ML20134E326
| ML20134E326 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/16/1995 |
| From: | Cietek F, Rothert J, Weerakody S NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134E307 | List: |
| References | |
| PRA95NQA-01294, PRA95NQA-01294-SY, PRA95NQA-1294, PRA95NQA-1294-SY, NUDOCS 9611010121 | |
| Download: ML20134E326 (48) | |
Text
NobOA REVISION 0 RESPONSIBLE SECTION PRA SERIAL NUMBER PRA95NOA-01294-SY PLANT (UNIT) CY PAGE 10F Zl REVISION PAGES 0 ATTACHMENT PAGES D APPENDIX PAGES 2f TOTAL PAGES 41 BLDG /SYS' COMP NPRF DATE/CTP DATE QUALITY SOFTWARE USED CAFTA 2.3 RMOS 2.5 TITLE: An Analysis of the Risk Impact Due to Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of CY ECCS MOVs METHOD OF REVIEW:
I' A ' '- F b A * ' C C La ; f 4 4,E f [, O h f(V Q l
i l
Prepared By: .[
[Ropiert, Senior Engineer Reviewed By:
F.O. Cietek Engineer Approved By: ~ O #
S.D. Weerakkody, Supervisor PRA '
Date: Sbb 5
/ I 9611010121 961030 PDR ADOCK 05000213 P PDR a
RTP DATA BASE INPUTS Calc. # PRA95NOA-01294-SY Rev # 0 j Vendor Calc # Plant CY i Title An Analysis of the Risk Imoact Due to Pressure Lockina and
] Thermal Bindina of CY ECCS MOVs CCN # Superseded by:
i Building System Component Component ID Ref. Calc. Ref. Drawing Computer Codes Used CAFTA 2.3 RMOS 2.5 Comments:
l Calculation Checklist Calculation Identifying Number PRA95NOA-01294-SY Revision 0
- 1. Precaration Initials 1.1 Section 6.1.2 JKER 1.2 Section 6.1.3 JKER 1.3 Section 6.1.4 JKER 1.4 Section 6.4.6 JKER l
- 2. Verification 2.1 Section 6.2.2.1 9 2.2 Section 6.2.2.2 4C '
2.3 Section 6.2.2.3 ic 2.4 Section 6.2.2.4 thC 2.5 Section 6.2.2.5 dec 2.6 Section 6.2.2.6 th '
2.7 Section 6.2.2.7 ~oC 2.8 Section 6.2.2.8 CEe ,
2.9 Section 6.2.2.9 de '
2.10 Section 6.2.2.10 Zb C-2.11 Section 6.2.2.11 5'?
2.12 Section 6.2.2.15 Oct
- 3. Accroval Initial & Date 3.1 Section 6.3.1 JAN 8[/6!9 f 3.2 Section 6.3.2 Jhw /
/ /
3.3 Section 6.3.3 Jaw /
3.4 Section 6.3.4 IDu /
3.5 Section 6.3.5 J)w /
3.6 Section 6.3.6 Jdo f
- 4. Non-OA Acolications Initial & Date 4.1 Section 5.4 waived 4.2 Section 6.1.4.7 waived 4.3 Section 6.2 waived Basis for Waiver:
l l
ED4297 5-80 h0RTHEAST UTillTlPS SERYlCE COMPANY
! SUBSBCT An Analvais e2 the Risk vannet Due to Frannura BY M _Rothmet DATE 08 / 0W 5 Lockino and Thermal sinaina of cv Rccs teoVs CHKD. BY F.O. clatak DATE 0$/ k /95 CALC. NO. PRA95NOA 01294=EY REV. 0 3 SHEET NO. 4 0F 21 4
1 1
1.0 Safety Issue The NRC issued Generic Letter 89-10 (GL89-10) -which identifies a phenomenon known-as pressure locking and thermal binding of gate l valves. NUREG-1275 (Ref. 1) discusses this phenomenon and provides I
instances of occurrences. CY performed an analysis (Ref. 5) which identified the following seventeen motor operated flexible wedge j gate valves which under certain transient conditions are potentially i susceptible to pressure locking (PL) or thermal binding (TB):
)
Valve EL TH SI-MOV-861A, B, C, &D X SI-MOV-871A & B X SI-MOV-901 & 902 X CH MOV-292B &C X X RHR-MOV-780, 781, 803 & 804 X X SI MOV-854A & B X SI-MOV-873 X The identified valves are located within the high pressure and low pressure injection systems, the residual heat removal system, and the charging system. Failure of these valves for certain plant transients (LOCAs, SGTR, loss of control air, etc.) could have a potentially significant impact on the CY core damage frequencies (CDF) associated with these transient initiators. ;
2_,,A obiective of the PRA Analysis The PRA section was requested to examine the impact on public heat 1th and safety due to having operated CY with the 17 valves listed above at a failure probability that is greater than
EDW Ho NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY SUBECT An Analvain of ths Risk Tammet Due to PramagIg_ BY .T . E . Rothart DATE 08/01/95 Lockins and Thermal Bindins ef cY ECCE MOVs CHKD. BY P.O. Elatak DATE DE/ T /95 CALC. NO. PRA95NOA-01294 BY REV. O SHEET NO. 5 OF 7. I originally estimated. This summary report documents the methods and results of that analysis.
L_Q Method of Analysis All of the 17 valves that are under consideration are components of systems used to mitigate accident intiators leading to core-damage.
Therefore, it was concluded that an appreciation of the risk impact can be derived by measuring the impact on CDF. Pressure locking (PL) is not a very well understood issue in that many valves that are susceptible, (i .e. , meet all conditions and known requirements for failure) do not fail and yet while others do.
SI-MOV-861A, B, C, & D, SI-MOV-871A & B, and SI-MOV-901 & 2 The SI-MOV-861A, B, C & D valves are 3 inch diameter Crane flexible wedge motor operate gate HPSI injection valves. The SI-MOV-871A &
B valves are 4 inch diameter Westinghouse flexible wedge motor operate gate LPSI core deluge valves. The SI-MOV-901 & 902 valves are 7 inch diameter Westinghouse flexible wedge motor operate gate cross connect valves. For these valves, pressure locking (PL) was determined to be a potential concern for large, medium and small LOCAs.
The change in CDF for small LOCAs was determined not to be as significant a concern as for large and medium LOCAs based on the following and therefore not evaluated in this analysis. The SI valves are only required in the event of charging injection f ailure.
Additionally, the small LOCA does not result in sudden rapid RCS depressurization. RCS depressurization would be much slower f or the small LOCA case than for large and medium LOCAs. The SI signal for
l Iw97 5 80 NORTHfAST UTluTIES SERYlCE COMPANY SUBJICT An Analvain of the Risk Turn?ct Due to Prramura BY 3.R. Roth+rt DATE 09/01/95 i
bekina and Thermal Bindina of cY ECCB MOVs CHKD. BY P.O. clatak DATE _Oh/ 9 /95 CALC. NO. PRA95NOA 01294.SY REV. O SHEET NO. 6 OF Ti s
1
] these SI valves is taken from the pressurizer. Since RCS l
depressurization is slower for a small RCS LOCA, the pressurizer pressure more closely follows RCS pressure. This in turn would result in lower pressure dif ferentials within the SI valves. Thus, '
) the SI valves would need less pullout thrust than in the large and
{ medium LOCA cases (Appendix A). Therefore, the likelihood for
- 3. ' pressure locking being a concern for small LOCAs is significantly 1ess than for the large and medium LOCA cases. Additionally, on '
March 27, 1980 CY experienced a transient wherein a spurious SI j occurred (Ref. 14) which required these valves to operate. Based upon the resultant LER 'all systems operated as designed; ' in other l words, the SI valves that were required to open ' opened'.
l l The large and medium LOCAs with and without a coincidental LNP are j therefore considered to be the transients of concern for PL of these j SI valves. These transients result in rapid RCS depressurization j which could result in the pressure locking phenomenon for these I valves. In these cases, the time delay from the start of the transient until these SI valves begin to unseat can potentially result in large differential pressures between the upstream, i downstream, and bonnet faces of these valves. The obj ective of the following analysis is to determine the change in CDF by accounting i for this potential valve failure mechanism.
This analysis will evaluate the change in CDF due to PL for these SI valves for the following four transient cases:
large LOCA transient medium LOCA transient large LOCA transient with consequential LNP
l mm 5 80 NORTilEAST UTILITIES SERYlCE COMPANY l
SUBJECT An Analvais of the Risk Tmnnt=# Du'1_fo Prangure SY AK. Rothert DATE 0_j,fA1/93 Loekina and Thermal Bindina of CY XCEE MOVs CHKD. BY P.O. clatak DATE.0 / 9 /95 CALC. NO. PRA95NOA-01294-SY REV. O SHEET NO. *1 OF 7. l
. medium LOCA transient with consequential LNP Large and Medium LOCAs, no LNP i
I PRA has reviewed several references and has had numerous discussions with plant personnel to make a determination as to the probability of these valves failing due to the pressure locking phenomenon for large and medium LOCA events. To make this determination, a combination of deterministic and qualitative evaluation was performed to determine the SI valves' failure rate. The following is a discussion of insights gained, the approximation of the failure rate for these valves, and the impact on the CDF.
For pressure locking of these S1 valves to be of concern, the bonnet must become pressurized. This can occur f rom primarily j two sources (Ref. 5) for these valves; RCS pressure leakage j into the bonnet during normal operation and cycling of valves i during plant heat up. l At CY, the largest of the valves of potential concern are flexible wedge gate valves with an approximate diameter of 7 )
inches. The reported pressure locking incidents of Appendix A to NUREG-1275 (Ref. 1) were reviewed for their applicability to CY. Based upon the amount of available information, the pressure locking phenomenon appears to predominately affect large flexible wedge gate valves (assumed h10 inches in ,
diameter) and double disk gate valves (assumed all sizes). l For the flexible wedge' style valves, it appears that the larger the flexible wedge gate valve (extrapolated from Ref.
2); the greater the likelihood of RCS side disk flex which could thus result in bonnet pressurization. The double disk
l B1297 $ B0 NORTilEAST UTiljTIES SERylCE COMPANY StJSJECT An annivais of the Risk 2mn m Due tg Pressure BY M Rothmet DATE 41/A1/95 Lockina and ThAIEg1 mindina of CY EccB MOVs CHKD. BY .F.O. clatak DATE _Q k / 3 /95 t CALC. NO..PRA95NOA 01294-EY RW. 0 SHEET NO. 8 OF 7l
. gate valves potential for bonnet pressurization appears to be relatively consistent irrespective of the size of the valve.
Thus based upon the previous discussion, these SI valves, due to their size, are considered much less likely to be I susceptible to bonnet pressurization due to wedge flexing than larger flexible wedge gate valves.
Pressure locking resulting from valve cycling during plant heat up yields the greatest potential for PL. These valves are cycled with RCS temperature and pressure at 400 C F and 1400 psi. Based upon the criteria of Ref. 11 the calculated results of Ref. 12 are considered extremely conservative for these valves from the PRA prespective. Specificaly since PL ,
is not a very well understood issue in that many valves that are susceptible, (i.e., meet all conditions and known I requirements for failure) do not fail and have not failed.
Additionally, at these calculated pressures, the bonnet has a high potential for f ailure due to leakage (observed) or due to rupture (never been observed).
l These SI valves are commanded open within the first seconds of a LOCA. Ref. 3 shows the RCS pressure is decreasing rapidly; however, as can be seen from Ref. 3, the RCS is still at approximately 900 psi when the valves would get the SI ;
signal / power to open. No undervoltage condition for the valve motors was assumed since no other coincidental transient is assumed to occur. The HPSI pumps have started and are
]
pressurizing the other side of the valves. Reference 2 ]
provides a calculation method for determining if a valve should be considered pressure locked. The method and calculations ( Appendix A) show that the valve motors developed sufficient thrust to overcome the offects of pressure locking for a large or medium LOCA transient without a coincidental
_ . _ . _ . ~ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . - _ _ _ _ . _
EDim $ S0 NORTilEAST UTiljTIES SERVICE COMPANY l i
SUBJECT An Analvain of the mink Y=nmet Due to Pressure 3Y J.K. methart DATE 09/01/95 i Lockina and thermal mindina of cY aces Nova CHKD. BY F.O. cintak DATE d/ 9 /95 CALC. NO. PRA95NOA 01294 EY REV. 0 SHEET NO. 9 OF TI
. LNP with bonnet pressures equal to RCS pressure. Appendix A
-also provides a calculated estimate of the maximum bonnet pressure (approx. 4370 psi) that would result in motor stall for SI valves 861A through D. These calculations took into consideration valve test data, expected plant operating conditions at the time of a transient, and expected plant conditions post transient. I i
Based upon Ref. 11 bonnet pressures in these valves were i
. calculated to be in excess of 14000 psi. The live load packing torque for these valves corresponds to the RCS design pressure (2485 psi at 650 F - conversation with A. Krinzman of CY). The purpose of live load torquing of the valve bonnet
]
packing is to provide reasonable assurance that valves do not leak for internal pressures below the corresponding design pressures for the live load packing torque. Thus for pressures in excess of 2485 psi a very high likelihood of excess pressure leak of f is considered to exist due to leakage through the packing. These valves are inspected for packing l.
leakage with the plant at rated RCS pressure and temperature j (2020 psi at 540 F) . If a valve is observed to be leaking it is assumed that the RCS valve f ace seat is leaking by and that bonnet pressure is equal to RCS pressure. This assumption is considered reasonable due to the relatively small valve size (3 inches) resulting in bonnet inventory being insuf ficient to sustain continuous leak off rate with both valve faces properly seated.
The generic base failure rate for a motor operated valve f ailing to open in the CY PRA is 4.0E-3/ demand. This value is based upon industry data which has a high probability of already including failures associated with the pressure locking phenomenon. For these SI valves the CY PRA failure m,. . .. - . - . -a 9.- -n -m ..
