ML20133P887
| ML20133P887 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 08/05/1985 |
| From: | Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Georgia Power Co, Oglethorpe Power Corp, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, City of Dalton, GA |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133P891 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-2.K.3.28, TASK-TM, TAC 56047, TAC 56048, TAC 56097, DPR-57-A-111, NPF-05-A-050 NUDOCS 8508140519 | |
| Download: ML20133P887 (11) | |
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UNITED STATES
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GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA DOCKET NO. 50-321 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.lll License No. OPP-57 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Georgia Power Company, et al.,
(the licensee) dated September 5, 1984, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with 'the Comission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 is hereby amended to read as follows:
8508140519 850005 PDR ADOCK 05000321 P
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Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and 8, as revised through Amendment No.lll, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REG LATORY COMMISSION 7-~-
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John F. Stolz, Chief /
Operating Reactors Branch #4
'Dfvision of Licensing
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
August 5,1985
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMEN 0 MENT NO.111 l
l FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-57 1
DOCKET NO. 50-321 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change.
Remove Insert 3.5-9 3.5-9 3.5-18 3.5-18 l
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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILIANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.F Automatic Depressurization Syste 4.5.F Automatic Depressurization Syste (ADS)
(ADS) 1.
Normal Syste Availability 1.
Normal Operational Tests
%e seven valves of the Autmatic a.
A simulated autmatic actuation Depressurization Syste shall be test shall be performed'on the operable:
ADS prior to startup after each refueling outage. Surveillance a.
Prior to reactor startup fr a a of all relief valves is covered cold shutdown, or in Specification 4.6.H.
b.
When there is irradiated fuel in b.
A leak rate test of each ADS the reactor vessel and the valve accumulator, check valve, reactor is above 113 psig except and actuator assembly shall be as stated in Specification performed during each refueling 3.5. F. 2.
outage at a pressure of 90+18 psig. %e leakage rate shall be verified to be64.5 SCFE.
2.
Operation with Inoperable 2.
Surveillance with Ineperable cmponents cmponents If one of the seven ADS valves is Wh m it is determined that one of known to be incapable of autm atic the seven ADS valves is incapable of operation, the reactor may renain in autmatic operation, the HPCI system operation for a period not to exceed and the actuation logic of the other seven (7) days, provided the HPCI ADS valves shall be deonstrated to syste is operable.
(Note that the be operable innediately and daily pressure relief function of these thereafter until all seven ADS valves is assured by Specification valves are capable of autm atic 3.6.H; Specification 3.5.F only operation.
applies to the ADS function).
3.
Shutdown Rerluirenents If Specification 3.5.F.1 or 3.5.F.2 cannot be met, an orderly shutdown will be initiated and the reactor pressure shall be radiced to 113 psig or less within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
f' A.iandment No.111 3.5-9
3.5.F.1 Normal System Availability (continued)
Specification 3.6 states the requirements for the pressure relief function of the valves.
It is possible for any neber of the valves assigned to the ADS to be incapable of perfoming their ADS functions because of instrmentation failures yet be fully capable of performing their pressure relief function.
Because the aut m atic depressurization system does not provide makeup to the reactor primary vessel, no credit is taken for the steam cooling of the core caused by the system actuation to provide further conservatim to the Core Standby Cooling Systems.
We ADS valve accmulators are sized such that, following loss of the pnematic supply, at least two valve actuations will be possible with the crywell at 70% of its design pressure, h is drywell pressure results fra the largest break which could lead to the need for rapic depressurization through the ADS valves.
The allowable acetrnulator leakage criterion ensures the above capability for 30 minutes following loss of the pnematic supply.
- 2. Operation with Inoperable C m ponents With one ADS valve known to be incapable of autmatic operation six valves renain operable to perfono their ADS function.
However, since the trCS Irss of Coolant Accident analysis for mall line breaks asstaned that all seven ADS valves were operable, reactor operation with one ADS valve inoperable is only allowed to continue for seven (7) days provided that the HPCI system is demonstrated to be operable and that the actuation logic for the (renaining) six ADS valves is demonstrated to be operable.
