ML20135E555
| ML20135E555 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 08/29/1985 |
| From: | Hufham J TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-85-403-000 PT21-85-403, PT21-85-403-000, NUDOCS 8509160442 | |
| Download: ML20135E555 (3) | |
Text
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 400 Chestnut Street Tower II August 29, 1985 c,
BLRD-50-438/84-58 Q
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II g
Attn:
Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator no 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323
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Dear Dr. Grace:
BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - EXCESSIVE WIRING DEFICIENCIES IN BABCOCK AND WILCOX SUPPLIED CABINETS - BLRD-50-438/84 FINAL REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE Inspector P. E. Fredrickson on November 14, 1984 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 3675. Our interim reports were submitted on December 12, 1984 and March 29 and June 25, 1985. Enclosed is our final report. We consider 10 CFR Part 21 applicable to this deficiency.
If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
~J. W. Hufham, Madag Licensing and Risk Protection Enclosure cc:
Mr. James Taylor, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission Washington, D.C.
20555 Records Center (Enclosure)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 05091go g g 8
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ENCLOSURE BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 EXCESSIVE WIRING DEFICIENCIES IN BABCOCK AND WILCOX-SUPPLIED CABINETS BLRD-50-438/84-58 NCR 3675 10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency The engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) control cabinets for Bellefonte Nuclear Plant (BLN) were supplisd to TVA by Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) on the BLN NSSS contract. The anitial site inspection of these cabinets resulted in at least 68 separate nonconfbrmance reports (NCRs) being issued for wiring and drawing de ficiencies. A large number of the NCRs identify installed wiring which does not conform to B&W drawings with respect to color codes, wire size, or configuration. Several NCRs identify breakers which are of a higher rating than the B&W drawings show. While none of these 68 NCRs represent a significant condition adverse to quality on an individual basis, they collectively indicate a significant breakdown in B&W's quality assurance / quality control program for BLN.
The cause of this deficiency was a deficiency in the manufacturer's (Bailey Meter) relevant engineering instruction for cabinet checkout.
The engineering instruction required the system to be electrically equivalent to the design and Danctionally correct. However, it did not require that the as-built configuration of the system be physically identical to the design drawings.
Safety Implications The ESPAS is a primary safety-related system which initiates action of various safety features devices to protect the reactor core during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or a steam line or feedwater line break, and to mitigate the consequences of these accidents. A deficient vendor quality assurance / quality control program could result in TVA receiving equipment of indeterminate quality. Failure of the affected equipment due to unidentified deficiencies co21d result in a condition adverse to safe plant operation.
Corrective Action B&W has issued field change packages (FCPs) 177 and 310 to resolve the wiring and drawing deficiencies in the unit 1 ESFAS control cabinets as identified on the 68 separate NCRs. Additionally, B&W has performed a 100 percent review of the BLN unit 2 ESFAS control cabinets and of the units 1 and 2 reactor protection system (RPS)
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3 control cabinets. The cabinets were checked to ensure that they were physically equivalent to the drawings. The subject wicing deficiencies were determined to be not applicable to these cabinets.
B&W has not provided the subject cabinets for any other TVA nuclear plant.
To prevent recurrence of this deficiency, B&W has notified TVA that Bailey Meter has revised their engineering instructions to require physical equivalency between their cabinets and design drawings.
All field modifications necessary to correct the deficiencies identified by the 68 separate NCRs will be completed by March 21, 1986.
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