__.__._ _ ._ . _.._.___.__.__-_._______m.__.._ -
! EDert 5 so NORTHEAST UTluTIES SERVICE COMPANY
- BUCJECT in Annivain of the Risk 2mmnet Due to Pressur L BY A K. Rothart DATE 09/01/95 Lockins and Tharanal sinAina of CY EccB MOVa CHKD. BY F.O. clatak DATE Dh/9/95 CALC. NO. PRA95NOA 01294 BY REV. O j SHEET NO. 10 or 7l 3'
4 9
-rate is 2.4E-2/ demand (the generic base failure rate was.
f ~ increased by a f actor of 6, since these valves are only tested during refueling outages). The common cause failure of these
- SI valves is determined by applying an additional appropriate beta factor to these SI valves failure rate.
i PRA at this point wishes to re-iterate its
[ acknowledgement / recognition of the significance of the PLTB l fai3ure mechanism, the importance of these valves to safe j shutdown given a LOCA, and the resultant potential dire l consequences should they fail. However, based upon 'the previous discussions to assume that these valves are failed with a certainty of one is overly conservative and is not considered representative in this case. Therefore, the CY IPE failure rate of 2.4E-2/ demand for these valves was assumed to increase by an additional 50% given the following:
the possible double counting of failures, the valve population size (those potentially affected by PLTB and those that are not) the potential for bonnet pressurization, and the calculated motor thrust to overcome PL.
Thus, for purposes of this analysis the random failure rate for these SI valves is 3.6E-2/ demand (Table 1).
It is recognized that PLTB is primmarly a common cause f ailure mechanism concern. Therefore, it was assumed / recognized that the additional increase (1.2E-2) in the random failure probability is the common cause f ailure probability due to the
= - . - -- . . . - - - . - - . . - _ - - . _ _ - . _ _ - ~ - . - - - - - -_ . . - -
ED4m 5-80 NORTHEAST UTluTIES SERVICE COMPANY st15 JECT in Analvain of the Rink 9mmaet Due to Pressurrt___ BY J.K- Rother2 DATE . 08/08/95 Lockina and Thermal Bindinn of CY ECCB Mova CHKD. SY F.O. clatak DATE DE/ 9 /95 CALC. NO. PRA95NOA*01294 SY REV. 0 SHEET NO. 11 OF 7I l
.PLTB mechanism irrespective of combination (2/2, 2/3, 2/4, etc.). This additional common cause failure probability for PLTB was added to the calculated CY PRA common cause failure due to other mechanisms to yield a new common cause failure probability for purposes of this analysis (see Table 1).
The core damage change for the LOCA cases without a consequential LNP was calculated by requantifying (Appendix B) the event trees for the large & medium LOCA cases (Ref. 5, C2 -
517-1041-RE). This was accomplished by accounting-for the
! possible increased valve failure rate (Table 1) due to i I pressure locking (Appendix B).
l large LOCA from 2.69E-5/yr to 3.33E-5/yr 6.4E-6/vr i
medium LOCA from 1.64E-5/yr to 2.65E-5/yr 1.0E-5/vr l
l For comparison purposes, if the assumption is made that these i
valves are failed, the associated CDF is equivalent to the large and medium event initiator frequencies (3.9E-4 /yr and l 6.1E-4/yr, respectively). j l l l
I The large and medium LOCA cases with a coincidental LNP were also identified as a potential concern. ;
Given a LOCA with a coincidental LNP the differential pressures within the SI valves would be greater than in the non LNP cases. This is due to the additional 10 second time
- - receiving power to start opening.
}
. _ _ - . . _ .- . . . . . - . - - - ~ - - - - ~ - - - - - ~ - - -= ---- - - - ' - - -'
r.Dus? 5 so h0RTilEAST UTiljTIES SERVICE COMPANY SUBJ" JCT in Analvaia of the 11ak fan *ct Due to Pressurm gY J.K. Rothert DATE 08/08/95 1.ockina and Tharmai aindina of cY acca Mova CHKD. 3Y F.O. clatak DATE _0 / /95 l CALC. No. PRA95NOA-01294 BY REV. O snEET wo. 12 or af l
l
! -The potential of a large or medium LOCA with a coincidental l .
LNP is calculated as follows:
large LOCA with coincidental LNP l
! (9. 0E - 2 /yr) X (3. 9E - 4 /yr) X (1/3 6 5 ) = 9.6E-8/vr I
( I
?
l where; I HNP LNP frequency ( 9. 0E - 2 /yr) large LOCA frequency (3.9E -4/yr) adjustment facter (lyr/365 day) l l
medium LOCA with coincidental LNP
( 9. 0E- 2 /yr) X ( 6.1E- 4 /yr) X (1/ 3 6 5 ) = 1.5E-7/vr l where; medium LOCA frequency (6.1E-4/yr) l These events are considered for design basis, however they have a very small probability of occurance from the PRA l 1
analysis perspective.
CH-MOV-292B & C CH-MOV-292B & C are Westinghouse 3 inch flexible wedge gate valves and are not directly modeled in the PRA (Ref. 7). These valves are normally open and their operation (closure and latter reopening) is
, dependent upon the transient initiator. Review of Ref. 5 identified j several transients f or which these valves are credited. However the i only transient that PRA determined to be applicable is the loss of
- control air (CA). For this transient these valves are indirectly I i
1
[ ED m 6-Bo NORTHEAST UTluTIPS SERVICE COMPANY l ggt An inm1vais of the Rink h act Dua to Pressura RY J.K. Rothmet DATE 08/08/95 Imekinn and Thermal mindina of CY ECCB MOVs CHKD. SY F.O. clatak DATE_ak/Ib/95 CALC. NO. PRA9EMna.01294*BY REV. 0 SHEET NO. 13 OF 7. l credited by PRA via operator actions to isolate charging to prevent pressurizer overfill. The other identified transients credit closure and reopening of these valves in the latter stages of these transients to rosch a cold shutdown condition. PRA currently only models CDF for failure to reach a safe hot shutdown condition.
However, these valves failing due to PL would not be expected to have any measurable impact on core damage in these latter stages of a transient. This is primarily due to operators having 1) time to take action since the reactor is in a stable hot shutdown condition and 2) other potential alternate flow paths to bring the plant to a safe cold shutdown condition.
To determine the potential impact upon CDF the operator actions which credit these valves were revised and assumed to be a 50%
increase in the f'ailure probability (Table 1). This value is considered conservative based on significantly increasing the f ailure of the operator action and on the previous discussion of the SI valves potential failure due to.PLTB.
To calculate the change in CDF the applicable transient of Ref. 7 was reviewed, the new conditional f ailure rate for these valves f rom Table 1 were applied, and the following changes in CDP were calculated (Appendix B):
loss of CA - from 6.54E-6/yr to 7.13E-6/yr 5.9E-7/vr This change in CDF is considered conservative since it does not consider operators having: 1) time to take action since the reactor is in a stable hot shutdown condition and 2) other potential alternate flow paths to bring the plant to a safe cold shutdown '
condition.
l Ec97 5 80 NORTilEAST UTilJTIES SERVICE COMPANY SUBJECT- An Annivain of the Rink tenmet Due to pressure... 3Y 3.K. Rothart DATE 08/08/95 Loekins and Thermal aindina of CY 2002 MOVs' CHKD. SY _F.O. clatak DATE N/ 3 /95 CALC NO. PRA95NOA 0129a=SY REV. O suusT wo. is or %f RHR-MOV-780. 781. 803 & 804 RHR- MOV- 7 8 0 & 7 81 and RHR-MOV 803 & 804 are two sets of Westinghouse 10 inch flexible wedge in series gate valves that are the RCS to RHR suction and return valves, respectively. These valves are normally ,
closed and a review of Ref. 5 identified that these valves are '
potentially susceptible to PLTB when placing the RHR system in service per NOP 2.9 -1 (Ref. 8) or AOP 3. 2 - 53 (Ref. 9), Ref. 5 also l i
notes that the conditions that these valves are normally operated l l
at under NOP 2.9-1 are the same that could result in PLTB of these i valves and that no failures due to the PLTB phenomenon have ever been credited to these valves. Based upon Ref. 5, AOP 3.2-53 is only entered into for transients which would require plant shutdown l form outside the control room. For this situation pressure locking l is the identified failure mechanism. Since these valves are in series it is considered reasonable that only one of the two valves ;
in the series is exposed to high RCS pressure and thus potentially ]
susceptible to the pressure locking failure mechanism.
PRA credits /models these valves in the internal events model (Ref.
- 7) for the early establishment of long term cooling for the steam generator tube rupture (STGR) initiator. PRA also reviewed Ref . 10 l for the external events model for situations where shutdown f rom the outside the control room is credited. In the external events analysis only CDF associated with failing to reach a safe hot i shutdown condition were considered. As in the internal events model the external events model does not model bringing the plant to a cold shutdown condition. However, these valves failing due to PL would not be expected to have any measurable impact on core damage in these latter stages of a transient. This is primarily due to operators having 1) time to take action since the reactor is in a stable hot shutdown condition and 2) other potential alternate flow paths to bring the plant to a safe cold shutdown condition.
, _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ .__ _ _= . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
l
- ED s 5 80 NORTHEAST UTIUTifS SERVICE COMPANY 3GDgiDCT J Anm1vais of the Risk h aet Dua tg Prasaura BY J.K. Rethart DATE 08/10/95 l Leckins and ThaIEW1 mindina of cY RccB Nova CHKD. BY _F.O. clatak DATE Ok/j/o/95 CALC. NO. PRA95NOA 01294-BY REV. 0 '
SHEET NO. 15 OF %f i
L To quantify the potential significance of these valves for the SGTR i
event the valves f ailure rate was increased by 50% (Table 1) and the l calculated change in CDF f or the internal events model envelopes the external events model enance in CDF. This is considered conservative since PL would have to occur under what are considered l the valves normal operating conditions, and by assuming that PL l occurs in the early stages of the transient. However, to balance l these conservative assumptions only one valve in the series is l assumed susceptible to PL. j i
Combinations of these valves are credited in the PRA for the SGTR initiator. To calculate this change the applicable transient of ]
j Ref. 7 was reviewed, the new conditional failure rate for these valves f rom Table 1 was applied, and the following change in CDF was I calculated (Appendix B): l l
l I SGTR - from 7.78E 6/yr to 8.40E-6/yr 6.2E 7/vr )
l l
l This change in CDF is considered very conservative since it does not l consider operators having: 1) time to take action since the reactor l
is in a stable hot shutdown condition and 2) other potential
! alternate flow paths to bring the plant to a safe cold shutdown condition.
i SI-MOV-854A & B and SI-MOV 873 These valves are not modeled by PRA since at the initiation of a transient these valves are in the open position. Pressure locking i
of these valves is of concern in the latter stages of a transient (not in the early stages) after these valves have been closed and
)
{ are then required to reopen to reach a cold shutdown condition. PRA l 3 currently only models CDF for failure to reach a safe hot shutdcwn r
1
\
EDC97 $ 80 NORTIIEAST UTIUTil'S SERVICE COMPANY a
SUBJECT An Analvain of the Risk immaet Due to Pressure EY J.K. Rothart DATE 08/16/95 1.ockins and Thamal mindins of cY Eccs Mova CHKD. By P.O. clatak DATE 07/ /95
- CALC. NO. PRA95NoA 01294-BY_ Rgy, o j l SHEET NO. 16 OF 1/
1 i
i
! conditi.on. However, these valves failing due to PL would not be l
[ expected to have any measurable impact on core damage in these 4
f latter stages of a transient. This is primarily due to operators having 1) time to take action since the reactor is in a stable hot shutdown condition and 2) other potential alternate flow paths to bring the plant to a safe cold shutdown condition. I l
. i.d Results PRA wishes to again acknowledge / recognize the significance of the PLTB failure mechanism, the importance of some of these previously discussed valves to saf e shutdown given a transient initiator (ie. ,
LOCAs, SGTR, etc.), and the resultant potential dire consequences should they fail. However based upon the previous analyses / discussions, to assume that these valves are failed with a certainty of one for all cases is overly conservative and is not considered representative of what the potential significance associated with PLTB failure mechanism truly is. This analysis is PRA's effort to quantify this potential significance based upon uncertainties associated with both the knowns and unknowns of PLTB and CY plant operations, i
The total CDF change due to pressure locking was calculated to be 1.76E-5/yr. This increase is a summation of the fallowing changes in the CDFs for the following transients: !
i large LOCA no LNP 6.4E-6/vr 1
medium LOCA no LNP 1.0E-5/vr large LOCA with LNP <1.0E-7/vr medium LOCA with LNP 11 5E-7/vr loss of CA 5.9E-7/vr SGTR 6.2E-7/vr l
j imm 5 80 NORTilEAST UTiljTIES SERYlCE COMPANY j SUBSECT in Analvain of the Risk 2mmace. Due to Prnamurn B*/ J.K. Rothert DATE 08/98/95 k Lockina and Thermal Bindina of CY ECCR MOVa CNED. BY F.O. clatak DATE Ch//h/95 j
CAI.C. NO. PRA95NOA 01294-BY REY. 0
} sxEET No. 17 or 2I i i
{ This-change represents an approximate 14% increase in the calculated j CY CDF of 1.3E 4/ year from Reference 7.
t, 4
r i Current PRA model only considers failure to establish hot shutdown
) in the determination of CDP. Many of the valves are only credited $
. for the establishing cold shutdown from hot shutdown which is not i currently modeled. Thus the impact on CDF from failing to go from 1
l hot shutdown to cold shutdown cannot be quantified. However, these i valves failing due to PL would not be expected to have any measurable impact on core damage in these latter stages of a transient. This is primarily due to operators having 1) time to take action since the reactor is in a stable hot shutdown condition and 2) other potential alternate flow paths to bring the plant to a safe cold shutdown condition.
i I
i
_ _ _ _ _ - . _ . . _ _ _ . _.__ m_ . .. _ ._ . . . . _ > . _ _. _
4 ED4297 5 80 - NORTilEAST UTillTIES SERVICE COMPANY
, S M CT An An=1vais of the Risk imm+ct Dus to Pressure BY J.K. 16thart DATE 08/08/95
, Lockins and Thernmal Bindina of CY EccB Mova CHKD. BY F.o. Cintak DATE Ok/11/95 s
CALC. NO. PRA95NOA*01294.SY REV. O SHEET NO. 1e or 7. l I
5.0 REFERENCES
4 1. " Operating Experience Feedback Report -
Pressure Locking and i Thermal Binding of Gate Valves," NUREG-1275, Vol. 9.