- 3. Minimtrn Core and contaiment cooling Systems Availability
%e purpose of this Specification is to assure that adequate core cooling equipnent is available at all times.
If, for exanple, one core spray loop were out of service and the diesel which powered the opposite core spray were out of service, only 2 RHR pumps would be available.
Specification 3.9 must also be consulted to determine other requirenents for the diesel generators.
In addition, refer to definition 1.0.00 for Cisnulative Downtime reluirenents.
%is specification establishes conditions for the performance of major maintenance, such as draining of the suppression pool. % e availability of the shutdown cooling subsysten of the RHR systen and the RHR service water system ensure adequate supplies of reactor cooling and emergerry makeup water when the reactor is in the Cold Shutdown condition.
In addition this specification provides that, should major maintenance be performed, no work will be performed which could lead to draining the water fr a the reactor vessel.
Amendment No, 111 3.5-18 m
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UNITED STATES g
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GEOPGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA DOCKET NO. 50-366 ED, WIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 50 License No. NPF-5 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found thet:
A.
The application for amendment by Georgia Power Company, et al.,
(the licensee) dated September 5, 1984, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 is hereby amended to read as follows:
l
c-Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised th>ough Amendment No. 50, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment. is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.
FOR THE NVCLEAR REGUL TORY COMMISSION
[
t John;Y. Stolz, Chief
/
Operating Reactors Brarch #4 Division of Licensing
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: August 5,1985 a
t ATTACRMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 50 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-5 L
DOCKET NO. 50-366 I
Peplace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with l
the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change. The corresponding l
i overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.
t Remove Insert 3/4 5-3 3/4 5-3 B 3/4 5-2 8 3/4 5-2 i
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- O DGRGENCY 00fC COOLING SYS71MS 3/4.5.2 AtrItNATIC DEPIUSSURIZATION SYSTEM LIMITING OCNDITICN FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 the Autmatic Depressurization Systa (ADS) shall be OPERABLE with.at l
least seven OPERABE A06 valves.
APPLICABILITY:
CONDITIONS 1,
2 and 3 with reactor vessel stem dme Fressure >150 psig.
ACTION:
s.
With one of the above required ADS valves inoperable, POWER l
OPERATION may continue provideJ the }GCI, CSS and LPCI systems are OPERAB2: restore the inoperable AD6 valve to OPERABE status within 14 days or te in at least IM SHL7IDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and recuce reactor vessel steen dme pressure to n 150 psig within the follwing 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, b.
With two or more of the above required ADS valves inoperable, be in at least }M SHtnDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and reduce reactor stem dme pressure to 6150 pig within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
c.
With the Surveillance Requirement of Specification 4.5.2.b not parfomed at the required interval due to low roector stem pressure, the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable l
providea the appropriate surveillance is perfomed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after reactor stem pressure is adequate to perfom the tests.
l SURVEIUANCE MUJIFFfNTS 1
4.5.2 The ADS.shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by a.
Perfoming a system functional test which includes simulated autmatic actuation of the syste throughout its emergency l
operating saluence, tut excluding actual va've actuation.
b.
Manually opwiing each Ars valve when the reactor stem dme pressure is 2 100 peig and observing that either 1
1.
We control valve or bypass valve position responds accordingly, or 2.
%ere it a corresponding change in the racesured stem flow.
c.
Perfoming a leek rate test of each ADS valve accoulator, che*
valve, and actuator assably at a pressure of 90+18 pig.
De
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i leakage rate shall be verified to be 54.5 SCMI.
l HA101 - UNIT 2 3/4 5-3 Amendment No, 50
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l 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM l
BASES f
l 3/4.5.1 HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM The high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system is provided to assure that the reactor core is adequately cooled to limit fuel clad temperature in the event of a small break in the nuclear system and loss of coolant which does not result in rapid depressurization of the reactor vessel.
The HPCI system permits the reactor to be shut down while maintaining sufficient reactor vessel water level inventory until the vessel is depressurized. The HPCI system continues to operate until reactor vessel pressure is below the pressure at which LPCI system operation or core spray system operation maintains core cooling.
