ML20134B074
| ML20134B074 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 10/30/1985 |
| From: | Jenison K, Linda Watson, Weise S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134B062 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-85-32, 50-328-85-32, NUDOCS 8511110226 | |
| Download: ML20134B074 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000327/1985032
Text
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A R E T ,,
UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
2
ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.: 50-327/85-32 and 50-328/85-32
Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority
6N11B Missionary Ridge Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
Docket Nos.: 50-327 and 50-328
License Nos.: DPR-77 and DPR-79
Facility Name:
Sequoyah linits 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted:
September 6, - October 5, 1985
Inspectors:
6 f7 . d.,, Ini,
/4/34/85
K.M.Jenison(/SeniorResidentInspector
Date Signed
C T dlnai,L,
An/D /RE
L. J. Watson, Re ident Inspector
Date Sfgned
Approved by:
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[
3v!D
S. P. Weise, Section Chief
Date Signed
Division of Reactor Projects
Sl'MMARY
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved 325 resident inspector-hours
onsite in the areas of: operational safety verification including operations
performance, system lineups, radiation protection, security and housekeeping
inspections; surveillance and maintenance observations; review of previous
inspection findings; followup of events; review of licensee identified items;
Engineered Safety Feature; and review of inspector followup items.
Results:
One violation was identified - Failure to follow procedure during a
test of the Control Room Chlorine Detection System (paragraph 10).
g1110226851030
ADOCK 05000327
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Licensee Employees
Persons Contacted
H. L. Abercrombie, Site Director
- P. R. Wallace, Plant Manager
L. M. Nobles, Operations and Engineering Superintendent
- B. M. Patterson, Maintenance Superintendent
- J. M. Anthony, Operations Group Supervisor
- D. C. Craven, Quality Assurance Supervisor
D. E. Crawley, Health Physics Supervisor
J. L. Hamilton, Quality Engineering Supervisor
- G. B. Kirk, Compliance Supervisor
D. H. Tullis, Mechanical Maintenance Group Supervisor
- R. C. Birchell, Compliance Engineer
- C. L. Wilson, Nuclear Engineer
- D. L. Cowart, Quality Surveillance Supervisor
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, shift
engineers, security force members, engineers and maintenance personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized with the Plant Manager and
members of his staff on October 7, 1985. A violation described in paragraph
10 and a second example of a previous violation described in paragraph 6
were discussed.
The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did
not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspectors during
this inspection.
During the reporting period, frequent discussions were
held with the Site Director, Plant Mannger and his assistants concerning
inspection findings.
At no time during the inspection was written material
provided to the licensee by the inspector.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)
(Closed) Violation 328/83-16-02.
The licensee's response of October 7,
1983, was reviewed and the indicated corrective actions were audited.
The
licensee conducted Mechanical Maintenance Section training on the importance
of adhering to mandatory Quality Assurance procedural hold points.
The
licensee's corrective actions are considered complete.
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(Closed) Violation 328/84-21-05.
The licensee's response of September 20,
1984, was reviewed and the indicated corrective actions were audited. The
licensee conducted training on the requirement for the independent verifi-
cation of processed hold orders.
In addition, administrative action was
taken with respect to the involved individuals.
The licensee's corrective
actions are considered complete.
(Closed) Violation 328/83-31-03.
The licensee's response of March 15,
1984, was reviewed and the indicated corrective actions were audited. The
licensee conducted training on a variety of operational subjects involved
with this violation.
Surveillance Instructions were revised to include the
methods and details of valve locking. The licensee's corrective actions are
considered complete.
(Closed) Violation 328/83-31-04.
The licensee's response of March 15,
1984, was reviewed and the indicated corrective actions were audited. The
licensee amended its maintenance procedures to require that both Assistant
Shift Engineers be required to sign prior to the removal from service of any
inverter, 6900-volt shutdown board or 480-volt shutdown board.
In addition,
this topic was included in licensed operator requalification training. The
licensee's corrective actions are considered complete.
!
(Closed) Unresolved Item 327, 328/85-26-04.
Corrective maintenance was
reviewed on containment isolation valves 2-67-580A through D.