1
- 2. " Calculation to Predict the Required Thrust to Open a Flexible !
Wedge Gate Valve subjected to Pressure Locking," by Dana E.
i Smith, Entergy Operations Inc., Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, 1
4 for NRC Public Meeting, Feb. 4, 1994.
a 2
- 3. Letter from D.J. Petrarca, Westinghouse to C.H. Wu, "Haddam 1
i I
Neck Plant Core Deluge /MOV Interlock Design," 93CY*-G-0072, l i
Dec. 17, 1993.
I i
i
, 4. Haddam Neck LER 95 - 010, " Pressure Locking of safety Injection !
j
$ Valves," docket Number 05000-213, Apr. 4, 1995.
I 4
J a
- 5. Yankee Atomic Electric Company Report, "CY GL 89-10 MOV Pressure Locking Thermal Binding Evaluation, " Rev. O, Mar. 24, i 1995, NU 95 089, WO 8233.
- 6. NRC Memorandum, "Intrem Inspection Guidance on Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Gate Valves," Dec. 20, 1993.
i
- 7. NUSCO PRA Calc. File "CY Final Quantification," C2-517 1041-i l RE, Rev. 1, July 4, 1995.
- 8. NOP 2.9-1, " Placing the Residual Heat Removal System in Service."
- 9. AOP 3.2-53, " Local Manual Operation of Residual Heat Removal System."
ED4297 6 - 80 NORTHEAST UtilJTIES SERYlCE COMPANY SUBJICT An inmivais of the Risk f amnact Due to pressura BY _J.r. Rothmet DATE 08/08/95 Lockina and Thermal aindina of CY Ecca Mova CHKD. BY F.O. clatak DATE Ok/ /2/95 CALC. NO. PRA95NoA 01294.SY $2V. 0 SHEET NO. 19 OF 7-l
PRA94NQA-01182-SY, Rev. O, Jan. 1, 1995.
- 11. Memo N.P. Sacco to R.S. VanSteenbergen, " Rise in Bonnet Pressure due to rise in Temperature during Plant Heat up for SI-MOV-861A,B,C, and D and SI-MOV 871A,B and RH-MOV-780,781,803 and 804," MOV-95-090, Rev. 1, March 15, 1995.
- 12. PI-20, Rev. 2, "MOV Program Pressure Locking and Thermal '
Binding Evaluation," NUSCO MOV Program, May 5, 1995.
- 13. NUSCO PRA Calc. File, "CY Reliability Database", C2-517-559-RE, Rev. 4, April 18, 1991.
- 14. PNO-1 80-49, "Inadvertant Plant Trip," March 27, 1980.
- 15. Memo R.S. VanSteenbergen to J.K. Rothert, "CY - Re-evaluation of SI-MOV-861A, B, C, D, SI-MOV-871A, B, SI-MOV-901 & 902 Subject to Pressure Locking," MOV-95-140, August 4, 1995.
5 r.a NORTilEAST UTiljTIES SERVICE CCCPAN' sunJzet __An_Ana1Y'in of the_Ria U psmet Dua to PrrsSUro BY J.K. Roth*rt DATE 08/16f99 Lockin<I and_ Thermal Binding _oLCY_ECCS MQYS CHKD. BY F.O. Cigteh DATE _O.$//b /95 CALC. NO.JRAMNQA-01211-SI_ REV. O SHEE" NO. 20 OF 2/
Tabl.el VALVE ID DISCUSSION PRA FAILURE PRESS. LOCKING PL FAIL. PRA BASIC RATE & MODE (PL) FACTOR 8 RATE EVENT ID N1 Mnv-#71 Them valve i a t e<fo i re.1 for twn path g er i r e' It
- dele-t f or na na na glaihed ntent f nt inalews t he reitre, g hate guset IN A . f a i l iers t o c l one Fressure lor k ing f nr t his en tve was a ennrern (not nedeled f or f rst l et ter :st agese of t he t reattient sehen t he f a t t i f>2 to opent valve is rinsed and t hest reopened t o estahlssh t wo pat h infection finw (proceduren have t-een t ev i ssed t o k eep t h i s wa t we npen t .
The line is nnr1ma l l y f ill-1 wi t h wat er g r ier to a transient. Faiture doe 4o low tengeanture tvetured Pt. tent ennsidereal very rea<e t b la .
Rf ten Anin. 9. C, HPRI injection valves are re*3uired
- n nposi 2.4R-2/D FTO 1EirA only 1.5 1.6E-2/D MMvav61 ( A. B.C. D6 4 D (tentma l l y for a tJ1t' A - Givets a ti1C A event tan HMoD61 ( A , R . C. Dt FTTW ctnsed) t-onse<tuent i a l 1 NP1, the valves receive a SI signal t o egien. T15ese va lves unuld start to 1,eR 1/D tK A only pq I,$E-2/D fptv ADA61 ogen pring to differenten in Rt'M pressure gue3pecpg329 resta t t ing in presnore Inrking terewatng a 2/4 rTF r,t.nrern . Preesure Ini k knq tras deternit ned to be a primary rnprern in t he event of a IA!C A 2.tF 1/D 14rA only na 1.4R-2/D HMVAPA61 with a consequential tJtP (%r vise vers,el due m F#62V to the time r eclu i rert t o recover pnwer and 2/1 Cry then npen thope va1ven, 1.1F 4/D LJ1CA only na 3.2R-2/D RMVAF961 MMt il1CC FR6 IV 1/4 rr*F 9 3 - scrsy 3 714 sp L.PS I rote deluce valvem are vertuired eo open 2,4K-2/D FTO 14K'A twit y 1,% 3.6R-2/D VMyAy?][A,et trentually elemed) for a E41f'A. Sauer en for 91 95W 94 t h in D: vter weevs 7 t t A , P D AW twneever . 1_PS I in tert inn doce not orror until RCS pressure i s s i en t f i cant t y i rneer t han g ,g gy 1/D CCF Li1CA nnly na VMV AA fl 71
- 1. 4 E - 2 /El 1115 pai.
91 feW-
- D1 & 402 HPSI valves required to open f or a 141CA 2 4P-2/D FTO 1.% 1. EF- 2 /ft HMV Arv9f% t 1,2 5 tranrimally closedt durinq starnp reci re, g,ha se to a t igts FMR to "PNI* 1.41P-1/D CY'P na 1.4P 2/D HMVAA912 at ! 94W-R%4A & R 99P9 7 /PerST isotat toet valves required 9o etavse Modeled for na the gen f renr1mally opent and reopen for a lElCA. These valves are rent failing to close mrwieled i ts the PPA as havires to r eopert. innt everwteleM f or f a i I i tig eo npent CM MrW - 29 2P S C CHG loop 2 cold leg t re tect inn valves. 1.DR-2 1.5 4.TE-2/D OAPKCHCM trinraatly opent Credited fnr Ines of inst, air and PCTD ovent e . These vaives are nnt di vert ly undeled by PF A ; hnweves. they are ennsidered enveloped l'y t he OA/MI t o est ablish charging 1.OE-3 1. . F 1/D P!WNCHGA twn g=e t h terirr.
5 03 N0lfrilEAST UTillT1ES SERVICE CCI'AN StDJECT M alvim of th2 Riat_ Imp;ct_pu3 to Prserurs BY J.K. Roth;rt DATE 08/10/95 LOCA1Aq_ rat 1_IheIERl_. Bind 1Dg_.Df CY ECCS_MQV2 CHKD. EY __F.O. Cir,1ck DATE Dh//fd/95 CALC, NO.M3NQLQ123ML REV. O SHEET NO. 21 OF 2/
4 VALVE ID DISCUSSION FRA FAILURE PRESS. LOCKING PL FAIL. PRA BASIC RATE & MODE (PL) FACTOR' RATE EVENT ID pn ww 7mn a 743 pte lewt 1 hot l e=3 suctinn valven, Pt.ew trn 2.47. 2/n me 1. r> 1. t. R 2/n penvA 730 i nntena l l y v I ngs.M in f or ryeret into of t hene ve l vete tehet 2 . M F. ' /D 1.9&P 2/D FMM9FM720 A f v shut 4=m f rews a transient i n t a"Tu i t ert f r<wn outalie the contrnt e ne um. PL ia rot enn.ia .e4 . <nn.eto f ne . tron.sent ehen shut -iointe f erwn the eemtent e rw est is pensitlo.
These v41veg are in meties *hus t he utst rem v4lve (7AAt is p art- j ere tn l't. .
.it .w ani . noe enn inn, a c t., i n ini ttino v.tve.. n 2. .r . un m, i.s u e 2/o em vAmei (nnrnwe l t y e t nset t es fnr WI ** W 7 R 81 & Tal. These valves see in 2.ME 2 / t> 1.96E-2/D PM4*EWA01AfV serses t hus t he upstteam valve (RGil is 9.sb iet*
- to Pt .
1 The pressure locking factor is an adjustment to the MOV failure rate to account for the potential of the MOV failing due to pressure locking (PL). The factor takes into consideration relevant pertinent data about the valve (presented in section 2), its potential to be exposed to conditions that could result in PL, and the uncertainty of whether or not the valve will operate. A 1.5 or 50% increase in failure rate is assumed for components which are considered to have a low probability of being potentially susceptible to pressure locking phenomenon. The 1.5 factor is applied to individual component failure rates. It is recognized that PLTB is primmarly a common cause failure mechanism concern. For CCF f ailure probability it was assumed / recognized that the additional increase (1.2E-2) in the random failure probability is the common cause failure probability due to the PLTB mechanism irrespective of combination (2/2, 2/3, 2/4, etc.). This additional common cause failure probability for PLTB was added to the calculated CY PRA common cause f ailure due to other mechanisms to yield a new common cause f ailure probability for purposes of this analysis. ;
ED4297 5 80 NORTHEAST UTilJTIES SERVICE C0WPANY
$U3J3CT An Analvais of the Rink Tan *ct Du? to Pleasure... EY J.K. Bothart DATE 07/27/95 Lockina and Tharmal Bindins of CY Ecca Riova CHKD. 3Y F.O. clatak DATE Ch//(/95 CALC. NO. PRA95NOA 01294 SY REV. 0 SHEET NO. # A- f OF 4"b 1
I Appendix A i
i b
l l
l
'i i
i i
l 3
l
I Nsrtheast Utilities System Memo ,
August 4,1995 MOV-95-140 To: dohn' Rothert From: R. S. Van Steenbergen MOV Group, CY, Ext. 3194
Subject:
CY - Re-evaluation of SI-MOV-861 A, B, C, D, St-MOV-871 A, B, SI-MOV-901 & 902 Subject to Pressure Locking i
References:
- 1. Connecticut Yankee LER 50-213 95-010-00," Pressure Locking of Safety injection Valves", dated April 6,1995
- 2. Dana E. Smith, " Calculation to Predict the Required Thrust to Open a Flexible Wedge Gate Valve Subjected to Pressure Locking", Entergy Operations Inc, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Port Gibson, MS 39150, Prepared for NRC Public Meeting February 4,1994, New Orleans, LA
- 3. Westinghouse Electric Corporation Letter 93CY'-G-0072 "Haddam Neck Plant Core Deluge /MOV Interlock Design", D. J. Petrarca to C. H. Wu dated December 17,1993
- 4. NUSCO Memo MOV-95-384 "CY-GL 89-10 MOV Program MOVs SI-MOV-861 A, B, C, & D and SI-MOV-871 A & B and RH-MOV-780,781,803 & 804 Bonnet Overpressurization", N. P Sacco to R. S. Van Steenbergen dated July 14,1995
- 5. Memo entitled "Use of Fig. 2 Hot Leg Pressure For Cold Leg Breaks", John Rothert to R. S. Van Steenbergen dated August 4,1995 (attached)
Chyra to J. K. Rothert dated August 4,1995 (attached)
The following table lists required thrusts to open the valves of concern in Reference 1 when pressure locked as well as their open thrust capability and their open thrust limits. The assumptions used in this evaluation are more realistic than the original evaluation (Reference 1) which resulted in the valves being declared inoperable. The required thrusts where calculated using the Entergy method of Reference 2 which was used previously to determine historical operability of these valves.
l August 4,1995 MOV-95-140 l Page 2 of 3 )
Valve No. Required Thrust Actuator Open Open Thrust l Thrust Capability Limit i SI MOV-861 A 20332' to 32704 2 18295 14912 3
I St-MOV-861 B 20332' to 32704 3 18295 14912' I SI-MOV-861C 16944' to 25631 3 17934 14912' l SI-MOV 861D 20332' to 32704 3 17224 14912 3
l SI-MOV-871 A 12116 29901 17100' SI-MOV 871B 17822 28042 17100*
SI-MOV-901 9701 19693 15337' SI-MOV-902 9701 20856 15337' Notes: 1. Intemal Bonnet Pressure = 5500 psi 3. Valve Limit
1 The range of required thrusts for SI-MOV-861 A through D correlate to the range of possible bonnet l pressures given in Reference 4. The bonnet pressure at which the required thrust would equal the l most limiting valve's (Sl-MOV-861D) open thrust capability is calculated to be 4374 psig. 1 l
Subsequent surface temperature measurements of SI-MOV-861 A, B, C, and D where made when the RCS was at operating temperature. The maximum temperature measured under insulation at a valve's center line was 368 F. This is much less than the assumed 562 F uninsulated bonnet temperature which the above bonnet pressure range is based on. Thus, the range of bonnet pressures used in this analysis is conservative.
The following assumptions where used in the calculations:
SI-MOV-861 A, B. C. D
. No motor torque derate due to high ambient temperature was applied due to the valves opening ,
immediately upon initiation of a of a large break LOCA. It is assumed that the motor windings I would not heat up significantly enough to effect motor output torque.
