ML20134C537
| ML20134C537 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 01/27/1997 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134C536 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9702030159 | |
| Download: ML20134C537 (3) | |
Text
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[,pwo uq UNITED STATES y
j NUCLEAR REEULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 2056H001 Q4*... + p$
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 201 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-66 DV0VESNE LIGHT COMPANY OHIO EDIS0N COMPANY PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION. UNIT N0. 1 DOCKET N0. 50-334
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated September 9, 1996, as supplemented December 20, 1996, the Duquesne Light Company (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No.1 (BVPS-1) Technical Specifications (TSs). The requested changes would revise the Minimum Channels Operable requirement of Item 4.c (Steam Line Isolation, Containment Pressure Intermediate--High-High) of TS Table 3.3-3 from 3 channels to 2 channels provided the provisions of Action Statement 14 are followed. This change would make this BVPS-1 TS consistent with the comparable Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 (BVPS-2) TS. The requested changes would also revise the minimum charging pump discharge pressure in TS 3/4.5.5 and associated Bases from 2311 psig to E397 psig. The December 20, 1996, letter provided minor editorial changes that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination or expand the amendment request beyond the scope of the October 23, 1996, Federal Reaister notice.
2.0 EVALUATION Three channels of Containment Pressure Intermediate--High-High are provided to initiate steam line isolation in the event of a loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) or a steam line rupture inside containment.
The trip logic for initiating such steam line isolation requires tripping at least two of these three channels. The current TS requires all three channels be operable to ineet the TS Minimum Channel Operable requirement.
The proposed change would decrease the Minimum Channels Operable requirement from 3 channels to 2 channels provided the provisions of Action Statement 14 are followed. Action Statement 14 permits plant operation to be initiated and to continue with one of three channels inoperable provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (plant operation may also continue for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> with an inoperable channel bypassed for surveillance testing of the other channels).
Implementation of Action Statement 14 with one channel inoperable reduces the trip logic from two-out-of-three to one-out-of-two since the inoperable channel would be in the tripped condition. The proposed change would make Item 4.c of BVPS-1 TS Table 3.3-3 identical to the corresponding requirement in the BVPS-2 TS Table 3.3-3.
The proposed change 9702030159 970127 PDR ADOCK 05000334 P
1 is consistent with the requirements of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard, " Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," (IEEE 279) and with Section 7.3 of the NRC's Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800) and is, therefore, acceptable.
TS 3/4.5.5 (Seal Injection Flow) requires that the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal injection flow shall be limited to less than or equal to 28 gpm with the seal injection flow control valve full open and with the supply pressure (charging pump discharge) greater than or equal to 2311 psig.
This flow restriction is required to ensure that the amount of emergency core cooling system flow diverted from the charging pumps' flow is not excessive.
j The licensee conducted a safety system functional inspection of the BVPS-1 i
safety injection system during November 1995. During this inspection, the j
licensee determined that the specified minimum allowable supply pressure (2311 i
i psig) had been incorrectly and non-conservatively established too low. The 3
i licensee determined that the minimum value for this pressure should be 2397
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psig rather than 2311 psig. Upon discovery of this error, this licensee promptly revised the applicable Operating Surveillance Test (10ST-6.4, Issue j
4, Revision 4) on December 8, 1995. The licensee has utilized this higher j
i pressure during all subsequent tests.
The proposed license amendment would i
also make corresponding changes to the applicable TS Bases as well as making minor editorial changes.
1 The proposed changes to TS 3/4.5.5 and corresponding Bases correct an error in the specified minimum supply pressure for the' RCP and injection flow.
Therefore, the proposed changes are acceptable.
The changes to the Bases are 1
acceptable since they make the Bases consistent with the TS.
The minor
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editorial changes are purely administrative, and are, therefore, also acceptable.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Pennsylvania State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment.
The State official had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no.significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (61 FR
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55032). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
5.0 CONCLUSION
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The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such 4
i activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, i
and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
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Principal Contributor:
D. Brinkman Date: January 27, 1997 j
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