Two of these
valves were examined by the inspector after being cut from the Essential Raw
y
Cooling Water system and disassembled.
The valves were badly corroded and
the internal flapper arm pins were out of round.
The seating surface was
worn, but there was no indication of foreign materials within the valves.
These valves were retested and determined to be operable.
The licensee
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updated their maintenance history associated with these components.
This
item is considered to be closed.
4.
Unresolved Items
No unresolved items were identified during this,it.spection.
5.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
Plant Tours
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
logs, conducted discussions with control room operators, observed shift
turnovers, and confirmed operability of instrumentation.
The
inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems,
reviewed tagout records, verified compliance with Technical
Specification (TS) Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) and verified
return to service of affected components. The inspectors verified that
maintenance work orders had been submitted as required and that
followup activities and prioritization of work was accomplished by the
licensee.
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Tours of the diesel generator, auxiliary, control, and turbine
buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions,
including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations
and plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions.
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following
safety-related systems on l' nit 1 and l' nit 2 to verify operability and
proper valve alignment:
Residual Heat Removal System (l' nits 1 and 2)
Charging Pump Flowpath (l' nits 1 and 2)
Diesel Generators (l' nits 1 and 2)
Control Room Ventilation Chlorine Detection System (Common)
b.
Security
During the course of the inspection, observations relative to protected
and vital area security were made, including access controls, boundary
integrity, search, escort, and badging.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
c.
Radiation Protection
The inspectors observed Health Physics (HP) practices and verified
implementation of radiation protection control.
On a regular basis,
radiation work pennits (RWPs) were reviewed and specific work
activities were monitored to assure the activities were being conducted
in accordance with applicable RWPs.
Selected radiation protection
instruments were verified operable and calibration frequencies were
reviewed.
On September 26, 1985, the inspector observed workers frisking out of a
regulated zone, on EL690 at the hallway laading to the hot machine
shop.
The licensee's procedure, Radiological Control Instruction,
RCI-1, Radiological Hygiene Control, requires frisking of the hands and
feet with a counter provided at the ev.it to the area. One maintenance
section worker exiting the regulated area frisked his feet, but did not
frisk his hands.
Failure to follow the radiation protection procedure
for frisking when exiting a regulated zone is a violation; however,
since the licensee was in the process of implementing corrective action
for a similar violation (327, 328/85-26-03), involving the failure to
frisk out of a contaminated zone, this incident constitutes a further
example of that violation.
Corrective action for this incident included the assignment of an HP
technician to the maintenance section to provide additional training
and assure awareness of Health Physics (HP) procedures and practices.
This training will be completed by January 3,1986.- Implementation of
these actions are intended to prevent recurrence of similar incidents.
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Current audits conducted by the licensee indicate a substantial
improvement in overall compliance with HP requirements during the past
year, and adequacy of corrective actions will be verified by TVA
through future audits.
In addition, the inspector noted that individuals were picking up the
hand held monitor without frisking the hand used to pick up the
monitor. This is a poor health physics practice and was brought to the
attention of plant management.
The inspector will continue to monitor
the frisk out process to assure proper controls are in place.
6.
Engineered Safety Features Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors verified operability of the Component Cooling Water System
(CCS) on Units 1 and 2 by performing a partial walkdown of the accessible
portions of the system.
The remainder of the walkdown on this system will
be completed in the next inspection period.
The following specifics were
reviewed and/or observed as appropriate:
a.
that the licensee's system lineup procedures matched plant drawings and
the as-built configuration;
b.
that equipment conditions were satisfactory and items that might
degrade performance were identified and evaluated;
c.
with assistance from licensee personnel, the interior of the breakers
and electrical or instrumentation cabinets- were inspected for debris,
loose material, jumpers, evidence of rodents, etc.;
d.
that instrumentation was properly valved in and functioning and
calibration dates were appropriate;
e.
that valves were in their proper positions, breaker alignment was
correct, power was available, and valves were locked as required; and
f.
local and remote instrumentation was compared, and remote instrumen-
tation was functional.