1
. No loss of offsite power is assumed. Motor undervoltage used based on normal offsite power i available at time of LOCA initiation. ,
. Stem torque coefficient of friction equal to 0.15.
. Bonnet pressures between 5500 and 10000 lb. due to heating effect from RCS (Reference 4).
. Upstream pressure equal to 20 psig which is the elevation head due to the RWST. The HPSI pumps are on a 10 second start delay after receipt of a safety injection signal. St-MOV-861 A, B, C, and D would be partially open before the HPSI pumps started.
. Down stream pressure equal to 900 psig which would be the hot leg pressure at the time the l pressurizer pressure SI setpoint is reached (1700 psig) after a large break LOCA per Reference 3, Figure 2. References 5 and 6 justify the use of hot leg pressure instead of the cold leg which SI-MOV-861 A, B, C and D are connected to.
. Static pull out estimated at 9000 lb. from previous VOTES tests.
August 4,1995 MOV 95140 ,
i Page 3 of 3 l
- I Valve factors from PI-13 dynamic test evaluations or grouping if valve was not dynamically tested. I I
SI-MOV-871 A. B I l
- No motor torque derate due to high ambient temperature was applied due to the valves opening immediately upon initiation of a of a large break LOCA. It is assumed that the motor windings would not heat up significantly enough to effect motor output torque.
e No loss of offsite power is assumed. Motor undervoltage used based on normal offsite power available at time of LOCA initiation. l e
l Upstream pressure equal to 20 psig which is the elevation head of the RWST. The LPSI pumps are on a 3 second start delay after receipt of a safety injection signal. SI-MOV-871A and B open immediately upon a Si signal.
Down stream pressure equal to 900 psig which was determined from Reference 3, Figure 2.
- Stem torque coefficient of friction equal to 0.15 SI-MOV-901. 902 l e Motor torque derated due to an ambient temperature of 140 'F which is the PAB LOCA temperature.
i I e No loss of offsite power is assumed. Motor undervoltage used based on normal offsite power l available at time of LOCA initiation.
I e Intemal bonnet pressure equal to 341 psig which is the shut off head of the LPSI pumps adjusted for elevation differences.
- Stem torque coefficient of friction equal to 0.15.
If you have any questions, please call.
cc: C. J. Gladding R. T. Harris S.T.Hodge M.E.Long N. P. Sacco P. D. Mason f
I
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AUG- 4-95 FRI 13:43 NUCLEAR FUEL ENGINEERING FAX NO. 203 665 3273 P.02 l INTER OFFICE MEMO I TO C4PMTup 1 tocatios J. k. Ro rnex 1- sA 8- PU c<) - t 33 E8088 De *MThErdi ullCATCN A . CH vn A sA 8 THA v)-I3 3 suuct mis Psassuae Dr.sr m vrio a sr Hsm Ateex pe,u.cosa s / MgA A M. % i115 l MESSAGE I l Are wasrwgo.tr Lerrea.
- 93 cy *- q - co72, Dec. / 7, t113 As our da.seuuta.,, F.y u rt 2 t,, tio . a % e. k fm.a ca - A* ud b douba r.the rencie ao /d try.s o s hypa fle.4ea/
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. . . _ - . ~ - . . - . . . . . - . - . - . . . - - - . ~ ,
ED4m s-Bo NORTHEAST Util) TIES SERVICE COMPANY ;
SUBJECT An analvain of the niak InnaeA Due PA PreanuL BY J.K. Bothart DATE
\
97/A7/95 1 Loekine and Thermal kindina of CY Recs Mova CHKD. BY F.O. clatak DATE 07/ /91 l CALC. NO..PRA95NOA 01294 SY REV. O BHEET NO. k b *l 09 8 'A Z. '
Appendix B 1
l 1
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t J 2
S 1 g 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 S L L 1
M M M 3 gA M 1 2 L L L L L L L L 4 O A 3 3 W C S F C S W F C S F C S F 9 L D D L E E E E E E E E E E E E E 2 S C P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A 1
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C:\CAFTA\LLOCR.RPT 7/26/95 23:24 Poge 1
\CAFTA\SEQCUT\F-LLOCA. CUT CUTSET REPORT 7-26-95 11:21 Page 1 Filter: ' ALL' B.E. MOD./CS.
MODULE / EVENT NAME DESCRIPTION RATE EXPOSURE PROB. PROB.
- 1) AECL1 . *2.58E-05
- 1) 141 IE LARGE LOCA INITI ATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04' 1.95E-35 r) Ar- 7 CAPRECIL OPERATOR f **S TO TRANSFER TO RECIRC. FOLLOWING LARGE LOCA 5.0E-02 5.00E-02
- 2) HIPREClb OPERATOR R TO TRANSFER TO RECIRC. FOLLOWING A LARGE LOCA(SCREE 1.0E-02 1.00E-02 3.90E-06 LC1 IE LARGE usCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04
- 3) CBCNDLDL CONDITIONAL ADVERSE BSL FAILS THE SYSTEM GIVEN LARGE LOCA IN LOOP .125 1.25E-01 5.85E-07 HMODCCF861V < module >CCF OF 3 OF 4 HPSI INJECTION VALVES TO OPEN 1.2E-2 1.20E-02 LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04
- 4) CBCNDLDL CONDITIONAL ADVERSE BSL FAILS THE SYSTEM GIVEN LARGE LOCA IN LOOP .125 1.25E-01 4.39E-07 HMODCCFRECO < module >CCF OF BOTH HPSI TRAINS TO OPERATE 9.0E-3 9.00E-03 LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITI ATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04
- 5) EMODRHMV22AIQ < module >RH-MOV-22 PATH FAILS TO OPEN 8.457E-03 8.46E-03 3.30E-07 EVMPQ808 OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN RH-V-808A 1.00E-01 1.00E-01 LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITI ATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04
- 6) LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 1.99E-07 VMOD871BFCAIV < module >SI-MOV-871B FAILS TO RECLOSE 5.105E-03 5.11E-03 6 VMVPV873 OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE SI-MOV-873 TO ISOLATE CORE DELUGE LINES 1.0E-1 1.00E-01
- 7) LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 1.99E-07 VMOD871AFCAIV < module >SI-MOV-871 A FAILS TO RECLOSE 5.105E-03 5.11E-03 VMVPV873 OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE SI-MOV-873 TO ISOLATE CORE DELUGE LINES 1.OE-1 1.00E-01 i
- 8) LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 1.24E-07 XMODSIWLABI < module >SIAS RESET FAILS 3.192E-04 3.19E-04
- 9) LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 1.06E-07 WMVAA056 CCF COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF SW-MOV-5 AND 6 TO OPEN 4.00E-3 6.8E-2 2.72E-04
- 10) ECVAA783 CCF COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF RH-CV-783 AND RH-CV-808A TO OPEN 2.00E-4 .816 1.63E-04 6.36E-08 LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 i
- 11) CBCND LDL CONDITIONAL ADVERSE BSL FAILS THE SYSTEM GIVEN LARGE LOCA IN LOOP .125 1.25E-01 6.16E-08 '
HMODPPATRFBIKO < module >HPSI PUMP TRAIN A FAILS TO OPERATE (RECIRC) 3.556E-02 3.56E-02 HMODPPDTRFAIJO < module >HPSI PUMP TRAIN B FAILS TO OPERATE (RECIRC) 3.556E-02 3.56E-02 LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITI ATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04
- 12) EMODRHRCCFQ < module >CCF OF BOTH RHR TRAINS 1.527E-04 1.53E-04 5.96E-08 LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04
- 13) LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 5.32E-08 VMOD871BFCAIV < module >SI-MOV-871B FAILS TO RECLOSE 5.105E-03 5.11E-03 $*0%
VMODMOV873AIV < module >SI-MOV-873 FAILS TO CLOSE 2.670E-02 2.67E-02 . u 't
- 14) LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 5.32E-08 .o303 VMOD871AFCAIV < module >SI-MOV-871A FAILS TO RECLOSE 5.105E-03 5.11E-03 VMODMOV873AIV < module >SI-MOV-873 FAILS TO CLOSE ggj[L V 2.670E-02 2.67E-02 ,
RCVAA225 CCF COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CC-CV-225A AND B TO OPEN 2.00E-4 .408 8.16E-05
- 16) CBCNDLDL CONDITIONAL ADVERSE BSL FAILS THE SYSTEM GIVEN LARGE LOCA IN LOOP .125 1.2SE-01 3.02E-08 HMODCCFHPIO < module >CCF OF BOTH HPSI TRAINS TO START AND OPERATE 6.192E-04 6.19E-04 LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 *
- 17) EAVSQ602 RH-FCV-602 IS OPEN DUE TO VALVE STEM SEPARATION 5.20E-5 1 5.20E-05 2.03E-08 LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 y *
].G % '
.0573
.v0 M' s11
-j7sii 25 :
. _ .~ - ._ . . - - .. - - - _
~
C:\CAFT4\LLOCA.RPT 7/2G/95 23:24 Page 2
\CAFTA\SEQCUT\F-LLOCA. CUT CUTSET REPORT 7-26-95 11:21 Page 2 Filter: ' ALL' B.E. MOD./CS.
MODULE / EVENT NAME DESCRIPTION RATE EXPOSURE PROB. , PROB.
- 2) AECL2 '*5.73E-07
OAPRECIL OPERATOR FAILS TO TRANSFER TO RECIRC. FOLLOWING LARGE LOCA 5.0E-02 5.00E-02 VMVAA871 CCF OF CORE DELUGE MOVS 871A AND 871B TO OPEN 1.4E-2 1.40E-02
- 2) ERVDQ715 RELIEF VALVE RH-RV-715 PREMATURE OPEN 1.25E-5 24 3.00E-04 1.17E-07 LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04
- 3) HIPRECIL OPERATOR FAILS TO TRANSFER TO RECIRC. FOLLOWING A LARGE LOCA(SCREE 1.0E-02 1.00E-02 5.46E-08 LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITI ATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 VMV AA871 CCF OF CORE DELUGE MOVS 871A AND 871B TO OPEN 1.4E-2 1.40E-02
- 4) EMVSQ874 RH-MOV-874 FAILS TO BE CLOSED POSITION DUE TO VALVE STEM SEPARA 1.04E-4 1 1.04E-04 4.06E-08 LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04
- 5) EMVRQ874 OPERATOR FAILS TO RESTORE RH-MOV-874 FOLLOWING T&M 1.00E-4 1.00E-04 3.90E-08 LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04
- 6) LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITI ATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 2.53E-08 OAPRECIL OPFRATOR FAILS TO TRANSFER TO RECIRC. FOLLOWING LARGE LOCA 5.0E-02 5.00E-02 VMODMV871AAV < module >SI-MOV-871A FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 VMODMV871BAV < module >SI-MOV-871B FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02
- 7) LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREOUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 2.34E-08 OAPRECIL OPERATOR FAILS TO TRANSFER TO RECIRC. FOLLOWING LARGE LOCA 5.0E-02 5.00E-02 VCVAR103 CHECK VALVE CV-103 FAILS TO OPEN 2.00E-4 6 1.20E-03
- 3) AECL3 *9.98E-08 7. cur J
- 1) HMODCCF862V < module >CCF OF 2 OF 3 HPSI INJECTION VALVES TO OPEN 1.4E-2 1.40E-02 7.'64E-08 LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 VMVAA871 CCF OF CORE DELUGE MOVS 871A AND 871B TO OPEN 1.4E-2 1.40E-02
- 2) LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITI ATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 2.34E-08 XRCHA2/2 CCF OF SI RELAY 4A AND 4B COIL TO ENERGIZE (SCREENING VALUE) 1.00E-4 6.000E-01 6.00E-05
- 4) AECM *6.8%E-06 L otF 6
- 1) LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 5:46E-06 VMVAA871 CCF OF CORE DELUGE MOVS 871A AND 871B TO OPEN 1.4E-2 1.40E-02
- 2) LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 5.05E-07 VMODMV871AAV < module >SI-MOV-871 A FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 VMODMV871BAV < module >SI-MOV-871B FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02
- 3) LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 4.68E-07 VCVAR103 CHECK VALVE CV-103 FAILS TO OPEN 2.00E-4 6 1.20E-03
- 4) LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 1.77E-07 VMODP1VCCFO < module > COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF LPSI PUMP TRAINS 4.550E-04 4.55E-04
- 5) LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 4.06E-08 VMVSV873 SI-MOV-873 FAILS TO BE IN OPEN POSITION DUE TO VALVE STEM SEPARA 1.04E-4 1 1.04E-04
- 6) LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 3.90E-08 VMVRV873 OPERATOR FAILS TO RESTORE SI-MOV-873 TO OPEN POSITION FOLLOW 1.00E-4 1.00E-04
- 7) LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 3.90E-08 VMVRR102 OPERATOR FAILS TO RESTORE SI-V-102 TO OPEN POSITION FOLLOW 1.00E-4 1.00E-04
- 8) LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 3.18E-08 VCVAA872 CCF OF CORE DELUGE CHECK VALVES 872A AND 872B TO OPEN 2.00E-4 .408 8.16E-05
- 9) LG1 IE LARGE LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 1.68E-08 VCVAV72A CHECK VALVE CV-872A FAILS TO OPEN 2.00E-4 6 1.20E-03 VMODMV871BAV < module >SI-MOV-871B FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02
[
~
.~
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, Filter: 'ALL' i
B.E. MOD./CS.
MODULE / EVENT HAME DESCRIPTION RATE EXPOSURE PROB. , PROB.
VCVAV72B CHECK VALVE CV-872B FAILS TO OPEN 2.00E-4 6 1.20E-03 VMODMVB71AAV < module >SI-MOV-971A FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02
- 11) LG1 IE 1ARGE LOCA INITI ATING EVENT FREQUENCY 3.9E-04 3.90E-04 1.27E-09 VMODLPIPPAIO < module >LPSI PUMP TRAIN A FAILS 5.698E-03 5.70E-03 VMODLPIPPBIO < module >LPSI PUMP TRAIN B FAILS 5.698E-03 5.70E-03
. _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ - - . - ~ _ -
. ._s
i MEDIUM LOCA HIGH PRESSURE CHARGl?nLEVEL 2 SUMP CAR FANS CONTAINMENT SPRAY CONTAINMENT SPRAY CLASS INITIATING EVENT SAFETY INJECTION ALTERNATE CORE RECIRCULATION 2 (LEVEL 2)
FREQUENCY COOLING L
LG2 HPSI CHG REC 2 CARF CS .CSM PD31 ,
PD32 I CARF1 ALWL1 ;
CS1 !