The caoacity of the system is selected to provide this required core cooling. The HPCI pump is designed to pump 4250 gpm at reactor pressures between 1135 and 165 psig. Initially, water from the condensate storage tank is used instead of injecting water from the suppression pool into the reactor, but no credit is taken in the hazards analysis for tne condensate storage tank water.
With the HPCI system inoperable, adequate core cooling is assured by OPERABILITY of the redundant and diversified automatic depressurization tystem and the low pressure cooling systems.
In addition, the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, a system for which no credit is l
taken in the hazards analysis, will automatically provide makeup at reactor operating pressures on a reactor low water level condition. The out-of-service period of 14 days is based on the demonstrated OPERABILITY of redundant and diversified low pressure core cooling systems.
j The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the
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HPCI system will be OPERABLE when required. Although all active components i
are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump i
discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hamer damage and to l
provide cooling at the earliest moment.
j i
I 3/4.5.2 AUT0AATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM j
Upon failure of the HPCI system to function properly after a small i
break loss-of coolant accident, the automatic depressurization system l
(ADS) automatics 11y causes selected safety-reitef valves to open, depres-l surizing the reactor so that flow from the low pressure cooling systems can enter the core in time to limit fuel cladding temperature to less than 2200*F. AD.i is conservatively required to be OPERABLE whenever
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reactor vessel pressure exceeds 150 psig even though low pressure cooling systems provide adequate core cooling up to 350 psig.
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HATCH UNIT 2 8 3/4 5-1 l
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DERGENCY CORE COOLING SYS'ITMS BASES AtmNATIC DEPPISSURIZATION SYS'IIM (Continued)
AD6 autmatically controls seven selected safety-relief valves although the hasards analysis only takes credit for six valves.
It is therefore appropriate to permit one valve to be out-of-service for 14 days without materially reducing systa reliability.
%e AD6 valve accmulators are sized such that, following loss of the pnematic supply, at least two valve actuations will be possible with the drywell at 70% oi its design pressure.
This drywell pressure results frm the largest break which could lead to the need for rapid depressurization through the ADS valves. %e a11mable accmulator leakage criterien ensures the above capability for 30 minutes following loss of the piematic su; ply.
3 /4.5. 3 Im FFIESUPI (DRE CDOLING SYSTD'.S 3 /4. 5. 3.1 CCPI SFPAY SYS'I1N 2e core spray system (CSS) is provided to assure that the core is adequately cooled following a loss-of-coolant accident.
'Ivo subsystmo provide adequate core cooling capacity for all break sizes frm 0.2 f td up to and including the double-ended reactor recirculation line break, and for maller breaks follwing depressurization by the ADS.
%e CSS specifications are applicable during all CPERATIOlaL CODITIOt;S because the CSS is a primary source of emergency core cooling after the reactor vessel is depressurized anc to provide a source for flooding of the core in case of accidental draining.
When in CQDITION 1, 2 or 3 with one CSS subsyste inoperable, the OFDABILITY of the redundant full capacity CSS subsysten and the full capacity low pressure coolant injection mode of the RHR systen proviacs assurance of adequate core cooling and justifies the specified 7 day out-of-service rlod.
When in CC:CITION 4 or 5 with neither CS; subsystem OPERAStI, prohibition of all operations which have a potential for draining the reactor vessel minimizes the probability of mergency core cooling being required. De required OPDABILITY of both IJCI subsystems or, in CONDITION 5 only, requiring the reactor vessel to be flooded with the fuel pool gates reoved, provides assurance of adequate core flooding and the restrictions on operations are not applicable.
We surveillance requirments provide adequate assurance that the CSS will be OPDAB12 when required. Although all active caponents are testable and full flow can be deonstrated by recirculation during reactor operation, a coplete functional test reluires reactor shutdown.
We pep discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hamer datage to piping and to start cooling at the earliest mment.
HATQf - 12:IT 2 b 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 50