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During the tour, the inspectors identified several discrepancies:
housekeeping in several areas was marginal
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new piping segments were attached to existing fire protection- piping
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using masking tape
valve labelling and location identifier accuracy
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conduit degradation
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This was brought to the attention of the licensee. The licensee attributed
the problem to outage work activities.
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The inspector reviewed housekeeping logs kept by the licensee in accordance
with procedure SQA-66, Plant Housekeeping.
TVA management housekeeping
tours are performed approximately monthly.
Ditcrepant areas identified
during tours are rechecked to assure corrective action has been taken. The
inspectors also reviewed Operations Section Letter OSLA-99, Auxiliary l' nit
Operator (Al'0) Duties, and determined that Al'Os are required to identify
housekeeping problems.
The inspectors will review plant housekeeping and
licensee implementation of SQA-66 and OSLA-99 during the remainder of the
outage.
Followu
on this issue is an Inspector Followup Item
(327, 328/85-32-02) p
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No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Monthly Surveillance Observations (61726)
The inspectors observed TS required surveillance testing and verified that
testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; that test
instrumentation was calibrated; that Limiting Conditions for Operation were
met; that test results met acceptance criteria requirements and were
reviewed by personnel other that the individual directing the test; that
deficiencies were identified, as appropriate, and that any deficiencies
identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by
management personnel; and that system restoration was adequate.
For the
completed tests, the inspector verified that testing frequencies were met
and tests were performed by qualified individuals.
The inspector witnessed / reviewed portions of the following surveillance test
activities:
SI-688.2
Functional Test for Accident Radi nion Monitor System
IMI-99
Reactor Protection System RT 11.6 & 11.8, Response Time
Test of Delta T/Tavg Channels 2 and 4
SI-40
Centrifugal Charging Pump
SMI-0-90-1
High Dose Rate Calibration for Containment High Range
Accident Monitors
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
8.
MonthlyMaintenanceObservations(62703)
a.
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components
were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in
accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes
and standards, and in conformance with TS.
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The following items were considered during this review: LCOs were met
while components or systems were removed from service; redundant
components were operable; approvals were obtained prior to initiating
the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and
were inspected as applicable; procedures used were adequate to control
the activity; troubleshooting activities were controlled and the repair
record accurately reflected what actually took place; functiona)
testing and/or calibrations were perfomed prior to returning
components or systems to service; quality control records were
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maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts
and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were
implemented; QC hold points were established where required and were
observed; fire prevention controls were implemented; outside contractor
force activities were controlled in accordance with the approved
Quality Assurance (QA) program; and housekeeping was actively pursued.
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b.
During the l' nit I refueling outage the inspector observed portions of
steam generator maintenance and audited documentation of the work
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activities involving the cleaning of the secondary side by sludge
lancing, primary side eddy current examinations and plugging of the
Row I and other tubes for all four steam generators. - The following
procedures were reviewed / observed by the inspectors:
Radiation Work Permit:
02-1-85112
Maintenance Requests:
A549689,
A549690, A549692,
AS49528,
A549691, A533110,
A301950,
A302397, A302398,
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A302399
x
Vendor Standard:
CFS-STD-020, Steam Generator
Tube Sheet Sludge Re1 oval
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Maintenance Instructions:
MI
3.7,
Preparation
for
Performance of . and Recovery
From Steam Generator Sludge
Lancing
MI 3.1, Removal and Installa-
tion of Steam Genera' tor' Primary
Manway Cover, l' nits 1 an_d 2
MI
3'. 3 ,
Secondary Side Inspection
m3
MI 3.4, Breaching Penetration
X-54 Without Breaching the
ABSCE for Eddy Current Testing,
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Helium Leak Testing, Sludge
Lancing and Other Purposes
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MI
3.2, Method of Plugging
Steam Generator Tubes
Standard Practices:
SQA 119, l'nreviewed Safety
Question Determination (l'SQD)
SQM 001,Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
Maintenance Program
l'SQD Documentation:
l'SQD 85-0998, involving use of
a special eddy current test
probe for Row 1 tubes.
d
l'SQD
85-0999,
involving
performance of worker platform
training.