CW 4tpt, ALCL1 !.2!$-5 REC 2 ALSL1 CARF CS RFL2 ,
i ALCM 4 2^ $ -'M LG2 >
i CARF1 ALWM '
CS1 I
ALFM ,
ALCL2 fN ~b REC 2 E ALSL2 CARF CS MFL3 ;
AECH1 KQiY CHG I
(
MEDIUM BREAK LOCA EVENT TREE ETASCYLOCAM.TRE S-12-94 / 7g , 4 .
([F /YE. '
/
$ Y(b C: \CAFTR\M LOCA. RPT 7/26/95 23:24 Page 1
\CAFTA\SEOCUT\F-MLOCA. CUT CUTSET REPORT 7-26-95 11:21 Page 1 Filter: ' ALL' B.E. MOD./CS.
MODULE / EVENT NAME DESCRIPTION RATE EXPOSURE PROB. PROB.
- 1) AECHI .*9.55E-08 yagpg
- 1) LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04' 3.$$E-08 XRCHA2/2 CCF OF SI RELAY 4A AND 4B COIL TO ENERGIZE (SCREENING VALUE) 1.00E-4 6.000E-01 6.00E-05
- 2) CMVBAVCT CCF OF 2/2 VCT TO CHG. SUCTION MOVs TO ISOL. MOVs 257 & 257B 4.00E-3 0.408 1.63E-03 1.39E-08 HMODCCF862V < module >CCF OF 2 OF 3 HPSI INJECTION VALVES TO OPEN 1.4E-2 1.40E-02 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 3) CMVAARWT CCF 2/2 MOVs FAIL TO OPEN (MOVs 373 6 32). 4.00E-3 0.408 1.63E-03 1.39E-08 HMODCCF862V < module >CCF OF 2 OF 3 HPSI INJECTION VALVES TO OPEN 1.4E-2 1.40E-02 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 4) CMOD409FTIN < module >VCT NOT ISOLATED FROM P-18-1B- CV-409 FAILS TO ISCLATE 1.214E-03 1.21E-03 1.04E-08 HMODCCF862V < module >CCF OF 2 OF 3 HPSI INJECTION VALVES TO OPEN 1.4E-2 1.40E-02 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04 UUUNX000 LOSS OF CONTROL AIR 1.00 1.00E+00
- 5) CMOD400FTIN < module >VCT NOT ISOLATED FROM P-10-1 A- CV-4 08 FAILS TO ISOLATE I.214E-03 1.21E-03 1.04E-08 HMODCCF862V < module >CCF OF 2 OF 3 HPSI INJECTION VALVES TO OPEN 1.4E-2 1.40E-02 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04 UUUNX000 LOSS OF CONTROL AIR 1.00 1.00E+00
- 6) CCVAU372 CHECK VALVE BA-CV-372 FAILS TO OPEN 2.00E-4 6 1.20E-03 1.02E-08 HMODCCF862V < module >CCF OF 2 OF 3 HPSI INJECTION VALVES TO OPEN 1.4E-2 1.40E-02 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 2) ALCL1 *1.}{E-05 r. f 6 -6
- 1) LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04 P.81E-06 OAPREC2M OA OPERATOR FAILS TO TRANSFER TO RECIRC. MEDIUM LOCA 1.28E-02 1.28E-02
- 2) HIPREC2M HI OPERATOR ERROR TO TRANSFER TO RECIRC. GIVEN MLOCA 3.0E-03 3.00E-03 1.83E-06 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 3) CBCNDHDL CONDITIONAL ADVERSE BSL FAILS THE SYSTEM- MEDIUM LOCA EVENT. COLD L 0.09 9.00E-02 6.59E-07 HMODCCF861V < module >CCF OF 3 OF 4 HPSI INJECTION VALVES TO OPEN 1.2E-2 1.20E-02 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 4) EMODRHMV22AIO < module >RH-MOV-22 PATH FAILS TO OPEN 8.457E-03 8.46E-03 5.16E-07 EVMPQ808 OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN RH-V-808A 1.00E-01 1.00E-01 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 5) CBCNDMDL CONDITIONAL ADVERSE BSL FAILS THE SYSTEM- MEDIUM LOCA EVENT. COLD L O.09 9.00E-02 4.94E-07 HMODCCFRECO < module >CCF OF BOTH HPSI TRAINS TO OPERATE 9.0E-3 9.00E-03 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 6) LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04 3.11E-07 EGbi VMOC871BPCAIV < module >SI-MOV-871B FAILS TO RECLOSE 5.105E-03 5.11E-03 VMVPV873 OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE SI-MOV-873 TO ISOLATE CORE DELUGE LINES 1.0E-1 1.00E-01 ^ qc
- 7) LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04 3.11E-07 VMOD071AFCAIV < module >SI-MOV-871A FAILS TO RECLOSE 5.105E-03 5.11E-03 Y*
VMVPV873
- 8) LG2 OPERATOR FAILS TO CIOSE SI-MOV-873 TO ISOLATE CORE DELUGE IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY LINES 1.0E-1 6.1E-04 1.00E-01 6.10E-04 1.95E-07
((5l i-XMODSIWLABI < module >SI AS RESET FAILS 3.192E-04 3.19E-04
- 9) ERVDQ115 RELIEF VALVE RH-RV-715 PREMATURE OPEN 1.25E-5 24 3.00E-04 1.83E-07 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 10) LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04 1.66E-07 WMVAA056 CCF COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF SW-MOV-5 AND 6 TO OPEN 4.00E-3 6.8E-2 2.72E-04
- 11) ECVAA783 CCF COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF RH-CV-783 AND RH-CV-808A TO OPEN 2.00E-4 .816 1.63E-04 9.96E-00 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FEEQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 12) EMODRHRCCFO < module >CCF OF BOTH FHR TRAINS 1.527E-04 1.53E-04 9.31E-08 5
3,32
.U6h f.3
- 71T i1 i
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MODULE / EVENT NAME DESCRIPTION RATE EXPOSURE PROB. , PROB.
LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 13) LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04 8.31E-08 VMOD871BFCAIV < module >SI-MOV-871B FAILS TO RECLOSE 5.105E-03 5.11E-03 VMODMOV873AIV < module >SI-MOV-873 FAILS TO CLOSE 2.670E-02 2.67E-02 <
- 14) LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04 8.31E-08 VMOD871AFCAIV < module >SI-MOV-871A FAILS TO RECLOSE 5.105E-03 5.11E-03 VMODMOV873AIV < module >SI-MOV-873 FAILS TO CLOSE 2.670E-02 2.67E-02
- 15) CBCNDMDL CONDITIONAL ADVERSE BSL FAILS THE SYSTEM- MEDIUM LOCA EVENT. COLD L 0.09 9.00E-02 6.94E-08 HMODPPATRFBIKO < module >HPSI PUMP TRAIN A FAILS TO OPERATE (RECIRC) 3.556E-02 3.56E-02 HMODPPBTRFAIJO < module >HPSI PUMP TRAIN B FAILS TO OPERATE (RECIRC) 3.556E-02 3.56E-02 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.lE-04 6.10E-04
- 16) EMVSQ874 RH-MOV-874 FAILS TO BE CLOSED POSITION DUE TO VALVE STEM SEPARA 1.04E-4 1 1.04E-04 6.34E-08 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 17) EMVRQ874 OPERATOR FAILS TO RESTORE RH-MOV-8 74 FOLLOWING TEM 1.00E-4 1.00E-04 6.10E-08 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 18) LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04 4.98E-08 RCVAA225 CCF COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CC-CV-225A AND B TO OPEN 2.00E-4 .408 8.16E-05
- 19) EAVSQ602 RH-FCV-602 IS OPEN DUE TO VALVE STEM SEPARATION 5.20E-5 1 5.20E-05 3.17E-08 LC2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04 i
- 20) EMODRH808AQ < module >RH-V-808A PATH FAILS TO OPEN 2.525E-03 2.52E-03 1.30E-08 EMODRHMV22AIQ < module >RH-MOV-22 PATH FAILS TO OPEN 8.457E-03 8.46E-03 LC2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 21) EVMPQ808 OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN RH-V-808A 1.00E-01 1.00E-01 1.22E-08 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04 '
XMOD4AX4BXI < module >4 AX/4BX RELAYS FAIL GIVEN SI AS RESET 2.000E-04 2.00E-04
- 22) L52 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04 1.21E-08 WM7DSNMOVSAIP < module >SW-MOV-5 FAILS TO OPEN 4.460E-03 4.46E-03 .
WMCDSWMOV6AIP < module >SW-MOV-6 FAILS TO OPEN 4.4 60E-03 4.46E-03
- 23) CMVlAVCT CCF OF 2/2 VCT TO CHG. SUCTION MOVs TO ISOL. MOVs 257 s 257B 4.00E-3 0.408 1.63E-03 1.19E-08 HMOE CCF861V < module >CCF OF 3 OF 4 HPSI INJECTION VALVES TO OPEN 1.2E-2 1.20E-02 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04 CCF 2/2 RHRS MOVs FAIL TO OPEN. (MOVs-33A s 33B) 4.00E-3
- 24) CMVAhRRR 0.408 1.63E-03 1.19E-08 HMOGCCF861V < module >CCF OF 3 OF 4 HPSI INJECTION VALVES TO OPEN 1.2E-2 1.20E-02 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 25) CBCNDMDL CONDITIONAL ADVERSE BSL FAILS THE SYSTEM- MEDIUM LOCA EVENT. COLD L 0.09 9.00E-02 1.04E-08 HMODHPIPPAKO (module >HPSI PUMP TRAIN A FAILS 5.309E-03 5.31E-03 HMODPPBTRFAIJO < module >HPSI PUMP TRAIN B FAILS TO OPERATE (RECIRC) 3.556E-02 3.56E-02 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 26) CBCNDMDL CONDITIONAL ADVERSE BSL FAILS THE SYSTEM- MEDIUM LOCA EVEN1. COLD L 0.09 9.00E-02 1.04E-08 HMODHPIPPBJO < module >HPSI PUMP TRAIN B FAILS 5.309E-03 5.31E-03 HMODPPATRFBIKO < module >HPSI PUMP TRAIN A FAILS TO OPERATE (RECIRC) 3.556E-02 3.56E-02 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 3) ALCL2 +1.99E-07 1. d C ( - 7
- 1) HMODCCF862V < module >CCF OF 2 OF 3 HPSI INJECTION VALVES TO OPEN 1.4E-2 1.40E-02 1.09E-07 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04 OAPREC2M OA OPERATOR FAILS TO TRANSFER TO RECIRC. NEDIUM LOCA 1.28E-02 1.28E-02
- 2) CBCNDMDL CONDITIONAL ADVERSE BSL FAILS THE SYSTEM- MEDIUM LOCA EVENT. COLD L 0.09 9.00E-02 3.40E-08 HMODCCFHPIO < module >CCF OF BOTH HPSI TRAINS TO START AND OPERATE 6.192E-04 6.19E-04 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
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MODULE / EVENT NAME DESCRIPTION RATE EXPOSURE PROB. , PROB.
- 3) HIPREC2M HI OPERATOR ERROR TO TRANSFER TO RECIRC. GIVEN MLOCA 3.0E-03 3.00E-03' 2.56E-08 HMODCCF862V < module >CCF OF 2 OF 3 HPSI INJECTION VALVES TO OPEN 1.4E-2 1.40E-02 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 4) HMOD61AFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861A OR CV-862A FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 1.01E-08 HMOD61BTTOV < module >SI-MOV-861B OR CV-862B FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04 OAPREC2M OA OPERATOR FAILS TO TRANSFER TO RECIRC. MEDIUM LOCA 1.20E-02 1.28E-02
- 5) HMOD61AFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861 A OR CV-862A FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 1.01E-08 HMOD61CFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861C OR CV-862C FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04 OAPREC2M OA OPERATOR FAILS TO TRANSFER TO RECIRC. MEDIUM LOCA 1.28E-02 1.28E-02
- 6) HMOD61BFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861B OR CV-862B FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 1.01E-08 HMOD61CFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861C OR CV-862C FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 i LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04 OAPREC2M OA OPERATOR FAILS TO TRANSFER TO RECIRC. MEDIUM LOCA 1.28E-02 1.20E-02
- 4) ALCM
- 1. 30 E-05 0 7# I-d
- 1) HMODCCF862V < module >CCF OF 2 OF 3 HPSI INJECTION VALVES TO OPEN 1.4E-2 1.40E-02 8:34E-06 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 2) HMOD61AFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861A OR CV-862A FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 7.91E-07 HMOD61BFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861B OR CV-8628 FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 3) HMOD61AFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861A OR CV-862A FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 7.91E-07 HMOD61CFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861C OR CV-862C FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 4) HMOD61BFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861B OR CV-862B FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 7.91E-07 l HMOD61CFTOV < module >EI-MOV-861C OR CV-862C FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 '
LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 5) HMODCCFHPIO < module >CCF GF BOTH HFSI TRAINS TO START AND OPERATE 6.192E-04 6.19E-04 3.78E-07 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA IMITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04 i
- 6) HMOD61AFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861A OR CV-862A FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 1.17E-07 HMODHPIPPAKO < module >HPSI PUMP TRAIN A FAILS 5.309E-03 5.31E-03 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04 LG2
- 7) HMOD61CFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861C OR CV-862C FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 1.17E-07 .
