficiencies.
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