ASME Code Document:
ASME Code Section XI, 1977
amended by Summer 1978 addenda
<
The licensee began steam generator (SG) maintenance with a visual
examination of the secondary side using a fiberscope to determine the
condition of the steam generators.
Video recordings were made of the
in:;pection.
It was determined that sludge lancing was needed to remove
sediment on the secondary side at the tube sheet.
The inspector
observed sludge lancing activities, which involved a newly developed
technique.
All four SGs were sludge lanced between three to four sweeps each with
a total of approximately 1750 pounds of sludge removed. This averaged
over 400 pounds'per SG.
Fiberscopic examinations after completion
indicated that the SGs were essentially clean.
The new technique was
found to be more effective for sludge removal.
The licensee stated that the sludge removed consisted of approximately
The licensee is also replacing the main
feedwater heaters and the moisture separator reheater tube bundles
during this outage to eliminate copper from the secondary system. The
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licensee recovered two small pieces of a drill bit from one steam
generator.
No damage was attributed to this material.
The licensee
also had to recover parts of a camera that came loose during a
fiberscopic exam.
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The licensee inspected 100% of the tubes on all four SGs using eddy
current probes, with the exception of the l'-bend portion of the Row 2
tubes.
This exception was made due to the difficulty associated with
an inspection of these lf-bends and no industry wide history of failures
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in the Row 2 l'-bend area.
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.The eddy current exams identified .that four Row 1 tubes had indications
of corrosive cracking.
Although the indications were minor and could
riot be categorized as to depth, the licensee decided to plug the Row 1
tubes in all four steam generators to ensure that cracks did not
develop in these tubes. The licensee will evaluate the indications and
can later remove the Row 1 tube plugs as desired.
The licensee is
evaluating a stress relieving process which employs electric heaters to
remove induced thermal stresses as a part of the process that could
return the plugged Row 1 tubes to service. Three other tubes with
indications of less than 30% through wall were plugged. At the end of
this inspection period, the licensee was still evaluating the eddy
current data and may elect to plug additional tubes.
The licensee also utilized a new device for tube plugging developed by
Combustion Engineering.
The device was installed in the steam
. generator and manipulated remotely to install *;ube plugs.
The device
is capable of employing a magazine which can be loaded with a number of
plugs at one time reducing entries into the SG.
The device offered
reductions in the dose and time associated with SG tube plugging. The
licensee estimated that the dose - associated with the plugging
operations during this outage was reduced from approximately 200 rem to
50 rem.
c.
Replacement of the 1-A Centrifugal Charging Pump mechanical seals was
observed. The following documents were reviewed / observed in part:
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Maintenance Instruction (MI) 6.4 - Removal, Inspection and
Replacement of Centrifugal Charging Pump Seals
Surveillance Instruction (SI) 40 - Centrifugal Charging Pump
Maintenance Request A529430
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During the performance of the seal replacement, the technicians
identified that an 0-ring, issued from Power Stores, was not the size
specified by the vendor.
This appeared to be due to mispackaging of
the 0-ring by the vendor, since the shipping package and the receipt
documentation matched the material identification numbers specified by
the vendor.
A new 0-ring was requisitioned to replace the defective
one,
d.
During this outage period, preventive maintenance was conducted on both
l' nit 1 and l' nit 2 Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP).
One activity involved
an evaluation of the breakaway torque associated with each RCP motor.
Maintenance Request A529848 was used to obtain the breakaway torque for
each RCP motor and the data was evaluated against vendor's acceptance
criteria.
The inspector observed the performance of the preventive
maintenance on the l' nit 2 loop 3 RCP with no discrepancies . identified.
The licensee later identified the t' nit 1 loop 2 RCP as not meeting the
acceptance criteria and disassembled the subject pump to perform
corrective maintenance.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (92700)
The following LER's were reviewed and closed. The inspector verified that:
reporting requirements had been met; causes had been identified; corrective
actions appeared appropriate; generic applicability had been considered; the
LER forms were complete; the licensee had reviewed the event; no unreviewed
safety questions were involved; and violations of regulations or TS condi-
tions had been identified.
a.