HMODRPIPPBJO < module >HPSI PUMP TRAIN B FAILS 5.309E-03 5.31E-03 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 8) HMOD61AFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861A OR CV-862A FAI LS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 1.17E-07 HMODHPIPPBJO < module >HPSI PUMP TRAIN B FAILS 5.309E-03 5.31E-03 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 9) HMOD61CFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861C OR CV-862C FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 1.17E-07 HMODHPIPPAKO < module >HPSI PUMP TRAIN A FAILS 5.309E-03 5.31E-03 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 10) HMOD61BFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861B OR CV-862B FAI LS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 1.17E-07 HMODHPIPPAKO < module >HPSI PUMP TRAIN A FAILS 5.309E-03 5.31E-03 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 11) HMOD61BFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861B OR CV-862B FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 1.17E-07 HMODHPIPPBJO < module >HPSI PUMP TRAIN B FAILS 5.309E-03 5.31E-03 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 12) HMOD61CFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861C OR CV-862C FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 9.00E-08 HP40015B OOS HPSI PUMP P-15-1B OUT OF SERVICE 4.10E-3 1 4.10E-03
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MODULE / EVENT NAME DESCRIPTION RATE EXPOSURE PROB. , PROB.
LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 13) HMOD61BFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861B OR CV-862B FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 9.00E-08 HP40015B OOS HPSI PUMP P-15-1B OUT OF SERVICE 4.10E-3 1 4.10E-03 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 14) HMOD61BFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861B OR CV-862B FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 9.00E-08 HP40015A 005 HPSI PUMP P-15-1A OUT OF SERVICE 4.10E-3 1 4.10E-03 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 15) HMOD61AFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861A OR CV-862A FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 9.00E-08 HP4QO15A 005 HPSI PUMP P-15-1A OUT OF SERVICE 4.10E-3 1 4.10E-03 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 16) HMOD61CFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861C OR CV-862C FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 9.00E-08 ,
HP4QO15A 005 HPSI PUMP P-15-1A OUT OF SERVICE 4.10E-3 1 4.10E-03 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 17) HMOD61AFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861A OR CV-862A FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 9.00E-08 HP4QO15B OOS HFSI PUMP P-15-1B OUT OF SERVICE 4.10E-3 1 4.10E-03 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 18) HBKBA61A SI-MOV-861 A BREAKER FAILS TO CLOSE 3.00E-4 6 1.80E-03 3.95E-08 HMOD61CFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861C OR CV-862C FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 19) HBMBA61C SI-MOV-861C BREAKER FAILS TO CLOSE 3.00E-4 6 1.80E-03 3.95E-08 '
HMOD61AFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861A OR CV-862A FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 ,
LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 20) HBKRA61B SI-MOV-861B BREAKER FAILS TO CLOSE 3.00E-4 6 1.80E-03 3.95E-08 HMOD61CFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861C OR CV-862C FAILS TO OPEh 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 21) HBKRA61A SI-MOV-861A BREAKER FAILS TO CLOSE 3.00E-4 6 1.80E-03 3.95E-08 HMOD61BFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861B OR CV-862B FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04 ,
- 22) HBKRA61C SI-MOV-861C BREAKER FAILS TO CLOSE 3.00E-4 6 1.80E-03 3.95E-08 HMOD61BFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861B OR CV-862B FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 23) HBKBA61B SI-MOV-861B BREAKER FAILS TO CLOSE 3.00E-4 6 1.80E-03 3.95E-08 !
HMOD61AFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861A OR CV-862A FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 t LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 24) HMOD61BFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861B OR CV-862B FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 3.10E-08 HMODSIASPAI < module >SIAS LOGIC FOR HPSI PUMP A FAILS 1.410E-03 1.41E-03 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 25) HMOD61CFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861C OR CV-862C FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 3.10E-08 HMODSIASPAI < module >SI AS LOGIC FOR HPSI PUMP A FAILS 1.410E-03 1.41E-03 f LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 26) HMOD61AFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861A OR CV-862A FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 3.10E-08 HMODSIASPBI < module >SIAS LOGIC FOR HPSI PUMP B FAILS 1.410E-03 1.41E-03 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 27) HMOD61CFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861C OR CV-862C FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 3.10E-08 HMODSIASPBI < module >SIAS LOGIC FOR HPSI PUMP B FAILS 1.410E-03 1.41E-03 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 28) HMOD61AFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861 A OR CV-862A FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 3.10E-08 HMODSIASPAI < module >SI AS LOGIC FOR HPSI PUMP A FAILS 1.410E-03 1.41E-03 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 29) HMOD61BFTOV < module >SI-MOV-861B OR CV-862B FAILS TO OPEN 3.6E-2 3.60E-02 3.10E-08
- ,. .. .. - -.n . . . . . - . - . ._ . . . . - - - .- . - . . . .. -
C:\CQFTA\MLOCA.RPT 7/26/95 23:24 Page 5
\CAFTA\SEQCUT\F-MLOCA. CUT CUTSET REPORT 7-26-95 11:21 Page 5 Filter: ' ALL' B.E. MOD./CS.
MODULE / EVENT NAME DESCRIPTION RATE EXPOSURE PROB. . PROB.
HMODSIASPBI < module >SIAS LOGIC FOR HPSI PUMP B FAILS 1.410E-03 1.41E-03' LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 30) HMODHPIPPAKO < module >HPSI PUMP TRAIN A FAILS 5.309E-03 5.31E-03 1.72E-08 HMODHPIPPBJO < module >HPSI PUMP TRAIN B FAILS 5.309E-03 5.31E-03 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04 '
- 31) HMODHPIPPAKO < module >HPSI PUMP TRAIN A FAILS 5.309E-03 5.31E-03 1.33E-08 HP40015B OOS HPSI PUMP P-15-1B OUT OF SERVICE 4.10E-3 1 4.10E-03 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
- 32) HMODHPIPPBJO < module >HPSI PUMP TRAIN B FAILS 5.309E-03 5.31E-03 1.33E-08 HP40015A OOS HPSI PUMP P-15-1A OUT OF SERVICE 4.10E-3 1 4.10E-03 LG2 IE MEDIUM LOCA INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 6.1E-04 6.10E-04
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C: \CRFTAir-ta* 9 ' F3T 8/16/95 8:31 Page 1 ,
\CAFTA\SEOCUT\P-AIR. CUT CUTSET REPORT 8-16-95 8:31 Page 1 }
Filter: ' ALL' !
B.E. MOD./CS. ,
MODULE / EVENT NAME DESCRIPTION RATE EXPOSURE PROB. PROB. i
- 1) SECH1 .
- 5. 0 9 E-0 8 !
- 1) CRVAV408 RANDOM FAILURE OF RV-400 TO OPEN. 1.00E-3 20 2.00E-02 3.39E-08 ;
OAPBAFRT OA OPERATOR ACTION TO INITIATE FEED AND BLEED COOLING (RT) 1.0E-2 1.00E-02 i OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 !
SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 i
- 2) CRVAV400 RANDOM FAILURE OF RV-400 TO OPEN. 1.00E-3 20 2.00E-02 1.70E-08 HIPPAFRT HI OPERATOR ACTION TO INITIATE FEED AND BLEEO COOLING (RT) 5.0E-3 5.00E-03 i OARMNSCC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 SC2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 2) SECH5 *2.15E-07
- 1) RT1 AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP 3.8E-5 3.80E-05 2.15E-07 SG2 IE TOTAL LOS3 OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 3) SLCHI *1.73E-06 i
- 1) OAPRECRT OA OPCRATOR ACTION TO TRANSFER TO RECIRCULATION (AT) 2.00E-3 2.00E-03 5.09E-07 OARXCHGM OA OPERATOR ACTION TO CONTROL CHARGING FLOW GIVEN A LOSS OF AIR 4.5E-2 4.50E-02 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 ,
- 2) HIPRECRT HI OPERATOR ACTION TO TRANSFER TO RECIPCULATION (RT) 1.0E-3 1.00E-03 2.54E-07 OARXCHGM OA OPERATOR ACTION TO CONTROL CHARGING FLOW GIVEN A LOSS OF AIR 4.5E-2 4.50E-02 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 5
- 3) EMODRHMV22AIQ < module >RH-MOV-22 PATH FAILS TO OPEN 8.457E-03 8.46E-03 2.15E-07 EVMPQ808 OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN RH-V-808A 1.00E-01 1.00E-01 !
OARXCHGM OA OPERATOR ACTION TO CONTROL CHARGING FLOW GIVEN A LOSS OF AIR 4.5E-2 4.50E-02 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 4) CARXCHGM OA OPERATOR ACTION TO CONTROL CHARGING FLOW GIVEN A LOSS OF AIR 4.5E-2 4.50E-02 1.30E-07 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 VMOD871AFCAIV < module >SI-MOV-871A FAILS TO RECDOSE 5.105E-03 5.11E-03 VMVPV873 OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE SI-MOV-873 TO ISOLATE CORE DELUGE LINES 1.0E-1 1.00E-01
- 5) OARXCHGM OA OPERATOR ACTION TO CONTROL CHARGING FLOW GIVEN A LOSS OF AIR 4 . 5 E-2 4.50E-02 1.30E-07 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 VMOD871BFCAIV < module >SI-MOV-871B FAI.LS TO RCSaSE 5.105E-03 5.11E-03 VMVPV873 OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE SI-MOV-873 TO ISOLATE CORE DELUGE LINES 1.0E-1 1.00E-01
- 6) CARXCHGM OA OPERATOR ACTION TO CONTROL CHARGING FLOW GIVEN A LOSS OF AIR 4.5E-2 4.50E-02 8.12.+^t SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 XMODSIW LABI < module >SIAS RESET FAILS 3.192E-04 3.19E-04
- 7) ERVDQ715 RELIEF VALVE RH-RV-715 PREMATURE OPEN 1.25E-5 24 3.00E-04 7.63E-08 OARXCHGM OA OPERATOR ACTION TO CONTROL CHARGING FLOW GIVEN A LOSS OF AIR 4.5E-2 4.50E-02 I SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 i
- 8) OARXCHGM OA OPERATOR ACTION TO CONTROL CHARGING FLOW GIVEN A LOSS OF AIR 4.5E-2 4.50E-02 6.92E-08 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 WMVAA056 CCF COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF SW-MOV-5 AND 6 TO OPEN 4.00E-3 6.9E-2 2.72E-04
- 9) ECVAA783 CCF COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF RH-CV-783 AND RH-CV-808A TO OPEN 2.00E-4 .816 1.63E-04 4.15E-08 OARXCHGM OA OPERATOR ACTION TO CONTROL CHARGING FLOW GIVEN A LOSS OF AIR 4.5E-2 4.50E-0?
SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 10) EMODRHRCCFQ < module >CCF OF BOTH RHR TRAINS 1.527E-04 1.53E-04 3.88E-08 i OARXCHGM OA OPERATOR ACTION TO CONTROL CHARGING FLOW GIVEN A LOSS OF AIR 4.5E-2 4.50E-02 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 11) OARXCHGM OA OPERATOR ACTION TO CONTROL CHARGING FLOW GIVEN A LOSS OF AIR 4.5E-2 4.50E-02 3.47E-00 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 i
C:\CAFTa\F-AIR.RPT 8/16/95 Q:31 Page 2
\CAFTA\SEQCUT\F-AIR. CUT CUTSET REPORT 8-16-95 8:31 Page 2 Filter: ' ALL' B.E. MOD./CS.
MODULE / EVENT NAME DESCRIPTION RATE EXPOSURE PROB. , PROB.
VMOO871AFCAIV < module >SI-MOV-871A FAILS TO RECLOSE 5.105E-03 5.11E-03 VMODMOV873AIV < module >SI-MOV-873 FAILS TO CLOSE 2.670E-02 2.67E-02
- 12) OARXCHGM OA OPERATOR ACTION TO CONTROL CHARGING FLOW GIVEN A LOSS OF AIR 4.5E-2 4.50E-02 3.47E-08 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 VMOD871BFCAIV < module >SI-MOV-871B FAILS TO RECLOSE 5.105E-03 5.11E-03 VMODMOV873AIV < module >SI-MOV-873 FAILS TO CLOSE 2.670E-02 2.67E-02
- 13) EMVSQ874 RX-MOV-874 FAILS TO BE CLOSED POSITION DUE TO VALVE STEM SEPARA 1.04E-4 1 1.04E-04 2.64E-08 OARXCHGM OA OPERATOR ACTION TO CONTROL CHARGING FLOW GIVEN A LOSS OF AIR 4.5E-2 4.50E-02 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 14) EMVRQ874 OPERATOR FAILS TO RESTORE RH-MOV-874 FOLLOWING TsM 1.00E-4 1.00E-04 2.54E-08 OARXCHGM OA OPERATOR ACTION TO CONTROL CHARGING FLOW GIVEN A LOSS OF AIR 4.5E-2 4.50E-02 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 15) CARXCHGM OA OPERATOR ACTION TO CONTROL CHARGING FLOW GIVEN A LOSS OF AIR 4.5E-2 4.50E-02 2.08E-08 RCVAA225 CCF COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CC-CV-225A AND B TO OPEN 2.00E-4 .408 8.16E-05 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 16) OARXCHGM OA OPERATOR ACTION TO CONTROL CHARGING FLOW GIVEN A LOSS OF AIR 4.5E-2 4.50E-02 1.53E-08 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 XRCHA2/2 CCF OF SI RELAY 4A AND 4B COIL TO ENERGIZE (SCREENING VALUE) 1.00E-4 6.000E-01 6.00E-05
- 17) EAVSQ602 RX-FCV-602 IS OPEN DUE TO VALVE STEM SEPATATION 5.20E-5 1 5.20E-05 1.32E-08 OARXCHGM OA OPERATOR ACTION TO CONTROL CHARGING FLOW GIVEN A LOSS OF AIR 4.5E-2 4.50E-02 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUME9T AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 18) HIRXCHGA HI OPERATOR ACTION TO CONTROL CHARGING FLOW GIVEN A LOSS OF AIR 1.5E-3 1.50E-03 1.70E-08 OAPRECRT OA OPERATOR ACTION TO TRANSFER TO RECIRCULATION (RT) 2.00E-3 2.00E-03 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 4) SLCH2 *1.02E-08
- 1) CRVAV408 RANDOM FAILURE OF Rv-400 TO OPEN. 1.00E-3 20 2.00E-02 1.02E-08 OAPRECRT OA OPERATOR ACTION TO TRANSFER TO RECIRCULATION (RT) 2.00E-3 2.00E-03 OARXCHGM OA OPERATOR ACTION TO CONTROL CHARGING FLOW GIVEN A LOSS OF AIR 4.5E-2 4.50E-02 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 5) SICH5 *3.39E-08
- 1) CRVAV408 RANDOM FAILURE OF RV-408 TO OPEN. 1.00E-3 20 2.00E-02 2.26E-08 OAPRECRT OA OPERATOR ACTION TO TRANSFER TO RECIRCULATION (RT) 2.00E-3 2.00E-03 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 UVMPPAIR OPERATOR FAILS TO ALIGN BACKUP AIR SUPPLY (SCREENING VALUE) 1.0E-01 1.00E-01
- 2) CRVAV408 RANDOM FAILURE OF RV-408 TO OPEN. 1.00E-3 20 2.00E-02 1.13E-08 HIPRECRT HI OPERATOR ACTION TO TRANSFER TO RECIRCULATION (RT) 1.0E-3 1.00E-03 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 UVMPPAIR OPERATOR FAILS TO ALIGN BACKUP AIR SUPPLY (SCREENING VALUE) 1.0E-01 1.00E-01
- 6) TECH 1 *3.90E-06
- 1) OAPBAFRT OA OPERATOR ACTION TO INITIATE FEED AND BLEED COOLING (RT) 1.0E-2 1.005-02 1.70E-06 OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DDE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 2) HIPBAFRT HI OPERATOR ACTION TO INITIATE FEED AND BLEED COOLING (RT) 5.0E-3 5.00E-03 8.48E-07 OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 3) OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 4.54E-07 PMODPRVAIRV < module > AIR SUPPLY TO THE PORVS FAILS 2.676E-03 2.68E-03
.m____ ~m_ _. ._ _- - -
C:\CAFTA\F-AIR.RPT 8/16/95 8:31 Page 3 t i- +
\CAFTA\SEOCUT\F-AIR. CUT CUTSET REPORT 8-16-95 8:31 Page 3 l Filter: ' ALL' B.E. MOD./CS. ,
MODULE / EVENT NAME DESCRIPTION RATE EXPOSURE PROB.
- PROB. I
' l t
SC2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-037
- 4) OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.COE-02 2. 9 9E-07 !
PMODPRV5681V < module >PORV 568 FAILS TO OPEN 4.201E-02 4.20E-02 I
PMODPRV5701V < module >PORV 570 FAILS TO OPEN 4.201E-02 4.20E-02 SC2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 5) HIRMNSGC HI OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW GIVEN A LOSS 3E-03 3.00E-03 1.70E-07 OAPBAFRT OA OPERATOR ACTION TO INITIATE FEED AND BLEED COOLING (RT) 1.0E-2 1.00E-02 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 6) HIPBAFRT HI OPERATOR ACTION TO INITIATE FEED AND BLEED COOLING (RT) 5.0E-3 5.00E-03 8.48E-08 HIRMNSGC HI OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW GIVEN A LOSS 3E-03 3.00E-03 l SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 i
- 7) HIRMNSGC HI OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW GIVEN A LOSS 3E-03 3.00E-03 4 . 54 E-08 PMODPRVAIRV <mocule> AIR SUPPLY TO THE PORVS FAILS 2.676E-03 2.68E-03 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 !
- 8) FMODAFWPCV CCF OF PUMPS AND DISCHARGE CHECK VALVES 6.869E-04 6.87E-04 3.88E-08 l OAPBAFRT OA OPERATOR ACTION TO INITIATE FEED AND BLEED COOLING (RT) 1.0E-2 1.00E-02 l SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITI ATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 i
- 9) OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 3.06E-08 i PMODBLV569AV < module >PR-MOV-569 FAILS 4.299E-03 4.30E-03 [
PMODPRv5681V < module >PORV 568 FAILS TO OPEN 4.201E-02 4.20E-02 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 10) OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E 3. 0 6E-0 8 i PMODBLV567AV < module >PR-MOV-567 FAILS 4.299E-03 4.30E-03 i FMODPRv5701V < module >PORV 570 FAILS TO OPEN 4.201E-02 4.20E-02 l i SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 !
- 11) HIRMNSGC HI OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW GIVEN A LOSS 3E-03 3.00E-03 2. 9 9E-08 f PMODPRV568IV < module >PORV 568 FAILS TO OPEN 4.201E-02 4.20E-02 i PMODPRV570IV < module >PORV 570 FAILS TO OPEN 4.201E-02 4.20E-02 i SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 12) CARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 2.23E-08 [
PMODCCFPRVV < module >CCF OF EITHER THE FORVS OR THE BLOCK VALVES TO OPEN 3.127E-03 3.13E-03 !
PMODPRV5681V < module >PORV 568 FAILS TO OPEN 4.201E-02 4.20E-02 :
SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 [
- 13) OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION T3 MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 2.23E-08 i PMODCCFPRVV < module >CCF OF EITHER THE PORVS OR THE BLOCK VALVES TO OPEN 3.127E-03 3.13E-03 r
, PMODPRV570IV < module >PORV 570 FAILS TO OPEN 4.201E-02 4.20E-02 l 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY ;
- 14) FMODDWSTFDFGN FLOW DIVERSION PATHS RESULTING IN LOSS OF DWST INVENTORY 3.400E-04 3.48E-04 1.97E-08 [
OAPBAFRT 1.00E-02 OA OPERATOR ACTION TO INITI ATE FEED AND BLEED COOLING (RT) 1.0E-2 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 15) FMODAFWPCV CCF OF PUMPS AND DISCHARGE CHECK VALVES 6.869E-04 6.87E-04 1. 94 E-08 HIPBAFRT HI OPERATOR ACTION TO INITIATE FEED AND BLEED COOLING (RT) 5.0E-3 5.00E-03 i SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 !
- 16) CMVBAVCT CCF OF 2/2 VCT TO CHG. SUCTION MOVs TO I3ct. MOVs 257 & 257B 4.00E-3 0.408 1.63E-03 1.16E-08 .
OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 C PMODPRV5681V < module >PORV 568 FAILS TO OPEN 4.201E-02 4.20E-02 E SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 ;
- 17) CMVAARWT CCF 2/2 MOVs FAIL TO OPEN (MOVs 373 s 32). 4.00E-3 0.408 1.63E-03 1.16E-08 OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 !
PMODPRV5681V < module >PORV 568 FAILS TO OPEN 4.201E-02 4.20E-02 [
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\CAFTA\SEQCUT\F-AIR. CUT CUTSET REPORT 8-16-95 8:31 Page 4 Filter: 'ALL' B.E. MOD./CS.
MODULE / EVENT NAME DESCRIPTION RATE EXPOSURE PROB. PROB.
, j SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03% '
- 18) CMVAARWT CCF 2/2 MOVs FAIL TO OPEN (MOVs 373 6 32). 4.00E-3 0.408 1.63E-03 1.16E-08 OARMNSGC l OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 i PMODPRV5701V < module >PORV 570 FAILS TO OPEN 4.201E-02 4.20E-02 ,
SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 L
- 19) CMVBAVCT CCF OF 2/2 VCT TO CHG. SUCTION MOVs TO ISOL. MOVs 257 & 257B 4.00E-3 0.408 1.63E-03 1.16E-08 ,
OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 PMODPRv570IV < module >PORV 570 FAILS TO OPEN 4.201E-02 4.20E-02 P SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 ;
- 20) FMODAFWPCV CCF OF PUMPS AND DISCHARGE CHECK VALVES 6.869E-04 6.87E-04 1.04E-08 PMODPRVAIRV
.{
< module > AIR SUPPLY TO THE PORVS FAILS 2.676E-03 2.68E-03 :
SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 l
- 21) OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FIDW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 1.02E-08 l SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 ?
XRCHA2/2 CCF OF SI RELAY 4A AND 4B COIL TO ENERGIZE (SCREENING VALUE) 1.00E-4 6.000E-01 6.00E-05 !
- 22) CARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 1. 00 E-08 !
PMOD63X5701 < module >63X/570 LOGIC FAILS 1.410E-03 1.41E-03 PMODPRV5681V < module >PORV 568 FAILS TO OPEN 4.201E-02 4.20E-02 SC2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 ;
- 23) CARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 1.00E-08 ;
PMOD63X568I < module >63X/568 LOGIC FAILS 1.410E-03 1.41E-03 PMODPRV5701V < module >PORV 570 FAILS TO OPEN 4.201E-02 4.20E-02 i SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 6 i
- 7) TLCH1 *1.19E-06 f
- 1) OAPRECRT OA OPERATOR ACTION TO TRANSFER TO RECIRCULATION (RT) 2.00E-3 2.00E-03 3.39E-07 OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 '
SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 2) HIPRECRT HI OPERATOR ACTION TO TRANSFER TO RECIRCULATION (RT) 1.0E-3 1.00E-03 1.70E-07 I OADMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 "
SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 3) EMODRHMV22AIQ <modulc>PR-MOV-22 PATH FAILS TO OPEN 8.457E-03 8.46E-03 1.43E-07 i EVMPQ808 OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN RH-V-808A 1.00E-01 1.00E-01 i OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 4) OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 8. 65 E-0 8 t SG2 IE TOTAL I:OSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUEECY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 VMOD871AFCAIV < module >SI-MOV-871A FAILS TO RECLOSE 5.105E-03 5.11E-03 )
VMVPV873 OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE SI-MOV-873 TO ISOLATE CORE DELUGE LINES 1.0E-1 1.00E-01 !
- 5) OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 8.65E-08 SC2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 VMOD871BFCAIV < module >SI-MOV-871B FAILS TO RECLOSE 5.105E-03 5.11E-03 VMVPV873 OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE SI-MOV-873 TO ISOLATE CORE DELUGE LINES 1.0E-1 1.00E-01 j
- 6) OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 5.41E-08 l SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 t XMODSIWLABI < module >SIAS RESET FAILS 3.192E-04 3.19E-04 i
- 7) ERVDQ715 RELIEF VALVE RH-RV-715 PREMATURE OPEN 1.25E-5 24 3.00E-04 5.09E-08 I CARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 f SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 8) OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 4.61E-08 !
_ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ - ._,._-.~m.__ _ . - ~ .__ z._-.. _ , ,_ ~ _ . _ _
. _ _ _ _ .. m C:\CAFTA\F-AIR.RPT O/16/95 8:31 Page 5 i
\CAFTA\SEOCUT\F-AIR. CUT CUTSET REPORT 8-16-95 8:31 Page 3 Filter: ' ALL' B.E. MOD./CS.
MODULE / EVENT NAME DESCRIPTION RATE EXPOSURE PROB. , PROB.
n.- ---- -----
SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E WMVAA056 CCF COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF SW-MOV-5 AND 6 TO OPEN 4.00E-3 6.8E-2 2.12E-04 ,
- 9) HIRMNSGC HI OPERATOR ACTION TO MAN'JALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW GIVEN A LOSS 3E-01 3.00E-03 3.39E-09 OAPRECRT OA OPERATOR ACTION TO TRANSFER to RECIRCULATION (RT) 2.00E-3 2.00E-03 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREOCENCT 5 iE-03 5.65E-03
- 10) ECVAA783 CCF COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF RX-CV-783 AND RH-CV-808A TO OPEN 2.00E-4 1.63E-04 2.77E-08 OARMNSCC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEE 0 WATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O s.. . 3.00E-02 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.6 ale-03 5.65E-03
- 11) EMODRHRCCFQ < module >CCF OF BOTH RHR TRAINS 1.527E-04 1.53E-04 2.59E-08 OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E "1 5.65E-03
- 12) OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E . 3.00E-02 2.31E-08 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVEN1 FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 VMOD871AFCAIV < module >SI-MOV-871 A FAILS TO RECLOSE 5.105E-03 5.11E-03 .
VMODMOV873AIV < module >SI-MOV-873 FAILS TO CLOSE 2.670E-02 2.67E-02
- 13) OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 2. 31 E -0 8 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03 VMOD871BFCAIV < module >SI-MOV-871B FAILS TO RECLOSE 5.105E-03 5.11E-03 VMODMOV873AIV < module >SI-MOV-873 FAILS TO CLOSE 2.670E-02 2.67E-02
- 14) EMVSQ874 RH-MOV-874 FAILS TO BE CLOSED POSITION DUE TO VALVE STEM SEPARA 1.04E-4 1 1.04E-04 1.76E-08 OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 15) EMVRQ874 OPERATOR FAILS TO RESTORE RH-MOV-874 FOLLOWING TsM 1.00E-4 1.00E-04 1.70E-08 OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 SG2 IE TOTAL DOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 16) HIPRECRT HI OPERATOR ACTION TO TRANSFER TO RECIRCULATION (RT) 1.0E-3 1.00E-03 1.70E-08 HIRMNSGC HI OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW GIVEN A LOSS 3E-03 3.00E-03 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 17) EMODRHMV22AIQ < module >RH-MOV-22 PATH FAILS TO OPEN 8.457E-03 8.4 6E-03 1.43E-08 EVMPQ808 OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN RH-V-808A 1.00E-01 1.00E-01 HIRMNSGC HI OPERATOR ACTION TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW GIVEN A LOSS 3E-03 3.00E-03 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
- 18) OARMNSGC OA OPERATOR ACTIUN TO MANUALLY CONTROL FEEDWATER FLOW DUE TOLOSS O 3.0E-2 3.00E-02 1.38E-08 RCVAA225 CCF COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CC-CV-225A AND B TO OPEN 2.00E-4 .408 8.16E-05 SG2 IE TOTAL LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 5.651E-03 5.65E-03
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8/10/95 9:43 Page 1
\CAFTA\SEQCUT\F-SGTR. CUT CUTSET REPORT 8-10-95 9:16 Page 1 Filter: ' ALL' B.E. MOD./CS.
MODULE / EVENT NAME DESCRIPTION RATE EXPOSURE PROB. PROB.