LER Unit 1
327/82115
Inoperable Upper Containment Personnel Airlock
(Revision 1)
327/83093
Inoperable Condenser Vacuum Flow Rate Monitor
(Revision 1)
327/83100
Automatic Control Valve Declared Inoperable
327/83165
Primary Containment Internal Pressure (Revision 1)
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327/83168
1 A-A Diesel Generator (DG) Failed to Start
327/83177
2 A-A DG Failed to Trip
327/83183
Limitorque Operator Limit Switch Failed
327/83186
1 A-A DG Trip
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327/84011
Control Habitability System (Revision 1)
327/84034
No Flow Indication on 'B'
Essential Raw Cooling Water
327/84045
Inoperable Auxiliary Air Compressors (Revision 1)-
327/85003
Surveillance Interval Exceeded
327/85022
Failure to Complete Hourly Fire Watch
327/85024
Failure to Complete Hourly Fire Watch
'327/85025-
Failure to Obtain a Noble Gas Sample
327/85028
Failure to Complete Hourly Fire Watch
327/85031
Auxiliary Building Isolation
327/85033.
Main Control Room Isolation
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327/85035
Emergency Diesel Generator Start
327/85036
Failure to Complete Hourly Fire Watch
b.
LER l' nit 2
328/84004
Loss of 6900 Volt l' nit Board
328/84020
Inadvertent Safety Inje: tion (Revision 1)
10. EventFollowup(93702,62703,61726)
a.
On August 27, 1985 an engineered safety feature actuation occurred as a
result of a Train B main control room isolation signal.
The main
control room isolation occurred during the performance of Surveillance
Instruction (SI) 240, Functional Test of Control Room Air Intake
Chlorine Detection System.
Step 4.4 of SI 240 requires the technician
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to place switch HS-43-205B in the test position prior to introducing
chlorine fumes into the detection system.
The technician performing
the surveillance and the assistant observing his actions failed to
implement step 4.4 of SI 240, and as a consequence, initiated an
engineered safety feature actuation when the chlorine fumes were
introduced into the. detection system. This failure to follow procedure
constitutes a violation (327, 328/85-32-01). The technician placed the
subject switch in the test position after becoming aware of the main
control room isolation. He then continued the surveillance, initialing
Section 4.4 of Appendix B to SI 240 and reapplying the chlorine
standard to the detection system, without informing appropriate
supervisory or operations personnel.
As a result of previous Inspector Followup Item (327, 328/85-26-07),
the licensee committed to provide formal instructions to employees on
actions to be taken when the employee fails to follow procedures. The
licensee issued a maintenance notice entitled, Your Responsibilities
in Following Instructions,
to all maintenance employees on or about
July 22, 1985.
Based on inspector review, a majority of the mainte-
nance technicians appear to have received the notice.
The technician
that was involved in the above failure to follow procedure was tem-
porarily assigned to the TVA training center during the period that
the notice was issued and therefore was not . fully aware of its
contents.
Inspector Followup Item 327, 328/85-26-07 will-remain open
pending further NRC assessment.-
b.
On' September 27, 1985, a Combustion Engineering employee abraded his
plastic ~ gloves and scraped his hand on the SG tube sheet while per-
forming steam generator tube plugging activities.
The individual
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was removed from the area for decontamination.
Initial contamination
was approximately 1,000 cpm. The licensee decontaminated the hand to a
level of 400 cpm.
At the advice of an offsite physician, the licensee
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decided to take the individual to the hospital for further treatment.
The licensee declared an l'nusual Event in accordance with IP-1,
Emergency Plan Classification Logic, and IP-2, Notification of l'nusual
Event, in anticipation of transporting a contaminated person to an
offsite medical facility.
The individual, however, refused to be
transported offsite and continued decontamination efforts.
He
successfully reduced the contamination to below acceptable limits, and
the t'nusual Event was terminated.
Reports of the incident were made to
the NRC and the State of Tennessee, as required.
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Inspector Followup Items (92701)
Based on inspection activities in the affected functional areas the
.following items were determined to require no additional specific followup
and are closed.
328/84-21-04
328/84-31-05
328/84-31-06
327/84-11-03
327/83-23-04