- 1) GETH3 . *8.36E-07
- 1) LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 8.36E-07 RT1 AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP 3.8E-5 3.80E-05
- 2) GLFH1 *3.33E-06
- 1) EMODMOV803AIV < module >RH-MOV-803 (AILS TO OPEN 3.964E-02 3.96E-02 8.37E-07 HIPRWSTI HI OPERATOR ACTION TO ALIGN MAKEUP TO THE RWST 3.0E-3 3.00E-03 LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTIC" DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01
- 2) EMODMOV781AIV < module >RH-MOV-781 F'ILS TO OPEN 2.764E-02 2.76E-02 5.84E-07 HIPRWSTI HI OPERATOR ACT'*7 TO ALIGN MAKEUP TO THE RWST 3.0E-3 3.00E-03 LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01
- 3) EMODMOV780AIV < module >RH-MOV-780 FAILS TO 07J5 3.949E-02 3.95E-02 8.34E-07 HIPRWST1 HI OPERATOR ACTION TO ALIGN MAKE!!P TO THE RWST 3.0E-3 3.00E-03 LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FAEOUFLCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESS *%:ZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01
- 4) EMODMOV804AIV < module >RH-MOV-804 FAILS 7' 9PFA 2.749E-02 2.75E-02 5.81E-07 HIPRWST1 HI OPERATOR ACTION TO ALIGN MAKEUP TO THE RWST 3.0E-3 3.00E-03 LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FCLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01
- 5) HIPRWST1 HI OPERATOR ACTION TO ALIGN MAKEUP TO THE RWST 3.0E-3 3.00E-03 1.69E-07 HIPSGLTC HI OPERATOR ACTION TO INITIATE LONG TERM COOLING 8.0E-3 8.00E-03 LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 CAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01
- 6) EMODMOV803AIV < module >RH-MOV-803 FAILS TO OPEN 3.964E-02 3.96E-02 5.58E-08 LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 OAPRWSTM OA OPERATOR ACTION TO ALIGN MAKEUP TO THE RWST 2.0E-04 2.00E-04 OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01
- 7) EMODMOV781AIV < module >RH-MOV-781 FAILS TO OPEN 2.764E-02 2.76E-02 3.89E-08 LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 OAPRWSTM OA OPERATOR ACTION TO ALIGN MAKEUP TO THE RWST 2.0E-04 2.00E-04 OAPSCDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01
- 8) HIPRWSTI HI OPERATOR ACTION TO ALIGN MAKEUP TO THE RWST 3.0E-3 3.00E-03 4.22E-08 LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 OAPRWST1 OA OPERATOR ACTION TO ALIGN MAKEUP TO THE RWST 2.0E-03 2.00E-03 OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01
- 9) EMODFCV602IQ < module >RH-FCV-602 FAILS TO OPERATE 1.940E-03 1.94E-03 4.10E-08 HIPRWST1 HI OPERATOR ACTION TO ALIGN MAKEUP TO THE RWST 3.0E-3 3.00E-03 LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01
- 10) EMODMOV804AIV < module >RH-MOV-804 FAILS TO OPEN 2.749E-02 2.75E-02 3.87E-08 LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 OAPRWSTM OA OPERATOR ACTION TO ALIGN MAKEUP TO THE RWST 2.0E-04 2.00E-04 OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01
- 11) EMOOMOv780AIV < module >RH-MOV-780 FAILS TO OPEN 3.949E-02 3.95E-02 5.56E-08 LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 OAPRWSTM OA OPERATOR ACTION TO ALIGN MAKEUP TO THE RWST 2.0E-04 2.00E-04 OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGYP 3.2E-01 3.20E-01
- 12) EMODFCV796IQ < module >RH-FCV-796 FAILS TO OPERATE 1.797E-03 1.80E-03 3.80E-08
C:\CAFTA\F-SGTR.RPT 8/10/95 9:43 Paga 2
\CAFTA\SEOCUT\r-SGTR. CUT CUTSET REPORT 8-10-95 9:16 Page 2 Filter: ' ALL' B.E. MOD./CS.
MODULE / EVENT NAME DESCRIPTION '
RATE EXPOSURE PROB. . PROB.
HIPRWSTI HI OPERATOR ACTION TO ALIGN MAKEUP TO THE RWST 3.0E-3 3.00E-03 LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01
- 13) HIPSGLTC HI OPERATOR ACTION TO INITIATE LONG TERM COOLING 8.0E-3 8.00E-03 1.13E-08 LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 OAPRWSTM OA OPERATOR ACTION TO ALIGN MAKEUP TO THE RWE' 2.0E-04 2.00E-04 OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS ELLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01
- 3) GLFH2 *l.42E-07
- 1) LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 4.22E-08 OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01 OARSGLIV OA OPERATOR ACTION TO CLOSE LOOP ISOLATION VALVES 1.0E-1 1.00E-01 XRCHA2/2 CCF OF SI RELAY 4A AND 4B COIL TO ENERGIZE (SCREENING VALUE) 1.00E-4 6.000E-01 6. 00E-05
- 2) LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 2.53E-08 OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01 OARSCLIV OA OPERATOR ACTION TO CLOSE LOOP ISOLATION VALVES 1.0E-1 1.00E-01 XPTGB2/3 CCF OF 2/3 PRESSURIZER PRESS. TRANSMITTERS TO PROVIDE OUTPUT (SCRE 5.00E-6 7.200E+00 3.60E-05
- 3) CMVBAVCT CCF OF 2/2 VCT TO CHG. SUCTION MOVs TO ISOL. MOVs 257 & 257B 4.00E-3 0.408 1.63E-03 1. 3 8 E-08 HMODCCF861V < module >CCF OF 3 OF 4 HPSI INJECTION VALVES TO OPEN 1.2E-2 1.20E-02 LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 OAPSGDEP DA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01 OARSGLIV >A OPERATOR ACTION TO CLOSE LOOP ISOLATION VALVES 1.0E-1 1.00E-01
- 4) CMVAARWT JCF 2/2 MOVs FAIL TO OPEN (MOVs 373 s 32). 4.00E-3 0.408 1.63E-03 1.38E-08 HMODCCF061V < module >CCF OF 3 OF 4 HPSI INJECTION VALVES TO OPEN 1.2E-2 1.20E-02 LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01 OARSGLIV OA OPERATOR ACTION TO CLOSE LOOP ISOLATION VALVES 1.0E-1 1.00E-01
- 5) AMODCCFDGS < module >CCF of DGS 2.540E-03 2.54E-03 1.38E-08 LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 LOSPPROB CONSEQUENTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER PROBABILITY 2.466E-04 2.47E-04
- 6) LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 1.15E-08 LMODDISLIVIV < MODULE >RCP DISCH. LOOP ISOLATION VALVE FAILS TO ISOLATE 2.731E-02 2.73E-02 OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01 XRCHA2/2 CCF OF SI RELAY 4A AND 4B COIL TO ENERGIZE (SCREENING VALUE) 1.00E-4 6.000E-01 6.00E-05
- 7) LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 1.15E-08 LMODSUCLIVIV < MODULE >RCP SUCTION LOOP ISOLATION VALVE FAILS TO ISOLATE 2.731E-02 2.73E-02 OAPSCDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01 XRCHA2/2 CCF OF SI RELAY 4A AND 4B COIL TO ENERGIZE (SCREENING VALUE) 1.00E-4 6.000E-01 6.00E-05
- 8) CCVAU372 CHECK VALVE BA-CV-372 FAILS TO OPEN 2.00E-4 6 1.20E-03 1.01E-08 HMODCCF861V < module >CCF OF 3 OF 4 HPSI INJECTION VALVES TO OPEN 1.2E-2 1.20E-02 LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01 OARSGLIV OA OPERATOR ACTION TO CLOSE LOOP ISOLATION VALVES 1.0E-1 1.00E-01
- 4) GLFH3 *3.55E-06 II HIPRWST1 HI OPERATOR ACTION TO ALIGN MAKEUP TO THE RWST 3.0E-3 3.00E-03 2.11E-06 LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 NRVBDSV1 STUCK OPEN SG SAFETY VALVE GIVEN SGTR AND SG OVERFILL .1 1.00E-01 OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01
- ~ ~ . -
- - - ~ ~ . . . - . - . . . - . - ~ _ . - . . - , - -_ - - - . ..,
C:\CAFTA\F-SGTR.RPT 8/10/95 9:43 Paqa 3
\CAFTA\SEQCUT\F-SGTR. CUT CUTSET REPORT 8-10-95 9:16 Page 3 Filter: 'ALL' B.E. MOD./CS.
MODULE / EVENT NAME DESCRIPTION RATE EXPOSURE PROB. , PROB. '
NRVBDSV1 STUCK OPEN SG SAFETY VALVE GIVEN SGTR AND SG OVERFILL .I 1.00E-01' OAPRWST1 OA OPERATOR ACTION TO ALIGN MAKEUP TO THE RWST 2.0E-03 2.00E-03 OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01
- 3) HIPRWSTI HI OPERATOR ACTION TO ALIGN MAKEUP TO THE RNST 3.0E-3 3.00E-03 1.98E-08 HIPSGDEP HI OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.0E-3 3.00E-03 LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 NRVBDSV1 STUCK OPEN SG SAFETY VALVE GIVEN SGTR AND SG OVERFILL .1 1.00E-01
LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 NRVBDSV1 STUCK OPEN SG SAFETY VALVE GIVEN SGTR AND SG OVERFILL .1 1.00E-01 OAPRWST1 '
OA OPERATOR ACTION TO ALIGN MAKEUP TO THE RWST 2.0E-03 2.00E-03 s
- 5) GLFH4 *1.05E-07 ;
- 1) LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 4.22E-08 NRVBDSV1 STUCK OPEN SG SAFETY VALVE GIVEN SGTR AND SG OVERFILL .1 1.00E-01 OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01 XRCHA2/2 CCF OF SI RELAY 4A AND 4B COIL TO ENERGIZE (SCREENING VALUE) 1.00E-4 6.000E-01 6.00E-05
- 2) LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 2. 53 E-08 NRVBDSV1 STUCK OPEN SG SAFETY VALVE GIVEN SGTR AND SG OVERFILL .1 1.00E-01 OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01
- XPTGB2/3 CCF OF 2/3 PRESSURIZER PRESS. TRANSMITTERS TO PROVIDE OUTPUT (SCRE 5.00E-6 7.200E+00 3.60E-05
- 3) CMVBAVCT CCF OF 2/2 VCT TO CHG. SUCTION MOVs TO ISOL. MOVs 257 s 257B 4.00E-3 0.408 1.63E-03 1.38E-08 !
HMODCCF861V < module >CCF OF 3 OF 4 HPSI INJECTION VALVES TO OPEN 1.2E-2 1.20E-02 :
LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 !
NRVBDSV1 STUCK OPEN SG SAFETY VALVE GIVEN SCTR AND SG OVERFILL .1 1.00E-01 OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESOURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01 i
- 4) CMVAARWT CCF 2/2 MOVs FAIL TO OPEN (MOVs 373 s 32). 4.00E-3 0.408 1.63E-03 1.38E-08 HMODCCF861V < module >CCF C7 3 OF 4 HPSI INJECTION VALVES TO OPEN 1.2E-2 1.20E-02 #
LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 [
NRVBDSV1 STUCK OPEN SG SAFETY VALVE GIVEN SGTR AND SG OVERFILL .1 1.00E-01 OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01 l
- 5) CCVAU372 CHECK VALVE BA-CV-372 FAILS TO OPEN 2.00E-4 6 1.20E-03 1.01E-08 HMODCCF861V < module >CCF OF 3 OF 4 HPSI INJECTION VALVES TO OPEN 1.2E-2 1.20E-02 r LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 ;
NRVBDSV1 STUCK OPEN SG SAFETY VALVE GIVEN SGTR AND SG OVERFILL .1 1.00E-01 i OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01 i
- 6) GLFHS *7.04E-08 #
- 1) HIPRWST1 HI OPERATOR ACTION TO ALIGN MAKEUP TO THE RWST 3.0E-3 3.00E-03 4.22E-08 HIPSGTRI HI OPERATOR ACTION TO ISOLATE THE FEED /STEAMLINES OF FAULTEDSG (SG 2.0E-3 2.00E-03 LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 ,
OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01 i
- 2) HIPSGTRI HI OPERATOR ACTION TO ISOLATE THE FEED /STEAMLINES OF FAULTEDSG (SG 2.0E-3 2.00E-03 2.82E-08 '!
LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 !
OAPRWST1 OA OPERATOR ACTION TO ALIGN MAKEUP TO THE RWST 2.0E-03 2.00E-03 I OAPSGDEP OA OPERATOR ACTION TO DEPRESSURIZE THE RCS FOLLOWING A SGTR 3.2E-01 3.20E-01 i
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MODULE / EVENT NAME DESCRIPTION RATR EXPOSURE PROB.
- PROB.
- 7) GLFL1 *3.70E-07
- 1) LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 3.08E-07 NRVBDSRV STUCK OPEN SAFETY VALVE GIVEN SGTR 1.00E-3 1 7.00E-03 OAPRWSTI OA OPERATOR ACTION TO ALIGN MAKEUP TO THE RWST 2.0E-03 2.00E-03
- 2) EMODMOV781AIV < module >RH-MOV-781 FAILS TO OPEN 2.764E-02 2.76E-02 1.2 8 E-08 HIPRWST1 HI OPERATOR ACTION TO ALIGN MAKEUP TO THE RWST 3.0E-3 3.00E-03 LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 NRVBDSRV STUCK OPEN SAFETY VALVE GIVEN SGTR 7.00E-3 1 7.00E-03
- 3) EMODMOV803AIV < module >RH-MOV-803 FAILS TO OPEN 3.964E-02 3.96E-02 1. 83E-08 HIPRWST1 HI OPERATOR ACTION TO ALIGN MAKEUP TO THE RWST 3.0E-3 3.00E-03 LG5 IE SGTR INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 2.2E-02 2.20E-02 NRVBDSRV STUCK OPEN SAFETY VALVE GIVEN SGTR 7.00E-3 1 7.00E-03